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THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 
AFTER FOUR DECADES: 
CONDITIONALITY AND THE SHRINKING MARGIN 
OF PREFERENCE 
Kevin C. Kennedy* 
The legal cornerstone of special and differential treatment in favor of 
developing countries is the Generalized System of Preferences. Since 
1971—the year in which the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was 
first authorized under GATT auspices—GSP has become a fixture in the 
trade policies of developed countries. The GSP marked its 40th anniversary 
in 2011, an appropriate occasion to ask whether or not GSP remains 
relevant. This article examines two sets of questions. First, are the 
conditions that are an intrinsic part of the U.S. and EU GSP programs 
WTO-legal? Do the preconditions and conditions to being designated as a 
GSP beneficiary under both the U.S. and EU trade preference programs 
bear a rational relationship to the overarching goal of economic 
development within beneficiary countries? Besides examining the 
conditionality that is an inherent feature of the U.S. and EU GSP programs, 
the second overarching question that this article addresses is whether GSP 
remains economically relevant or whether instead the shrinking margin of 
preference between the most-favored-nation (MFN) duty rate and the 
preferential duty rate has reduced the efficacy of national GSP programs to 
the vanishing point.   
Assuming that these programs remain economically relevant, do the 
conditions and limitations that are an integral part of them suffer from a 
lack of coherency? Is it time to overhaul trade and development policy, at 
least with respect to GSP programs? The author’s answers to the first set of 
questions on the legality of conditionality is a qualified “no” and to the 
second set of questions on whether the GSP remains economically relevant 
is a qualified “yes.” The author recommends reforming the GSP program 
and moving beyond the GSP as a key piece of preference-granting 
countries’ trade and development policy for developing countries. His 
prescription is fourfold: (1) integrate and expand the four U.S. trade 
preference programs, (2) revisit and substantially revise conditionality, (3) 
  
 * Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. This manuscript 
will be published in volume 20 of the Michigan State International Law Review. Grateful 
acknowledgment is extended to the participants at the February 2011 symposium sponsored 
by the Michigan State International Law Review for their many helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this article. Special thanks to Lu Wang, MSU Law Class of 2012, for his 
invaluable research assistance. All errors are solely those of the author who may be contacted 
at kenne111@law.msu.edu.  
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harmonize preferential rules of origin at the international level, and (4) 
provide better focused and coordinated aid for trade. 
 
 
Differential treatment should not be looked upon as immutable. If it were, 
the results of the efforts made through national and international policies to 
promote development would amount to little. 
Olivier Long, former Director-General of GATT (1985) 
 
 
Le mieux est l’ennemi du bien. (The best is the enemy of the good.) 
Voltaire, La Bégueule (1772) 
 
 
The best time to plant a tree is twenty years ago. The next best time is now. 
African proverb 
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INTRODUCTION  
The intellectual keystone of the multilateral trade system is that 
economic development is best achieved through non-discriminatory trade 
patterns, the progressive reduction of tariffs, and the elimination of nontariff 
barriers that impede trade flows.1 Still, the principle of non-discrimination at 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) is far from dogma.  The two most 
significant exceptions to the non-discrimination principle that honor the 
most-favored- nation (MFN) obligation in the breach are (1) the hundreds of 
regional trade arrangements that have proliferated over the past two decades 
and that continue to increase,2 and (2) the numerous provisions found in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the WTO 
multilateral trade agreements (MTAs) that extend preferential treatment  to 
developing countries (“special and differential treatment” in WTO 
parlance).3  
The legal cornerstone of special and differential treatment in favor of 
developing countries is the Generalized System of Preferences. Since 
1971—the year in which the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was 
first authorized under GATT auspices—GSP has become a fixture in the 
trade policies of developed countries.4 The GSP marked its 40th anniversary 
in 2011, an appropriate occasion to ask whether or not GSP remains 
relevant. In a 2008 report the Congressional Research Service gave the 
following less than sanguine appraisal: 
Scholarly studies have . . . come to conflicting conclusions of the impact 
of the GSP program on international trade flows. Depending on the 
methodology used and the assumptions made, the studies have estimated 
  
 1. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. I:1 (unconditional, most-
favored nation obligation), II (tariff bindings), III (the national treatment obligation), and 
XI:1 (the prohibition on quotas and other border measures affecting imported and exported 
goods), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194., arts. I:1 (unconditional, most-favored 
nation obligation), II (tariff bindings), III (the national treatment obligation), and XI:1 (the 
prohibition on quotas and other border measures affecting imported and exported goods). See 
generally JUAN C. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES AND THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 51-84 (2002). 
 2. As of May 2011, 210 regional trade agreements (RTAs) were in force and had 
been notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO), with approximately an additional 40 
either in negotiation or signed and awaiting approval. See Regional Trade Agreements 
Information System, WTO, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (last 
visited May 31, 2011). There is some double counting, however, because the WTO credits as 
two notifications an RTA that covers both goods and services (one for goods and one for 
services), even though a single legal instrument establishes the legal regime for both under 
the RTA. 
 3. See infra notes 44-70 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the pre-WTO 
years of special and differential treatment, see generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (Trade Policy Research Ctr. ed., 1987). 
 4. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text. 
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the trade effect for GSP-eligible products as ranging from being negligible 
to increasing by over 60%. For example, a 2006 study of EU trade 
preference programs estimated that the EU GSP program “does not 
significantly increase exports” for beneficiary countries. Most of the 
studies calculated a less than 20% increase in GSP-eligible product 
exports.5 
In a 2006 report the Congressional Research Service noted studies from 
the 1970s and 1980s which concluded that GSP has had a stimulative effect 
on developing countries’ exports.6 That same report observed, however, that 
GSP benefits are limited by several features of the U.S. program. In 2005, 
for example, less than 10 percent of U.S. imports from GSP beneficiary 
countries took advantage of GSP duty-free treatment. The majority of 
products that were GSP eligible were excluded, most often because they 
either exceeded the competitive need limit for a specific product or because 
they did not satisfy the GSP rule of origin.7 Exacerbating the situation is that 
any given preference-granting countries’ list of GSP-eligible products can 
change over time and not all donor countries make the same products GSP-
eligible.8 In other words, donor countries do not coordinate their respective 
GSP programs with other donor countries.  
Presenting a detailed description of all national GSP schemes is not only 
beyond the scope of this work, but it also would duplicate the fine work of 
others on the subject.9 At least as importantly, national GSP schemes 
present somewhat of a moving target in that national legislatures from time 
to time revise and amend their GSP schemes, thus rendering an analytical 
description of such schemes often out of date by the time such an analysis is 
published.10  Indeed, special and differential treatment with regard to tariff 
  
 5. MICHAE F. MARTIN & VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34702, 
POTENTIAL TRADE EFFECTS OF ADDING VIETNAM TO THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF 
PREFERENCES PROGRAM 11 (2008) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Maria Persson & Fredrik 
Wilhelmsson, Assessing the Effects of EU Trade Preferences for Developing Countries 16 
(Lund Univ. Dep’t of Economics Working Papers, Paper No. 2006:4, 2006)). 
 6. See WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-389, GENERALIZED SYSTEM 
OF PREFERENCES 4 (2006). 
 7. See id. For an explanation of competitive need limits, see infra notes 74, 138, 
156, 207, 275, 286 and accompanying text. 
 8. See COOPER, supra note 6, at 4. 
 9. The highlights of a handful of national GSP schemes are noted below. See infra 
notes 71-83 and accompanying text. 
 10. To cite two examples, Congress conducts a periodic renewal ritual for three of 
the four U.S. trade preference programs for developing countries, having most recently done 
so at the end of 2008 and again at the end of 2010. Congress created a new trade preference 
program in 2000 (the African Growth and Opportunity Act) and amended two others (the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act and the Andean Trade Preference Act). In 2008, 
the European Union (EU) overhauled its GSP scheme in response to the WTO Appellate 
Body’s report striking down the EU’s earlier GSP scheme, which the Appellate Body found 
to be inconsistent with the Enabling Clause. See infra notes 215-227 and accompanying text. 
With the growing popularity of e-government, not only in the United States but globally, 
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preferences has become both multilayered and multifaceted. First, 
developing countries receive differential tariff treatment inter se under the 
various trade preference schemes of the EU and the United States, that is, 
more favorable tariff treatment is extended to certain beneficiary developing 
countries compared to other developing countries.11  In other words, a 
second layer of discrimination exists within the already discriminatory tariff 
treatment in favor of developing countries in general that is authorized 
under the Generalized System of Preferences and its successor legal 
instrument, the Enabling Clause.12 Second, least-developed countries 
(LDCs) receive additional preferential tariff treatment on top of that 
extended to non-LDC developing countries in general pursuant to a 1999 
WTO waiver, thus creating a third layer of special and differential tariff 
treatment by developed countries in favor of developing countries.13  
Consequently, rather than attempt an in-depth survey of all national GSP 
programs, this article’s specific focus is instead on the nonreciprocal, 
unilateral trade preference programs for developing countries that the 
United States and the EU have established.  
In a carrot-and-stick approach to trade and development policy for 
developing countries, both the U.S. and EU preferential tariff programs are 
riddled with limitations and conditions intended both to deter and to reward 
certain conduct. Most conditions are intended to discourage developing 
countries from engaging in certain practices at the risk of not being 
designated GSP eligible. Other conditions are designed to encourage 
countries to assume and effectively implement additional legal obligations 
in exchange for extended GSP eligibility for products that are otherwise 
ineligible for preferential duty treatment.14 Following the WTO Appellate 
  
most GSP donor countries have built websites where they post practical information 
regarding their respective GSP schemes that is up-to-date and of assistance to practitioners 
and beneficiaries alike. 
 11. See infra notes 122-139, 215-227, and accompanying text. 
 12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, (Nov. 28, 1979), 
GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203-05 (1980). 
 13. A ten-year waiver of the most-favored-nation obligation of GATT Article I:1 was 
granted in favor of the least-developed countries (LDCs) in 1999 with regard to tariffs on 
their imported goods. See Decision on Waiver, Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-
Developed Countries, WT/L/304 (June 17, 1999). The 1999 waiver was extended for an 
additional ten years in May 2009. See Decision on Extension of Waiver, Preferential Tariff 
Treatment for Least-Developed Countries, WT/L/759 (May 29, 2009). 
 14. See generally Diego J. Linan Nogueras & Luis M. Hinojosa Martinez, Human 
Rights Conditionality in the External Trade of the European Union: Legal and Legitimacy 
Problems, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 307, 309 (2001); Amy M. Mason, The Degeneralization of 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): Questioning the Legitimacy of the U.S. GSP, 
54 DUKE L.J. 513, 524-25 (2004) (“All GSP schemes condition preferences to some degree 
in the form of either “‘positive’ or ‘negative’ conditionality. Positive conditionality is the 
practice of granting additional concessions to developing countries that fulfill prescribed 
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Body’s 2004 report in EC—Tariff Preferences,15 donor countries may 
lawfully impose conditions on beneficiary countries in order for the latter to 
qualify for GSP benefits above and beyond those generally granted to GSP-
eligible beneficiaries, provided such conditions have a nexus with the trade, 
financial, and development needs of the beneficiary countries.16 As will be 
explored more fully below, the Appellate Body was characteristically 
Delphic regarding the conditions that a preference-granting country may 
permissibly impose in the first instance to become GSP eligible. The panel 
report in EC—Tariff Preferences discusses “a priori limitations” that donor 
countries may permissibly establish as part of their GSP programs, citing 
limitations on product eligibility and safeguards actions to shield domestic 
producers in the country of importation from injurious GSP imports.17 Once 
these two threshold questions are answered, what other permissible a priori 
limitations may a donor country impose that are consistent with the 
Enabling Clause? Import ceilings and whether or not a country is a 
“developing” country might be two additional “a priori limitations.” What 
about other conditions? The Appellate Body limited itself to ruling on the 
WTO-consistency of what could be termed “positive conditionality,”18 i.e., 
in exchange for satisfying additional conditions, a beneficiary receives 
additional GSP benefits beyond those made generally available to other 
GSP-eligible countries. What is the difference, if any, between a 
“condition” and an “a priori limitation”? Is the difference merely a semantic 
one? These are questions that the Appellate Body left unanswered.19 
While the EU vigorously defended its GSP program in the EC—Tariff 
Preferences dispute in the face of India’s claim that it violated the terms of 
the Enabling Clause, the United States has pursued a different legal course. 
Rather than argue that its three trade preference programs that single out 
blocs of countries for preferential tariff treatment are consistent with the 
Enabling Clause—the countries of the Caribbean Basin region under the 
  
criteria; positive conditionality affects preferences offered to countries that are already GSP 
beneficiaries.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 15. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of 
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (2004) [hereinafter EC—
Tariff Preferences]. For a critique of the Appellate Body’s report, see Mason, supra note 14; 
Maureen Irish, GSP Tariffs and Conditionality: A Comment on EC–Preferences, 41 J. 
WORLD TRADE 683 (2007). 
 16. EC—Tariff Preferences, supra note 15, ¶ 147. 
 17. Panel Report, European Communities — Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R, at 125-26 (Dec. 1, 2003).  
 18. See generally Lorand Bartels, The WTO Enabling Clause and Positive 
Conditionality in the European Community’s GSP Program, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507 (2003); 
Mason, supra note 14, at 531. 
 19. The Appellate Body also did not address GSP graduation criteria, noting that it 
was not ruling on the legitimacy of “the EC’s mechanisms for the graduation of developing 
countries.” EC—Tariff Preferences, supra note 15, paras. 128-29.  
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Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA),20 the four Andean 
countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru under the Andean Trade 
Preference Act (ATPA),21 and the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa under 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)22—the United States has 
instead obtained waivers at the WTO for each of these regional tariff 
preference programs.23 However, the United States has not sought a waiver 
for the U.S. GSP program, but rather only for its three GSP sister programs.  
This article examines two sets of questions. First, are the conditions that 
are an intrinsic part of the U.S. and EU GSP programs WTO-legal? Are 
they rationally related to the goal of promoting trade and economic 
development within beneficiary countries? At the outset, this article does 
not accept the legitimacy of conditionality when such conditions have as 
their focus non-trade concerns. The premise that conditions have the 
potential to be an effective tool in causing positive change by influencing 
beneficiary country domestic policies is not adopted as being a priori 
valid.24  At least this is the case for the conditions that the United States and 
  
 20. See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2707 (1983). For the current list of CBERA-eligible countries, see Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), General Note 7(a), Products of Countries 
Designated as Beneficiary Countries for Purposes of the Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, http://hts.usitc.gov (last visited June 5, 2011).  
 21. See Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (1991). 
Bolivia was removed from ATPA and ATPDEA eligibility in 2008. As of 2011 its eligibility 
status had not been restored. See HTSUS, supra note 20, General Note 11, Products of 
Countries Designated as Beneficiary Countries for Purposes of the Andean Trade Preference 
Act.  
 22. See African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 19 U.S.C. § 2466, §§ 3701-
3706, §2466, §§3721-3724, §§3731-3741 (2000).  The 48 countries that are eligible for 
designation as a beneficiary country under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, and  Zimbabwe. As of 2011, 37 of the 48 potential beneficiary countries 
were designated as AGOA-eligible. For the current list of AGOA-eligible countries, see 
HTSUS, supra note 20, General Note 16(a), Products of Countries Designated as 
Beneficiary Countries for Purposes of the African Growth and Opportunity Act.   
 23. In 2009 the WTO General Council granted the U.S. request for extensions of the 
waivers previously granted for CBERA and the ATPA, and for the first time granted a 
waiver for AGOA. The extensions of the waivers granted for CBERA and the ATPA expire 
at the end of 2014. The waiver granted for AGOA expires September 30, 2015, which 
coincides with the congressional sunset date for the program. See Decision of the General 
Council, United States—African Growth and Opportunity Act, WT/L/754 (May 29, 2009); 
Decision of the General Council, United States—Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 
WT/L/753 (May 29, 2009); Decision of the General Council, United States—Andean Trade 
Preference Act, WT/L/755 (May 29, 2009). 
 24. GSP conditionality is not without its staunch critics. See, e.g., FRANK J. GARCIA, 
TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE 156-68 (Raj 
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the EU have established in their respective GSP schemes.25 They are both 
overbroad and under inclusive, assuming that trade and development 
concerns are the litmus test of the validity of GSP conditionality. For 
example, linking the benefits to non-trade issues, such as environmental and 
labor standards, as well as intellectual property rights and the fight against 
illicit drugs, curtail the benefits under the scheme and introduce elements of 
discrimination and reciprocity into the GSP scheme.26 Such conditions cut 
against the fundamental principles of the GSP. Developing countries have 
complained that withdrawal, or the threat of withdrawal, of preferences is 
used as leverage to obtain non-trade objectives.27  As beneficiary countries 
cannot count on availability of preferences, the consequent uncertainty of 
market access is a major concern to the countries affected. Turning to 
political considerations, what does a developing countries’ political status as 
a Communist country have to do with its trade and development concerns? 
Instead, why aren’t developing countries that are battling an AIDS epidemic 
or that are the chronic victims of natural disasters singled out for special 
GSP treatment in either the U.S. or EU GSP scheme?28 Why aren’t anti-
corruption campaigns one of the conditions of national GSP programs? Just 
  
Bhala et al. eds., 2003) (concluding that egalitarian fairness principles, such as Rawls’s 
“justice as fairness,” oblige developed countries to provide unconditional and nonexclusive 
trade preferences to developing countries); Çaglar Özden & Eric Reinhardt, The Perversity of 
Preferences: GSP and Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976-2000 21 (World Bank 
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2955, 2003) available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2955.html (noting that the “political process leading to 
GSP decisions” prevents developing countries from building their export sectors for fear that 
preferences will be removed), http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2955.html; Frank J. 
Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing World, 21 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 975, 1033 (2000) (contending that it is morally unjustifiable for developed countries 
to terminate GSP preferences for political reasons); Robert Howse, India’s WTO Challenge 
to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the European Community Generalized System of 
Preferences: A Little Known Case with Major Repercussions for “Political” Conditionality 
in US Trade Policy, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 385, 395 (2003) (noting “persistent concern by 
developing countries about conditionality and selectivity in GSP schemes”); Peter 
Lichtenbaum, “Special Treatment”  vs. “Equal Participation”: Striking a Balance in the 
Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1003, 1015-16 (2002) (highlighting the 
detrimental effects of conditionality in the U.S. GSP). 
 25. Initially, the U.S. GSP program was a “no strings attached” scheme.  The 
program was non-contractual and autonomous, with the United States reserving the right to 
withdraw or modify benefits at any time.  However, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 
expanded the number of criteria which beneficiaries had to meet, so that the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) was able to use these provisions as a non-reciprocal tool. As noted 
below, the main conditions relate to protection of intellectual property, the respect of labor 
rights, and the resolution of investment disputes. See infra notes 162-171 and accompanying 
text. See also WTO Secretariat, The Generalised System of Preferences: A Preliminary 
Analysis of the GSP Schemes in the Quad 13, WT/COMTD/W/93 (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter 
Note by the Secretariat]. 
 26. See Note by the Secretariat, supra note 25, at 13. 
 27. See id. at 5. 
 28. See Howse, supra note 24, at 400. 
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who are the intended beneficiaries of the GSP programs? The overarching 
focus of some of the U.S. and EU GSP conditions appears to be more on the 
welfare of U.S. and EU nationals than it is on the economic welfare of 
persons living in the developing world. 
As a policy matter, conditionality is not unique to developed countries’ 
international trade and finance programs. On the contrary, conditionality has 
become a well-recognized fixture that has acquired a decades-long patina of 
legitimacy within intergovernmental organizations. Take, for example, 
conditionality at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World 
Bank).29 The overarching purpose of the IMF is to stabilize the international 
monetary system,30 but IMF conditionality is one of the most notorious 
examples of conditionality in the arena of international finance.31  
Conditionality is viewed as indispensable to ensure that IMF financing goes 
hand-in-hand with appropriate policy action by the country receiving that 
financing. According to the IMF, “The key purpose of conditionality is to 
ensure that Fund resources are used to assist a member in solving its balance 
of payments problem, thus providing adequate safeguards for the temporary 
use of these resources, and to provide assurances to the member of access to 
Fund resources.”32 Pledges to combat official corruption may be among the 
conditions that the IMF imposes.33 While requiring steps to combat 
corruption may be more insulting than it is controversial, other IMF 
conditions may be highly contentious, such as austerity programs to 
eliminate or pare back domestic food subsidies or the privatization of key 
  
 29. For a defense of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
conditionality, see JOHN W. HEAD, LOSING THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT WAR: A 
CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUE OF THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND THE WTO 218-25 (2008). 
 30. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. I, Dec. 27, 
1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 40 (current version at 15 I.L.M. 546, 547, Apr. 30, 
1976). 
 31. See generally Int’l Monetary Fund, Guidelines on Conditionality, Decision No. 
12864-(02/102) (Sep. 25, 2002), www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302. 
pdf. The IMF maintains a web-based factsheet on conditionality at www.imf.org/ 
external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm.  
 32. IMF, Review of the 2002 Guidelines on Conditionality, ¶ 9 (March 3, 2005), 
www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/030305.pdf. 
 33. See also David Fuhr & Zachary Klughaupt. The IMF and AGOA: A Comparative 
Analysis of Conditionality, 14 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 125, 128-129 (2004), where the 
authors support the imposition of anti-corruption conditions by the IMF because 
“[c]orruption . . . wastes the resources of borrower countries, thereby endangering their fiscal 
position and decreasing their ability to repay their external debts.  The IMF is required to 
conserve its resources responsibly, and therefore can only extend funding to countries that 
are reasonably likely to service their loans. When a substantial portion of revenue is wasted 
on graft, it becomes more difficult for a government to fulfill all of its domestic obligations 
while simultaneously keeping the deficit under control. In addition, when corruption is 
uncontrolled, government officials will steal money that had been destined for development, 
thus hampering a country’s growth and reducing the future revenue available to service its 
loans.” [Footnote omitted.] 
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public services. Such conditions—often grouped under the rubric of 
“structural adjustment”—may trigger a strong political backlash within the 
recipient country.34  
The other major international financial institution, the World Bank, 
likewise imposes conditions on its loans and development assistance.35 
Broadly speaking, the World Bank makes its resources available if the 
borrower “(a) maintains an adequate macroeconomic framework, (b) 
implements its overall program in a manner satisfactory to the Bank, and (c) 
complies with the policy and institutional actions that are deemed critical 
for the implementation and expected results of the supported program.”36 
Despite the criticism that has been directed at the IMF and World Bank for 
their conditions on finance and development assistance, in favor of IMF and 
World Bank conditionality—in contrast to U.S. and EU GSP 
conditionality—is that the IMF and World Bank conditions have a clear 
finance and development nexus.37 
  
 34. See Guidelines on Conditionality, supra note 31, at 2 (“Conditions will normally 
consist of macroeconomic variables and structural measures that are within the Fund’s core 
areas of responsibility. Variables and measures that are outside the Fund’s core areas of 
responsibility may also be established as conditions but may require more detailed 
explanation of their critical importance. The Fund’s core areas of responsibility in this 
context comprise: macroeconomic stabilization; monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policies, 
including the underlying institutional arrangements and closely related structural measures; 
and financial system issues related to the functioning of both domestic and international 
financial markets.”). 
 35. See generally Review of World Bank Conditionality, WORLD BANK, (Sep 9, 
2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1114615847489/ 
ConditionalityFinalDCpaperDC9-9-05.pdf; EMMANUEL TUMUSIIME-MUTEBILE ET AL., 
CONDITIONALITY REVISITED: CONCEPTS, EXPERIENCES, AND LESSONS (Stefan Koeberle, 
Harold Bedoya, Peter Silarsky, & Gero Verheyen eds. 2005); Axel Dreher, The Development 
and Implementation of IMF and World Bank Conditionality (Hamburg Inst. of Int’l Econ., 
Discussion Paper No. 165, 2002), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/ 
bitstream/26352/1/dp020165.pdf. 
 36. Review of World Bank Conditionality, supra note 35, at 4. See also World Bank, 
Review of World Bank Conditionality, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20292723~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSiteP
K:40941,00.html (last visited June 13, 2011).  
 37. Another type of conditionality is associated with official development assistance 
(ODA) that is conditioned in a specific way. For example, many donor countries tie foreign 
aid to the purchase of goods and services that are produced in the donor country, although 
this practice has drastically decreased globally during the 15-year period 1990-2005. See 
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT  REPORT 2005, at 102 (2005), 
available at  http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2005 (last visited June 15, 2011) 
[hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT  REPORT]. The 2005 United Nations Human Development 
Report estimated that only about 8 percent of bilateral aid is tied, down from 27 percent in 
1990. However, the degree to which strings are attached to bilateral aid varies from country 
to country with the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Norway giving 100 percent of their ODA 
untied; Canada, Austria, and Spain giving less than 60 percent of their ODA untied; and the 
United States giving less than 20 percent its ODA untied. Id. 
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Besides examining the conditionality that is an inherent feature of the 
U.S. and EU GSP programs, the second overarching question that this 
article addresses is whether GSP remains economically relevant or whether 
instead the shrinking margin of preference between the most-favored-nation 
(MFN) duty rate and the preferential duty rate has reduced the efficacy of 
national GSP programs to the vanishing point.  Pre-Uruguay Round 
assessments of the GSP program were mixed.  In a 1983 OECD report on 
the first ten years of the GSP, the GSP was seen as playing an important 
role in opening developed countries’ markets and expanding developing 
countries’ trade.38 Other assessments were less sanguine, concluding that 
GSP benefits had not been distributed evenly among the beneficiary 
developing countries.39  A 1986 study estimated that 44 percent of total GSP 
benefits went to three countries: Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea (each 
received three times the benefits of the next largest beneficiary, Brazil).40 
The entire program of differential and more favorable treatment of 
developing countries received a thorough reexamination in the Uruguay 
Round.  Although GSP was not abandoned, developed countries applied 
greater pressure on many newly industrialized countries to assume more 
WTO obligations. A similar scenario is being played out in the Doha Round 
negotiations, with the United States and the EU pressuring the BRIC nations 
of Brazil, Russia (currently engaged in the WTO accession process), India, 
and China to make deeper tariff cuts on imported industrial goods.  
Although the country names have changed, the phenomenon of GSP 
benefits being distributed in a top heavy fashion persists under the U.S. GSP 
program.  In fact, this phenomenon is observed in all of the Quad countries, 
with China being the prohibitive top GSP beneficiary in the EU, Japan,41 
and Canada. (China has not been designated as a beneficiary under the U.S. 
GSP program.) Under the EU GSP scheme, 60 percent of the benefits 
accrue to five countries, in the United States the top five beneficiaries 
  
 38. See VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33663, GENERALIZED SYSTEM 
OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE 2-3 (2008). 
 39. See, e.g., Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Principle of Preferential Treatment in the Law 
of GATT: Toward Achieving the Objective of an Equitable World Trading System, 18 CAL. 
W. INT’L L.J. 291 (1987-88); Nina J. Lahoud, The “Non-Discriminatory” United States 
Generalized System of Preferences: De Facto Discrimination Against the Least Developing 
Countries, 23 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1982). 
 40. See Brian Hindley, Different and More Favorable Treatment—And Graduation, 
in WORLD BANK, THE URUGUAY ROUND HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 69 (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987). 
 41. See Norio Komuro, Japan’s Generalized System of Preferences, in TRADE 
PREFERENCE EROSION: MEASUREMENT AND POLICY RESPONSE 113 (B. Hoekman, W. Martin 
& C.A. Primo Braga eds. 2009) (where the author notes that for the period 2000-2005 
Japan’s imports from China accounted for nearly 60 percent of all imports receiving GSP 
treatment, with five ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam) accounting for roughly 30 percent of the balance) [hereinafter Japan’s Generalized 
System of Preferences]. 
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account for almost 75 percent of the value of preferences, and in Japan the 
top five beneficiary countries are responsible for nearly 90 percent of the 
preferences.42 In the case of LDCs, under the Japanese and the U.S. 
programs for LDCs, the top 10 beneficiaries—out of a pool of 48 potential 
beneficiaries—account for 100 percent of the benefits, and in the EU that 
same number account for more than 90 percent of the benefits.43 
Two methods have been adopted to address the uneven distribution of 
GSP benefits: (1) graduate a beneficiary country entirely from a GSP 
program, or (2) remove a product from GSP eligibility when a beneficiary 
country achieves a certain level of global competitiveness in that product. 
As is explored more fully below, neither option has worked. 
Has the GSP run its course as a matter of economics? It has been 40 
years since the GATT Contracting Parties initially authorized preferential 
tariff treatment of imported goods from developing countries. Over that 
forty-year period MFN tariff rates in the EU and the United States have 
plummeted. The gap between the MFN duty rate applicable to non-
preferential trade and the rate applicable to preferential trade under the GSP 
has substantially narrowed, except in the case of a few sectors of strong 
export interest to developing countries, namely, textiles, clothing, footwear 
and leather goods, and agricultural products. Has the shrinking margin of 
preference—the difference between the MFN duty rate and lower duty rate 
accorded to GSP-eligible imports—rendered donor countries’ GSP 
programs economically irrelevant? Assuming that these programs are still 
economically relevant, do the conditions and limitations that are an integral 
part of them suffer from a lack of coherency? Do the preconditions and 
conditions to being designated as a GSP beneficiary under both the U.S. and 
EU trade preference programs bear a rational relationship to the overarching 
goal of economic development within beneficiary countries? Is it time to 
overhaul trade and development policy, at least with respect to GSP 
programs? My answer to the first set of questions on the legality of 
conditionality is a qualified “no” and to the second set of questions on 
whether the GSP remains economically relevant is a qualified “yes.” As 
developed more fully in Part V, I recommend reforming the GSP program 
and moving beyond the GSP as a key piece of preference-granting 
countries’ trade and development policy for developing countries. My 
prescription is fourfold: (1) integrate and expand the four U.S. trade 
preference programs, (2) revisit and substantially revise conditionality, (3) 
harmonize preferential rules of origin at the international level, and (4) 
provide better focused and coordinated aid for trade. 
  
 42. See Paul Brenton & Ça lar Özden, Trade Preferences for Apparel and the Role 
of Rules of Origin: The Case of Africa, in TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION, supra note 41, at 
416-17. 
 43. See id. at 417. 
2012] The Generalized System of Preferences after Four Decades 533 
 
Before examining these questions and proposals in greater detail, the 
next Part provides a brief history of special and differential treatment in the 
multilateral trading system. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF S&D TREATMENT AT GATT AND THE WTO 
During the initial negotiations in 1947 to establish international rules on 
the conduct of global trade in goods, the view was ultimately accepted that 
the principle of equality of treatment among countries is inappropriate when 
countries are not economic equals.44  Within the multilateral trading system, 
the concept of special and differential (S&D) treatment found its way into 
the permanent legal structure of GATT. In a nutshell, the rules requiring 
MFN treatment of imported goods regardless of origin were altered in the 
early years of the multilateral trading system in the case of imports from 
developing countries.45 
Over the history of GATT, but prior to the establishment of the WTO in 
1994, developing countries showed little enthusiasm for participating in 
GATT-sponsored multilateral trade negotiation (MTN) rounds because of 
their perception of GATT as an economic club of rich countries dominated 
by what was eventually to become known as the “Quad Members” or 
  
 44. For summaries of the treatment of developing countries under the rules of the 
WTO’s predecessor organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), see 
VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL 33663, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: 
BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE 4-7 (2008); WTO, HIGH LEVEL SYMPOSIUM ON TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT, BACKGROUND DOCUMENT (1999); HUDEC, supra note 3; DIANA TUSSIE, 
THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A CHALLENGE TO THE 
GATT (1987); ABDULQAWI YUSUF, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE PREFERENCES FOR 
DEVELOPING STATES: A STUDY IN THE INFLUENCE OF DEVELOPMENT NEEDS ON THE 
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1982); F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE EMERGING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT: A NEW DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW (1990); WORLD BANK, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (Will 
Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF 
GATT §25.1-25.7 (1969); KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 376-85 (1970); Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the 
International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 347 (1994); Note, Developing Countries and 
Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and the Promise of Development, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1715 (1995); Robert E. Hudec, GATT and the Developing Countries, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
67 (1992). 
 45. The concept of special and differential treatment of developing countries met 
with resistance from the United States. In the negotiations leading up to the Havana Charter 
(the organic document of the stillborn International Trade Organization), the United States 
proposed that developing countries join the ITO on terms equal to those of all other 
countries, regardless of their stage of economic development. See DAM, supra note 44, at 
225; JACKSON, supra note 44, at 628-40. The principle of equality of treatment was totally 
unacceptable to the developing countries. Consequently, Articles 8 through 15 of the Havana 
Charter were drafted to take into account the concerns of developing countries with respect 
to economic development and reconstruction.  These Articles covered access to capital and 
other financing arrangements, international investment, preferential arrangements among 
developing countries, and commodity agreements.  
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“Quad” of Canada, the EU, Japan, and the United States. The Quad was not 
forthcoming in meeting the demands of developing countries to lower their 
tariffs and other trade barriers to goods of export interest to developing 
countries. The concept of “free trade” was a hollow promise to developing 
countries which for them seemed like a one-way street.  A major failure of 
the MTN rounds prior to the 1986-1993 Uruguay Round, at least from a 
developing-country perspective, was a lack of progress in liberalizing trade 
in two sectors of export interest to developing countries, namely, textiles 
and agriculture. 
Regardless of the merits of the economic argument for and against 
special and differential treatment of developing countries in the multilateral 
trading system, the fact is that they do receive such treatment.  The view 
that developing countries should receive S&D treatment has found concrete 
expression in several GATT articles and in many of the WTO MTAs.  
Briefly, special and differential treatment is reflected in two amendments to 
GATT;46 in the 1971 GATT waiver for GSP, codified in the 1979 Tokyo 
  
 46. In a prelude to the 1958 Haberler Report and the addition of Part IV to GATT 
1947 (mentioned below), the Contracting Parties took steps in 1955 to assist developing 
countries in integrating into the world trading system by substantially redrafting Article 
XVIII, Governmental Assistance to Economic Development.  The current text of Article 
XVIII, which took effect in 1957, is derived from two 1955 GATT Working Party reports, 
the Report of the Review Working Party on Quantitative Restrictions, GATT B.I.S.D. (3rd 
Supp.) at 170 (1955), and the Report of the Review Working Party on Schedules and 
Customs Administration. See Report of the Review Working Party, Schedules and Customs 
Administration, GATT B.I.S.D. (3rd Supp.) at 205 (1955). With the stillbirth of the ITO and 
the Havana Charter, it fell to GATT Article XVIII to accommodate the demands of 
developing countries for S&D treatment within the GATT legal and institutional framework. 
Article XVIII, as substantially amended in 1955, gives developing countries that meet the 
criteria of having a low standard of living and of being in the early stages of development 
virtual carte blanche to adopt trade protectionist measures in the name of economic 
development.  
  Part IV of GATT, added in 1965, expands on Article XVIII. In 1957, the GATT 
Contracting Parties appointed a panel of experts to report on trends in international trade, “in 
particular the failure of the trade of less developed countries to develop as rapidly as that of 
industrialized countries, excessive short-term fluctuations in prices of primary products, and 
widespread resort to agricultural protection.” GATT B.I.S.D. (6th Supp.) at 18 (1957). The 
Report, Trends in International Trade (also known as the “Haberler Report” after Gottfried 
Haberler, the panel’s chairman), galvanized the Contracting Parties to examine ways in 
which developing countries could achieve greater access for their exports in world markets. 
See WTO, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, vol. 2, at 1040-41 
(1995). The end product of the 1958 Haberler Report was Part IV of GATT, Trade and 
Development, which was added to GATT 1947 by the Protocol Amending the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and Development, done at 
Geneva, Feb. 8, 1965, 572 U.N.T.S. 320, GATT B.I.S.D. (13th Supp.) at 1 (1965). Although 
Part IV is an integral part of a binding legal instrument, i.e., GATT 1994, it is drafted in 
language that is hortatory, not mandatory. In other words, developed countries apparently 
made few, if any, binding legal commitments to developing countries in Part IV. Part IV is 
comprised of three Articles, Articles XXXVI through XXXVIII. In brief, Article XXXVI is a 
statement of principles and objectives whose thrust is greater market access for the products 
of developing countries.  Article XXXVII states the commitments the Members agree to 
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Round Enabling Clause (discussed more fully below);47 in a small handful 
of Decisions reached during the Uruguay Round;48 and in several articles in 
the WTO MTAs.49 In addition, the MTAs in a number of instances accord 
special treatment that is reserved exclusively for LDCs.50 
The 1955 amendment to GATT Article XVIII and the addition of Part IV 
to GATT in 1966 did not alter the fact that GATT still required 
nondiscriminatory MFN treatment in trade between and among GATT 
contracting parties.  With the exception of validating historical preferences 
in existence at the time GATT entered into effect or when a country acceded 
to GATT,51 any preferential tariff treatment that a developed country 
extended to a developing country had to be generalized and accorded to all 
other GATT contracting parties.52  With the amendments to GATT Article 
XVIII, the addition of Part IV to GATT, and the work of United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on behalf of developing 
  
make to ensure developing countries do in fact attain increased access to world markets.  
Article XXXVIII provides for joint action by the WTO Members.  
 47. Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, ¶ 1, L/4903 (Nov. 18, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th 
Supp.) at 203 (1979) [hereinafter Enabling Clause]. 
 48. For a survey and analysis of the S&D provisions in GATT and the WTO MTAs, 
see RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW 406-39 (1998); Kevin Kennedy, 
Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries, in THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1526 (Patrick F.J. Macrory, 
Arthur E. Appleton & Michael G.Plummer eds. 2005); Peter Lichtenbaum, “Special 
Treatment” vs. “Equal Participation:” Striking a Balance in the Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. 
U.  INT’L L. REV. 1003, 1007-21 (2002). 
 49. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 48, at 431-39. 
 50. See id. at  431-43.  
 51. GATT Art. I:2; Annexes A-F. A number of countries’ protocols of accession to 
the General Agreement that were not original GATT contracting parties include preferences 
between the acceding country and other countries listed in the protocol of accession.  For 
example, when Argentina joined GATT, it included preferences in existence at the time of its 
accession with several border countries in South America.  For a list of such protocols of 
accession, see GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 46, vol. 1, at 48-49. 
 52. To be sure, in exceptional circumstances, a Member may be granted a waiver of 
its GATT obligations pursuant to GATT Article XXV, para. 5, but such waivers may be 
granted only in “exceptional circumstances,” and must be approved by a three-fourths 
absolute majority of WTO Members. What constitutes “exceptional circumstances” 
warranting an Article XXV, para. 5 waiver has been the subject of some controversy within 
GATT. There is no generally accepted definition or standard criteria to identify what 
circumstances are deemed “exceptional.” See, e.g., Report of the GATT Working Party, 
United States-Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 180 
(1980).  In that Report, the Working Party recognized that there are a number of different 
approaches within the GATT framework to the establishment of preferential schemes and 
that each case must be analyzed on the basis of all the circumstances peculiar to it. “Having 
considered these alternative approaches,” the Working Party noted, “a number of the 
members of the Working Party concluded that the waiver procedure under paragraph 5 of 
Article XXV was the most appropriate alternative with respect to the CBERA.”  Id. at 198, ¶ 
62.  For an analysis of the art. XXV, para. 5 waiver procedure, see GUIDE TO GATT LAW 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 46, vol. 2, at 882-88. 
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countries, momentum was building for more changes within the multilateral 
trading system to assist developing countries in their economic 
development.  The notion of unilaterally extending tariff preferences to 
developing countries was gaining ground. Developing countries argued that 
GATT Part IV was itself authorization to developed countries to grant tariff 
preferences to developing-country imports that would otherwise derogate 
from the MFN clause, but developed countries disagreed.53  What was 
needed was some legal device by which developed countries could give 
preferential tariff treatment to developing countries without simultaneously 
violating the MFN commitment. To that end the Generalized System of 
Preferences was born. 
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was launched by 
UNCTAD at its inaugural conference in 1964.54 The GSP’s raison d’etre 
was threefold: (1) developing countries would increase their exports to 
developed countries; (2) they would  export higher value-added goods, 
thereby reducing their dependency on commodities as their main source of 
exports; and (3)  GSP would reduce dependence on foreign aid.55  In 
  
 53. See EDMOND MCGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION § 9.222 (1996).  
 54. See  PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [hereinafter UNCTAD], General 
Principle Eight & Annex A.III.5, vol. 1 in PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, at 10-11, 39 (1964); DAM, supra note 44, at 249. 
 55. See Kennedy, supra note 48, at 1539. In its 2008 report the Congressional 
Research Service offers the following version of GSP’s purposes: 
 
The GSP was established based on an economic theory that 
preferential tariff rates in developed country markets could promote 
export-driven industry growth in developing countries. It was 
believed that this, in turn, would help to free beneficiaries from 
heavy dependence on trade in primary products, whose slow long-
term growth and price instability contributed to chronic trade 
deficits. It was thought that only the larger markets of industrialized 
trading partners were large enough to provide enough economic 
stimulus to attain these goals. 
Some economists also mention that the Generalized System of 
Preferences was established, in part, as a means of reconciling two 
widely divergent economic perspectives of trade equity that arose 
during early negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). Industrialized, developed nations argued that the 
most-favored-nation principle should be the fundamental principle 
governing multilateral trade, while lesser-developed countries 
believed that equal treatment of unequal trading partners did not 
constitute equity and called for “special and differential treatment” 
for developing countries. GSP schemes thus became one of the 
means of offering a form of special treatment that developing nations 
sought while allaying the fears of developed countries that tariff 
“disarmament” might create serious disruptions in their domestic 
markets. 
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reaction to the perceived intransigence of the developed countries to move 
on liberalizing trade in textiles, clothing, footwear, and agriculture, 
developing countries pursued a two-track approach at the international 
level, one within GATT and the other within UNCTAD.  Within GATT, 
developing countries pressed for special and differential treatment in 
connection with tariffs, subsidies, and import quotas. The track pursued by 
developing countries outside of GATT was initiated in the 1960s under the 
auspices of UNCTAD.56  Established in 1964, UNCTAD as supposed to 
serve as a counterweight to GATT. 57 UNCTAD’s first Secretary-General, 
Raúl Prebisch, advocated an overhaul of the world trading system in order 
to level the uneven playing field which favored developed countries.58 The 
reforms that UNCTAD championed included commodity price stabilization 
schemes,59 import substitution policies in order to promote domestic 
  
JONES, supra note 38, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). 
 56. For a background discussion of UNCTAD in the context of GATT, see DAM, 
supra note 44, at 376-85. See also UNCTAD, THE HISTORY OF UNCTAD 1964-1984 (1985); 
BRANISLAV GOSOVIC, UNCTAD: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE (1972).  As a United Nations 
organ, membership in UNCTAD includes all UN members, as well as Monaco and Vatican 
City. 
 57. See OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL 
TRADE SYSTEM 90 (1985). 
 58. UNCTAD, TOWARDS A NEW TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc.  
(E/CONF.46/1964).  
 59. For an overview of international commodity agreements, see generally KABIR-
UR-UAHMAN KAHN, THE LAW AND ORGANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY 
AGREEMENTS (1982). UNCTAD’s influence in the world trading system has been dwarfed by 
the WTO. UNCTAD maintains oversight responsibility for several international commodity 
agreements, including the International Cocoa Agreement, the International Coffee 
Agreement, the International Sugar Agreement, the International Wheat Agreement, the 
International Tropical Timber Agreement, the International Jute Agreement, the International 
Rubber Agreement, the International Cotton Agreement, the International Grains Agreement, 
the International Olive Oil Agreement, the International Sugar Agreement, and the 
International Tropical Timber Agreement. UNCTAD’s Work with the International 
Commodity Bodies (ICBs), UNCTAD.ORG, http://www.unctad.org/templates/ 
WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=5391&lang=1 (June 21-25, 2010). Perhaps most importantly, 
UNCTAD provides a forum for advancing the economic development of LDCs, having held 
three decennial conferences that focus on this subject. In May 2001, UNCTAD held its Third 
United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Belgium. Under the 
program of action, participants commit to good governance, to building human and 
institutional capacities, to enhancing the role of trade in economic development, and to 
mobilizing financial resources. See UNCTAD, Draft Program of Action for the Least-
Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010, A/CONF.191/L.18 (2001).  In May 2011, 
the Fourth United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries initiated the new 
Istanbul Programme of Action, which gives particular priority to science, technology and 
innovation as an important additional element. See Statement at the Fourth United Nations 
Conference on Least Developed Countries, UNCTAD (May 13, 2011), 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/ldc_dir/docs//aldc2011_12_stat_final_en.pdf. 
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manufacturing, and improved global market access for developing-country 
goods.60  
At UNCTAD’s First Session in 1964, developed countries, including the 
United States, opposed developing-country initiatives in support of such 
preferences.61 By UNCTAD’s Second Session in 1968 (UNCTAD II), 
however, developed countries, including the United States, came to support 
the general principle of a system of trade preferences, although they could 
not reach agreement on the details.62 With the support of the United States 
and other developed countries, at UNCTAD’s second quadrennial 
conference held in 1968 the GSP concept was formally adopted. The 
UNCTAD II participants adopted what was called “Resolution 21(II),” a 
document recognizing “unanimous agreement in favour of the early 
establishment of a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-
reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences which would be beneficial to 
the developing countries.”63 Resolution 21(II) also established a Special 
Committee on Preferences to work out the details of this proposed system.64  
In 1970 the Special Committee adopted the following “Agreed 
Conclusions” that put some flesh on the bare bones of Resolution 21(II): (1) 
all developing countries should participate as beneficiaries from the outset, 
with beneficiary status determined according to the principle of self-
selection; (2) a priori limitations on the quantity of goods that could be 
imported through the GSP are permitted; and (3) the tariff preferences will 
be temporary,  nonbinding, and subject to obtaining the necessary GATT 
  
 60. See Thomas R. Graham, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for 
Developing Countries: International Innovation and the Art of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 513, 514-15 (1978) (describing the first proposal for such preferences from Raúl Prebisch, 
Secretary General of UNCTAD). 
 61. See Kelé Onyejekwe, International Law of Trade Preferences: Emanations from 
the European Union and the United States, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 425, 448 (1994) (describing 
developed-country opposition to the developing world’s arguments for the establishment of 
preferential tariffs); Graham, supra note 60, at 516 (highlighting the United States’ role in 
this opposition). 
 62. See Onyejekwe, supra note 61, at 449. Two factors prompted the United States to 
support the concept of the GSP: (1) it was facing increasing pressure from Latin American 
countries to implement a preferential system similar to that of the Europeans; and (2) it “saw 
in the GSP an opportunity to halt the trend towards cartelization of world trade through 
exclusive preferential arrangements.” Graham, supra note 60, at 516-17. 
 63. See Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on Its 
Second Session, U.N. TDBOR, 2d Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 11, at 38, U.N. Doc. 
TD/97/Annexes (1968) [hereinafter Resolution 21(II)], reprinted in Panel Report, European 
Communities — Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 
WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003).  
 64. See Resolution 21(II), supra note 63, at 2. For an overview of the content of the 
initial submissions, see generally R. Krishnamurti, Tariff Preferences in Favour of 
Developing Countries, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 447 (1970). 
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waiver.65 UNCTAD’s Trade and Development Board took note of these 
Agreed Conclusions in October 1970. In accordance with the Agreed 
Conclusions, certain developed GATT contracting parties sought a waiver 
for the GSP from the GATT Council. The call for the establishment of a 
mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal, and non-
discriminatory preferences was finally realized three years later in 1971 in 
the Generalized System of Preferences66 when the necessary GATT waiver 
was secured.67  
The Decision on a Generalized System of Preferences of June 25, 197168 
was a ten-year waiver of the MFN obligation of GATT Article I:1 with 
respect to preferential duty rates that developed countries applied to 
imported from developing countries. The GSP system as originally 
conceived had three features:  (1) developed countries would grant 
temporary, unilateral tariff preferences to developing countries; (2) tariff 
preferences would be on goods of export interest to developing countries in 
which they were not competitive internationally; and (3) tariff preferences 
would not be extended to goods produced by an industry in the importing 
country if that industry was vulnerable to import competition.69 The 1971 
waiver in no way mandated developed countries to offer tariff preferences 
to developing countries.  Any preference-granting country was free to 
terminate its GSP program at any time.70   
  
 65. Agreed Conclusions of the Special Comm. on Preferences, U.N. TDBOR, 4th 
Sess., 267th mtg., Annex 1, paras. I.9, II.1, III.1-4, IV.1, & IX.2, U.N. Doc. TD/B/330 (1970) 
[hereinafter Agreed Conclusions], reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1083, 1084 (1971).  
 66. For additional background on the origins of GSP, see generally WTO Comm. on 
Trade & Dev., The Generalised System of Preferences: A Preliminary Analysis of the GSP 
Schemes in the Quad, WT/COMTD/W/93, at 2-4 (Oct. 5, 2001) [hereinafter The Generalised 
System of Preferences: A Preliminary Analysis of the GSP Schemes in the Quad]; REPORT OF 
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE OECD, THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES:  THE 
REVIEW OF THE FIRST DECADE 9-12 (1983). On the economic theory of nonreciprocal trade 
preferences, see SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 1, at 17-45. 
 67. Waiver Decision on the Generalized System of Preferences, (June 25, 1971), 
GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24 (1972). Even though the GSP Decision itself did not refer 
to GATT Article XXV:5, the waiver is generally understood to rest on GATT Art. XXV, 
para. 5. See Lorand Bartels, The WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionality in the 
European Community’s GSP Program, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 512 (2003) (discussing the 
adoption of the 1971 waiver). 
 68. Waiver Decision on a Generalized System of Preferences, supra note 67. The 
Contracting Parties settled on a waiver, as opposed to a decision or amendment, largely 
because of the time and political will the latter two options required but which were absent at 
the time. See LONG, supra note 57, at 100.  
 69. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 104TH CONG., OVERVIEW AND 
COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 13 (Comm. Print 1995). 
 70. As noted by the WTO Secretariat in a 2001 paper on the GSP: 
In the earliest discussions, some flexibilities were discussed and 
these have become de facto part of operational schemes.  For 
example, it was noted that “. . . the industrial countries could 
establish a quota for admitting manufactured goods from developing 
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The Generalized System of Preferences has been described as a non-
homogeneous set of national schemes sharing certain common 
characteristics.71 Due to differences in developed countries’ economic 
structures and tariff rates — as well as the existence of a non-homogenous 
set of domestic industries, some of which were more internationally 
competitive than others — it proved impossible from the outset to create 
one harmonized system of identical tariff concessions. Therefore, the GSP 
became a set of individual national schemes based on common goals and 
principles — each with a view toward providing developing countries with 
generally equivalent opportunities for export growth.72 Certain elements 
bind them all, however.  
As a condition for providing such tariff preferences, GSP preference-
granting countries reserved the right to (1) exclude certain countries, (2) 
determine product coverage, (3) determine rules of origin governing the 
preference, (4) determine the duration of the scheme, (5) reduce any 
preferential tariff margins by continuing to lower or eliminate tariffs on an 
MFN basis during multilateral trade negotiations, (6) prevent the 
concentration of benefits among a few countries, and (7) include safeguard 
mechanisms to counter injurious import surges.73 Generally speaking, each 
  
countries free of duty, but they could exclude from these preferences 
a schedule of items constituting a reasonable percentage of the total 
goods they import.” And “all the developing countries, irrespective 
of their level of development, would be eligible to avail themselves 
of the preferential system up to the amount of the relevant quota.  
But there would have to be a periodic review of the flow of exports; 
and if the exports from one or more countries increased so much that 
they did not leave sufficient room for those from others, equitable 
solutions should be sought.”  “Special preferences should be granted 
to the less advanced developing countries.” It was also accepted that, 
after preferences had helped the developing countries “to prevent or 
rectify the structural imbalance in their trade”, they “will gradually 
have to disappear.” That was the concept of “graduation”: that 
developing countries becoming advanced would not longer benefit 
from the GSP. Finally, it was recognized that, while developing 
countries would not offer “conventional reciprocity,” as a result of 
preferences they would be able to import more than if the 
preferences had not been granted. Thus, irrespective of the 
subsequent legal texts, the early discussion already envisaged quota 
limits, graduation, special preferences for LDCs, and the eventual 
phasing out of preferences. 
 
The Generalised System of Preferences: A Preliminary Analysis of the GSP Schemes in the 
Quad, supra note 66, at 3, (quoting TOWARDS A NEW TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 59 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted)). 
 71. See SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 1, at 185. 
 72. See JONES, supra note 38, at 3. 
 73. See id. Each preference-granting country has safeguards in place to ensure that 
any significant increases in imports of a certain product do not adversely affect the receiving 
country’s domestic market. Generally, these restrictions take the form of quantitative limits 
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preference-granting country extends to qualifying beneficiary developing 
countries (as determined by each donor country) an exemption from duties 
(either reduced tariffs or duty-free access) on most manufactured products 
and certain “non-sensitive” agricultural products, although product coverage 
and preferential treatment vary widely.74 While most GSP schemes 
(including the U.S. GSP program) admit eligible products duty-free, some 
countries provide tariff reductions, rather than complete exemption from 
duties (this is true, for example, in Australia, Japan, and the EU).75  
  
on goods entering under GSP. Under Japan’s system, for example, imports of certain 
products under the preference are limited by quantity or value (whichever is applicable) on a 
first-come, first-served basis as administered on a monthly (or daily, as indicated) basis. For 
other products, import ceilings and maximum country amounts are set by prior allocation. 
See WTO Comm. on Trade & Dev., Notification by Japan, WT/COMTD/N/2/Add.9 (June 
21, 2000). Nevertheless, even with such statutory safeguard mechanisms in place, the manner 
in which they are administered is critical. For example, even though most U.S. producers are 
shielded by the automatic safeguards triggered under the competitive need limits (CNL) of 
the GSP program, some U.S. manufacturers and workers might be adversely affected by the 
program due to CNL waivers. See 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c). In 2004, three U.S. producers of 
titanium complained that the Bush Administration refused to terminate duty-free market 
access for wrought titanium (subject to an MFN duty rate of 15 percent), despite a petition 
asking the government not to waive the import limits. Russian imports of titanium were 
allowed to continue to enter duty-free under the Presidential waiver even though its sales 
made up more than 60 percent of U.S. imports. See GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: 
BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE, supra note 38, at 27. 
 74. See generally Note by the Secretariat, supra note 25. 
 75. The Australian system, for example, is based on a five percentage point margin 
of preference. When the Australian General Tariff (GT) is 5% or higher, the amount of the 
tariff is reduced by five percentage points for products of beneficiary countries. When the 
GT rate is 5% or less, the preferential rate is zero. See UNCTAD, Generalized System of 
Preferences: Handbook on the Scheme of Australia 5 (June 2000), 
www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc56_en.pdf [hereinafter Handbook on the Scheme of 
Australia].  
  Under the EU GSP scheme, imports from beneficiaries under the EU’s general 
arrangement receive duty-free treatment on their imports. However, if products are deemed 
import sensitive, then the duty reduction is either 3.5 percentage points or 20 percent of the 
MFN duty rate, depending upon how the import-sensitive product has been scheduled (the 
20% reduction applies to textile and clothing imports).  See Council Regulation.  No. 
980/2005, art. 7(2), Applying a Scheme of Generalizsed Tariff Preferences, 2005 O.J. (L 
169) 1 (EC); WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Note Report by the Secretariat: Trade Policy 
Review for the European Communities, 35 n.93, WT/TPR/S/177/Rev.1 (May 15, 2007). 
Under Japan’s GSP program, the depth of tariff cuts varies according to the product. Tariffs 
on industrial products are zero except for sensitive industrial products (1,192 items at the HS 
nine-digit level in 78 product groups) to which various preferential rates (0%, 20%, 40%, 
60%, or 80% of MFN rates) apply up to specified ceilings.  The ceilings are open for 
utilization by all beneficiaries.  However, preferential treatment is suspended on a monthly 
basis when ceilings are reached.  If preferential imports from one beneficiary exceed one-
fifth of the total value or volume of the overall ceiling, the preferential treatment for that 
beneficiary is suspended.  Preferential treatment under the GSP scheme is granted on the 
condition that goods meet Japan’s GSP rules of origin.  The administration of ceilings and 
maximum country volumes are managed on a first-come, first-served basis.  See WTO, Trade 
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In 1971 the original six members of the European Economic Community 
implemented the world’s first GSP program pursuant to the 1971 GATT 
GSP waiver.  During the 1970’s several OECD member countries—
Australia,76 Canada,77 Hungary, Japan,78 New Zealand, Norway,79 
  
Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review for Japan, 
WT/TPR/S/175/Rev.1, at 25-26 (2007). 
 76. For an overview of Australia’s GSP program, see Douglas Lippoldt, The 
Australian Preferential Tariff Regime, in TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION, supra note 41. 
Australia first extended unilateral trade preferences to developing countries in 1976. In 2002 
LDCs were given duty-free, quota-free access to the Australian market. See id. at 204. 
Australia’s rule of origin for developing-country imports claiming preferential tariff 
treatment is either the goods wholly obtained test or the substantial transformation test. In the 
case of substantial transformation, the test is a 50-percent value-added test, with cumulation 
up to half of the 50-percent from other developing countries. In the case of LDCs inputs from 
all developing countries and Australia may count toward the 50-percent value-added test. See 
id. Lippoldt, supra, at 187. For additional information on Australia’s GSP program, see id.; 
Douglas Lippoldt, The Australian Preferential Tariff Regime (OECD 2008); Generalized 
System of Preferences: Handbook on the Scheme of Australia, supra. 
 77. For an overview of Canada’s nonreciprocal preferential tariff programs, see 
DANIEL ANTHONY, UNILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE PROGRAMS OFFERED BY THE UNITED 
STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND CANADA: A COMPARISON (2008), [hereinafter 
UNILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE PROGRAMS OFFERED BY THE UNITED STATES, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, AND CANADA: A COMPARISON], available at 
http://tradepartnership.com/pdf_files/GSP_Comparison.pdf; Przemyslaw Kowalski, The 
Canadian Preferential Tariff Regime and Potential Economic Impacts of Its Erosion, in 
TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION, supra note  41, at 131-39. Canada has three GSP programs, 
one for developing countries in general (the General Preferential Tariff or GPT), a second for 
LDCs (the Least Developed Country Tariff or LDCT), and a third for the Caribbean region 
(the Caribbean-Canada Trade Agreement or CARIBCAN). The Canadian GPT was first 
introduced for an initial period of 10 years in 1974, and was subsequently renewed in 1984, 
1994, and 2004.  In 1995 there was an expansion of the product coverage and reductions in 
the preferential duty under the current scheme to counter the erosion of the margins of 
preference resulting from the Uruguay Round.  The scheme was again modified in 2000 to 
improve market access for LDCs by extending the product coverage and liberalizing the 
rules of origin. The GPT duty preference is either a reduction in the MFN duty rate or a zero 
duty rate on eligible products (certain agricultural products, textiles, clothing, and footwear 
are excluded). In 2003 Canada removed all duties and quotas on imports from LDCs, with 
the exception of certain supply-managed agricultural products (dairy, poultry, and egg 
products) and products from Myanmar. The GPT rule of origin is 60-percent local content 
with cumulation being permitted from any other GPT beneficiary country or Canada. The 
rule of origin under the LDCT is 40 percent with cumulation of up to half of the 40 percent 
being permitted from any other developing country.  In addition, Canadian content may be 
counted towards the qualifying limit. See id. Kowalski, supra, at 134-39; Note by the 
Secretariat, supra note 25, at 6-7; UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences: Handbook 
on the Scheme of Canada (Dec. 2001), www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc66_en.pdf. 
  Unlike the United States and the EU, Canada has no specific eligibility criteria 
for beneficiary countries under its GPT and LDCT programs. Nevertheless, it has removed 
countries for various reasons. For example, in July 2007, Canada removed Belarus from the 
GPT over concerns about its undemocratic regime and abuses of human rights. Canadian 
Dep’t of Fin., General Preferential Tariff Withdrawal Order (Republic of Belarus), 141 C. 
Gaz. No. 17 (Aug. 22, 2007), available at http://gazette.gc.ca/archives/p2/2007/2007-08-
22/html/sor-dors174-eng.html. Similarly, Canada has no formal graduation criterion 
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comparable to that of the United States or the EU that graduate beneficiaries once they 
become “high income” per the World Bank’s country classification scheme (in the case of 
the EU high-income status must be for three consecutive years). However, Canada does 
terminate GPT eligibility for countries that join the EU. See, e.g., Canadian Dep’t of Fin., 
General Preferential Tariff Withdrawal Order (Bulgaria and Romania), 141 C. Gaz. No. 17 
(Aug. 22, 2007), available at http://gazette.gc.ca/archives/p2/2007/2007-08-22/html/sor-
dors173-eng.html.   (“On January 1, 2007, Romania and Bulgaria acceded to the European 
Union (EU). Over the years, it has been the practice in Canada to withdraw entitlement to the 
GPT from countries acceding to the EU. Such accession constitutes membership in a highly 
developed and integrated economic entity whose members are not entitled to GPT treatment 
in Canada. Entitlement to the GPT was most recently withdrawn from 10 countries, 
including Poland and the Czech Republic, upon their accession to the EU in 2004.”), 
http://gazette.gc.ca/archives/p2/2007/2007-08-22/html/sor-dors173-eng.html.   
 78. For an overview of Japan’s GSP scheme, see UNCTAD, GENERALIZED SYSTEM 
OF PREFERENCES: HANDBOOK ON THE SCHEME OF JAPAN (2006), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc42rev3_en.pdf. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs maintains an English language website for its GSP program, available at 
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/gsp. Japan established its GSP program in 1971. Japan’s 
program is bifurcated into a general preferential regime for developing countries and a 
special preferential regime for LDCs.  Most agricultural and fishery products (80 percent) are 
excluded from coverage for non-LDCs. In the case of industrial goods, coverage is 74 
percent for non-LDCs.  A country graduates from Japan’s GSP program once it has been 
designated by the World Bank as a high-income country for three consecutive years.  See 
WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, Note Report by the Secretariat: Trade Policy Review for 
Japan, WT/TPR/S/175/Rev.1, at 26 (Apr. 10, 2007); Komuro, supra note 41, at 103-07. In 
2011 Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados were graduated as high income countries. 
Japan’s list of GSP beneficiaries as of April 2011 is available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/gsp/benef.pdf (last visited June 7, 2011). In 2001, 
Japan extended its GSP scheme to March 31, 2011, and in March 2011 it again extended the 
GSP program for another ten years until March 2021. BENEFICIARIES OF JAPAN’S GSP, see 
Explanatory Notes for Japan’s GSP Scheme, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/ 
gsp/benef.pdf (last visited June 7, 2011). In 2007, Japan expanded the list of products from 
LDCs eligible for duty-free and quota-free treatment under its GSP scheme from 7,758 to 
8,859, adding 1,101 products. This has increased its coverage of duty-free and quota-free 
treatment from 86.1 to 98 per cent in terms of tariff lines and over 99 per cent in terms of 
import value. Products eligible for duty-free and quota-free treatment include live animals, 
processed food, fish and fish products, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, tea, cereals, 
vegetable oils, juice, kerosene, fuel oils, gas oils, plywood, and raw silk.  In addition, all 
textile and clothing products from LDCs enter Japan duty-free and quota-free. See UNCTAD 
GSP NEWSLETTER 92 (UNCTAD/DITC/Misc/2008/3), July 2008), available at 
www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcmisc20083_en.pdf. 
 79. As of January 1, 2008, 140 developing countries and territories were eligible for 
the Norwegian GSP scheme. However, 57 of these did not meet the scheme’s requirements. 
Consequently, 27 developing countries, 11 low-income countries, and 45 middle-income 
countries were beneficiaries. On January 1, 2008, Norway’s GSP scheme was extended to 
give duty- and quota-free market access for all goods to LDCs and an additional 14 low-
income countries. As a result, duty-free and quota-free access was granted to 64 countries. 
The only low-income countries not included in this extension were those with a population of 
75 million or greater (as of June 2008 those countries were India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and 
Vietnam). In 2006, the utilization rate of the GSP scheme, as estimated by Statistics Norway, 
was 81% for LDCs and 77% for ordinary GSP countries.  See WTO, Trade Policy Review 
Body, Note Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review of Norway, 
WT/TPR/S/205/Rev.1, at 20-21 (Jan. 16, 2009); WTO Comm. on Trade & Dev., Generalized 
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Switzerland,80 and the United States81—followed suit.82 What these various 
  
System of Preferences: Notification by Norway, WT/COMTD/N/6/Add.2 (Jan. 18, 2001) and 
WT/COMTD/N/6/Add.4 (Apr. 10, 2008).  Additional information on Norway’s GSP 
program can be found at the Government of Norway’s website, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/Trade-policy/gsp_preferences.html?id= 
505963 (last visited July 19, 2011); GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES—GSP, TOLL 
CUSTOMS, http://www.toll.no/templates_TAD/Article.aspx?id=146952&epslanguage=en 
(last updated Feb. 5, 2008). 
 80. For a summary of Switzerland’s GSP program, see WTO Comm. on Trade & 
Dev., Generalized System of Preferences, Notification by Switzerland, 
WT/COMTD/N/7/Add.3 (Oct. 9, 2009). 
 81. See GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 46, vol. 2, at 50. For a brief 
survey of national GSP schemes, see SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 1, at 185-226. 
 82. Pursuant to the Agreement on the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP), 
developing countries that are parties to the GSTP provide preferential tariff treatment on 
their trade inter se. Forty-three developing countries are parties to the GSTP.  See UNCTAD, 
16 Dec. 10—Agreements on Trade Preferences Among Developing Countries (Dec. 16, 
2010). Developing countries meet every three years under the auspices of UNCTAD to 
discuss extending and withdrawing concessions under the GSTP. The GSTP requires that 
trade preferences extend to all products. However, each country is free to set the level of the 
preference margin and the coverage of products. The GSTP rules of origin require that at 
least 50 percent of a qualifying product’s final value to be added within a beneficiary 
country. See UNCTAD, Agreement on the Global System of Trade Preferences Among 
Developing Countries (April 12, 1988), available at www.unctadxi.org/Secured/GSTP/ 
LegalInstruments/gstp_en.pdf. See also infra note 323 and accompanying text.  
  A few developing countries have their own stand-alone GSP programs.  For 
example, as part of the 1996 customs union agreement with the EU, in 2002 Turkey 
established a GSP scheme that is modeled after the EU’s GSP scheme. Under that agreement, 
Turkey was required “to align itself progressively with the preferential customs regime of the 
EC.” UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences: Handbook on the Scheme of Turkey 1 
(2007) (quoting Article 16 of Decision No. 1/95 of the Turkey-EC Association Council), 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc74_en.pdf. Nearly all aspects of the 
program—rules of origin, eligibility criteria, and graduation procedures—are identical to the 
EU’s GSP program. Currently, Turkey grants GSP preferences to 38 countries and territories 
that have completed the necessary procedures to benefit from Turkey’s GSP program, 
including China, Brazil, and the Philippines. Under Turkey’s GSP regime, preferences are 
granted to selected non-agricultural goods, including raw materials and semi-finished goods. 
The goods covered by the regime are classified according to their “sensitivity.” Duties on 
non-sensitive products are fully eliminated, while those on sensitive products are reduced. In 
general, the reduction is by 3.5 percentage points on the MFN duty rate. However, for HS 
Chapters 50-63 (textiles and clothing), the reduction is 20% of the MFN duty rate. In 
addition, where the EU’s GSP scheme provides for preferential tariff reductions of more than 
3.5 percentage points on sensitive products, these higher reductions apply.  Duties are 
eliminated for LDCs on the basis of the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) Initiative. In line 
with the EU, Turkey grants further preferences to countries selected under the Special 
Incentives Arrangements for Sustainable Development and Good Governance. See Trade 
Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review for Turkey, 
WT/TPR/S/192/Rev.1, at ¶ 21 (April 3, 2008).  
  In late 2006, Brazil became one of the first developing countries to announce that 
it would implement the “duty-free quota-free” (DFQF) initiative that emerged from the 2005 
WTO Ministerial Conference meeting in Hong Kong. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 
18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, ¶ 47 (Dec. 22, 2005) (“Building upon the 
commitment in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, developed-country Members, and 
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national schemes broadly share are rules of origin to ensure that developing 
countries are the true beneficiaries of the GSP programs.83 However, 
differences among the various donor countries’ rules of origin can be 
significant. In addition, national GSP programs often differ concerning the 
countries that are beneficiaries and the products that are GSP-eligible (most 
national schemes differentiate between agricultural and industrial products, 
the former being more protected).84 Moreover, some donor countries do not 
attach formal preconditions to qualifying as a beneficiary country or impose 
formal conditions for retaining beneficiary status.85 
Preference-granting countries were expected to provide GSP benefits to 
all beneficiary developing countries without discrimination, i.e., no 
beneficiary was to receive super-preferential tariff treatment.  However, 
discriminatory tariff preferences have become embedded in GSP programs. 
For example, the list of beneficiaries and exceptions may vary among 
preference-granting countries.86 A country might be excluded on political 
grounds from GSP programs by some donor countries (such as the United 
  
developing-country Members declaring themselves in a position to do so, agree to implement 
duty-free and quota-free market access for products originating from LDCs as provided for 
in Annex F to this document.”) [hereinafter Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration]. In 
December 2009, Brazil announced that it would grant DFQF access for products from LDCs 
covering 80 percent of all tariff lines by mid-2010, which would be increased by 5 percent 
annually to cover all tariff lines by 2014. See UNCTAD GSP Newsletter 4 (Dec. 2009), 
available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcmisc20092_en.pdf.  
  In 2008, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced that India was 
implementing a Duty Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) Scheme for LDCs. The initiative grants 
preferential market access for exports from all LDCs, covering 94 percent of India’s tariff 
lines. Tariff elimination will be progressive and implemented over a period of five years 
through five equal tariff reductions of 20 percent per year of the current applied rates. For 
another 9 percent of total tariff lines, or 468 tariff lines, India will provide preferential tariff 
reduction for LDCs through a prescribed margin of preference on the applied rates. See 
Gov’t of India, Dep’t  of Commerce, Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme (2008), available 
at http://commerce.nic.in/pressrelease/pressrelease_detail.asp?id=2331; UNCTAD, GSP 
Newsletter 3 (UNCTAD/DITC/Misc/2008/3 July 2008), available at www.unctad.org/en/ 
docs/ditcmisc20083_en.pdf; India Pushing Ahead With Duty Free Market Access for Goods 
From LDCs, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), March 25, 2010. 
China provides preferential tariff treatment on select items from select LDCs. See UNCTAD 
GSP Newsletter 2-3 (July 2008), available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcmisc20083_ 
en.pdf. Other developing countries, including Argentina, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, 
Mauritius, and Thailand, have also established their own non-reciprocal tariff preference 
programs for LDCs. See WTO Sub-Comm. on Least-Developed Countries, Market Access 
Conditions for Least Developed Countries, WT/LDC/SWG/IF/14/Rev.1 (2001). 
 83. See SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 1, at 185-86. 
 84. See id. at 187-90. 
 85. See, e.g., UNILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE PROGRAMS OFFERED BY THE UNITED 
STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND CANADA, supra note 77 (noting that Canada, unlike the 
United States and the EU, does not impose preconditions for qualifying or conditions for 
retaining developing county beneficiary status).  
 86. See GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL 
DEBATE, supra note 38, at 8.  
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States) but not in others.87 Under the first Lomé Convention in 1976,88 the 
European Economic Community (the predecessor of the European Union) 
extended special GSP benefits to a group of 70 developing countries in 
Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (known as the ACP countries), most 
of which were former European colonies.89  The United States followed suit 
in 1984   with the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA).90 
CBERA provided discriminatory tariff treatment in favor of two-dozen 
countries in the Caribbean and Central America by offering CBERA 
beneficiary countries preferential duty treatment on approximately 1,700 
more items than is the case under the U.S. GSP program.91  The United 
  
 87. For example, China and Vietnam are both eligible under the EU’s GSP scheme, 
but neither is eligible under the U.S. GSP program. Compare Council Regulation 732/2008, 
2008 O.J. (L 211) 1, 14, 18 (EC), with HTSUS, supra note 20, General Note 4, Products of 
Countries Designated Beneficiary Developing Countries for Purposes of the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) 11. See MARTIN & JONES, supra note 5, at 1 (“In May 2008, 
Vietnam formally requested to be added to the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) program as a ‘developing country.’ . . . Vietnam has already been accepted into 
several other developed-country GSP programs around the world, including Canada, the 
European Union (EU), and Japan.”). General Note 4 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of 
the United States provides current lists of beneficiary countries for the four U.S. trade 
preference programs. It is available at the U.S. International Trade Commission’s website, 
www.usitc.gov. 
 88. See ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, 1976 O.J. (L 25) 2, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21975A0228(01):EN:HTML (last 
visited May 25, 2011). 
 89. See ELLEN FREY-WOUTERS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE THIRD WORLD: 
THE LOMÉ CONVENTION AND ITS IMPACT (1980); Douglas E. Matthews, Lomé IV and 
ACP/EEC Relations: Surviving the Lost Decade, 22 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1 (1991); Kele 
Onyejekwe, GATT, Agriculture, and Developing Countries, 17 HAMLINE L. REV. 77 (1993). 
The Lomé Convention was overhauled in 2000 in the form of a 20-year agreement that 
focuses on regional free-trade agreements among the 71 ACP beneficiary countries.  See EU 
and 71 Developing Nations Agree to Overhaul of Lomé Convention, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. 
(BNA) 240 (2000); EU Requests WTO Waiver on New Pact Giving ACP Countries 
Preferential Access, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 596 (2000).  The EU received an Article I 
MFN waiver at the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference for its successor agreement to the 
Lomé Convention, the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, also known as the Cotonou 
Convention. The waiver expired on December 31, 2007.  See WTO, European 
Communities—the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, WT/MIN (01)/15 (2001). Since 2008 
ACP market access to the EU has been superseded either by reciprocal economic partnership 
agreements or by the EU’s “Everything But Arms” duty-free program for LDCs. 
 90. See 19 U.S.C.  §§ 2701-33 (2000). Free trade agreements concluded by the 
United States with several CBERA beneficiaries, most notably the Dominican Republic-
Central American Free Trade Agreement, has reduced the number of CBERA-eligible 
beneficiaries.   
 91. Because CBERA extends discriminatory tariff treatment to a limited number of 
developing countries, it does not qualify for the blanket MFN waiver available under the 
GSP.  In September 1995, pursuant to Article IX of the WTO Agreement, the United States 
requested the WTO to renew the waiver previously granted CBERA for an additional ten 
years.  The initial U.S. request was granted on November 15, 1995.  See Decision of the 
General Council, Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, WT/L/104 (Nov. 24, 1995). A 
follow-up waiver was granted in 2010. See supra note 23. 
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States added two more trade preference programs for select developing 
countries in 1991 (the Andean Trade Preference Act92 in favor of Ecuador, 
Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia) and in 2001 (the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act in favor of the 48 countries located in sub-Saharan 
Africa).93 Both of these programs grant more trade benefits than does the 
U.S. GSP program. 
II. MAKING THE 1971 GSP WAIVER PERMANENT: THE ENABLING CLAUSE 
Whereas the political will did not exist in 1971 to make GSP a 
permanent GATT fixture, by 1979 opinion had shifted.  The ten-year GSP 
waiver was made permanent by the Tokyo Round Decision of November 
18, 1979 on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries,94 popularly known as the 
“Enabling Clause.”95 The Enabling Clause permits but does not mandate 
that developed countries extend preferential tariff treatment to beneficiary 
countries.96 Thus, paragraph 1 provides that “[n]otwithstanding the 
provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may 
accord differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries, 
without according such treatment to other contracting parties.” Paragraph 2 
identifies four non-exclusive areas in which such preferential treatment may 
be accorded: 
  
 92. Pub. L. No. 102-182, tit. II, 105 Stat. 1236 (1991), codified as amended at 19 
U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (2002). The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) was enacted on 
December 4, 1991, to authorize preferential trade benefits for the Andean nations of Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru.  ATPA benefits are similar but not identical to the benefits 
accorded beneficiary countries under CBERA. 
 93. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3706, §2466, 
§§3721-3724, §§3731-3741 (2000). 
 94. Enabling Clause, supra note 47. The Enabling Clause gave the GSP permanent 
legal status at GATT and the WTO. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, ¶ 
1(b)(4), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt.pdf (last visited July 
21,2011); LONG, supra note 57, at 101; Howse, supra note 24, at 390 (“The Enabling Clause 
does not mention any exceptional circumstances, nor does it name any particular member 
state. It is not called a waiver on its face. It is not temporary, as the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ language would imply. It is not listed among the list of Article XXV waivers 
in the relevant GATT/WTO instruments.”). 
 95. See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, “Differential and More Favourable Treatment”: The 
GATT Enabling Clause, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 488 (1980). 
 96. In Report of the Panel, United States—Denial of Most-Favored-Nation 
Treatment as to Non-Rubber Footwear form Brazil, ¶ 6.14-6.17, DS 18/R—39S/128 (Feb. 
10, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) 128, 152-53 (1992), at 152-53, paras. 6.14-6.17, the 
panel concluded that the Enabling Clause permits only preferential tariff treatment of 
products from developing countries without obligating the importing developed country to 
accord that treatment to imports of other countries, but does not permit such preferential 
treatment in connection with other rules and regulations (in this case, the use of an injury test 
in countervailing duty actions). 
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(a) preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties 
to products originating in developing countries in accordance with the 
[1971 Decision on a] Generalized System of Preferences; 
(b) differential and more favorable treatment with respect to the provisions 
of the General Agreement concerning non-tariff measures governed by the 
provisions of instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of 
the GATT [referring to the Tokyo Round Codes, many of which contained 
provisions on special treatment of developing countries]; 
(c) regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed 
contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and     
. . . of non-tariff measures, on products imported from one another;[97] 
(d) special treatment of the least developed among the developing 
countries in the context of any general or specific measures in favor of 
developing countries.[98] 
Recognizing that preferential tariff treatment of developing countries 
could possibly retard trade liberalization among developed countries, 
paragraph 3 of the Enabling Clause underscores its purposive function, 
namely, “to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not 
to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other 
contracting parties.”99  Thus, from the start the Enabling Clause 
contemplated the eventual shrinking margin of preference for developing 
countries. In addition and importantly, paragraph 3(c) provides, “Any 
differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause: . . . (c) 
shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties 
to developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond 
positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing 
countries.”100  
The Enabling Clause is explicit that tariff preferences are unilateral in 
favor of developing countries.  Paragraph 5 of the Enabling Clause echoes 
  
 97. The leading regional trade arrangements among developing countries inter se 
have been notified under the Enabling Clause, including the Andean Pact, MERCOSUR, 
ALADI, and the ASEAN Free Trade Area. Eighteen regional trade agreements among 
developing countries inter se have been notified to the Committee on Trade and 
Development under the Enabling Clause.  See WTO Comm. On Reg’l Trade Agreements, 
Report (2000) of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements to the General Council, 
WT/REG/9, ¶ 5 (Nov. 22, 2000). 
 98. Enabling Clause, supra note 47, ¶ 2(a)-(d). 
 99. Id. ¶ 3(a). 
 100. Id. ¶ 3(c). Paragraph 4 imposes a procedural obligation on preference-granting 
countries to notify and consult with GATT on their GSP programs. 
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the principle of GATT Article XXXVI:8 that reciprocity in tariff 
preferences is not expected.101  
Paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause memorializes the principle of 
graduation from GSP, although it does so in an elliptical fashion.  Although 
it doesn’t mention graduation by name, paragraph 7 incorporates graduation 
into GSP with the statement that as their economic condition improves, 
“they [developing countries] would accordingly expect to participate more 
fully in the framework of rights and obligations under the General 
Agreement.”102 
Other than its allusion to graduation in paragraph 7 and that unilateral 
tariff preference schemes are to benefit developing countries on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, the Enabling Clause is silent with respect to 
criteria for country eligibility, graduation, and product coverage, thus 
leaving it to donor countries to sort out for themselves in their respective 
GSP programs. Thirteen national GSP schemes have been notified to the 
UNCTAD secretariat,103 but in terms of volumes of trade affected the trade 
preference programs of the United States and the EU are the most 
  
 101. GATT Article XXXVI:8 provides as follows: “The developed contracting parties 
do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or 
remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties.” The lack 
of reciprocity in the GSP program could also result in long-term costs for beneficiary 
countries. In multilateral trade negotiations, such as the Doha Round, countries may engage 
in reciprocal tariff reductions, meaning that all parties would agree to reduce their tariffs. By 
avoiding such reciprocal concessions, some developing countries may have tended to keep in 
place protectionist, import-substitution trade policies that may, in fact, impede their long-
term growth. See COOPER, supra note 6, at 5. Moreover, these preferences can become an 
impediment to negotiations as developing countries seek ways of maintaining their 
preferences from eroding. For this reason, some economists prefer multilateral, 
nondiscriminatory tariff cuts because preferential tariff programs, such as the GSP, can lead 
to inefficient production and trade patterns. See GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: 
BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE, supra note 38, at 22; COOPER, supra note 6, at 5. 
When tariffs are reduced across-the-board, rather than in a preferential manner, countries 
tend to produce and export on the basis of their comparative advantage — thus exporting 
products that they produce relatively efficiently and importing products that others produce 
relatively efficiently. However, while some producers in developing countries (especially 
those whose products are not GSP eligible) may benefit from multilateral tariff reductions, 
other industries may be hurt because their margin of preference under GSP is reduced. See 
Cooper, supra note 6, at 5. Multilateral tariff reductions redistribute the benefits of trade 
liberalization among developing countries. Some exporters benefit because they face reduced 
tariffs in the industrial countries, while others are hurt because the margin of preference 
under GSP is reduced. See id. 
 102. Enabling Clause, supra note 47, ¶ 7. 
 103. The following countries grant non-reciprocal tariff preferences to developing 
countries in general: Australia, Belarus, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States.  See About 
GSP, UNCTAD, www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1 (last visited 
March 30, 2012).  
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significant.104 Although the U.S. and EU GSP programs differ with respect 
to preferential duty rates, eligible products, and eligible countries, what the 
U.S. and EU trade preference programs share in common is a set of 
preconditions that developing countries must meet in order to be designated 
as program beneficiaries. Both the U.S. and EU trade preference programs 
also establish a number of conditions that must be met in order to retain 
beneficiary status.  The WTO-legality of certain preconditions and 
conditions that the EU had established under its GSP program were 
challenged at the WTO by India. The next Part reviews Appellate Body 
report concerning India’s challenge to the EU’s GSP scheme and assesses 
the WTO-consistency of U.S. and EU GSP conditionality in light of that 
Appellate Body report. 
III. GSP CONDITIONALITY 
An issue that the Enabling Clause does not explicitly address and that 
remained unresolved was whether preference-granting countries might 
discriminate among beneficiary countries by conditioning GSP eligibility. 
The consistency of GSP conditionality and the resulting tariff discrimination 
with the Enabling Clause has been questioned by some WTO members.105  
Matters came to a head in 2002 when India brought a complaint at the WTO 
challenging certain features of the EU’s GSP scheme, specifically, the 
special arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking (the so-
called “Drug Arrangements”), as provided in EC Council Regulation No. 
2501/2001 of December 10, 2001 (the EC Regulation or Regulation).106 The 
EC Regulation provided for five different tariff preference arrangements, 
  
 104. See Bernard Hoekman et al., Will Martin & Carlos A. Promo Braga, Quantifying 
the Value of Preferences and Potential Erosion Losses, in TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION, 
supra note 41, at 3, 13. 
 105. See, e.g., Special Session of WTO Comm. on Trade & Dev., Special Session, 
Application of the Special and Differential Treatment Provisions Contained in the 
Agreements and Decisions of the WTO, Communication from Paraguay, TN/CTD/W/5 (May 
24, 2002). 
 106. See EC–Tariff Preferences, supra note 15, ¶¶ 151-53. For additional analyses of 
the Appellate Body’s report, see generally Lorand Bartels, The WTO Ruling on EC–Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries and Its Implications for Conditionality in GSP 
Programs, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 463 (Thomas Cottier, Elisabeth 
Bürgi & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2005); Kevin Moss, The Consequences of the WTO Appellate 
Body Decision in EC—Tariff Preferences for the African Growth and Opportunity Act and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 665 (2006); Shun-yong Yeh, Dragging 
Out of or Deeper into Another Impasse of the Political Economy of the World Trade 
Organization? A Critic of the Findings of the Dispute Settlement Body in European 
Communities–Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 1 
ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 465 (2006); Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO 
Case Review 2004, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 142-78 (2005); Julia Ya Qin, Defining 
Nondiscrimination under the Law of the World Trade Organization, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 215, 
281-95 (2005).  
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including the Drug Arrangements. Under the General Arrangements, all 
countries and territories listed in Annex I to the Regulation were eligible to 
receive tariff preferences. The products covered were listed in Annex IV, 
and were divided into two categories: non-sensitive and sensitive. Article 7 
of the Regulation specified that non-sensitive products would enjoy duty-
free access while sensitive products were subject to reduced tariffs. The 
benefits under the Drug Arrangements were made available to a closed list 
of twelve countries, all but one from Latin America: Bolivia, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Through the Drug Arrangements, 
the tariff reductions accorded to the 12 beneficiary countries were greater 
than the tariff reductions granted to other developing countries under the 
General Arrangements. For example, in respect of products that were 
included in the Drug Arrangements but not in the General Arrangements, 
the 12 beneficiary countries were granted duty free access to the EU market, 
while all other developing countries had to pay the MFN duty rate. As to 
products that were included in both the Drug Arrangements and the General 
Arrangements and that were deemed “sensitive,” the 12 beneficiary 
countries were granted duty free access to the EU market, while all other 
developing countries only received duty reductions.  
India claimed that the Drug Arrangements were inconsistent with the 
MFN obligation and were not justified by the Enabling Clause.  
The crux of the dispute centered on whether the term “non-
discriminatory” in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause requires that identical 
tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing 
countries without differentiation, except for the implementation of a priori 
limitations, such as quotas on duty-free treatment of certain imported goods 
or exclusions of certain trade-sensitive products. According to the Appellate 
Body, whether the drawing of distinctions is per se discriminatory, or 
whether it is discriminatory only if done on an improper basis, the ordinary 
meanings of the term “discriminate” converge in one important respect: 
“they both suggest that distinguishing among similarly-situated 
beneficiaries is discriminatory.”107 Thus, the Appellate Body observed that 
the EU and India agreed that similarly situated GSP beneficiaries should not 
  
 107. EC—Tariff Preferences, supra note 15, ¶ 151. But see Robert Howse, Back to 
Court After Shrimp/Turtle? Almost But Not Quite Yet: India’s Short Lived Challenge to 
Labor and Environmental Exceptions in the European Union’s Generalized System of 
Preferences, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1333, 1352-53 (2003) (based on the history of the 
Enabling Clause, the description of GSP preferences as “generalized, non-discriminatory and 
non-reciprocal” was always meant to be aspirational; this is reflected in the 2001 Doha 
Decision on Implementation Related Concerns, which states in similarly hortatory language 
that GSP preferences should be generalized, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory) 
[hereinafter Howse II]. 
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be treated differently, but disagreed as to the basis for determining whether 
beneficiaries are similarly situated.108  
The Appellate Body next examined paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling 
Clause which provides that differential and more favorable treatment 
provided under the Enabling Clause “shall . . .  be designed and, if 
necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and 
trade needs of developing countries.” The Appellate Body found significant 
the absence of any explicit requirement in the text of paragraph 3(c) that 
donor countries respond to the needs of “all” developing countries or to the 
needs of “each and every” developing country.109 The Appellate Body added 
that “the participants in this case agree that developing countries may have 
“development, financial and trade needs” that are subject to change and that 
certain development needs may be common to only a certain number of 
developing countries.”110  It continued that a “need” cannot be characterized 
as one of the specified needs of developing countries based merely on an 
assertion to that effect by, for instance, a preference-granting country or a 
beneficiary country. Rather, “the existence of a ‘development, financial [or] 
trade need’ must be assessed according to an objective standard.”111 The 
Appellate Body elaborated that “[b]road-based recognition of a particular 
need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments adopted 
by international organizations, could serve as such a standard.”112 In 
addition, paragraph 3(c) “mandates that the response provided to the needs 
of developing countries be ‘positive.’” This suggests, according to the 
Appellate Body, “the response of a preference-granting country must be 
taken with a view to improving the development, financial or trade situation 
of a beneficiary country, based on the particular need at issue.”113 Thus, in 
the Appellate Body’s view, “a sufficient nexus should exist between, on the 
one hand, the preferential treatment provided under the respective measure 
authorized by paragraph 2, and, on the other hand, the likelihood of 
alleviating the relevant ‘development, financial [or] trade need.’”114 In the 
context of a GSP scheme, the Appellate Body explained, “the particular 
need at issue must, by its nature, be such that it can be effectively addressed 
through tariff preferences.”115 Importantly, the Appellate Body held that “by 
requiring developed countries to ‘respond positively’ to the ‘needs of 
developing countries,’ which are varied and not homogeneous, paragraph 
3(c) indicates that a GSP scheme may be ‘non-discriminatory’ even if 
  
 108. EC—Tariff Preferences, supra note 15, ¶ 153. 
 109. Id. ¶ 158. 
 110. Id. ¶ 159. 
 111. Id. ¶ 162 (alteration in original). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. ¶ 163. 
 114. EC—Tariff Preferences, supra note 15, ¶ 164 (alteration in original). 
 115. Id. ¶ 164. 
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‘identical’ tariff treatment is not accorded to ‘all’ GSP beneficiaries.”116 
Moreover, “paragraph 3(c) suggests that tariff preferences under GSP 
schemes may be ‘nondiscriminatory’ when the relevant tariff preferences 
are addressed to a particular ‘development, financial [or] trade need’ and are 
made available to all beneficiaries that share that need.”117 Because the Drug 
Arrangements comprised a closed list of twelve countries, with no 
transparent or objective criteria for initially listing a country, for delisting a 
country, or for adding a country not initially listed, the Appellate Body was 
drawn to the conclusion that there was no basis to determine whether or not 
impermissibly discriminatory criteria or standards were in play.118 The 
Appellate Body ultimately concluded that “the European Communities has 
failed to prove that the Drug Arrangements meet the requirement in footnote 
3 that they be ‘non-discriminatory,’”119 i.e., that all similarly-situated 
developing countries be treated in a similar manner.120 
  
 116. Id. ¶ 165 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id.  
 118. See id. ¶ 187. 
 119. Id. ¶ 188. 
 120. Although not addressed in EC—Tariff Preferences, when is a country a 
“developing country” vel non for GSP purposes? By its express terms the Enabling Clause 
restricts GSP eligibility to developing countries. When does a country not qualify for GSP 
because it is not a “developing country,” and when does an existing GSP beneficiary no 
longer qualify for GSP treatment because it has “graduated”? The WTO divides its 
membership into three groups—developed countries, developing countries, and least 
developed countries—that are differentiated inter se by the legal commitments each group 
agrees to undertake.  The WTO does not provide a quantitative definition of the term 
“developing country” by using per capita gross domestic product or gross national income 
benchmarks. Although no quantitative definition of the term “developing country” has ever 
been adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties or the WTO Ministerial Conference, GATT 
Article XVIII:1 contains a qualitative definition of “developing country” as a country whose 
economy “can only support low standards of living and [is] in the early stages of 
development.”  Regarding the phrase “can only support low standards of living,” 
Interpretative Note Ad Article XVIII:1 provides that the determination whether a country can 
only support low standards of living is not to be based on a temporary situation where 
exceptionally favorable conditions exist for the export products of a developing country.  
Regarding the phrase “in the early stages of development,” Interpretative Note Ad Article 
XVIII:2 states that it is not limited to countries that have just started their economic 
development, but also covers countries that are industrializing in order to reduce their 
dependency on exports of primary products.  The poorest of the developing countries are 
referred to collectively as the least-developed countries or “LDCs.” With regard to the 48 
LDCs, Article XI:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
accepts the United Nations’ designation of a country as least-developed for purposes of the 
WTO agreements.  For the current list of LDCs and the criteria used to determine LDC 
status, see UN Recognition of the Least Developed Countries, UNCTAD, 
http://unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3618&lang=1 (last visited July 10, 2011).   
With regard to graduation from GSP, the Quad graduate all high-income beneficiary 
countries based on the World Bank’s definition of a country as “high income.” Based on 
their per capita gross national income (GNI), the World Bank groups countries into four 
categories: low income ($995 or less), lower middle income ($996–$3,945), upper middle 
income ($3,946–$12,195), and high income ($12,196 or more). See How We Classify 
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Against the backdrop of the EC—Tariff Preferences report, what 
conditions or limitations may a donor country impose in its GSP program 
consistently with paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause as interpreted by 
the Appellate Body? The next section examines that question in the context 
of the four U.S. trade preference programs and the EU’s revised GSP 
scheme.  
A. Overview of U.S. Trade Preference Programs 
The United States has in essence four trade preference programs in the 
following chronological order (effective date in parentheses): the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP 1976), with 130 beneficiaries as of 
2011;121 the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA aka the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative or CBI, 1984), with 18 beneficiaries as of 
2011;122 the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA 1991), with three 
  
Countries, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last visited 
July 10, 2011). The World Bank classifies several WTO developing-country members as 
“high income,” including Aruba, Bahrain, Barbados, Brunei, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and Trinidad and Tobago. See Income Categories, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-
groups#Low_income (last visited July 10, 2011). 
  In sum, rather than representing a monolithic, homogenous group of nations that 
are all at the same stage of economic development, developing countries instead can be 
placed on a continuum that runs from the extremes of abject poverty (the 48 LDCs with 
annual per capita GNI of less than $750), to comparatively greater wealth in the case of 
Mexico with per capita GNI of $8,960, to significantly greater wealth in the case of 
Singapore with per capita GNI of $37,220. See Countries and Economies, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country (last visited July 10, 2011). 
 121. HTSUS, supra note 20, General Note 4. 
 122. HTSUS, supra note 20,  General Note 7. The Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act was enhanced and expanded in 2000 under the Caribbean Basin Trade 
Partnership Act (CBTPA, with eight beneficiaries as of 2011). The eight CBTPA 
beneficiaries are Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, St. Lucia, and Trinidad 
and Tobago. HTSUS, General Note 17 (2011), www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/ 
tata/hts/bychapter/1100gntoc.htm (last visited May 2011). The CBTPA provides improved 
access for clothing and other items of export interest not otherwise eligible for duty-free 
entry under the other U.S. trade preference programs.  
A further enhancement of the CBERA and the CBTPA that targets trade with Haiti was 
enacted in 2006. The Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement 
Act of 2006 (HOPE Act) makes Haiti eligible for new trade benefits, in addition to those it 
currently receives under CBI. 19 U.S.C. § 2703a. (2010). Under the CBTPA, clothing 
imports from Haiti qualified for duty-free treatment only if they were made from U.S. or 
Haitian fabric. However, the HOPE Act allows clothing imports from Haiti to enter the 
United States duty free if at least 50 percent of the value of inputs and/or costs of processing 
are from any combination of U.S., FTA partner countries, and regional preference program 
partner countries, with the percentage increasing to 55 percent beginning December 20, 
2015, and to 60 percent beginning December 20, 2017. 19 U.S.C. § 2703a(b)(1)(B)(v). The 
quantity of clothing eligible for duty-free treatment under this provision was subject to a 
limit in the first year equivalent to one percent of total U.S. clothing imports that increased to 
1.25 percent. 19 U.S.C. § 2703a(b)(1)(C). The HOPE Act also allows automotive wire 
 
2012] The Generalized System of Preferences after Four Decades 555 
 
  
harnesses imported from Haiti that contain at least 50 percent by value of materials produced 
in Haiti, U.S., FTA partner countries, or regional preference program countries to qualify for 
duty-free treatment. 19 U.S.C. § 2703a(c).  
  The HOPE Act benefits could not go into effect until certain conditions were 
met. Haiti was required to establish or demonstrate that it was “making continual progress 
toward establishing”: (1) a market-based economy, (2) the rule of law, political pluralism, 
and due process, (3) the elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment, (4) economic 
policies to reduced poverty, increase the availability of health care and education and 
promote private enterprise, (5) a system to combat corruption, and (6) protection of 
internationally recognized worker rights.  19 U.S.C. § 2703a(d). 
  The clothing provisions of the HOPE Act were expanded in 2008 through the 
HOPE Act II, and was expanded and renewed for ten years until September 2020 pursuant to 
the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act. The HELP Act was enacted in response to the 
devastating 7.0 magnitude earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010. The ten-year 
extension is at 19 U.S.C. § 2703a(h). The HELP Act provides duty-free treatment for 
additional textile and apparel products wholly assembled or knit-to-shape in Haiti regardless 
of where the inputs originated, and increases from 70 million square meter equivalents 
(SMEs) to 200 million SMEs the respective tariff preference levels (TPLs) under which 
certain Haitian knit and woven apparel products may receive duty-free treatment regardless 
of where the inputs originated. In any given year, the TPL increase is triggered if 52 million 
SMEs of Haitian apparel enter the United States under the existing knit or woven TPL. After 
the increase is triggered, certain knit apparel products entering duty-free under the knit TPL 
will be subject to an 85 million SME sublimit, and certain woven apparel products entering 
duty-free under the woven TPL will be subject to a 70 million SME sublimit. 19 U.S.C. § 
2703a(b)(2A). For a comparison of the rules of origin for clothing under the CBTPA and the 
HOPE Act, see U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, Nineteenth, The Impact of the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act, 19TH REPORT, 2007-2008, at 1-11 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N (Pub. 
4102 2009). Inv. No. 332-227, USITC Pub. 4102 (Sept. 2009) (Final), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4102.pdf. 
  The HOPE Act has been rated as a disappointment by the U.S. International 
Trade Commission: 
Haiti is a relatively small supplier of textile and apparel articles to 
the U.S. market, even though it ranked as the largest CBERA textile 
and apparel supplier in 2008. Moreover, despite implementation of 
HOPE I and HOPE II, textile and apparel imports from Haiti under 
CBERA declined from $420.8 million in 2007 to $394.4 million in 
2008. . . .  
The limited amount of trade and new investment under the HOPE 
Acts to date can be partly attributed to the brief time the provisions 
have been in effect. However, Haiti’s apparel sector also faces 
considerable challenges that remain disincentives for investors. For 
example, Haiti’s underdeveloped infrastructure slows transport and 
delivery times and makes Haiti’s shipping costs the highest in the 
region. Insufficient access to water and electricity also prevent 
Haiti’s apparel sector from increasing production. Despite 
competitive labor rates that average $2.50–$3.75 per day, bank 
interest rates ranging as high as 30 percent reportedly discourage 
Haitian apparel producers from taking out loans to expand 
production.65 Haiti has no weaving facilities; middle management 
and technical personnel are in short supply; and its workers have 
limited training. Such constraints likely outweigh the benefits that 
the HOPE Acts offer, and prevent Haiti’s textile and apparel sector 
from taking full advantage of the programs. 
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beneficiaries as of 2011;123 and the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA 2000), with 37 beneficiaries as of 2011.124  In general, the goal of 
all four programs is to promote economic development in poorer nations by 
supporting increased and diversified exports. GSP establishes a basic level 
of product coverage common to all the preference programs, with added 
products for least-developed beneficiaries. The three regional programs 
cover additional products and generally have more liberal conditions for 
product entry than GSP, but regional beneficiaries are subject to more 
extensive conditions for participation. Furthermore, the regional programs 
serve specific foreign policy interests — for example, the ATPA has an 
additional goal of countering illicit drug production and trafficking. Chart 1 
below shows the growth in U.S. trade preference programs over the three 
decades from 1975 to 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
THE IMPACT OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT, 19TH REPORT, supra note 
122, at  3-19 (footnotes omitted). 
 123. HTSUS, supra note 20, General Note 11. 
 124. HTSUS, supra note 20, General Note 16. In 2002 the Andean Trade Preference 
Act was enhanced and expanded under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication 
Act (ATPDEA, with Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru designated as beneficiaries as of 2011). 
Id. at General Note 11. The ATPDEA provides improved access for clothing and other items 
of export interest not otherwise eligible for duty-free entry under the other U.S. trade 
preference programs.   
  A 2008 offshoot of the ATPA is the Dominican Republic 2:1 Earned Import 
Allowance Program (EIAP), which creats a benefit for eligible apparel articles wholly 
assembled in the Dominican Republic that meet the requirements for a “2 for 1” earned 
import allowance. It was created as part of the Andean Trade Preference Extension Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-436, 122 Stat. 4976 (2008). The EIAP allows apparel manufacturers 
in the Dominican Republic who use U.S. fabric to produce certain apparel to earn a credit 
that can be used to ship eligible apparel made with non-U.S.-produced fabric into the United 
States duty free. The USITC is required to evaluate the effectiveness of the EIAP and make 
recommendations for improvements annually under the Dominican Republic-Central 
America-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act. In its 2011 report the 
ITC found that the program as currently structured does not provide sufficient benefits to 
make the apparel industry in the Dominican Republic competitive vis-à-vis other suppliers of 
cotton bottoms to the U.S. market. Earned Import Allowance Program: Evaluation of the 
Effectiveness of the Program for Certain Apparel from the Dominican Republic, Inv. No. 
332-503, USITC Pub. 4246 (July 2010) (Final), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4175.pdf. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, EARNED 
IMPORT ALLOWANCE PROGRAM: EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM FOR 
CERTAIN APPAREL FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  (Pub. No. 4246 2011), 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4246.pdf. See also Commerce to Maintain 
DREIAP Requirement That Textiles Must Be Finished, Dyed in U.S., INT’L TRADE DAILY 
(BNA), (Aug. 4, 2010). 
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Chart 1. Growth in U.S. Trade Programs over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office 
 
In a nutshell each regional program is more liberal in its preference 
scheme than is GSP. Countries that are GSP-eligible only are accorded 
duty-free access to 69 percent of the total number of tariff lines in the U.S. 
tariff schedule (7,285 lines), consisting of 3,879 MFN duty-free lines and 
3,406 additional lines that are GSP duty-free.125 As indicated in Chart 2 
below, all three of the post-GSP regional programs and their respective 
enhancements improve upon GSP to varying degrees. CBERA beneficiaries 
are accorded duty-free treatment on approximately 9,200 tariff line items;126 
ATPA beneficiaries are accorded duty-free treatment on approximately 
9,000 tariff line items;127 and AGOA beneficiaries are accorded duty-free 
access to approximately 9,100 items, including many textile and clothing 
products.128  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 125. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-443, U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE 
PROGRAMS PROVIDE IMPORTANT BENEFITS, BUT A MORE INTEGRATED APPROACH WOULD 
BETTER  ENSURE PROGRAMS MEET SHARED GOALS 70 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON 
INTEGRATING U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS]. The expansion of GSP for LDCs in 1996 
also increased the number of duty-free lines for LDC beneficiaries. 
 126. See id. at 71. With the enhancements to CBI that were made in 2000 by the 
CBPTA, the number of tariff-lines eligible for duty-free treatment is approximately 9,400. 
See id.  
 127. See id. With the enhancements to the ATPA that were made in 2002 by the 
ATPDEA, the number of tariff-lines eligible for duty-free treatment is approximately 9,400. 
See id.  
 128. See id.; U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, The Year in Trade 2008: Operation of the 
Trade Agreements Program, at 2-13, 2-14 (USITC Pub. No. 4091 (July 2009), at 2-13, 214, 
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4091.pdf. 
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Chart 2. Duty-Free Tariff Lines under U.S. Trade Preference Programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S.  Government Accountability Office 
 
The number of tariff lines that receive duty-free treatment is, of course, 
only part the picture. The distribution of duty-free treatment across product 
groups is not even among the various programs.129 By statute certain 
products are ineligible for preferential tariff treatment under GSP (textiles, 
clothing, watches, footwear, certain leather goods, and agricultural products 
subject to a tariff-rate quota on any quantities that exceed the quota).130 In 
addition to the less favorable tariff treatment that certain product groups 
receive under the GSP program compared to the three regional trade 
preference programs, GSP is subject to periodic renewal (as are the ATPA 
and AGOA but not the CBERA), automatic graduation applies once a 
country becomes a high-income country (applicable in the ATPA and 
AGOA but not CBERA), and loss of product eligibility is triggered once 
  
 129. The countries that have the highest share of their exports to the United States 
benefiting from preferences tend to be lower income countries. For higher income 
developing countries, the share of their exports to the United States benefiting from 
preferences varies, but tends to be less. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-
1209, AN OVERVIEW OF Use OF U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS BY BENEFICIARIES AND 
U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWS 3-4 (2007) [hereinafter GAO OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRADE 
PREFERENCE PROGRAMS]. 
 130. See 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b). 
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competitive needs limits are reached (inapplicable in ATPA, AGOA, and 
CBERA).131  
While textile and clothing products are ineligible for preferential tariff 
treatment under the U.S. GSP program, under amendments to both CBERA 
and ATPA that were made in 2000 and 2002—the Caribbean Basin Trade 
Partnership Act and the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, 
respectively –imports of textiles and clothing made in CBERA and ATPA 
countries enter duty-free, provided such imports use yarn or fabric that is 
wholly made in the United States. Both program expansions also permit 
some preferential access for clothing made from regional fabric, but unlike 
AGOA, neither program has a third-country fabric provision.  Under 
AGOA’s so-called Special Rule for Apparel, LDCs receive duty-free 
treatment on clothing made from third-country fabric (i.e., non-U.S., non-
African fabric), subject to an annual cap. Nevertheless, as Chart 3 indicates, 
despite the expanded coverage of the regional trade preference programs, 
several important product groups with greater than zero MFN duty rates are 
not eligible for preferential tariff treatment. 
 
 
Chart 3. Product Groups with Most Dutiable Product Lines in U.S. Tariff 
Schedule, Taking Into Account All U.S. Preference Programs 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office 
 
These product exclusions are manifested in the relative lack of 
diversification of products exported by beneficiary countries to the United 
States. As analyzed by the GAO, exports under AGOA, the ATPA, and 
GSP are concentrated in fuels and clothing.132 What about the economic 
  
 131. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e). 
 132. See GAO REPORT ON INTEGRATING U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS, supra 
note 125, at 28-29. U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk flagged the lack of export 
diversification among AGOA beneficiaries with their high dependency upon textiles and 
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impact on the U.S. economy? Several factors suggest that the overall effects 
of GSP on the U.S. economy are small. First, only about 1.5 percent of total 
U.S. imports enter duty-free under GSP.133 Second, most products that 
would otherwise have been GSP eligible do not come from GSP 
beneficiaries. Rather, they are imported from non-beneficiary countries 
(principally China) at MFN duty rates. Third, many imports that enter duty-
free under GSP would probably be competitive without preferential rates in 
any event because for many products U.S. MFN duty rates are the same as 
(i.e., zero) or only marginally higher than GSP duty-free rates.  
Consequently, the effects of paying the higher MFN duty rates would be 
small.134 In short, U.S. domestic producers of most products are unlikely to 
be adversely affected by import competition from GSP imports. At the same 
time, some domestic producers and consumers benefit significantly from 
GSP. For some companies that use parts, components, or materials that are 
imported under GSP, the reduced tariffs can mean lower costs. Consumers 
who buy products imported under GSP or products that are produced with 
GSP inputs may benefit from significantly lower prices.135 Domestic 
producers who compete with imports that enter duty free under GSP, 
however, can bear significant adjustment costs. Adjustment costs include 
the costs to workers for retraining and finding new employment and the 
costs to firms for retooling to become more competitive or to shift capital to 
other uses.136 Such costs are ameliorated by the exclusion of import-
sensitive products and by the competitive need limits of the program.137 
When taking into account all U.S. trade preference programs, combined 
they represent less than a five-percent share of total U.S. imports (see Chart 
4 below). Nevertheless, imports under U.S. preference programs constitute a 
significant share of many beneficiary countries’ exports to the United 
States. In other words, the programs may be economically important to 
certain beneficiaries, even if the programs’ impact on the overall U.S. 
economy is marginal.138  
 
 
 
 
  
clothing. See Len Bracken, Kirk Puts AGOA Extension Chances Over 50 Percent, but Not 
Made Permanent, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Aug. 4, 2010. Value-added manufacturing is 
one alternative to textiles and clothing, but that is easier said than done. 
 133. See COOPER, supra note 6, at 5. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Nevertheless, those who compete against GSP imports complain that preferential 
tariff treatment generates unfair competition. See id.  
 138. See GAO OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 129, at 
26. Fuel imports under preference programs account for half of preference imports by value. 
See id. 
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Chart 4.  Imports under U.S. Trade Preference Programs as a Share of Total 
U.S. Imports (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office 
 
B. The Uneven Distribution of U.S. GSP Benefits 
In its first ten years of operation, the U.S. GSP program provided non-
reciprocal duty-free treatment to about 3,000 articles imported from 140 
developing countries.139  In 1986, duty-free imports under the program 
amounted to nearly $14 billion (up from $3.2 billion in 1976),140 or 3.8 
percent of total U.S. imports.141  Seventy-nine percent of all U.S. imports 
receiving duty-free treatment under GSP in 1986 came from seven 
beneficiary countries: Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, Mexico, Brazil, 
Singapore, and Israel (in that order).142 Three years later, four of these seven 
countries—the Asian “tigers” or “dragons” of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, 
and Singapore—were “graduated” from the GSP program based upon their 
general level of development.143  Least-developed countries typically have 
been the beneficiaries of less than one percent of total U.S. GSP benefits.144 
Five years later, in 1991, the number of articles benefitting from the U.S. 
GSP program had increased to approximately 4,300 products, while the 
  
 139. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 
RENEWAL ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 98-1090, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5101.  For an assessment of the U.S. GSP program after its first five years, see HOUSE 
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST 
FIVE YEARS’ OPERATION OF THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP) (Comm. 
Print 1980). 
 140. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1090, supra note 139, at 2.  
 141. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
PROGRAM, 38th Report REP., 5-16 (Pub. No. 1995 1987). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 5-17. 
 144. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1090, supra note 139, at 3. 
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number of beneficiary countries had dropped slightly, but remained above 
130 countries.145  Duty-free imports under the program totaled $13.7 billion 
(2.8 percent of total U.S. imports) in 1991.146  Although the comparable 
figures for 1986 are larger, the decrease is explained in part by the fact that 
two other trade preference programs had been launched since 1986, the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative and the U.S.-Israeli Free Trade Agreement, under 
which articles previously entered into the United States duty free under GSP 
now entered under one or the other of these new preferential trade 
programs.  The top ten GSP beneficiaries in 1991, accounting for 83 percent 
of total GSP duty-free imports, were Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil, 
Philippines, India, Israel, Argentina, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia, with 
Mexico capturing 28 percent of all GSP duty-free imports to the United 
States that year.147 In 1994, $104 billion in imports were entered from 
beneficiary-developing countries (BDCs), of which $18 billion received 
duty-free treatment under the GSP program, or 17 percent of total BDC 
imports.148  The rank order of the top ten beneficiary countries remained 
essentially the same, with the countries on the 1991 top-ten list moving up 
following the removal of Mexico and Yugoslavia.149  Two new names in the 
ranks of the top ten were Venezuela (8th) and Russia (10th).  The top ten 
GSP beneficiaries accounted for 82 percent of total GSP duty-free imports 
into the United States in 1994.150 In 1995, there were $112 billion in total 
imports from BDCs, with the top ten GSP beneficiaries accounting for 83 
percent of total GSP duty-free imports.151 In 1996, $16.9 billion in duty-free 
imports entered under the U.S. GSP program, accounting for 2 percent of 
total U.S. imports.152  
  
 145. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1991: OPERATION OF THE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 157 (Pub. No. 2554 1992). 
 146. Id. at 160.  In 1993, almost 45 percent of total imports entered the United States 
duty free, but only 3.4 percent of all duty-free imports entered duty free under GSP.  See U.S. 
INT’L TRADE COMM’N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1993: OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
PROGRAM 130-32 (Pub. No. 2769 1994). 
 147. THE YEAR IN TRADE 1991, supra note 145, at 161. Mexico was removed from the 
GSP program with its accession to NAFTA, effective January 1, 1994, under provisions of 
the NAFTA Implementation Act. 
 148. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1994: OPERATION OF THE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 126-27 (Pub. No. 2894 1995). 
 149. See id. at 127. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1995: OPERATION OF THE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 78-79 (Pub. 2971 1996) [hereinafter THE YEAR IN TRADE 
1995].  Russia took seventh place in the GSP top ten and Turkey moved into tenth place. See 
THE YEAR IN TRADE 1995, supra, at 79. 
 152. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1996: OPERATION OF THE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 143 (Pub. 3024 1997).  
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The last major reform of the U.S. GSP program occurred in 1996,153 with 
the goal of redistributing GSP benefits among beneficiary countries. To that 
end, the 1996 amendments changed the benchmark for determining when a 
beneficiary country would be graduated as a high income country by basing 
that determination on World Bank statistics. In 1996 the World Bank 
categorized countries with per capita income of over $8,600 as “high 
income.”  Under pre-1996 law, the per capita income threshold for 
graduation had been $11,800.154 Since the new income per capita threshold 
was considerably lower, more beneficiary countries would in theory 
graduate sooner. Another provision lowered the competitive need limit 
(CNL)155 from $114 million (the 1994 CNL) to $75 million in 1996, with 
  
 153. Small Business and Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188 (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 154. It would take nearly 15 years before the former $11,800 threshold would become 
the World Bank “high income” threshold. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 48, at 465. 
 155. GSP eligibility can be lost on a product-by-product basis once a BDC reaches the 
statutory competitive need limits. The purpose of the competitive need limits is twofold: (1) 
to establish a benchmark for determining when products from particular countries are 
competitive in the U.S. market and, therefore, no longer merit preferential tariff treatment, 
thus giving some measure of import protection to domestic producers of like or directly 
competitive products; and (2) to reallocate GSP benefits to less competitive BDCs. See 
STAFF OF HOUSE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 104TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW AND 
COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 17 (Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF 
U.S. TRADE STATUTES]. The competitive need limits provide that if the value of imports of a 
specific GSP-eligible product from a particular BDC exceed either (1) $150 million in 2011 
(with annual adjustments of $5 million), or (2) 50 percent of total U.S. imports of the product 
by value in a calendar year, GSP eligibility for that product must be withdrawn for that 
particular BDC and the MFN rate of duty imposed the following July. GSP Renewal Act of 
1996, § 503(c)(2)(A)(i)-(ii); 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) & (D).  The 1996 amendments 
repeal the competitive need ceilings of prior law by setting the annual value of imports at a 
fixed dollar figure.  Prior law provided for a ceiling indexed to U.S. GNP, which was $25 
million in 1974, which was increased to $122 million in 1995.  GSP eligibility may be 
restored if in the subsequent calendar year imports of the subject product from that BDC fall 
below the competitive need limits in effect during the preceding calendar year.  Neither of 
the competitive need limits applies to LDBDCs. In addition, the 50-percent import share 
limit does not apply if a like or directly competitive product is not produced in the United 
States. GSP Renewal Act of 1996, § 503(c)(2)(E); 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2)(E). 
  The competitive need limitations may be waived in three circumstances. First, 
the President may waive the 50-percent import share competitive limit, but not the dollar 
limit, on articles for which total U.S. imports are deemed to be de minimis, set at $20.5 
million in 2011 and increased annually by $500,000. Id. § 503(c)(2)(F), 19 U.S.C. § 
2463(c)(2)(F).  The 1996 amendments changed the indexing formula in the prior law that 
provided for an initial de minimis import limit of $5 million, adjusted annually according to 
increases in U.S. GNP ($13.4 million in 1994). See SMALL BUSINESS PROTECTION ACT OF 
1996, S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 355 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474, 1843 
[hereinafter S. REP. NO. 281]. In 2010, de minimis waivers were granted to more than a dozen 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, 
Maldives, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and 
Uruguay) on a host of products. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Results of the 
2009 GSP Review: Decisions on Products Eligible for De Minimis Waivers 2-11 (2010), 
www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2016 (last visited July 21,2011). Second, the President may 
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subsequent increases of $5 million annually. The 1996 amendments also 
provided specific authority for the President to designate additional articles 
as GSP eligible if they originated from least developed beneficiary 
countries. Finally, the 1996 amendments barred consideration of an article 
for GSP treatment for three years following formal consideration and 
eligibility denial of that article.156 
Did the 1996 amendments have their intended effect? The top ten GSP 
beneficiaries in 1996 accounted for 85 percent of all GSP duty-free imports, 
led by Malaysia and followed by Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines.157   
The top heavy distribution of GSP benefits has continued over the past 
decade. As shown in Tables 1 and 2 below, the top ten U.S. GSP 
  
waive both competitive need limits on any eligible article from any BDC, provided (a) he 
receives advice from the ITC on the likely effect of the waiver on any U.S. industry; (b) he 
determines that the waiver is in the national economic interest, after considering the ITC’s 
advice, the overall purposes of the GSP program, and the discretionary BDC-designation 
criteria; and (c) he publishes that determination in the Federal Register. GSP Renewal Act of 
1996, § 503(d)(1); 19 U.S.C. § 2463(d)(1). In making the waiver determination, the President 
must give great weight to assurances from the affected BDC that it will provide equitable and 
reasonable market access, and the extent to which the BDC provides protection to intellectual 
property rights. GSP Renewal Act of 1996, § 503(d)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2463(d)(2). Third, the 
President may waive the competitive need limits for a particular country based on a 
determination that (a) there has been an historical preferential trade relationship between the 
United States and that country; (b) there is a treaty or trade agreement in force covering 
economic relations between the United States and that country; and (c) such country does not 
discriminate against or impose unjustifiable or unreasonable barriers to U.S. commerce. GSP 
Renewal Act of 1996, § 503(d)(3), 19 U.S.C. 2463(d)(3).  The Philippines was the intended 
beneficiary of this waiver exemption, but it has never been invoked. See OVERVIEW OF U.S. 
TRADE STATUTES, supra, at 18; TRADE AND TARIFF ACT OF 1984, H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 98-
1156, at 162 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5279. Waivers remain in effect until the 
President determines that a waiver is no longer warranted due to changed circumstances. 
GSP Renewal Act of 1996, § 503(d)(5), 19 U.S.C. § 2463(d)(5). The President’s waiver 
authority is further restricted by capping total waivers at 30 percent of total GSP duty-free 
imports.  In addition, the top BDCs have their waivers capped at 15 percent of total GSP 
duty-free imports.  Specifically, the President may not waive the competitive need limitations 
in the following two situations: (1) if the aggregate appraised value of articles receiving a 
waiver would equal or exceed 30 percent of total GSP duty-free imports during the preceding 
calendar year; or (2) if the aggregate appraised value of articles from BDCs (a) with per 
capita GNP of $5,000, or (b) which had exported to the United States GSP articles duty-free 
that in the aggregate were more than 10 percent of the total value of GSP duty-free articles 
during that year, would exceed 15 percent of total GSP duty-free imports during the 
preceding calendar year, and those articles are from such BDCs. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(d)(4)(A)-
(C).  
 156. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 48, at 451 n.232.  
 157. See THE YEAR IN TRADE 1996, supra note 152, at 144. Malaysia was graduated 
from the GSP program in 1996, effective January 1, 1997, because it had become sufficiently 
advanced in economic development and had so improved in trade competitiveness that 
continued preferential treatment under the GSP was not warranted. Aruba, the Cayman 
Islands, Cyprus, Greenland, Macau, and the Netherlands Antilles were also graduated in 
1996, effective January 1, 1998, because they had become “high income” countries.  See id. 
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beneficiaries have barely changed over the past ten years and have never 
accounted for less than 75 percent of total duty-free imports under the U.S. 
GSP program.158  
 
Table 1. Top Ten U.S. GSP Beneficiaries, 2000-2010 
(GSP imports in $ millions, rank in parentheses) 
 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Angola 2,843 
(1) 
2,511 
(1) 
2,826 
(1) 
3,883 
(1) 
3,049 
(1) 
4,098 
(2) 
6,774 
(1) 
6,924 
(1) 
7,529 
(1) 
4,142 
(1) 
3,544 
(2) 
India 1,138 
(5) 
1,334 
(4) 
2,041 
(4) 
2,646 
(3) 
3,270 
(2) 
4,179 
(1) 
5,678 
(2) 
4,735 
(2) 
3,965 
(2) 
2,848 
(3) 
3,482  
(3) 
Thailand 2,205 
(2) 
2,201 
(2) 
2,312 
(2) 
2,702 
(2) 
3,143 
(4) 
3,575 
(4) 
4,252 
(3) 
3,820 
(3) 
3,533 
(3) 
2,886 
(2) 
3,612 
(1) 
Brazil 2,086 
(3) 
1,950 
(3) 
2,124 
(3) 
2,490 
(4) 
3,168 
(3) 
3,628 
(3) 
3,738 
(4) 
3,427 
(4) 
2,754 
(4) 
1,978 
(4) 
2,124 
(4) 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
136 91 352 670 
(8) 
806 
(10) 
1,343 
(6) 
1,478 
(6) 
1,193 
(6) 
2,467 
(5) 
1,611 
(5) 
1,275 
(6) 
Indonesia 1,369 
(4) 
1,322 
(5) 
1,513 
(5) 
1,347 
(5) 
1,290 
(5) 
1,594 
(5) 
1,946 
(5) 
2,243 
(5) 
2,161 
(6) 
1,455 
(6) 
1,856 
(5) 
S. Africa 583 
(10) 
506 
(8) 
553 
(8) 
670 
(9) 
949 
(8) 
1,017 
(7) 
1,066 
(9) 
1,190 
(7) 
1,457 
(7) 
742 
(7) 
1,200 
(7) 
Philippines 745 
(6) 
676 
(6) 
708 
(6) 
895 
(6) 
967 
(7) 
1,008 
(9) 
1,141 
(7) 
1,165 
(8) 
913 
(10) 
734 
(8) 
913 
(8) 
Turkey 435 
(9) 
437 
(9) 
472 
(9) 
723 
(7) 
970 
(6) 
1,068 
(8) 
1,126 
(10) 
1,128 
(9) 
917 
(9) 
644 
(9) 
793 
(9) 
Argentina 298 196 287 451 563 617 666 666 
(10) 
1,400 
(8) 
506 
(10) 
578 
(10) 
Russia 515 
(8) 
378 
(10) 
381 
(10) 
430 554 738 512 469 594 252 529 
Venezuela 745  
(7) 
637 
(7) 
582 
(7) 
619  
(10) 
815 
(9) 
745 
(10) 
685 427 251 127 113 
Source: International Trade Commission DataWeb, http://dataweb.usitc.gov 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 158. See Sallie James, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences: Helping the Poor, 
But At What Price? 10 (Cato Institute Center for Trade Policy Studies, Trade Policy Analysis 
No. 43 Nov. 16. 2010), www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12555. 
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Table 2. Top Ten U.S. Beneficiaries’ GSP Imports as a Percentage of Total 
GSP Imports, 2000-2010 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GSP 
Imports 
from Top 
Ten BDCs 
12,664 11,952 13,512 16,645 18,427 22,255 27,199 26,496 27,098 17,546 19,377 
GSP 
Imports 
from Top 
Ten BDCs 
12,664 11,952 13,512 16,645 18,427 22,255 27,199 26,496 27,098 17,546 19,377 
Source: International Trade Commission DataWeb, http://dataweb.usitc.gov 
 
 
At least one self-evident fact emerges from these two Tables: The top ten 
GSP beneficiary countries, regardless of which countries they are, continue 
to capture the lion’s share of U.S. GSP benefits.  This remains the case even 
after many of their imported products are removed from the list of eligible 
articles under the competitive needs limits of the GSP program, and even 
after one of the top ten countries graduates from the GSP program. 
Does the proportionately small amount of trade entering under the GSP 
program mean that the program is underutilized, and therefore can be easily 
eliminated? This may be especially true for many least-developed 
beneficiary developing countries (LDBDCs) that historically are not large 
users of GSP preferences. Some in Congress favor graduating some of the 
more advanced BDCs, thinking that this would leave more room for other 
countries, especially LDCs, to take greater advantage of the program.159 
However, some U.S. business interests have indicated that, absent GSP 
eligibility, importers are likely to seek out the best alternative source for the 
goods, which would probably be China.160 Some observers have also 
 
  
 159. See USTR Considers Withholding Trade Benefits from India, Brazil in Wake of 
WTO Debacle, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Aug. 9, 2006). 
 160. See GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL 
DEBATE JONES, supra note 38, at 2225. “Although the intent of country and product 
graduation is to focus benefits on those countries most in need of the competitive margin that 
preferences provide . . . , remaining GSP beneficiaries will not necessarily profit from 
another country’s loss of preference benefits. . . . China would be most likely to gain U.S. 
imports as a result of a beneficiary’s loss of preferences. In 2007, the President revoked eight 
CNL waivers as a result of legislation passed in December 2006. Consequently, over $3.7 
billion of trade in 2006 from six GSP beneficiaries — notably Brazil, India, and Thailand — 
lost duty-free treatment. . . . GAO’s analysis showed that China and Hong Kong were the 
largest suppliers of the precious metal jewelry formerly eligible under GSP for duty-free 
import by India and Thailand. Canada, Mexico, Japan, and China were the leading 
competitors to Brazil’s motor parts.” See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-08-
907T, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE UNITED STATES NEEDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO 
TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS 5-6 (2008). 
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suggested that the GSP may not be used by some countries due to (1) 
unfamiliarity with the program, or because some BDC governments do a 
poor job of promoting the existence of available opportunities under the 
program, (2) the lack of infrastructure (for example, undeveloped or 
damaged roads and ports that impede the efforts to move goods into the 
international market), or (3) a combination of both.161 Such problems could 
be addressed through trade capacity building efforts (see discussion below 
in Part V). 
When the GSP program was renewed in 2006 it was amid some 
controversy owing, at least in part, to concerns that the more advanced 
BDCs (such as India and Brazil) were contributing to the impasse in the 
Doha Round. Compromise language worked out between the House and 
Senate extended the GSP for two years for all countries, while instructing 
the President to revoke CNL waivers for products of certain countries.162 
Some in Congress continue to be concerned that certain “more advanced” 
developing countries (again, India and Brazil) are receiving benefits to the 
exclusion of comparatively lesser-developed countries.163 
C. Conditionality under U.S. Trade Preference Programs 
1. The U.S. GSP Program164 
Two categories of beneficiary country exist under the U.S. GSP 
program: beneficiary developing countries (BDCs) and least-developed 
beneficiary developing countries (LDBDCs).  Section 502 imposes 
mandatory conditions circumscribing the President’s authority to designate 
a country as either a BDC or LDBDC.165  First, the President is prohibited 
from designating specific developed countries as BDCs: Australia, Canada, 
  
 161. See GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL 
DEBATE, JONES, supra note 38, at 17, 22. 
 162. See id. at 16.  
 163. See id. 
 164. The U.S. Trade Representative has published a GSP guide, OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES GUIDEBOOK (2010), 
available at www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1597. See also UNCTAD, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF 
PREFERENCES: HANDBOOK ON THE SCHEME OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2010), 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc58rev2_en.pdf.  For early critiques of 
the operation of the U.S. GSP program, see Barry H. Nemmers & Ted Rowland, The U.S. 
Generalized System of Preferences: Too Much System, Too Little Preference, 9 L.AW & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 855 (1977); Thomas R. Graham, The U.S. Generalized System of 
Preferences for Developing Countries: International Innovation and the Art of the Possible, 
72 AM. J. INT’L L. 513 (1978); Rachael McCulloch, Note, United States Preferences: The 
Proposed System, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 216 (1974); Leslie A. Glick, The Generalized 
System of Preferences: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 30 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 284 (1983); 
Leslie A. Glick, The Generalized System of Preferences Revisited, 32 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 
139 (1985).  
 165. 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (2002); Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title V, § 502. 
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EU-member countries, Iceland, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, and 
Switzerland.166 Second, the President may not designate a country as a BDC 
that: 
(1) is a Communist country, unless (a) it receives MFN treatment, (b) it is 
a member of both the WTO and the IMF, and (c) it is not dominated or 
controlled by international communism; 
(2) is a party to a cartel that effect of which is (a) to withhold supplies of 
vital commodity resources from international trade or raise their price to 
an unreasonable level, and (b) to cause serious disruption of the world 
economy;[167] 
(3) affords preferential treatment to the products of a developed country, 
other than the United States, which is likely to have a significant adverse 
impact on U.S. commerce; 
(4) has nationalized or expropriated, de facto or de jure, property owned 
by U.S. citizens or businesses which are 50-percent beneficially owned by 
U.S. citizens, unless the President determines either that prompt, adequate, 
and effective compensation has been paid; that good faith negotiations on 
compensation are in progress; or that the dispute has been submitted to 
binding international arbitration; 
(5) fails to recognize or enforce arbitral awards in favor of U.S. citizens or 
businesses which are 50-percent beneficially owned by U.S. citizens; 
(6) aids or abets, by granting sanctuary from prosecution to, any individual 
or group which has committed an act of international terrorism; and 
(7) has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized 
worker rights to its workers. 168 
  
 166. Id. 
 167. The GSP Renewal Act of 1984 made specific reference to members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as being ineligible per se for BDC 
designation.  The reference to OPEC was dropped in the 1996 renewal.  See SMALL BUSINESS 
JOB PROTECTION ACT OF 1996, S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 351 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474, 1843. 
 168. Although most of these conditions were part of the original GSP legislation 
contained in the Trade Act of 1974, the workers’ rights exception was added in 1984.  See 
H.R. REP. NO. 98-1090, supra note 140, at 4-5.  The term “internationally recognized worker 
rights” includes “(A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and bargain 
collectively; (C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a 
minimum age for the employment of children . . .; and (E) acceptable conditions of work 
with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.” 19 
U.S.C. § 2467(4). The President must submit an annual report to Congress on the status of 
internationally recognized workers’ rights within each BDC. 19 U.S.C. § 2464.  An 
unsuccessful court challenge to an alleged failure by the President to carry out his 
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Countries otherwise ineligible because they are countries which fall under 
the disqualifying conditions stated in paragraphs (4)-(7) may nevertheless 
receive BDC designation if the President determines that such designation 
will be in the national economic interest of the United States and reports 
that determination to Congress with his reasons.169 
In addition to the mandatory conditions that the President must take into 
consideration when making a GSP country-eligibility designation, the 
President is required to take into account a list of seven discretionary factors 
when making his BDC determination: (1) an expression by such country of 
its desire to be so designated; (2) the country’s level of economic 
development; (3) whether other major developed countries (e.g., Canada, 
the EU, Japan) are extending GSP treatment to the country (which is in 
large part an inquiry into whether U.S. major trading partners have 
graduated such country from their GSP program); (4) the extent to which 
such country has assured the United States that it will provide equitable and 
reasonable market access and refrain from engaging in unreasonable export 
practices; (5) the extent to which such country is providing adequate and 
effective protection of intellectual property rights;170 (6) the extent to which 
such country has taken steps to reduce barriers to investment and trade in 
services; and (7) whether or not such country has taken or is taking steps to 
afford its workers internationally recognized worker rights.171 
Regarding the designation of a least-developed developing country as an 
LDBDC, the President is authorized generally to designate any country as 
  
responsibilities under this section was made in Int’l Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. 
Bush, 752 F. Supp. 495 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 169. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462(c), 2463(d).   
 170. For example, in 1997 Argentina lost fifty50 percent of its GSP benefits for its 
failure to provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products.  See U.S. to Cut Argentine 
GSP Benefits for Failure to Provide Patent Protection, 14 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 106 
(1997). 
 171. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c).  The discretionary criteria listed in (5), (6) and (7) were 
added by the GSP Renewal Act of 1984.  See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1090, supra note 140, at 12-
13. For example, in 1995, Maldives was suspended as a GSP beneficiary following a 
determination that it had not taken and was not taking steps to afford its workers 
internationally recognized workers’ rights. In 1996, President Clinton suspended certain GSP 
benefits from Pakistan for its failure to make sufficient progress in protecting worker rights. 
See BHALA  & KENNEDY, supra note 48, at 464-68. 
  On top of the many conditions that developing countries are subject to in order to 
become GSP eligible, it has been suggested that other conditions be added. One such 
additional condition is a commitment to adopt climate change measures.  See Michael 
McKenzie, Climate Change and the Generalized System of Preferences, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
679 (2008). As part of its GSP+ scheme, the EU requires accession to and effective 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention. See infra notes 
224-26 and accompanying text. As recently as 2010 one member of Congress suggested 
adding environmental protection to the list of conditions that a country must satisfy in order 
to become and remain GSP eligible. See Rangel Sees Short Term Extensions This Year for 
GSP, ATPA, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Nov. 18, 2009) (proposal by Representative Linda 
Sanchez). 
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an LDBDC, based on the overall economic and discretionary criteria for 
country designations listed above.172 With the exception of statutorily 
exempted articles, he may designate any article from an LDBDC as GSP 
eligible, after receiving advice from the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) that such an article is not import-sensitive in the context of imports 
from least-developed countries.173  The most important special preferential 
  
 172. As of 2011, 42 forty-two countries were designated as LDBDCs. HTSUS, supra 
note 20, at General Note 4(b)(i). 
 173. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(a)(1)(B). Section 503 of the Act authorizes the President to 
designate imports as eligible articles from all BDCs by Executive Order or presidential 
proclamation, after receiving advice from the ITC that the articles are not “import sensitive” 
and are thus eligible for GSP designation. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(a), (e). The President may also 
designate certain articles as GSP eligible for LDBDCs exclusively, after receiving advice 
from the ITC that the articles are not “import sensitive” and are thus eligible for GSP 
designation.  The President may not designate any article as GSP eligible that is within any 
of the following seven categories of import-sensitive articles: (1) most textiles and clothing, 
(2) certain watches, (3) import-sensitive electronic articles, (4) import-sensitive steel articles, 
(5) most footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and leather wearing apparel, 
(6) import-sensitive semi-manufactured and manufactured glass products, and (7) any other 
articles which the President determines to be import-sensitive for GSP purposes. 19 U.S.C. § 
2643(b)(1)(A)-(G). As noted by one commentator, the statutory product exclusions carry 
significant costs for U.S. consumers: 
 
The United States has a generally open trade policy, with a simple 
average tariff (i.e., the sum of all tariffs divided by the number of 
tariff lines) of 3.5 percent and a trade-weighted average tariff (total 
tariff revenue divided by the value of imports) of 2.2 percent. Almost 
50 percent of manufactured products, and just over one third of 
agricultural products, are imported duty-free on an MFN basis. But 
there are significant tariff peaks in the schedule, and a range of other 
trade barriers like antidumping orders that keep import prices higher 
than they would be in a free market. The average tariff on imported 
footwear and leather products is, according to the U.S. International 
Trade Commission, 10 percent, with some types of shoes attracting a 
tariff of 48 percent. Americans paid a (trade-weighted) average 11.4 
percent tariff on apparel imports in 2007. That average obscures even 
higher taxes for individual products, such as the 28.6 percent women 
paid for imported woven man-made fiber pants. In theory, tariff 
peaks should represent valuable opportunities for exporters and 
importers to trade those products duty-free under the GSP program, 
but . . . there are important gaps in the program that prevent those 
opportunities from being realized. 
 
James, supra note 158, at 7 (footnotes omitted). See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, The 
Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints: SIXTH UPDATE 2009, Inv. No. 332-
325, USITC Pub. 4094 at 4, Table 1.1. Articles that are the subject of safeguards relief or the 
national security provisions of sections 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 are also 
ineligible for GSP designation, as are agricultural products subject to a tariff-rate quota that 
exceed the in-quota quantity. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2253, 1862, 2463(b)(2)-(3), 2463(d). 
  Members of Congress occasionally attempt to the product exclusions products 
that are not already statutorily excluded. For example, in 2010, the USTR denied a petition to 
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rule applicable to LDBDCs is the automatic waiver of the competitive need 
limits. 
A BDC may lose GSP benefits in whole or in part in one of two ways: 
(1) by being declared ineligible as a beneficiary country under the 
discretionary or mandatory criteria of the GSP statute, or (2) on an article-
by-article basis if a BDC exceeds the competitive need limits of the Act. 
The President has general authority to withdraw, suspend, or limit a 
country’s BDC designation on the basis of any of the seven discretionary 
factors.174 Graduation from the GSP program is mandatory once a BDC 
becomes a “high income” country under the World Bank benchmark,175 or 
as a result of a review of the BDC’s advances in economic development and 
trade competitiveness.176  
2. The CBERA Program 
The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) is the trade-
related component of the broader program commonly referred to as the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative or CBI.177  Enacted in 1984, CBERA was 
  
remove certain sleeping bags from the list of GSP-eligible products.  See Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, Results of the 2009 GSP Annual Review (2010), 
www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2016. Bangladesh was the primary GSP beneficiary. Id. See 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Results of the 2009 GSP Review: Decision on 
Petition to Remove Certain Sleeping Bags from the List of Eligible Products for the 
Generalized System of Preferences, 2010, Special Review 24 (2010), 
www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2016.  In reaction to denial of the petition, Representative Robert 
Aderholt (R-AL) introduced the Save U.S. Manufacturing and Jobs Act (H.R. 5940) to 
remove sleeping bags from the list of eligible products on the ground that sleeping bags are 
textile products and, therefore, are statutorily excluded.  See Office of Congressman Robert 
B. Aderholt, Press Release, Aderholt Authors Bill to Protect Textile Jobs in North Alabama, 
(July 30, 2010), http://aderholt.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=20&sectiontree=6,20&itemid 
=1040.  
 174. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(d). 
 175. See EC—Tariff Preferences, supra note 15, ¶ 188.  
 176. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e).  The GSP beneficiaries to have been graduated from the 
program most recently were Trinidad and Tobago, Equatorial Guinea, and Croatia because 
the President determined that they had become “high income” countries. See Presidential 
Proclamation 8272, 73 Fed. Reg. 38297, 38298 (June 30, 2008). Pres. Proc. 8467Presidential 
Proclamation to Modify Duty-Free Treatment Under the Generalized System of Preferences 
and for other Purposes, Pres. Proc. 8467, Presidential Proclamation 8467, 74 Fed. Reg. 
69221 (Dec. 23, 2009).  Countries also become ineligible for GSP benefits if they formally 
enter into a bilateral trading relationship with the United States or other developed country. 
Bulgaria and Romania became ineligible for this reason when they joined the EU. 
Presidential Proclamation to Take Certain Actions Under the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act and the Generalized System of Preferences, Presidential Proclamation. 
8098, 72 Fed. Reg. 459 (Dec. 29, 2006).  The same is true for the six Caribbean and Central 
American countries that entered into DR-CAFTA free trade agreement with the United States 
in 2006-07. 
 177. CBERA, supra note 20.  For the legislative history of CBERA, see H.R. REP. NO. 
98-266. For additional background on the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, see U.S. 
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intended to shore up the region economically, politically, and socially.178  
Twenty-four countries and territories were initially designated as CBERA 
beneficiaries, but with the entry into force of DR-CAFTA in 2006-2009 that 
number has been reduced to 18.179  
  
INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT: IMPACT ON U.S. 
INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMERS AND ON BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES (Pub. 4271 Sept. 2011). See 
generally OVERVIEW OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 155, at 19; Francis W. Foote, The 
Caribbean Basin Initiative: Development, Implementation and Application of the Rules of 
Origin and Related Aspects of Duty-Free Treatment, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 245 
(1985); Keiron E. Hylton, International Trade: Elimination of Tariffs on Caribbean Products 
— Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 25 HARV. INT’L L.J. 245 (1984); James E. 
Stamps, Caribbean Basin Initiative: Tens Years of Trade Preference, 3 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 149 (1994). 
 178. In the 1988 CBERA amendments, Congress made the following findings 
regarding the CBI: 
 
(1) Caribbean and Central American countries historically have had 
close economic, political, and cultural ties to the United States; 
 
(2) promoting economic and political stability in the Caribbean and 
Central America is in the national security interests of the United 
States; 
 
(3) the economic and political stability of the nations of the 
Caribbean and Central America can be strengthened significantly by 
the attraction of foreign and domestic investment specifically 
devoted to employment generation; and 
 
(4) the diversification of the economies and expansion of exports, 
particularly those of a non-traditional nature, of the nations of the 
Caribbean and Central America is linked directly to fair access to the 
markets of the United States. 
 
Act of Aug. 23, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1909(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 1318 (1988). 
Originally enacted for a 12-year period, CBERA trade benefits became permanent under the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1990, or CBI II, which reenacted 
CBERA without a statutory expiration date.  CBERA-eligible countries are, for the most 
part, also GSP-eligible. Being a high-income country renders a beneficiary no longer GSP 
eligible, but GSP graduation does not result ipso facto in withdrawal or suspension of 
CBERA benefits. CBERA was significantly expanded by the Caribbean Economic Recovery 
Expansion Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, tit. II, 104 Stat. 629 (1990).  Minor 
amendments were made to CBERA by Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 
Stat. 2948 (1984); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988); and Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
 179. Four other countries that Congress designated as potentially eligible for CBERA 
benefits, but which have not requested to be so designated, are Anguilla, the Cayman Islands, 
Suriname, and Turks and Caicos Islands. The current CBI-eligible countries are listed under 
HTSUS General Note 7.   
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Under CBERA, the President is prohibited from designating a country as 
a CBERA beneficiary for tax or trade benefits in the following seven 
circumstances:180 
(1) the country is a Communist country;181 
(2) the country has nationalized or expropriated U.S. property, including 
intellectual property, or taken action with similar effect, without 
compensation or submission to arbitration; 
(3) the country fails to recognize or enforce arbitral awards in favor of 
U.S. citizens;182 
(4) the country extends preferential tariff treatment (“reverse 
preferences”) to products of developed countries that has or is likely to 
have a significant adverse effect on U.S. commerce; 
(5) the country broadcasts U.S. copyrighted material without the owner’s 
consent;183 
(6) the country has not signed an extradition treaty with the United 
States; or 
(7) the “country has not or is not taking steps to afford internationally 
recognized worker rights (as defined in [the GSP statute])” to its 
workers.184  
 
The President may waive all of these conditions, with the exception of 
the reverse preferences and extradition treaty disqualifications, if he 
determines that the designation of a particular country would “be in the 
national economic or security interests of the United States and so reports 
such determination to the Congress with his reasons therefor.”185 Five of the 
seven mandatory grounds for disqualification have verbatim counterparts in 
the GSP statute.  In addition, while CBERA disqualifies countries that do 
not have an extradition treaty with the United States, the GSP statute 
disqualifies countries that harbor terrorists.  The GSP statute does not have a 
specific exception for pirate broadcasting and, conversely, CBERA does not 
have a disqualification for countries that belong to a commodities cartel.   
Assuming that none of the mandatory factors against designating a 
country as a CBERA beneficiary apply, the President may still take into 
  
 180. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2005). 
 181. For congressional guidelines on what constitutes a “Communist country,” see 
H.R. REP. NO. 98-266, supra note 177, at 8.  Cuba is one clear example of such a country.  
Id. 
 182. A business entity that is at least 50-percent beneficially owned by U.S. citizens is 
included in this subsection.  See 19 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A). 
 183. See generally Richard V. Campagna, Video and Satellite Transmission Piracy in 
Latin America: A Survey of Problems, Legal Strategies and Remedies, 20 INT’L LAW. 961 
(1986). 
 184. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)-(7). 
 185. Id. § 2702(b). 
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account eleven discretionary factors before designating a country a CBERA 
beneficiary:  
(1) the country’s expressed desire to be designated;  
(2) the economic conditions and living standards in the country;  
(3) “the extent to which such country has assured the United States it 
will provide equitable and reasonable access to the markets and basic 
commodity resources”;  
(4) the degree to which the country adheres to multilateral trade 
agreements, including the international trade rules of the World Trade 
Organization;  
(5) “the degree to which such country uses export subsidies or imposes 
export performance requirements or local content requirements”;  
(6) the degree to which the country’s trade policies contribute to regional 
revitalization;  
(7) “the degree to which such country is undertaking self-help measures 
to promote its own economic development”;  
(8) whether or not the country is taking or has taken steps to promote 
internationally-recognized worker rights for its workers;  
(9) the extent to which the country provides “adequate and effective 
means for foreign nationals to secure, exercise, and enforce” exclusive 
intellectual property rights; 
(10) the extent to which the country prohibits pirate broadcasting by its 
nationals; and  
(11) the extent to which the country is willing to cooperate with the 
United States in CBERA administration.186 
The first, second, third, fifth, eighth, and ninth factors have a GSP 
counterpart; the remaining five factors are unique to CBERA.  The only 
discretionary factor unique to the GSP program is the extent to which other 
developed countries extend GSP status to that country. 
Once a country has been designated a CBERA beneficiary, the President 
may later withdraw or suspend the designation, as well as withdraw, 
suspend, or limit the application of duty-free treatment of any eligible 
article from any CBERA country, based on changed circumstances that 
would bar a country from being initially designated a CBERA beneficiary 
under the seven mandatory conditions.187  
In 2000, Congress enacted enhanced tariff preferences under CBERA 
through the U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA).188 In an 
  
 186. Id. § 2702(c). 
 187. Id. § 2702(e)(2)(A)-(B). 
 188. United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, Pub. L. No. 106-200, title 
II, 114 Stat. 275 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §  2701 (2000) [hereinafter CBTPA]. In 
contrast to CBERA which is permanent, CBTPA benefits periodically expire, although in 
2010 the CBTPA was extended for ten years until either September 30, 2020 or the date on 
which the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) or another free trade agreement 
 
2012] The Generalized System of Preferences after Four Decades 575 
 
effort to create rough, but not equal, parity among Mexico and AGOA 
beneficiaries on the one hand and CBERA beneficiaries on the other hand, 
the CBTPA expands the degree of preferential treatment of clothing made in 
the Caribbean region.189 In addition to these clothing preferences, the 
CBTPA provides tariff treatment equivalent to that extended to Mexican 
products under NAFTA for certain items previously excluded from duty-
free treatment under the CBERA program (footwear, canned tuna, 
petroleum products, certain watches and watch parts, certain handbags, 
luggage, flat goods, work gloves and leather wearing apparel).190 
In considering the eligibility of CBI beneficiaries that have expressed an 
interest in receiving the enhanced preferences of the CBTPA, the President 
is required to take into account the existing CBERA eligibility criteria, as 
well as the following:  
(1) whether the beneficiary country has demonstrated a commitment to 
“undertake its obligations to the WTO. . . on or ahead of schedule” and 
participate in the negotiations toward a free trade agreement with the 
United States;  
(2) “the extent to which the country provides protection of intellectual 
property rights consistent with or greater than the protection afforded 
under” the WTO Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights;  
(3) “the extent to which the country provides internationally recognized 
worker rights, including the right of association, the right to organize and 
bargain collectively, a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or 
compulsory labor, a minimum age for the employment of children; and 
acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 
work, and occupational safety and health”;  
  
enters into force with respect to the United States and the CBTPA beneficiary country, 
whichever first occurs. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2), (b)(5)(D). 
 189. Under the CBTPA, duty-free and quota-free treatment is provided for clothing 
assembled in CBI countries from U.S. fabrics formed from U.S. yarns and cut in the United 
States. If the U.S. fabrics used in the production of such clothing are cut into parts in the 
CBTPA beneficiary countries rather than in the United States, the clothing must also be 
assembled with U.S. thread in order to qualify for preferential treatment. Duty-free and 
quota-free treatment is also available for certain knit clothing made in CBTPA beneficiary 
countries from fabrics formed in the Caribbean Basin region, provided that the fabric is 
formed from U.S. yarns. This “regional fabric” benefit for knit apparel is subject to an annual 
quantitative limit, with a separate limit provided for t-shirts. Duty-free and quota-free 
treatment is also available for certain brassieres, certain textile luggage, apparel made in CBI 
countries from fabrics determined not to be available in commercial quantities in the United 
States, and designated “hand-loomed, handmade, or folklore” articles. See OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EIGHTH REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE OPERATION OF THE 
CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT  4 (2009). For a table summarizing the textile 
and clothing articles that are eligible for duty-free treatment under the CBTPA, see THE 
IMPACT OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT, 19TH REPORT, supra note 123, 
at 1-10. 
 190. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b). 
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(4) “whether the country has implemented its commitments to eliminate 
the worst forms of child labor”;  
(5) the extent to which the country has met U.S. counternarcotics 
certification criteria under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 
(6) “the extent to which the country has taken steps to become a party to 
and implement the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption”; and  
(7) “the extent to which the country (I) applies transparent, 
nondiscriminatory, and competitive procedures in government 
procurement and “(II) contributes to efforts in international fora to 
develop and implement international rules on transparency on 
government procurement.”191  
3. The ATPA Program 
The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), enacted in 1991, authorizes 
preferential trade benefits for the four Andean nations of Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Colombia, and Peru.192  The Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication 
Act (ATPDEA) renewed and expanded the ATPA, providing beneficiary 
countries duty-free access to the U.S. market for any product not 
specifically excluded. Sections 203(c) and 203(d) and Section 204(b)(6)(B) 
of ATPA,193 as amended by the ATPDEA, require that countries meet 
certain criteria in order to be designated as an ATPDEA beneficiary country 
and to maintain such beneficiary status. As is the case with the GSP and 
CBERA programs, the ATPA and ATPDEA establish both mandatory and 
discretionary criteria. Designation by the President as an ATPA/ATPDEA 
beneficiary is subject to seven conditions identical to the mandatory criteria 
for beneficiary designation under CBERA.194 These conditions also are 
  
 191. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(5)(B). 
 192. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206. 
 193. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3202 (c), (d), 3203 (b)(6)(B) (2010). 
 194. The mandatory criteria for renewed ATPA benefits and for ATPDEA benefits are 
as follows: 
 
The President shall not designate any country: 
(1) if such country is a Communist country; 
(2) if such country: 
• has nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seized ownership or 
control of property owned by a United States citizen or by a 
corporation, partnership, or association which is 50 percent or more 
beneficially owned by United States citizens, 
• has taken steps to repudiate or nullify any existing contract or 
agreement with, or any patent, trademark, or other intellectual 
property of, a United States citizen or a corporation, partnership, or 
association, which is 50 percent or more beneficially owned by 
United States citizens, the effect of which is to nationalize, 
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expropriate, or otherwise seize ownership or control of property so 
owned, or 
• has imposed or enforced taxes or other exactions, restrictive 
maintenance or operational conditions, or other measures with 
respect to property so owned, the effect of which is to nationalize, 
expropriate, or otherwise seize ownership or control of such 
property, unless the President determines that: prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation has been or is being made to such citizen, 
corporation, partnership, or association, 
• good-faith negotiations to provide prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation under the applicable provisions of 
international law are in progress, or such country is otherwise taking 
steps to discharge its obligations under international law with respect 
to such citizen, corporation, partnership, or association, or 
• a dispute involving such citizen, corporation, partnership or 
association, over compensation for such a seizure has been submitted 
to arbitration under the provisions of the Convention for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, or in another mutually agreed 
upon forum, and promptly furnishes a copy of such determination to 
the Senate and House of Representatives; 
(3) if such country fails to act in good faith in recognizing as binding 
or in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens or a 
corporation, partnership, or association which is 50 percent or more 
beneficially owned by United States citizens, which have been made 
by arbitrators appointed for each case or by permanent arbitral bodies 
to which the parties involved have submitted their dispute; 
(4) if such country affords preferential treatment to the products of a 
developed country, other than the United States, and if such 
preferential treatment has, or is likely to have, a significant adverse 
effect on United States commerce, unless the President: 
• has received assurances satisfactory to him that such preferential 
treatment will be eliminated or that action will be taken to assure 
that there will be no such significant adverse effect, and 
• reports those assurances to the Congress; 
(5) if a government-owned entity in such country engages in the 
broadcast of copyrighted material, including films or television 
material, belonging to United States copyright owners without their 
express consent or such country fails to work towards the provision 
of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights; 
(6) unless such country is a signatory to a treaty, convention, 
protocol, or other agreement regarding the extradition of United 
States citizens; and 
(7) if such country has not or is not taking steps to afford 
internationally recognized worker rights (as defined in section 507(4) 
of the Trade Act of 1974) to workers in the country (including any 
designated zone in that country). 
 
19 U.S.C. § 3202(b). Despite Ecuadorian laws protecting intellectual property and 
membership in numerous international intellectual property organizations, intellectual 
property rights protection and enforcement remain “major problems,” according to the 
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subject to the same waiver authority as under CBERA.195 The President may 
not designate an ATPA/ATPDEA country as a beneficiary if the country 
fails to meet the mandatory criteria, described in the statute as “limitations 
on designation,” unless the President finds that designation would be in the 
national economic or security interest of the United States (the reverse 
preferences criterion and extradition treaty criterion may not be waived).196 
In addition, the ATPA country-designation process is subject to eleven 
discretionary factors identical to those under CBERA,197 with an additional 
  
USTR. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FIFTH REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
OPERATION OF THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE ACT 33 (2010) (copyright piracy described 
as “pervasive,” and pirated products openly sold with little threat of prosecution).  
 195. 19 U.S.C. § 3202(c)(7).  
 196. Id. § 3202(c). That subsection provides, “Paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (5), (7) shall 
not prevent the designation of any country as a beneficiary country under this chapter if the 
President determines that such designation will be in the national economic or security 
interest of the United States and reports such determination to the Congress with his reasons 
therefore.” 
 197. Id. § 3202(d). The discretionary criteria applicable to both renewed ATPA 
benefits and ATPDEA benefits are as follows: 
 
(1) an expression by such country of its desire to be so designated; 
(2) the economic conditions in such country, the living standards of 
its inhabitants, and any other economic factors which he deems 
appropriate; 
(3) the extent to which such country has assured the United States it 
will provide equitable and reasonable access to the markets and basic 
commodity resources of such country; 
(4) the degree to which such country follows the accepted rules of 
international trade provided for under the WTO Agreement and the 
multilateral trade agreements (as such terms are defined in 
paragraphs (9) and (4), respectively, of section 2 of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act); 
(5) the degree to which such country uses export subsidies or 
imposes export performance requirements or local content 
requirements which distort international trade; 
(6) the degree to which the trade policies of such country as they 
relate to other beneficiary countries are contributing to the 
revitalization of the region; 
(7) the degree to which such country is undertaking self-help 
measures to protect its own economic development; 
(8) whether or not such country has taken or is taking steps to afford 
to workers in that country (including any designated zone in that 
country) internationally recognized worker rights; 
(9) the extent to which such country provides under its law adequate 
and effective means for foreign nationals to secure, exercise, and 
enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property, including patent, 
trademark, and copyright rights; 
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twelfth factor relating to narcotics cooperation certification criteria required 
to be met for eligibility for U.S. agricultural assistance.198 The President 
must take the discretionary criteria, described in the statute as “factors 
affecting designation,” into account in determining whether to designate any 
country as a beneficiary country, but he is not barred from designating a 
country that fails to meet those criteria as a beneficiary. Separate 
discretionary criteria exist for ATPDEA eligibility.199 
  
(10) the extent to which such country prohibits its nationals from 
engaging in the broadcast of copyrighted material, including films or 
television material, belonging to United States copyright owners 
without their express consent; 
(11) whether such country has met the narcotics cooperation 
certification criteria set forth in section 481(h)(2)(A) [deemed to be a 
reference to section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1991 by 
section 6(a) of Public Law 102-583] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 for eligibility for United States assistance; and 
(12) the extent to which such country is prepared to cooperate with 
the United States in the administration of the provisions of the 
Andean Trade Preference Act, as amended. 
 
 198. Id. § 3202(d)(11).   
 199. 19 U.S.C. § 3202. The discretionary criteria, applicable to ATPDEA benefits 
only, are as follows: 
 
(1) Whether the beneficiary country has demonstrated a commitment 
to undertake its obligations under the WTO, including those 
agreements listed in section 101(d) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, on or ahead of schedule, and participate in 
negotiations toward the completion of the FTAA or another free 
trade agreement; 
(2) the extent to which the country provides protection of intellectual 
property rights consistent with or greater than the protection afforded 
under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights described in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act; 
(3) the extent to which the country provides internationally 
recognized worker rights, including: 
the right of association; 
the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory 
labor; 
a minimum age for the employment of children; and 
acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, 
hours of work, and  occupational safety and health; 
(4) whether the country has implemented its commitments to 
eliminate the worst forms of child labor, as defined in section 507(6) 
of the Trade Act of 1974; 
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The President’s ATPA withdrawal or suspension authority, and the 
notification procedures to be followed in the event of a proposed withdrawal 
or suspension, are identical to the authority granted under CBERA.200 In 
2008 President Bush suspended Bolivia’s designation as a beneficiary 
country under the ATPA/ATPDEA, effective December 15, 2008, citing 
Bolivia’s failure to meet the program’s eligibility criteria related to 
counternarcotics cooperation.201 In its previous extension of the program, 
Congress stipulated that Bolivia would not receive ATPA/ATPDEA 
benefits after June 30, 2009, unless by that date the President determined 
that Bolivia was satisfying the program’s eligibility criteria. In a June 30, 
2009 report to Congress, President Obama determined that Bolivia did not 
satisfy the program’s eligibility requirements.202 As a result, no 
ATPA/ATPDEA benefits remained in effect for Bolivia after that date, 
although Bolivia continues to be GSP eligible.203 
4. The AGOA Program 
The central U.S. trade and development program for sub-Saharan Africa 
is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), enacted by Congress 
  
(5) the extent to which the country has met the counternarcotics 
certification criteria set forth in section 490 of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291(j)) for eligibility for United States 
assistance; 
(6) the extent to which the country has taken steps to become a party 
to and implements the Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption; 
(7) the extent to which the country applies transparent, 
nondiscriminatory, and competitive procedures in government 
procurement equivalent to those contained in the Agreement on 
Government Procurement described in section 101(d)(17) of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, and contributes to efforts in 
international fora to develop and implement rules on transparency in 
government procurement; and 
(8) the extent to which the country has taken steps to support the 
efforts of the United States to combat terrorism. 
 
 200. Id. § 3202(e). The President was initially required to submit a triennial report to 
Congress on the third, sixth, and ninth anniversaries of the ATPA (1994, 1997, and 2000) 
regarding the operation of the ATPA program. Id. § 3202(f). That reporting requirement was 
subsequently changed to a biennial report. For an overview of the ATPA and ATPDEA, see 
Kevin Grubbs, The Andean Trade Preference Act: Historical Effectiveness, Modern Trends, 
and Outlook for the Future, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 95 (2010). 
 201. Bush Suspends Bolivia’s ATPA Participation Because of Failure to Cooperate on 
Narcotics, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Nov. 28, 2008). 
 202. Rossella Brevetti, Obama Continues ATPA Benefits For Ecuador, Does Not 
Reinstate Bolivia, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (July 2, 2009).  
 203. See HTSUS, supra note 20, General Note 4. 
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in 2000.204 As originally enacted, AGOA had three broad objectives: (1) to 
“increase[] trade and investment between the United States and sub-Saharan 
Africa” (SSA), (2) to strengthen the private sector in SSA nations, and (3) to 
encourage political and economic reform in the region.205 Nearly all 
products of AGOA beneficiary countries may enter the United States duty-
free, either under AGOA, GSP, or under an MFN zero rate of duty.  
Products are eligible for preferential access to the U.S. market from AGOA-
eligible countries in three ways. First, AGOA extends the GSP program for 
beneficiary countries through September 30, 2015. For sub-Saharan African 
exporters, this provides longer-term access to the U.S. market than they 
enjoy under the GSP program. AGOA also eliminates the application of the 
GSP’s competitive need limits.206 Second, AGOA grants the President 
authority to provide duty-free treatment for certain goods not covered under 
the GSP program.207 Third, separate AGOA provisions grant duty-free 
treatment to qualifying apparel articles of beneficiary sub-Saharan African 
countries.208 Very few products of AGOA beneficiary countries are not 
eligible for duty-free treatment.209  
AGOA’s clothing and textile benefits are the heart of the program. 
AGOA provides duty-free and quota-free treatment for eligible clothing 
articles made in qualifying sub-Saharan African countries through 2015. 
Qualifying articles include clothing made of U.S. yarns and fabrics; clothing 
made of sub-Saharan African yarns and fabrics, subject to a cap until 2015; 
clothing made in a lesser-developed sub-Saharan African country from 
third-country yarns and fabrics, subject to a cap until 2012;210 clothing made 
  
 204. See generally note 22.  See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-606 (2000), reprinted in 
2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 323.  For an analysis and critique of AGOA, see J.M. Migai Akech, The 
African Growth and Opportunity Act:  Implications for Kenya’s Trade and Development, 33 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 651, 663-85 (2001); Rebecca Trent, Implications for Foreign 
Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa under the African Growth Opportunity Act, 23 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 213 (2002). AGOA was amended in 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 
1038 (2002), and again in 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-274, 118 Stat. 823 (2004). 
 205. See Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 252, §103 (2000); 19 U.S.C. § 2463 (2000). 
 206. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2)(D). 
 207. 19 U.S.C. § 3721.  
 208. Id. 
 209. The full list of products from AGOA beneficiaries that may enter the U.S. duty-
free may be found in the AGOA Implementation Guide, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, African Growth and Opportunity Act Implementation Guide (Oct. 2000), 
http://ustraderep.gov/assets/Trade_Development/Preference_Programs/AGOA/AGOA_Impl
ementation_Guide/asset_upload_file505_6510.pdf. 
 210. 19 U.S.C. § 3721(c)(1)(A). Through September 30, 2012, lesser-developed 
beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries may use third-country fabric and yarn in apparel 
wholly assembled in their countries and still qualify for duty-free and quota-free treatment. 
exports under the Special Rule are subject to a cap. Lesser-developed countries are those 
with a per capita gross national product of less than $1500 a year in 1998 as measured by the 
World Bank. Botswana, Namibia, and Mauritius continue to receive lesser-developed 
country status and are eligible to use the third-country fabric provision. 19 U.S.C. § 
3721(c)(3). See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2008 Comprehensive Report on 
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of yarns and fabrics not produced in commercial quantities in the United 
States; certain cashmere and merino wool sweaters; hand loomed, 
handmade, or folklore articles, or ethnic printed fabrics; and textile articles 
(e.g., towels, sheets, blankets, floor coverings) produced entirely in one or 
more designated lesser-developed sub-Saharan African countries.211 
Unlike GSP or ATPA where beneficiaries may lose their eligibility status 
through a private-party petition process, AGOA requires the President to 
determine annually whether sub-Saharan African countries are, or remain, 
eligible for benefits based on their progress in meeting criteria set out in the 
Act (a similar biennial process applies under CBERA). These criteria 
include all of the GSP eligibility criteria plus the following: (1) 
establishment of a market-based economy, (2) establishment of the rule of 
law, (3) elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment, (4) 
implementation of economic policies to reduce poverty, (5) the protection of 
internationally recognized worker rights, and (6) establishment of a system 
to combat corruption.212 Additionally, countries cannot engage in violations 
of internationally recognized human rights, support acts of international 
terrorism, or support activities that undermine U.S. national security or 
foreign policy interests.213  
  
U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act 24-25 (2008). The most current data on aggregate 
imports under the cap are available at http://web.ita.doc.gov/tacgi/eamain.nsf/ 
d511529a12d016de852573930057380b/8a3cec919226ed0f852573940048b050?OpenDocum
ent (last visited July 23, 2011).  
 211. 19 U.S.C. § 3721(b). 
 212. Id. §§ 3703(b), 3705. 
 213. The statutory criteria for AGOA eligibility provide as follows: 
(a) In general 
The President is authorized to designate a sub-Saharan African 
country as an eligible sub-Saharan African country if the President 
determines that the country— 
(1) has established, or is making continual progress toward 
establishing—   
(A) a market-based economy that protects private property 
rights, incorporates an open rules-based trading system, and 
minimizes government interference in the economy through 
measures such as price controls, subsidies, and government 
ownership of economic assets;  
(B) the rule of law, political pluralism, and the right to due 
process, a fair trial, and equal protection under the law;  
(C) the elimination of barriers to United States trade and 
investment, including by—  
(i) the provision of national treatment and measures to 
create an environment conducive to domestic and foreign 
investment;  
(ii) the protection of intellectual property; and  
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Table 3 summarizes the eligibility criteria under the four U.S. trade 
preference programs. The next section analyzes the conditions that the EU 
has established for eligibility under its GSO scheme. 
Table 3.  U.S.  Trade Preference Programs: Conditions for Eligibility 
 
  
(iii) the resolution of bilateral trade and investment disputes;  
(D) economic policies to reduce poverty, increase the 
availability of health care and educational opportunities, expand 
physical infrastructure, promote the development of private 
enterprise, and encourage the formation of capital markets 
through micro-credit or other programs;  
(E) a system to combat corruption and bribery, such as signing 
and implementing the Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions; 
and  
(F) protection of internationally recognized worker rights, 
including the right of association, the right to organize and 
bargain collectively, a prohibition on the use of any form of 
forced or compulsory labor, a minimum age for the employment 
of children, and acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and 
health;  
(2) does not engage in activities that undermine United States 
national security or foreign policy interests; and  
 (3) does not engage in gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights or provide support for acts of 
international terrorism and cooperates in international efforts to 
eliminate human rights violations and terrorist activities.  
 
(b) Continuing compliance 
If the President determines that an eligible sub-Saharan African 
country is not making continual progress in meeting the requirements 
described in subsection (a)(1) of this section, the President shall 
terminate the designation of the country made pursuant to subsection 
(a) of this section. 
 
19 U.S.C. § 3703.  
Conditions for Eligibility  GSP CBERA ATPA AGOA 
Beneficiary is not classified as a high-income country based on World Bank 
criteria 
    
Beneficiary must not be a Communist country, subject to certain exceptions     
Beneficiary has not expropriated or nationalized property of U.S. persons 
without compensation and other due process protections 
    
Beneficiary has acted in good faith in recognizing as binding or in enforcing 
arbitral awards in favor of U.S. persons 
    
Beneficiary does not afford preferential treatment to the products of a developed 
country, other than the United States 
    
Beneficiary does not engage in the broadcast of copyrighted material belonging 
to U.S. copyright owners without express consent 
    
Beneficiary is a signatory to a treaty, convention, protocol, or other agreement 
regarding the extradition of U.S. citizens 
    
Beneficiary has or is taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker     
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†
 Internationally recognized worker rights are defined as the right of association, the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor, a minimum age for the employment of 
children, a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor, and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum 
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. 19 U.S.C. § 2467(4). 
‡  The worst forms of child labor are defined as all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale 
or trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom, or forced or compulsory labor, including forced or compulsory 
recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; the use, procuring, or offering of a child for prostitution, for the 
production of pornography or for pornographic purposes; the use, procuring, or offering of a child for illicit activities in 
particular for the production and trafficking of drugs; and work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is 
carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety, or morals of children. 19 U.S.C. § 2467(6). 
 
With regard to the conditions that are shaded, they all plainly have a 
focus on protecting U.S. commercial and national interests. Query: Where is 
the causal link or nexus between the development needs of beneficiaries and 
these conditions? What “development need” are these conditions 
addressing? Aren’t the needs that are being addressed those of the United 
States rather than those of the beneficiary country? The term “development 
need” would have to be interpreted quite expansively to include these 
conditions within its ambit. These issues are explored more fully at the end 
of the next section. 
D. Conditionality in the EU GSP Scheme 
According to the EU, the EU’s GSP scheme is the most widely used of 
all developed-country GSP programs.214  In the aftermath of the EC—Tariff 
Preferences case, the EU adopted a replacement GSP scheme in 2005 that 
underwent minor technical revisions in 2008. The EU’s current GSP scheme 
creates three separate arrangements:215 (1) standard GSP, which provides 
  
 214. See WTO Comm. on Trade & Dev., Generalized System of Preferences, 
Notification by the European Communities, at 1-2, WT/COMTD/N/4/Add.4 (Mar. 12, 2009) 
[hereinafter EU GSP Notification]. 
 215. See Council Reg. No. 980/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 169) 1. The EU notified the WTO 
of the Council Regulation in 2006. See WTO Comm. on Trade & Dev., Generalised System 
of Preferences, Communication from the European Communities, WT/COMTD/57 (March 
28, 2006). The entire Council Regulation is reprinted in that notification to the WTO. The 
EU GSP scheme was renewed in 2008 for an additional three-year period. See Council Reg. 
 
rights to workers within the beneficiary country† 
Beneficiary is not a member of a commodity cartel     
Beneficiary does not aid or abet any individual or group which has committed an 
act of international terrorism 
    
Beneficiary has implemented commitments to eliminate worst forms of child 
labor‡ 
    
Beneficiary has established, or is making progress toward establishing, a market-
based economy, the rule of law, poverty reduction, and the elimination of 
official corruption 
    
 
Beneficiary has not engaged in gross violations of internationally recognized 
human rights or failed to cooperate in international efforts to eliminate human 
rights violations  
    
 
Beneficiary has eliminated barriers to U.S. trade and investment     
Beneficiary does not engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security 
or foreign policy interests 
    
Imports of a particular GSP-eligible product from a beneficiary country 
(excluding LDCs) do not exceed either (1) $140 million in 2010, with annual 
adjustments of $5 million, or (2) 50% of total U.S. imports of the product by 
value in a calendar year. In either event, GSP eligibility for that product must be 
withdrawn for that beneficiary country, subject to presidential waiver authority 
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nonreciprocal tariff preferences to 176 developing countries and territories 
on over 6,200 tariff lines;216 (2) the Special Incentive Arrangement for 
Sustainable Development and Good Governance (popularly known as “GSP 
Plus” or “GSP+”), which offers additional preferences to support vulnerable 
developing countries in their ratification and implementation of relevant 
international conventions in the areas of human rights, labor rights, 
environment, and good government;217 and (3) Everything But Arms (EBA), 
which provides duty-free, quota-free access to the EU for the 48 LDCs on 
all products (7,140 tariff lines) except arms, ammunition, and parts and 
accessories thereof.218   
The GSP-eligible products are classified as either non-sensitive or 
sensitive products. Non-sensitive products (approximately 3,200 tariff lines 
representing slightly more than half of the products covered) enjoy duty-
free access. Sensitive products (a mix of agricultural, textile, clothing, 
carpets, and footwear items) benefit from a tariff reduction of 3.5 
percentage points off the MFN tariff rate on ad valorem duties, or a 30 
percent reduction of those duties when calculated on a specific rate basis.  
For textiles and clothing, the reduction is 20 percent of the ad valorem MFN 
duty rate.219  
In terms of country coverage, tariff preferences under standard GSP are 
granted to all countries that are not classified by the World Bank as high-
income countries for three consecutive years and which are not sufficiently 
diversified in their exports to the EU.  Lack of export diversification is 
deemed to exist when the value of imports for the five largest sectors of a 
country’s GSP imports into the EU represent more than 75 percent of the 
total GSP imports from that beneficiary country into the EU.220  Any of the 
GSP arrangements may be temporarily withdrawn for serious and 
systematic violations of core human and labor rights conventions and on a 
  
No. 732/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 211) 1 EC) [hereinafter EU Council Reg. 732/2008], http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:211:0001:0039:EN:PDF. 
 216. The EU’s Combined Nomenclature (the EU’s version of the Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System) consists of 9,568 tariff lines, of which 2,405 
carry an MFN duty rate of zero. See EU GSP Notification, supra note 214, at 1-2. 
 217. See generally UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences: Handbook on the 
Scheme of the European Community 12-16 (2008), http://www.unctad.org/en/ 
docs/itcdtsbmisc25rev3_en.pdf; EU Council Reg. 732/2008, supra note 215. See also Lorand 
Bartels, The WTO Legality of the EU’s GSP+ Arrangement, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 869, 991 
(2007) (GSP+ does not comply with Appellate Body’s report in EC—Tariff Preferences 
because, inter alia, “it is difficult to see how the imposition of an immediate cost [in the form 
of adopting and implementing 27 international conventions] on a developing country can be 
seen as a ‘positive response’ to a development need.”). 
 218. See Handbook on the Scheme of the European Community, supra note 217, at 9-
12;  EU GSP Notification, supra note 214, at 4. 
 219. See EU GSP Notification, supra note 214, at 3. For illustrations of the various 
duty-rate reductions under the EU GSP scheme, see Handbook on the Scheme of the 
European Communities, supra note 217, at 3-5. 
 220. EU Council Reg. 732/2008, supra note 215, art. 3(1). 
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number of other grounds such as unfair trading practices and serious 
shortcomings in customs controls.221  This measure was applied in 2006 to 
Belarus on the grounds of serious and systematic violations of labor 
rights.222 In addition, GSP+ benefits may be temporarily withdrawn if the 
national legislation of a GSP+ beneficiary country no longer incorporates 
the relevant human rights, environmental, and good governance conventions 
or if that legislation fails to effectively implement the relevant 
conventions.223 
The GSP+ scheme—formally known as “the special incentive 
arrangement for sustainable development and good governance”—was 
adopted by the EU in order to bring its former GSP program into 
compliance with the Appellate Body report in EC—Tariff Preferences.224 As 
with its predecessor, GSP+ offers additional tariff preferences for countries 
deemed to be “vulnerable,” provided the country ratifies and effectively 
implements 16 core human and labor rights conventions and 11 conventions 
related to the environment and good governance principles (the 27 
conventions are listed in Table 4 below). Imported products originating in a 
GSP+ beneficiary generally receive duty-free treatment.225 This tariff 
preference has the potential for being a significant benefit for GSP+ 
beneficiaries that export products to the EU that are deemed to be sensitive, 
in particular textiles and clothing, and thus excluded from duty-free 
treatment under standard GSP.   
A country is deemed to be vulnerable if (1) it lacks export diversification 
to the EU, i.e., more than 75 percent of its GSP exports to the EU are based 
on five or fewer product groups, and (2) it is a small exporter to the EU, i.e., 
its GSP exports to the EU account for less than 1 percent of total GSP 
imports into the EU.226 The Euro-centric nature of the vulnerability criteria 
is self-evident. 
  
 221. Id. art. 15(1). 
 222. See EU GSP Notification, supra note 214, at 6. 
 223. EU Council Reg. 732/2008, supra note 215, art. 15(2). 
 224. See Council Reg. No. 980/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 169) 1. The EU notified the WTO 
of the Council Regulation in 2006. See WTO Comm. on Trade & Dev., Communication from 
the European Communities, Generalised System of Preferences, WT/COMTD/57 (March 28, 
2006) (the entire Council Regulation is reprinted in the EU’s notification to the WTO).  
 225. EU Council Reg. 732/2008, supra note 215, art. 8(1). 
 226. Id. art. 8(2). Article 8(2) provides as follows: 
 
[A] vulnerable country means a country: 
(a) which is not classified by the World Bank as a high-income 
country during three consecutive years, and of which the five 
largest sections of its GSP-covered imports into the Community 
represent more than 75% in value of its total GSP-covered 
imports; and 
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Table 4.  Conditions for Eligibility in EU Trade Preference Programs 
 
†Core human and labor rights UN/ILO Conventions (Annex III, Council Regulation 732/2008) 
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
5. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
6. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
  
(b) of which the GSP-covered imports into the Community 
represent less than 1% in value of the total GSP-covered imports 
into the Community. 
 
In 2008, the following 16 countries were designated as GSP+ beneficiaries through 2011: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela. See 
Commission Decision 2008/938, 2008 O.J. (L 334) 90 (EC). 
Conditions for Eligibility  GSP GSP
+ 
EB
A 
Beneficiary is not classified by the World Bank as a high-income country for three 
consecutive years 
  
 
Beneficiary is classified as an LDC based on U.N. Economic & Social Council 
criteria  
  
 
Beneficiary must be removed when the value of imports for the five largest 
sections of its imports covered by the GSP into the Community represents less than 
75% of the total GSP-covered imports from that beneficiary country into the 
Community. 
 
 
 
 
 
Beneficiary must be removed when it benefits from a preferential trade agreement 
with the EU which covers all the preferences provided for by the present scheme to 
that country 
 
 
  
Beneficiary must ratify and effectively implement the core human and labor rights 
conventions† and the conventions related to the environment and good 
governance‡ 
  
 
 
GSP-covered imports into the EU represent less than 1% in value of the total GSP-
covered imports into the EU 
 
 
 
Tariff preferences must be removed for products covered in a section of the 
Common Customs Tariff when the average value of EU imports from that country 
of products included in the section exceeds 15% of the value of EU imports of the 
same products from all beneficiary countries over three consecutive years, unless 
imported products under any section represent more than 50% in value of all GSP-
covered imports into the EU originating from that country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The preferential arrangements may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or 
of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following 
reasons: 
(a) the serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the core human 
and labor rights UN/ILO Conventions;† 
(b) the export of goods made by prison labor; 
(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of illicit 
drugs, or failure to comply with international conventions on money-laundering; 
(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices which have an adverse effect on 
EU industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country; 
(e)  serious and systematic infringement of the objectives of regional fishery 
organizations or arrangements of which the EU is a member  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The preferential arrangements may be withdrawn temporarily in cases of fraud, 
irregularities or systematic failure to comply with or to ensure compliance with the 
rules concerning the origin of the products  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where a product originating in a beneficiary country causes, or threatens to cause, 
serious difficulties to an EU producer of like or directly competing products, 
normal Common Customs Tariff duties on that product may be reintroduced at any 
time at the request of a Member State or on the Commission’s initiative. 
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8. Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 
9. Convention concerning the Prohibition and Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor 
10. Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor 
11. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor 
12. Convention concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal   Value  
13. Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation  
14. Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
15. Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain 
Collectively  
16. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
 
‡Conventions related to the environment and to good governance principles (Annex III, Council 
Regulation 732/2008) 
17. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
18. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal 
19. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
20. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
21. Convention on Biological Diversity 
22. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
23. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
24. United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) 
25. United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971) 
26. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(1988) 
27. United Nations Convention against Corruption (Mexico) 
 
Assuming that trade, financial, and development needs are the litmus test 
of the validity of GSP conditionality, the conditions that the United States 
and the EU have established in their respective GSP schemes are both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive. They are over-inclusive to the extent that 
they link GSP benefits to market access for goods, services, and capital, to 
IPR protection, and to the fight against illicit drugs. These conditions 
introduce elements of reciprocity into the GSP scheme. Why are 
conventions on apartheid and genocide included on the EU’s GSP+ list? 
Where is the causal link between beneficiaries’ development needs and the 
27 conventions listed in the EU’s GSP+ scheme? Do all countries have a 
“need” or a risk of suffering apartheid or genocide? Is the EU compensating 
countries for “needs” that they do not have? Will tariff preferences alleviate 
the identified “need”? If not, then the necessary causal link between the 
condition and the preference is broken. In addition, the EU’s vulnerability 
criteria for GSP+ preferences are patently euro-centric which doesn’t 
necessarily translate into a country being vulnerable vis-à-vis other 
countries. For example, certain countries might be major exporters to the 
United States and only to the EU on a secondary or tertiary basis. In other 
words, they might not be economically vulnerable, at least from a more 
global perspective rather than through the lens of the vulnerability criteria 
set out in the GSP+ scheme. Moreover, what does a developing country’s 
status as a Communist country—a disqualifying condition under all the U.S. 
trade preference programs—have to do with its trade, financial, and 
development needs? Why is the Kyoto Protocol on the EU’s list of 27 
conventions? Just how big is the carbon footprint of the GSP+ 
beneficiaries?  
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Both the U.S. trade preference program conditions and the EU’s GSP+ 
conditions are under-inclusive to the extent that none of the conditions 
include preferences for developing countries, for example, that are battling 
an AIDS epidemic or that are the chronic victims of natural disasters. Why 
aren’t such countries singled out for special GSP treatment in either the U.S. 
GSP or EU GSP+ scheme? Why aren’t anti-corruption campaigns one of 
the conditions of the U.S. GSP program? Exactly who are the intended 
beneficiaries of the GSP programs? The clear focus of some of the U.S. and 
EU conditions is on the economic and social welfare of persons in the EU 
and the United States rather than on the economic and social welfare of 
persons living in the developing world. 
E. Conditionality Revisited 
The legality of conditionality in GSP programs, whether such conditions 
actually promote development, and whether they even have a colorable link 
to trade and development have been hotly contested.227 Furthermore, critics 
of GSP conditionality charge that preference-granting countries’ conditions 
violate principles of morality, justice, and equality.228 Regarding the legality 
of GSP conditionality, do such conditions violate the spirit, if not the letter, 
of the Enabling Clause? The Appellate Body’s report in EC—Tariff 
Preferences notwithstanding, the preamble to the GSP Decision refers to 
“mutually acceptable arrangements . . . drawn up in the UNCTAD 
concerning the establishment of generalized, non-discriminatory, non-
reciprocal preferential tariff treatment.”229 While preambulary language 
does not create a legally binding commitment, the Enabling Clause makes 
permanent the GSP “described in” the GSP Decision.230 No one has ever 
seriously argued that national GSP schemes are the product of a “mutually 
acceptable arrangement” between preference-granting and beneficiary 
countries. The phrase “mutually acceptable arrangement,” contemplates 
consultation, if not a modicum of negotiation as well. Because GSP 
schemes are unilateral in nature, by definition they cannot be mutual. 
Beyond that, however, the Appellate Body in EC—Tariff Preferences 
elevated the preambulary language to a legally binding commitment when it 
interpreted the Enabling Clause as permitting discrimination among GSP 
beneficiary countries, provided such discrimination treats similarly 
  
 227. See generally Lorand Bartels, The WTO Ruling on EC–Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries and Its Implications for Conditionality in GSP Programs, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 106, at 463. 
 228. See, e.g., FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE INEQUALITY, AND JUSTNESS: TOWARD A 
LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE 156-68 (2003); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Mini-Symposium 
on Developing Country in the Doha Round: Introduction, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 347, 349-57 
(2005). 
 229. Waiver Decision on a Generalized System of Preferences, supra note 68, prmbl. 
 230. Enabling Clause, supra note 47, at n.3. 
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circumstanced countries in a similar fashion.231 The Appellate Body gave a 
rather perfunctory interpretation of the pivotal term “generalized” as 
meaning that GSP schemes must be “generally applicable,”232 thus 
approving conditionality to the extent that objective criteria are laid down 
for distinguishing among classes of beneficiaries that have a nexus to the 
trade, development, and financial needs of developing countries. Most 
importantly for purposes of the present discussion, the Appellate Body 
clearly did not adopt an interpretation of the Enabling Clause that condemns 
GSP conditionality per se. In short, according to the Appellate Body, 
identical preferences need not be given to all developing countries. Whether 
the Appellate Body is correct as a matter of law and policy has been 
challenged by more than one commentator.233 As noted by Lorand Bartels: 
The Appellate Body’s reasoning and conclusion are quite plausible from a 
purely textual perspective. However, there are certain outstanding issues 
which could prove problematic in the future. First, it is difficult to share 
the Appellate Body’s confidence that “objective standards” exist according 
to which it might be possible to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate 
developing country needs. . . . Why should Pakistan’s troubles with drug 
production and trafficking be any more a legitimate “development need” 
than another developing country’s problems with poor education, health 
epidemics—or refugee flows (the EC’s rationale for adding Pakistan to the 
list of beneficiaries of the drugs preferences)?234 
Another difficulty is how to square the Appellate Body’s reasoning in 
EC—Tariff Preferences with what the Appellate Body said in the Shrimp—
Turtle dispute regarding discrimination among countries where the same 
conditions prevail. In Malaysia’s challenge to the revised U.S. regulations 
on shrimp harvesting for the protection of sea turtles, the Appellate Body 
stated with regard to discrimination among similarly circumstanced 
countries: “We believe that discrimination results not only when countries 
in which the same conditions prevail are differently treated, but also when 
the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into 
the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing 
in those exporting countries.”235 Building on this, the Appellate Body, in 
  
 231. The Appellate Body reached this conclusion by reference to the French and 
Spanish versions of the GSP Decision which use the phrase “as defined in” rather than “as 
described in” that is used in the English language version.  EC—Tariff Preferences, supra 
note 15, ¶ 147. 
 232. Id. ¶ 156. 
 233. See, e.g., Howse II, supra note 107, at 1352 (the description of GSP programs as 
“generalized, non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal” was meant to be aspirational); Bartels, 
supra note 227, at 482-83. 
 234. Bartels, supra note 227, at 482 (footnote omitted). 
 235. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 165, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) (adopted Nov. 26, 2001). 
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Malaysia’s Article 21.5 recourse challenging the compliance with the 
Appellate Body’s initial Shrimp—Turtle report of the revised U.S. 
guidelines on the harvesting of shrimp, stated: 
We need only say here that, in our view, a measure should be designed in 
such a manner that there is sufficient flexibility to take into account the 
specific conditions prevailing in any exporting Member, including, of 
course, Malaysia. Yet this is not the same as saying that there must be 
specific provisions in the measure aimed at addressing specifically 
the particular conditions prevailing in every individual exporting Member.  
Article XX of the GATT 1994 does not require a Member to anticipate and 
provide explicitly for the specific conditions prevailing and evolving in 
every individual Member.236 
This statement indicates that, in the Appellate Body’s view, GSP 
programs should be sufficiently flexible so as not to be a straight jacket 
when addressing developing countries’ trade, development, and financial 
needs.  Of course, that is not the same thing as saying that the Enabling 
Clause mandates national GSP programs to identify and address all relevant 
trade, development, and financial needs of each individual GSP 
beneficiary.237 Still, the Appellate Body in EC—Tariff Preferences did not 
take the position that it would totally defer to national legislatures insofar as 
conditionality is concerned, leaving them at liberty to impose whatever 
conditions they desire as part of their GSP schemes. Rather, in any future 
disputes concerning GSP conditionality—as unlikely as such disputes will 
be238—the Appellate Body has carved out a role for itself in resolving them, 
albeit an arguably hypothetical role. The Appellate Body added “the 
Revised Guidelines, on their face, permit a degree of flexibility that, in our 
view, will enable the United States to consider the particular conditions 
prevailing in Malaysia if, and when, Malaysia applies for certification.”239  
 
Conditions for Eligibility  GSP CBERA ATPA AGOA 
Beneficiary is not classified as a high-income country based 
on World Bank criteria 
 
   
Beneficiary must not be a Communist country, subject to 
certain exceptions 
    
  
 236. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, supra note 235, ¶ 149 (footnote omitted, 
emphasis in original). 
 237. See, e.g., Bartels, supra note 227, at 483. 
 238. See Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, GSP Programmes and Their Historical-
Political-Institutional Context, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 
107, at 488, 500-02 (authors note the unlikelihood of future disputes concerning the WTO 
legality of GSP conditionality because of the costs involved and human resources required to 
bring a successful WTO complaint). 
 239. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, supra note 235, ¶ 148. 
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Beneficiary has not expropriated or nationalized property of 
U.S. persons without compensation and other due process 
protections 
    
Beneficiary has acted in good faith in recognizing as 
binding or in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of U.S. 
persons 
    
Beneficiary does not afford preferential treatment to the 
products of a developed country, other than the United 
States 
    
Beneficiary does not engage in the broadcast of copyrighted 
material belonging to U.S. copyright owners without 
express consent 
 
  
 
Beneficiary is a signatory to a treaty, convention, protocol, 
or other agreement regarding the extradition of U.S. 
citizens 
 
  
 
Beneficiary has or is taking steps to afford internationally 
recognized worker rights to workers within the beneficiary 
country† 
    
Beneficiary is not a member of a commodity cartel     
Beneficiary does not aid or abet any individual or group 
which has committed an act of international terrorism 
 
  
 
Beneficiary has implemented commitments to eliminate 
worst forms of child labor‡ 
 
  
 
Beneficiary has established, or is making progress toward 
establishing, a market-based economy, the rule of law, 
poverty reduction, and the elimination of official corruption
    
 
Beneficiary has not engaged in gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights or failed to 
cooperate in international efforts to eliminate human rights 
violations  
    
 
Beneficiary has eliminated barriers to U.S. trade and 
investment 
   
 
Beneficiary does not engage in activities that undermine 
U.S. national security or foreign policy interests 
   
 
Imports of a particular GSP-eligible product from a 
beneficiary country (excluding LDCs) do not exceed either 
(1) $140 million in 2010, with annual adjustments of $5 
million, or (2) 50% of total U.S. imports of the product by 
value in a calendar year. In either event, GSP eligibility for 
that product must be withdrawn for that beneficiary 
country, subject to presidential waiver authority 
 
 
 
   
 
Does this mean that all GSP programs must be tailored to the individual 
needs of each and every developing country? In the Shrimp—Turtle dispute 
the Appellate Body strongly suggested that the conditions prevailing in a 
country exporting shrimp to the United States must be taken into account. 
However, the EC—Tariff Preferences and Shrimp—Turtle cases arguably 
are an apples-to-oranges comparison, given that the Shrimp—Turtle dispute 
concerned a U.S. import prohibition to protect endangered sea turtles. In 
addition, the Shrimp—Turtle dispute dealt with discrimination under the 
chapeau of GATT Article XX which contains the general exceptions to the 
GATT core obligations of non-discrimination. By its terms, GATT Article 
XX condemns “arbitrary or unjustifiable” discrimination. In other words, 
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the term “discrimination” is not monolithic but rather contextual, having 
different meanings and interpretations depending upon the legal setting.240  
Finally, in its report in EC—Tariff Preferences, the panel identified what 
it described as “a priori limitations” that are a permissible basis for 
discriminating among developing countries in GSP programs, namely 
“import ceilings so as to exclude certain imports originating in individual 
developing countries where the products concerned reach a certain 
competitive level in the market of the preference-giving country.”241  The 
panel’s source for reading into the Enabling Clause an exception for a priori 
limitations was an UNCTAD document, Agreed Conclusions of the Special 
Committee on Preferences, that served as the basis for the 1971 GSP waiver 
and, ultimately, the Enabling Clause itself.242 The Agreed Conclusions 
provide in part as follows: 
The preference-giving countries reserve the right to make changes in the 
detailed application as in the scope of their measures, and in particular, if 
deemed necessary, to limit or withdraw entirely or partly some of the tariff 
advantages granted. The preference-giving countries, however, declare that 
such measures would remain exceptional and would be decided on only 
after taking due account in so far as their legal provisions permit of the 
  
 240. See generally Qin, supra note 106. 
 241. Panel Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R, ¶ 7.108 (Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter 
Panel Report, EC– Tariff Preferences]. 
 242. See Panel Report, EC— Tariff Preferences, supra note 242, where the panel 
states:  
[T]he Panel is of the view that the Agreed Conclusions were 
incorporated by reference into the 1971 Waiver Decision. From the 
above factual review, the Panel considers that the 1971 Waiver 
Decision is intended to cover the Agreed Conclusions. According to 
Article 31.2(a) of the Vienna Convention, an “agreement relating to 
the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty” constitutes context of the treaty. The 
Panel considers that Resolution 21(II) and the Agreed Conclusions 
establish such an agreement relating to the conclusion of the 1971 
Waiver Decision; therefore, they are context for the 1971 Waiver 
Decision in the sense of Article 31.2(a) of the Vienna Convention. 
This is confirmed by the fact that the 1971 Waiver Decision itself 
does not contain any specifics on GSP arrangements. The fact that 
the Enabling Clause incorporates GSP “as described in the Decision 
of the Contracting Parties of 25 June 1971, relating to the 
establishment of generalized, nonreciprocal and non-discriminatory 
preferences to developing countries”, also strongly suggests that 
Resolution 21(II) and the Agreed Conclusions were carried over 
from the 1971 Waiver Decision into the 1979 Enabling Clause so as 
to constitute a context for the Enabling Clause in relation to GSP 
arrangements, and paragraphs 2(a) and 3(c) in particular. 
 
Id. ¶¶ 7.85-7.87. 
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aims of the generalized system of preferences and the general interests of 
the developing countries, and in particular the interests of the least 
developed among the developing countries. . . . 
Certain preference-giving countries provide for a mechanism[,] including 
an a priori limitation formula[,] under which quantitative ceilings will be 
placed on preferential imports. Some of these countries might, 
nevertheless, have recourse also to escape type measures, for those 
products which are not covered by a priori limitation formulae.243 
Without passing on the validity of other types of graduation mechanisms 
in GSP programs, the panel stated in a footnote that “[s]everal of the GSP 
schemes mentioned in this Note [by the WTO Secretariat on WTO 
members’ GSP programs] contain different forms of ‘graduation’ 
mechanisms.”244 The panel added, “[w[hether a particular a priori limitation 
measure in a GSP scheme complies with the terms of paragraph 3(c) [of the 
Enabling Clause] is a matter that can only be decided in light of the 
particular factual setting of the measure, and this is not a matter before this 
Panel.”245 On appeal, the Appellate Body declined to address this question 
or whether a priori limitations are permitted at all. In the words of the 
Appellate Body, “Given our interpretation, which permits differentiation 
among GSP beneficiaries, it is not necessary for us to rule on whether a 
priori limitations are permitted under the Enabling Clause.”246 We are thus 
left to wonder what other a priori limitations, if any, might be permitted 
under the Enabling Clause.  
F. The Top Heavy Distribution of GSP Benefits and the Shrinking 
  Margin of Preference 
As noted, the Enabling Clause alludes to the principle of graduation, but 
makes no express provision for it.247 The former Director-General of GATT, 
Olivier Long, was less elliptical on the subject:  
The contention that equality of treatment creates a condition of inequality 
between developed and developing countries was the main justification 
and motive for the introduction of preferential treatment.  A logical 
consequence of this precept is that, as the economic situation of 
developing countries improves, equality should become progressively the 
rule . . . . [C]ertain developing countries are already competitive in 
  
 243. UNCTAD, Agreed Conclusions of the Special Committee on Preferences, 
TD/B/330, ¶¶ III.1, III.3, attached as Annex D-4 to Panel Report, EC— Tariff Preferences, 
supra note 242. 
 244. Panel Report, EC—Tariff Preferences, supra note 242, ¶ 7.111 n.332. 
 245. Id. ¶ 7.114. 
 246. EC—Tariff Preferences, supra note 15, ¶ 174 n.355.  
 247. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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particular sectors.  In fact, some of them have lost the benefit of 
preferences for certain of their exports within the framework of the GSP.  
* * * * 
Differential treatment should not be looked upon as immutable.  If it were, 
the results of the efforts made through national and international policies 
to promote development would amount to little.248 
Olivier Long’s observation raises a question that has yet to be answered 
satisfactorily: When should a developing country graduate from GSP?   
The principle of graduation from GSP became increasingly popular 
among donor developed countries during the pre-Uruguay Round years.249 
While developed countries have tried to push developing countries down 
the road to fuller participation in the multilateral trading system, developing 
countries have pushed back.250 In fact, no developing country has ever 
volunteered to be graduated.  Preference-granting countries have reminded 
beneficiary developing countries that preferential tariff treatment is neither 
an end in itself nor is it meant to last in perpetuity.251 
While all developing countries may avail themselves of the WTO 
provisions on special and differential treatment, under national GSP 
programs preferential tariff treatment ends for those developing countries 
which attain a certain level of wealth.  For example, as noted above, under 
the U.S., EU, Japan, and Canada GSP programs, graduation is mandatory 
once a beneficiary country becomes a “high income” country under World 
Bank criteria.252 The concept of graduation was put into practice in the years 
leading up to the Uruguay Round, with the most noteworthy being the GSP 
graduation exercise in 1988 when President Reagan graduated the four 
Asian “tigers” of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, which 
  
 248. LONG, supra note 57, at 103-04. 
 249. See Hindley, supra note 40, at 71-74; Gregory O. Lunt, Graduation and the 
GATT: The Problem of the NICs, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 611 (1994). 
 250. See, e.g., Hindley, supra note 40, at 72, where the author notes that in 1979 the 
Group of 77, a bloc of developing countries, rejected the concept of graduation being 
introduced by developed countries.  In the 1982 Report of UNCTAD’s Secretary-General, 
ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, the graduation 
principle in paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause was criticized to the extent it would permit 
developed countries to discriminate among developing countries in their trade relations. See 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF UNCTAD, ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS OF THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 29, ¶ 179, UNCTAD Doc. T/B/778/Rev. 1 (1982). 
 251. Within the Committee on Trade and Development, the view was expressed that 
the Enabling Clause and GSP contemplated differentiation among different developing 
countries, given that they were at different stages of economic development.  See GUIDE TO 
GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 46, vol. 1, at 58. 
 252. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e); supra note 120 and accompanying text.   
596 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:3  
 
collectively accounted for 57 percent of U.S. GSP imports in 1985.253  In 
1996, President Clinton withdrew Malaysia’s GSP designation, effective 
January 1, 1997, because it had made sufficient progress in economic 
development and international competitiveness.254  Five countries were 
notified in 1996 that they were being graduated from the U.S. GSP program 
as “high income” countries, effective January 1, 1998: Aruba, Cyprus, 
Greenland, Macao, and the Netherlands Antilles.255 In 2009 (effective 
January 1, 2011), Croatia and Equatorial Guinea were removed from U.S. 
GSP eligibility as high income countries.256 To date, the economies of these 
countries have not collapsed due to a GSP graduation.257 
What seems to be clear is that unilateral trade preference programs have 
been beneficial for some developing countries, harmful to others, and 
insignificant for still others.258 Take, for example, the U.S. GSP program: 
the statutory goals of the GSP are, in part, to (1) promote the development 
of developing countries; (2) promote trade, rather than aid, as a more 
efficient way of promoting economic development; (3) stimulate U.S. 
exports in developing country markets; and (4) promote trade liberalization 
in developing countries.259 As observed by the Congressional Research 
  
 253. H.R. DOC. NO. 100-162 (1988).  See Reagan Decides Asia’s `Four Tigers’ can 
Fend for Themselves, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 1, 1988, at 7; Jay S. Newman, Korea 
and the American Generalized System of Preferences: Was Graduation A Proper Response?, 
11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 687 (1990).  The EU took similar action in 1995.  See Simon 
Lester, The Asian Newly Industrialized Countries to Graduate from Europe’s GSP Tariffs, 36 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 220 (1995). 
 254. Presidential Proclamation to Amend the GSP, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,719 (Oct. 21, 
1996).  See GSP: Malaysia Graduated from Program, Some Pakistan Products Suspended, 
13 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1629 (1996).  
 255. See Presidential Proclamation to Amend the GSP, 61 Fed. Reg. 54,719 (1996); 
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1996: OPERATION OF THE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 143 (Pub. No. 3024 1997). 
 256. See Presidential Proclamation To Modify Duty-Free Treatment Under the GSP, 
Presidential Proclamation 8467, 74 Fed. Reg. 69,221 (Dec. 23, 2009).  
 257. See, e.g., TOH MUN HENG & LINDA LOW, INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN 
STUDIES, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE GSP ON SINGAPORE 36 (1991). 
Under the U.S. GSP program, if a country loses its GSP beneficiary status, its exports to the 
United States are thereafter assessed the prevailing MFN duty rate, barring eligibility under 
another U.S. trade preference program, e.g., CBERA or AGOA, which does not have a high-
income gradation requirement.  
 258. See Hoekman, Martin & Primo Braga, supra note 41, at 23. 
 259. When it renewed the U.S. GSP program in 1984, Congress identified the 
following ten purposes of the GSP program: 
 
(1) promote the development of developing countries, which often 
need temporary preferential advantages to compete effectively with 
industrialized countries; 
(2) promote the notion that trade, rather than aid, is a more effective 
and cost-efficient way of promoting broad-based sustained economic 
development; 
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Service, “[i]t is difficult to assess whether or not the program has achieved 
these goals, however, because the GSP is only one of many such foreign aid 
initiatives employed by the United States to assist poorer countries.”260 
Economic success within countries is also related to endogenous factors 
such as political stability, sound macroeconomic policies, availability of 
infrastructure to foster industry, and legal/financial frameworks that 
encourage foreign investment. In the period 1996-2007, total U.S. imports 
  
(3) take advantage of the fact that developing countries provide the 
fastest growing markets for United States exports and that foreign 
exchange earnings from trade with such countries through the 
Generalized System of Preferences can further stimulate United 
States exports; 
(4) allow for the consideration of the fact that there are significant 
differences among developing countries with respect to their general 
development and international competitiveness; 
(5) encourage the providing of increased trade liberalization 
measures, thereby setting an example to be emulated by other 
industrialized countries; 
(6) recognize that a large number of developing countries must 
generate sufficient foreign exchange earnings to meet international 
debt obligations; 
(7) promote the creation of additional opportunities for trade among 
the developing countries; 
(8) integrate developing countries into the international trade system 
with its attendant responsibilities in a manner commensurate with 
their development; 
(9) encourage developing countries-- 
(A) to eliminate or reduce significant barriers to trade in goods 
and services and to investment, 
(B) to provide effective means under which foreign nationals 
may secure, exercise, and enforce exclusive intellectual 
property rights, and 
(C) to afford workers internationally recognized worker rights; 
and 
(10) address the concerns listed in the preceding paragraphs in a 
manner that-- 
(A) does not adversely affect United States producers and 
workers, and 
(B) conforms to the international obligations of the United 
States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
 
Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 501(b), 98 
Stat. 3019 (1984), codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2461(b). For the legislative history of the 1984 
Act, see HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 
RENEWAL ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 98-1090 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1501.  
 260. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE, 
supra note 38, at 20. 
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from GSP BDCs increased threefold, from $107.8 billion in 1996 to $313.4 
billion in 2007.261 This may indicate, in very general terms, that the GSP 
and other preferential programs have helped generate some export-driven 
growth in developing countries. However, that is only half the story. Total 
exports from BDCs claiming a GSP preference for their exports increased 
from $11.6 billion in 1996 to $32.6 billion in 2006 (in 2007, GSP imports 
declined slightly to $30.8 billion).262 Thus, the percentage of goods entering 
the United States under the GSP program, relative to total U.S. imports from 
BDCs, has remained relatively flat at around 10 percent.263 This may be due, 
in part, to competitive need limits (absent CNL waivers) on GSP-eligible 
products and mandatory graduation of high-income countries from the 
program.  
If it can be agreed that nonreciprocal trade preference programs are not a 
silver bullet for eradicating poverty in beneficiary countries, is the shortfall 
in efficacy inherent in the programs or is it attributable more to endogenous 
factors within beneficiary countries? Arguably, the internal factors within 
beneficiary countries outweigh the external ones.  One of the intrinsic 
factors for many potential beneficiary countries—especially LDCs—is 
limited supply capacity. If a country lacks the manufacturing capacity to 
supply value-added goods to a potential export market, then the promise of 
duty-free treatment in that market is an especially hollow one. A pivotal 
factor that can determine the impact of trade preference programs on 
economic development is the ability of developing countries to take 
advantage of global trading opportunities.264 A preferential tariff is of little 
benefit to countries without the ability to produce the goods that are subject 
to the preferential duty rate at competitive prices for which import demand 
exists. This ability to produce and trade competitively on world markets, 
which is termed “trade capacity,” is generally related to having the 
appropriate economic conditions and institutions that help attract investment 
and enhance efficiency. Yet, many developing countries’ lack of trade 
capacity prevents them from taking full advantage of opportunities to export 
goods and services. The lack of trade capacity is due to inadequate 
economic, legal, and governmental infrastructure. Poor networks of roads, 
small and outdated ports, inadequate supplies of energy and other utilities, 
rigid financial institutions, inefficient or corrupt customs bureaus, and 
poorly educated citizens are some of many obstacles that can make 
production and exporting difficult and more costly.265  In addition, 
  
 261. See id.  
 262. See id. 
 263. See id. 
 264. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-150, FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE: U.S. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING EXTENSIVE, BUT ITS EFFECTIVENESS HAS YET 
TO BE EVALUATED (2005). 
 265. For example, in Haiti, an apparel manufacturer located in a government-owned 
industrial park complained they did not have reliable public sources of electricity or water. 
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entrepreneurs in developing countries may have little access to information 
about markets and export standards or to affordable financing that would 
enable them to set up a successful export business. Even countries that have 
well-developed industries that produce items with strong global demand, 
with or without the boost of tariff preferences, may need to improve their 
trade capacity. For example, mineral commodities such as oil or agricultural 
products such sugar and soybeans are an important source of export income 
to many developing countries. However, developing a greater diversity of 
export industries requires new skills, technologies, and investment.   
Even assuming that supply capacity exists within a GSP beneficiary 
country and that it is not weighed down by negative internal factors, a 
number of extrinsic factors may raise the bar to foreign market access: (1) 
country exclusions based on economic or political grounds; (2) product 
exclusions for domestic political reasons on items of keen export interest to 
beneficiary countries, in particular textile and clothing products, and for 
economic reasons when a beneficiary has achieved a certain level of 
international competitiveness in a particular product; and (3) rules of origin 
and the associated record keeping that goes with such rules that make 
compliance with them difficult.   
Regarding country exclusions on economic or political grounds, over the 
course the 40-year life of GSP questions about which countries should 
benefit and how more benefits could be directed to poorer countries have 
been raised repeatedly. The concerns relate to the original intention that 
preference programs would confer temporary trade advantages on 
developing countries, which would eventually become unnecessary as the 
countries became more competitive. The GSP program has mechanisms to 
limit duty-free benefits by “graduating” countries that are no longer 
considered to need preferential treatment, based on income and 
competitiveness criteria. As noted, the U.S. GSP program has used two 
approaches to graduation: outright removal of a country from GSP 
eligibility once it becomes a World Bank high-income country, and the 
more gradual approach of ending duty-free access for individual products 
from a country. Why not graduate the perennially largest users of GSP 
programs—for example, Brazil and India—on the ground that they have 
achieved an overall level of international competitiveness to warrant such 
removal? Against the backdrop that some members of Congress were 
concerned that GSP benefits are reaped largely by a few countries while 
many developing countries are not trading much under the program, the 
USTR announced in 2006 that it would conduct a more comprehensive 
evaluation of the GSP program to determine whether the program should be 
changed so that benefits are not focused on a few countries and developing 
  
Consequently, they had to pay for backup electricity generators and trucked-in water to 
operate their factories. See GAO REPORT ON INTEGRATING U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE 
PROGRAMS, supra note 126, at 30. 
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countries that traditionally have not been major traders under the program 
receive benefits.266  As part of that overall review, the USTR examined trade 
and development indicators for large users of the GSP program to determine 
whether they could be considered sufficiently competitive in terms of trade 
in eligible products and, therefore, should no longer be designated as GSP 
beneficiaries.267 No firm conclusions were reached,268 arguably since a 
built-in tension exists with such a proposal because some beneficiaries may 
be very competitive in certain industries but nevertheless have large 
numbers of poor people.269 For example, a large developing country such as 
India may have more competitive export industries than smaller least-
developed countries, but it also may have many more people living in 
poverty who may benefit from the economic opportunities provided under 
trade preference programs.270 At the same time, if GSP beneficiary countries 
are to be differentiated, the process must be consistent with the Enabling 
Clause as interpreted by the Appellate Body in EC—Tariff Preferences. 
Regarding product exclusions for domestic political reasons, as noted 
supra, U.S. preference programs provide duty-free treatment for a little over 
half of the 10,500 U.S. tariff lines, in addition to those that are already duty-
free on an MFN basis for all countries. Still, they also exclude many other 
products from duty-free status, including some that developing countries are 
capable of producing and exporting. Some product exclusions were 
established in preference legislation to protect sensitive U.S. industries from 
  
 266. See GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL 
DEBATE,  supra note 38, at 17. 
 267. See GAO REPORT ON INTEGRATING U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS, supra 
note 125, at 41. 
 268. See GSP: Initiation of Reviews and Request for Public Comments, 71 Fed. Reg. 
45079 (Aug. 8, 2006).  As part of the Trade Policy Staff Committee’s, all previously granted 
CNL waivers were individually evaluated, in addition to the standard practice of examining 
requests for new CNL waivers. The TPSC also examine the eligibility status of several 
middle- income countries (Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Philippines, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela) based on (1) 
their World Bank classification as upper-middle-income economies and (2) the fact that 
exports from each of these countries accounted for more than 0.25% of world goods exports 
in 2005 as reported by the WTO. Although none of these countries were graduated or 
otherwise removed from GSP eligibility as a result of the 2006 review, several competitive 
need limit waivers (meaning that these products had been permitted to be imported duty-free 
under GSP despite the statutory import thresholds) from these countries were revoked. For 
example, effective July 1, 2007, Brazil lost CNL waivers for ferrozirconium and some motor 
vehicle parts exports, and India and Thailand lost CNL waivers for precious metal jewelry 
articles. 
 269. See Andy Sumner, Global Poverty and the New Bottom Billion: What if Three-
Quarters of the World’s Poor Live in Middle-Income Countries? (Inst. Dev. Stud. Sept. 
2010) (author concludes that three-fourths of the world’s poorest people live in low-middle 
income countries, including India, China, Pakistan, and Nigeria, thus complicating the design 
of trade and development programs), http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/GlobalPoverty 
DataPaper1.pdf. 
 270. See id.  
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import competition. As noted, the GSP statute prohibits various “import-
sensitive” categories of products from being designated as eligible, 
including most textiles, apparel, watches, footwear, handbags, luggage, flat 
goods, work gloves, and leather apparel; import-sensitive electronics, steel, 
and glass products; and “any other articles which the President determines 
to be import-sensitive in the context of the Generalized System of 
Preferences.”271 In addition, agricultural products subject to a tariff-rate 
quota are not eligible under GSP for duty-free treatment if such imports 
exceed the in-quota quantity. The three regional trade preference programs 
exclude some of these products as well. U.S. tariffs on a number of these 
excluded products tend to be high.272 However, the statutory language for 
each of these other product categories is based on business conditions as of 
specific dates—June 30, 1989, for watches; January 1, 1994, for textiles and 
apparel; and January 1, 1995, for footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods, 
work gloves, and leather apparel. U.S. industries have changed in the 
intervening years, and these statutory provisions may not be up-to-date.273 
Regarding product exclusions based on international competitiveness 
grounds, the United States uses competitive need limits to end GSP duty-
free status for individual products from individual countries once the value 
or volume of an imported product crosses a certain threshold.274 The 
  
 271. 19 U.S.C. § 2463 (2006). 
 272. The GSP statutes provide some discretion for the President to determine which 
items within some of these product categories are not import-sensitive. Specifically, for 
electronic, steel, and manufactured and semi-manufactured glass products, the President may 
determine which of these items are eligible for GSP benefits, based on advice from the ITC 
about import sensitivity. Typically, the determinations for individual products are based on 
petitions filed by interested parties. There is no administrative discretion to add products for 
the other product categories specifically excluded by statute from GSP eligibility. See 
generally Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Results of the 2009 GSP Review: 
Decisions on Petitions to Add Products to the List of Eligible Products for the Generalized 
System of Preferences 1 (2010), www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2016; GAO REPORT ON 
INTEGRATING U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 125, at 36.  
 273. For example, in comments to USTR on the GSP program in 2006, the Footwear 
Distributors and Retailers of America stated that imports now account for 99 percent of U.S. 
footwear sales and urged that the footwear exclusion be removed from the GSP legislation. 
See GAO REPORT ON INTEGRATING U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 125, at 
37.  
 274. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. The CNL caps—$150 million in 
GSP imports of one product from a single country in 2011, or 50 percent of all U.S. imports 
of the product—are set by statute. When GSP imports of a product reach one of these limits, 
the country is denied GSP benefits for that product unless imports fall below the CNL level 
in a subsequent year and it seeks renewed designation for GSP eligibility. However, an 
interested party could petition for a CNL waiver before imports reach the CNL cap. In 2010, 
President Obama determined that duty-free treatment for certain products from Brazil, India, 
and Thailand should be withdrawn because they had reached the CNL cap for passenger tires 
from Thailand, wood flooring from Brazil, and gold rope necklaces from India. See Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative, Results of the 2009 GSP Review: Products Newly Subject to 
Exclusion by Competitive Need Limitation 2 (2010), www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2016; 
Obama Withdraws Duty Free GSP Benefits For Certain Thai, Indian, Brazilian Imports, 
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rationale for these limits is that they indicate a country has become a 
sufficiently competitive exporter of the product and that ending preferential 
benefits may allow other GSP-eligible countries to expand their access to 
the U.S. market. The value of trade from GSP beneficiaries that is ineligible 
for duty-free entry because of the CNL ceiling is substantial. The GAO 
identified $13 billion in imports in 2006 that could not enter duty-free under 
GSP due to CNL exclusions—over one-third of the trade from GSP 
beneficiaries potentially subject to the CNL ceiling.275   
Although the intent of country and product graduation is to redistribute 
preference benefits more widely among beneficiary countries, GSP 
beneficiary countries will not necessarily benefit from another country’s 
loss of preference benefits. The benefits cannot be transferred directly from 
one country to another; rather, preferences are a marginal advantage that 
can make a country’s product competitive only if other factors make it 
nearly competitive. In fact, the loss of a tariff preference to a given country 
may give an advantage to a country that is not a beneficiary of U.S. trade 
preference programs, such as China.276  
In addition to the uneven distribution of GSP benefits among 
developing-country beneficiaries, as a direct result of the progressive 
reduction in the MFN duty rates on many products imported into the Quad 
countries following the Tokyo Round in 1979 and Uruguay Round in 1993, 
the margin of preference—the difference between the MFN duty rate and 
the GSP duty rate—has been drastically reduced for beneficiary developing 
countries, in many cases to zero.277 For the Quad countries as a group, it has 
been estimated that the margin of preference for industrial products is 
  
INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), July 1, 2010. Regarding Thai passenger tires, when the Obama 
administration imposed safeguards relief on tires from China in 2009 by increasing the duty 
on Chinese passenger tires to 35 percent, U.S. importers turned to Thailand as an alternative 
supplier. Thailand’s success pushed it over the CNL cap, with the result being that its 
passenger tire exports to the United States were subject to the 4-percent MFN duty rate. See 
James, supra note 159, at 12.  
 275. See GAO REPORT ON INTEGRATING U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS, supra 
note 125, at 40.  In 2007, President Bush revoked eight CNL waivers as a result of legislation 
passed in December 2006. Consequently, over $3.7 billion of trade in 2006 from six GSP 
beneficiaries lost duty-free treatment. Members of the business community and members of 
Congress raised concerns that the revocation of these waivers would harm U.S. business 
interests while failing to provide more opportunities to poorer beneficiaries.  See id. at 41. 
Under the regional trade programs CNLs do not apply. 
 276. As reported by the GAO, “In the countries we visited, we repeatedly heard 
concerns that China, or sometimes other countries, would be most likely to gain U.S. imports 
as a result of a beneficiary’s loss of preferences.” Id. at 40. 
 277. For an economic analysis and the policy implications of the shrinking margin of 
preference, see TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION, supra note 41. See generally AMERICAN 
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, RENEWAL OF THE GENERALIZED 
SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (1984). 
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virtually zero, with the exception of textiles and clothing.278 For agricultural 
products, the margin has been estimated to be 3.3 percentage points for non-
LDCs and as much as 14.3 percentage points for LDCs.279 Nevertheless, 
despite the shrinking margin of preference overall, the duty rates for 
selected products that are GSP-eligible can be high.280  
Have the overall benefits of GSP been eroded to the point of irrelevancy 
as a result of the progressive reduction in MFN tariff rates in the last two 
multilateral trade negotiation rounds? Opinion is divided. The answer 
depends to some extent on GSP utilization rates by beneficiary countries, 
i.e., the share of eligible imports entering the preference-granting country 
under its trade preference program.281 One study of the U.S. GSP program 
concludes that U.S. tariff preference erosion may be significant for 
  
 278. See Fabien Candau & Sébastien Jean, What Are European Union Trade 
Preferences Worth for Sub-Saharan African and Other Developing Countries in TRADE 
PREFERENCE EROSION, supra note 41, at 65, 70-71 [hereinafter Candau & Jean]. But see The 
Trade Partnership, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences Program: An Update (2010) 
(noting the economic importance of the U.S. GSP program for both beneficiary countries and 
U.S. consumers), www.tradepartnership.com/pdf_files/2010_GSP_Update.pdf.  
 279. See Candau & Jean, supra note 278, at 70-71. The authors note that in the case of 
agricultural products the average preference margin for all developing countries is higher in 
Canada and Japan than it is in the United States and the EU. See id. 
 280. See, e.g., Coalition for GSP, Statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance 
Regarding U.S. Preference Programs: Options for Reform, Mar. 9, 2010, at 3 (noting 
double-digit duty rates ranging from 12.5-26 percent on GSP-eligible products, such as 
certain household porcelain, china tableware, kitchenware, certain artificial flowers, and 
flashlights), http://www.tradepartnership.com/pdf_files/GSPCoalition_SFC_03092010.pdf. 
Moreover, in a 2001 study conducted by the WTO Secretariat of the Quad members’ GSP 
programs, the Secretariat issued a caveat about drawing any firm conclusions about the 
impact of GSP programs, given the spotty reporting of statistical data. See Note by the 
Secretariat, supra note 25, at 1 (“The elaboration, by the WTO Secretariat, of a study on the 
functioning of GSP schemes was complicated by the lack of comprehensive and easily 
usable notifications by Members and lacunae in the data available on the application of the 
GSP schemes preferences in general. This means that the statistical information, in 
particular, needs to be read with caution.  Moreover, drawing firm conclusions about the 
effects of the GSP from these limited data is fraught with difficulties.”).  
 281. In the United States overall utilization rates are high for nonagricultural products, 
although GSP utilization is low for countries eligible under the three regional trade 
preference programs. See Judith M. Dean & John Wainio, Quantifying the Value of U.S. 
Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries, in TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION, supra note 41, 
at 40-43, 50.  In the case of Canada, one study concludes that for developing countries the 
utilization rate is dichotomous, with the bulk of developing-country exports to Canada not 
utilizing the GPT program because most of their exports receive duty-free treatment under 
the prevailing MFN duty rate. See Kowalski, supra note 78, at 141-42, 159. In the case of 
LDCs, a similar dichotomous situation is observed. See id. at 159.  In the WTO’s 2007 trade 
policy review for Australia, it was observed that the value of preferential tariffs was being 
eroded because of MFN duty rate reductions. See WTO, Trade Policy Review: Australia, 
WT/TPR/S/104 (2007). For a graphical analysis of the percentage of imports entered under 
the U.S. trade preference programs for the largest importers, see of U.S. Trade Preference 
Programs, supra note 129, at 33-35. For the largest U.S. importers, the share of imports 
receiving preferences is a mixed bag. See id. at 35. 
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exporting countries because the preference margins remain high, 
particularly in the case of textiles and clothing.282 The authors of one study 
conclude that “[a]lthough the erosion of U.S. tariff preferences may not 
have large impacts on development, it may be more significant for a large 
number of countries and products than previously thought.”283 However, 
these same authors add a caveat that bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements (FTAs) that the United States has with other countries, e.g., 
NAFTA, will lower the benefit for trade preference program beneficiaries, 
regardless of the program, because such FTAs effectively lower the nominal 
MFN duty rate published in the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United 
States.284  
It is equally important to note that having statutory duty-free access is 
not the same as having such access in practice. Compliance with rules of 
origin, supply capacity, and health and safety requirements affect overall 
utilization rates. The costs of complying with rules of origin in particular—
which can range from one to five percent of the value of the imported 
goods—have a strong tendency to wipe out the benefit of any margin of 
preference.285  One study conducted in 2002 estimated that 62 percent of 
  
 282. See Dean & Wainio, supra note 281, at 31, 61-62.   
 283. Id. at 62. 
 284. See id. 
 285. See Candau & Jean, supra note 278, at 73.  The U.S. Government Accountability 
Office notes the negative impact that competitive need limits and rules of origin can have on 
GSP utilization rates. According to the GAO: 
 
Conditions on product entry are also a significant factor affecting 
opportunities and trade under U.S. preference programs. Two 
specific conditions, “competitive need limits” and “rules of origin,” 
illustrate how administration of program provisions, although 
addressing important policy considerations, may affect the ability of 
beneficiary countries to fully access the opportunities otherwise 
offered by U.S. preference programs. GSP places export ceilings or 
“competitive need limits” (CNL) on eligible products for certain 
beneficiaries that exceed specified value and import market share 
thresholds. (LDCs and AGOA beneficiaries are exempt.) Our 
analysis of 2006 data shows that some 37 percent of the value of 
imports of GSP products from non-LDC, non-AGOA GSP 
beneficiaries — or $13 billion of the $35 billion — were excluded 
from entering duty-free under GSP largely due to CNLs. Researchers 
also warn that rules of origin and related paperwork are often 
complex and can raise costs. As a result, it may not be worth 
incurring the expense of compliance to use preferences. 
Rules of origin for U.S. trade preference programs typically 
specify a minimum percentage value-added to the entering product 
that must come from the beneficiary country in order to qualify for 
duty-free treatment. However, some programs allow countries to 
“cumulate” inputs from other countries or regions. More complex 
rules apply to some products, notably apparel. The fact that U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection [CBP]— the U.S. agency charged 
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imports from all developing countries to Quad members were eligible for 
preferential tariff treatment under all GSP schemes, but only 39 percent of 
such products were entered claiming preferential tariff treatment under one 
of those schemes.286 In the case of LDC imports, the percentages were 64 
  
with enforcing such rules when goods enter the United States — 
used a 70-page PowerPoint presentation to train its officers on the 
conditions associated with apparel access under U.S. preference 
programs is illustrative of the complexity of such rules. For example, 
our meetings with CBP and statements by Haitian textile industry 
groups indicate that some of the rules of origin for HOPE are highly 
complex to administer and use. Indeed, as recently as late November, 
2007 industry sources had indicated to us that HOPE has yet to 
become fully operational for Haiti to benefit because of delays in 
issuing export visas, and the complicated nature of HOPE rules of 
origin. Another possible indication of the impact of rules of origin 
are the “fill rates” for each region’s quotas (known as “tariff 
preference levels”). Within Africa, the LDCs that qualify for 
liberalized rules of origin allowing “third country” (non.-U.S., non-
AGOA) fabric and yarn to be used in apparel and still qualify for 
duty-free entry under AGOA had achieved a relatively high 43.3 
percent “fill rate” for their quotas in 2006, versus other African 
suppliers, which must use domestic African or U.S. inputs, whose fill 
rate stood at 1.8 percent. Recent economic literature also suggests 
that AGOA had some success in increasing export activity for some 
countries, but the increased exports are mainly associated with the 
liberalized apparel provisions. 
 
GAO Report on Integrating U.S. Trade Preference Programs, supra note 125, at 75-76 
(footnotes omitted).  
 286. See Candau & Jean, supra note 278, at 74. The U.S. Government Accountability 
Office reports that “the utilization rate for GSP or GSPLDC imports from all eligible partners 
was 61 percent. The utilization rate for imports from countries eligible for only GSP or 
GSPLDC was slightly higher, at about 75 percent. Countries eligible for GSPLDC, with 
enhanced duty-free access, had a utilization rate of 58 percent. Countries that were eligible 
for AGOA and CBI/CBTPA had utilization rates of 77 percent and 47 percent, respectively. 
The four Andean countries eligible for ATPA/ATPDEA had the highest utilization rate of 90 
percent.” GAO Report on Integrating U.S. Trade Preference Programs, supra note 125, at 78.  
The GAO adds that “to some extent, low utilization of GSP may reflect the fact that coverage 
across programs is relatively uniform for many products, whereas program conditions and 
rules of origin vary. As a result, countries that have access to both GSP and regional 
programs may opt to use the regional programs.” Id. It must be borne in mind that these 
statistics represent aggregate utilization rates. Such rates are not smooth across all countries, 
but rather will vary from country to country and across product sectors. See Patrick Low, 
Roberta Piermartini & Jürgen Richtering, Multilateral Solutions to the Erosion of 
Nonreciprocal Preferences in Nonagricultural Market Access, in TRADE PREFERENCE 
EROSION, supra note 41, at 235-36 (where the authors note that “aggregation often hides high 
variance”). Accord GAO Report on Integrating U.S. Trade Preference Programs, supra note 
126, at 78 (“The utilization rates of the leading GSP exporters to the United States in terms 
of value vary widely, ranging from 99 percent (Zimbabwe) to 9 percent (Chad).”). For 
statistics on the utilization rates of U.S. trade preference programs in 2006 on a beneficiary-
by-beneficiary basis, see id. at 82-91. 
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percent and 43 percent, respectively.287  Given the overlapping nature of 
both the U.S. and EU trade preference schemes, not only with each other 
but also within the United States and the EU, assessing utilization rates and 
the impact of the shrinking margin of preference is a complex exercise. For 
example, a low utilization rate under the U.S. GSP program might simply 
mean that a beneficiary country has entered the imported product under one 
of the three U.S. regional trade preference programs. Such could be the case 
when the applicable rules of origin for alternative trade preference programs 
are more favorable than those of the GSP program—which appears to be the 
case under the three regional U.S. trade preference programs relative to the 
U.S. GSP program and appears to have been the case under the now-
superseded Cotonou Agreement relative to the EU’s EBA initiative.288 In 
other words, familiarity with the administration and rules of origin of a 
preferential tariff regime creates inertia and inhibits resort to an alternative 
one, even if the latter offers a more favorable margin of preference. In 
addition, when the margin of preference is de minimis—say, one to two 
percentage points—the incentive for exporters to seek entry under the 
preferential tariff regime is wiped out by the costs of compliance with rules 
of origin.289 So long as compliance costs are greater than or equal to the 
  
 287. See Candau & Jean, supra note 278, at 74. Candau and Jean observe that under 
AGOA the utilization rate was 67 percent for mineral products, but only 36 percent for 
textiles and clothing. See id. 
 288. See Id. at 74, 76. The EC’s trade relations with the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries are governed by the ACP-EC Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 to 
run for a period of 20 years.  The ACP countries are comprised of 48 sub-Saharan African 
countries, 15 Caribbean nations, and 15 countries in the Pacific. The Cotonou Agreement 
replaced the Lomé Convention (1975-2000). The Agreement received a WTO waiver at the 
Doha Ministerial Conference that expired on December 31, 2007.  See WTO Ministerial 
Conference, European Communities—ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, Decision of 14 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/15 (Nov. 14, 2001). Under the Agreement, ACP countries 
(except for South Africa) benefited from non-reciprocal trade preferences during an interim 
period (2001-07), i.e., duty-free treatment on industrial, certain agricultural, and fishery 
products, subject to a safeguard clause.  Moreover, preferential rules of origin contain 
product-specific requirements that allowed for cumulation between the ACP countries, the 
EU, and overseas countries and territories. Pursuant to the Agreement, the EU negotiated 
reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the ACP countries.  Specifically, 
the EPAs define bilateral trade-related provisions, within the broader framework of WTO 
rules.  Thus, they provide for progressive elimination of tariffs and non-tariff measures 
(including technical barriers to trade), on both goods and services, and address other 
trade-related issues. Development concerns are reflected through flexibility regarding the 
depth of liberalization, its asymmetry, the length of transition periods, and trade coverage 
and exceptions. See Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy 
Review for the European Communities, WT/TPR/S/177/Rev.1, at 37-38 (May 15, 2007). 
 289. As noted in UNILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE PROGRAMS OFFERED BY THE 
UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND CANADA: 
 
Over the past 30 years, the track record on unilateral preference 
programs remains mixed. Although many developing countries have 
benefited overall from the programs through increased exports and 
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margin of preference, no incentive exists for an exporter to seek preferential 
duty treatment.290 In short, a correlation exists between utilization rates and 
the margin of preference; i.e., the smaller the margin of preference, the 
lower the utilization rate.291 Onerous rules of origin and the accompanying 
compliance costs set the stage for even lower utilization rates.292 
  
economic growth, they have also been hamstrung by high costs and 
inefficiencies that program rules often cause.  
Clearly, the rules and criteria that donor countries prescribe for 
granting trade preferences are a daunting obstacle for most 
developing countries to overcome. For example, manufacturers and 
exporters must determine the preference program(s) for which their 
country qualifies, if the programs cover their products, and finally 
wade through complex guidebooks, laws, and regulations to 
determine whether they can meet (and substantiate) the individual 
compliance standards for the various programs. For some producers, 
the costs of compliance may be higher than the tariff preference. 
According to one UNCTAD report, fulfilling the administrative 
requirements related to rules of origin may cost as much as 3 percent 
of the value of the goods concerned. Meanwhile, average applied 
tariffs for non-agricultural goods ranged from only 3.2 percent to 3.8 
percent in the United States, EU, and Canada in 2007. Meeting these 
standards—and doing so in a cost-effective manner—is particularly 
challenging for producers in countries with poor infrastructure and 
limited experience exporting.  
The myriad of rules and potentially high compliance costs affect 
not only developing-country producers’ ability to take advantage of 
the preferences, but also developed-country importers’ willingness to 
source from the GSP beneficiary countries. GSP tariff preferences 
improve competitiveness vis-à-vis imports from developed or other 
non-beneficiary countries, but program uncertainty (i.e., frequent 
expirations), limited country or product coverage, and strict rules of 
origin that increase costs all cut into the real preference margins 
gained by producers and importers alike. In the sense that complex 
program rules limit both overall export growth by and direct 
investment in the beneficiary countries, they severely inhibit the 
ability of the various GSP schemes to deliver on the promise of 
promoting economic development in needy countries. 
  
ANTHONY supra note, at 15-16 (footnotes omitted). 
 290. See Candau & Jean, supra note 278, at 82. 
 291. See id. at 84. 
 292. See, e.g., Low, Piermartini & Richtering, supra note 286, at 236 (where the 
authors observe that “if the cost of compliance with rules of origin exceeds the margin of 
preference, the producer would not use the preference”); Komuro, supra note 41, at 110 
(“The low GSP utilization rate [in Japan] reflects trade liberalization under GATT/WTO and 
Japan’s legal regime. With the promotion of trade liberalization following the Uruguay 
Round, the preference margin gradually decreased; hence, the benefits arising from 
preference margins faded compared to the costs incurred in qualifying for preferences. Major 
exporting GSP beneficiaries . . . incurred significant costs in meeting GSP rules of origin and 
keeping necessary evidence to obtain certificates of origin; moreover, small local industries 
in GSP beneficiaries frequently lack the financial and human resources to comply with 
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If additional reductions in MFN duty rates of developed countries are 
one of the positive outcomes of the Doha Round negotiations, what will be 
the losses for certain developing countries? For example, it is estimated that 
if the Quad cut its MFN duty rates by 40 percent, the loss in exports from 
LDCs in the aggregate—which with some exceptions293 currently receive 
duty-free treatment from the Quad—would be 1.7 percent, with select LDCs 
suffering even greater export losses of up to 11.5 percent.294 In terms of total 
world trade these amounts are small, but for the adversely affected LDCs 
these losses would be a substantial blow. On the other hand, it is estimated 
that developing countries other than LDCs would on the whole stand to gain 
from such MFN duty-rate reductions by the Quad members.295 This 
asymmetrical effect of trade liberalization is more than a little disturbing.296 
However, these estimates rest on three heroic assumptions: (1) that the 
Doha Round will eventually be concluded, (2) that the Doha Round will 
achieve ambitious results insofar as tariff reductions on goods of export 
interest to developing countries are concerned, and (3) that with or without a 
successful and ambitious Doha Round, that the pace of reciprocal bilateral 
and regional free trade agreements will slow or stop. Currently, there exists 
little evidence to support any of these assumptions.297  
Chalk it up to the law of unintended consequences, but one of the 
foreseeable outcomes of the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds was the reduction 
in MFN duty rates. Tariff reductions have always been a top priority on 
negotiators’ agendas at the MTN rounds, and this is no different in the Doha 
Round. However, in the Doha Round there is a clear recognition of the 
problem of the shrinking margin of preference. The shrinking margin of 
preference has arguably created an incentive to foot-drag at the Doha 
Round.298 In 2004 the WTO General Council flagged the issue in a rather 
  
onerous rules of origin.”). It has been suggested that in the case of very low utilization rates, 
where liberalizing rules of origin is not an option, it might be preferable to lower the MFN 
duty rate. See Low, Piermartini & Richtering, supra note 286, at 239. 
 293. Although Australia, Canada, and the EU have extended duty-free treatment to 
nearly all imports originating in LDCs, Japan and the United States have not extended an 
across-the-board, duty-free exception for LDCs. 
 294. See Hoekman, Martin & Primo Braga, supra note 104, at 18. 
 295. See id. at 19. 
 296. See id. at 20. By one estimate real income losses to African LDCs if the EU were 
to eliminate all import duties would be $460 million. See id. In addition to the trade 
preference erosion that beneficiary developing countries will experience if donor countries’ 
MFN duty rates are further lowered in the Doha Round, developing countries that are parties 
to reciprocal bilateral and regional free trade agreements with developed countries will 
likewise experience trade erosion.  
 297. See Daniel Pruzin, Punke Says U.S. Frustrated by Talks With Brazil, China, 
India on Doha Tariffs, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), June 25, 2010; Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief 
Lamy to Admit Doha Talks At Impasse as Fears of Collapse Grow, INT’L TRADE DAILY 
(BNA), (Mar. 29, 2011). 
 298. The U.S. Government Accountability Office has noted the perverse incentive that 
the shrinking margin of preference has created for foot-dragging in the Doha Round: 
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[I]nternational movement toward lowering tariffs has an unavoidable 
effect on the marginal value of trade preferences to beneficiaries. 
Because of this, beneficiary countries’ desire to keep their 
preferential advantages may generate some internal resistance to 
multilateral liberalization. As some countries make unilateral 
decisions to liberalize their national trade policies, and as others 
enter into bilateral and regional trade agreements that result in lower 
tariffs among trading partners, countries that rely on preferential 
margins find the advantages they gain from preferences fading away.  
The erosion of the value of trade preferences poses yet another 
trade-off. All of the preference programs include provisions to 
encourage countries to move into reciprocal and liberalized trading 
relationships. Indeed, a  number of countries that were former 
beneficiaries of preference programs have gone on to conclude free 
trade agreements with the United States, and some have joined the 
ranks of newly industrialized nations. However, members of 
Congress and some administration officials have raised concerns that 
some preference beneficiaries are placing their interests in trade 
preference programs above the broader interest in multilateral 
liberalization, which the United States has traditionally advocated. 
They note that, in an effort to maintain their preference benefits, 
some beneficiary countries have created roadblocks at WTO in the 
Doha Round of negotiations. This was confirmed by U.S. agency 
officials we interviewed. The assurance of continued preferential 
access to the U.S. market has at times, created a disincentive to 
negotiation of reciprocal free trade agreements. For example, 
officials at Commerce and Labor told us that the extension of AGOA 
preferences during the negotiations toward a free trade agreement 
with members of the Southern African Customs Union may have 
contributed to the suspension of those negotiations since countries 
were already granted broad access to the U.S. market. In the past, 
spokesmen for countries that benefit from trade preferences have told 
us that any agreement reached under the Doha framework must, at a 
minimum, provide a significant transition period to allow beneficiary 
countries to adjust to the loss of preferences. Additionally, they 
questioned whether it is even fair to expect certain countries, such as 
small-island states, to survive without some trade preference 
arrangements under any deal that may be reached through WTO 
negotiations.  
[E]conomic studies predict that global trade liberalization, such as 
might be achieved in a new WTO agreement from the Doha 
negotiations, would generally benefit most developing countries. 
Moreover, with regard to preference erosion and its impact on 
developing countries, some research has suggested that the negative 
effects of preference erosion may be outweighed by other factors — 
in particular, the benefits generated by more open trade on the part of 
developing countries. For example, one recent study estimates that 
while a small number of countries, particularly those that currently 
receive very large benefits under existing preference schemes, could 
experience a loss of market access, most countries would benefit 
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oblique manner in the context of negotiations on tariff reductions on non-
agricultural products. The General Council stated that “[w]e recognize the 
challenges that may be faced by non-reciprocal preference beneficiary 
Members . . . as a result of these negotiations on non-agricultural 
products”299—with a similar acknowledgment in the case of agricultural 
products300—and then handed the problem off to the negotiators to devise 
solutions.301  A few suggestions have been made, including the following: 
(1) limit the scope of product coverage when negotiating MFN tariff 
reductions,302 (2) extend the phase-in period for MFN tariff reductions in the 
  
from the expanded market access due to reduced tariffs under the 
Doha Round. 
 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-443, U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS 
PROVIDE IMPORTANT BENEFITS, BUT A MORE INTEGRATED APPROACH WOULD BETTER ENSURE 
PROGRAMS MEET SHARED GOALS 43-45 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 299. WTO, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, Annex B, ¶ 
16, WT/L/579  (Aug. 2, 2004) [hereinafter General Council Decision]. 
 300. See General Council Decision, supra note 299, annex A, ¶ 44. That paragraph 
provides that “[t]he importance of long-standing preferences is fully recognised. The issue of 
preference erosion will be addressed. For the further consideration in this regard, paragraph 
16 and other relevant provisions of TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1 will be used as a reference.” The 
cross-reference is to a document issued in 2003 by the chairman of the Doha Round 
negotiating group on agricultural products. That document called for extending the period for 
phasing in tariff reductions on agricultural products of export interest to developing countries 
from 5 years (a phase-in period that would be presumptively applicable to all agricultural 
products) to 8 years.  See WTO Comm. on Agriculture, Special Session, Negotiations on 
Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments, TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1, ¶16 
(March 18, 2003). 
 301. The General Council instructed the Negotiating Group on Market Access “to take 
into consideration, in the course of its work, the particular needs that may arise for the 
Members concerned.” General Council Decision, supra note 299, annex A, ¶ 44. 
 302. See, e.g., WTO, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-
Agricultural Products, Communication from Mauritius, TN/MA/W/21/Add.1, ¶ 6 (July 15, 
2003) (proposing that tariff lines on products of strong export interest to developing 
countries be either excluded from tariff reductions or that a maximum tariff reduction of 10 
percent on each tariff line so identified be staggered over 10 annual installments); WTO, 
Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, 
Communication from Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of the ACP Group of States, 
TN/MA/W/47, ¶ 11 (March 30, 2004) (proposing that specific tariff lines of products 
exported under preferences be identified and then excluded or adapted so that the margin of 
preference is less drastically affected as a result of MFN tariffs reduction); WTO, 
Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, 
Communication from Benin on behalf of the ACP Group of States, TN/MA/W/53, ¶ 3 (March 
11, 2005) (proposing that certain products of export interest to select developing countries be 
subject to more modest tariff reductions and resulting tariff preference erosion using an 
“index of vulnerability” that is based on three factors: (1) the share of the particular product 
of the importing country on the total exports of the exporting country, (2) the share of the 
particular product of the exporting country in the importing country, and (3) the world 
market share of the exporting country for the particular product; in other words, a country 
will be deemed to be more vulnerable the less diversified its export markets and export 
products and the smaller its share of world trade in those products). See also WTO, 
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case of agricultural and non-agricultural products that are key exports for 
developing countries,303 (3) expand the scope of existing GSP programs to 
embrace excluded products of export interest to LDCs,304 (4) encourage 
developing countries to launch their own nonreciprocal trade programs in 
favor of LDCs,305 and (5) provide compensation to beneficiary developing 
countries that suffer trade losses as a result of MFN tariff reductions.306   
  
Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, 
Communication from Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, TN/MA/W/30, ¶ 18 
(March 25, 2003) (noting that the continued erosion of preferential market access will hinder 
the integration of these countries into the multilateral trading system, and proposing that 
certain unspecified “positive measures” be found to mitigate against the negative impact of 
the loss of preferential market access); WTO, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market 
Access for Non-Agricultural Products, Communication from Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, TN/MA/W/31, ¶ 18 
(March 25, 2003) (same); WTO, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for 
Non-Agricultural Products, Communication from Fiji, TN/MA/W/38, ¶ 13 (June 16, 2003) 
(same).   
 303. See, e.g., General Council Decision, supra note 299, annex A, ¶ 44; WTO, 
Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, 
Communication from Papua New Guinea, TN/MA/W/39, ¶ 24 (July 2, 2003) (proposing that 
tariff reductions affecting GSP schemes in respect of products of vital importance for 
developing countries be implemented in equal annual installments over a period which is 
double the normal implementation period for tariff reductions or 8 to10 years, with the first 
installment being deferred to the third year of the implementation period); WTO, Negotiating 
Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, Communication 
from Morocco, TN/MA/W/34, ¶ 21 (May 9, 2003) (noting tariff preference erosion and 
proposing that tariff reductions and the time period for their implementation be adapted when 
they affect preferences for products whose export is of importance to developing countries 
and least-developed countries benefiting from the preferential regimes). 
 304. Such an expansion would be consistent with the WTO waiver permitting duty-
free access to products originating in LDCs. The waiver was granted for an initial ten-year 
period in 1999 and then extended in 2009 for another ten years until June 30, 2019. See 
WTO, General Council, Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries, 
Decision on Extension of Waiver, WT/L/759 (May 29, 2009). For example, in 2003 Canada 
expanded its GSP program for LDCs by adding 903 tariff line items to the list of eligible 
products and relaxing the rules of origin for clothing. This new coverage includes 
agricultural, textile, apparel, and footwear products.  With the exception of over-quota tariff 
items for dairy, poultry, and egg products, Canada provides duty-free access under all tariff 
items for imports from LDCs. Under the new rules of origin, apparel products exported from 
LDCs will be eligible for duty-free treatment provided they are cut, or knit to shape, and 
sewn or assembled from inputs from any of the 48 eligible LDCs.  Inputs from General 
Preferential Tariff (GPT) beneficiary countries may also be used provided at least 25 percent 
of the content of the clothing originates in the LDC.  The rules of origin for fabrics and yarn 
allow for full accumulation of originating inputs from LDCs or GPT beneficiary countries.  
Any materials used in the textile or apparel products that originate from Canada are deemed 
to have originated in the LDC. See WTO, Comm. on Trade and Dev., Notification of 
Improvements to the Canadian Preferential Scheme for Least-Developed Countries, 
WT/COMTD/N/15/Add.1 (Feb. 13, 2003). 
 305. See, e.g., WTO, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-
Agricultural Products, Negotiating proposal submitted by Bangladesh on behalf of the least 
developed countries, TN/MA/W/22, ¶ 13 (Jan. 8, 2003); WTO, Negotiating Group on Market 
Access, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, Communication from Ghana, Kenya, 
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Some of these proposals—in particular the first and second—are not 
novel. In 1973 during the Tokyo Round negotiations Brazil tabled a 
proposal that would have preserved the margin of preference for developing 
countries under developed-country national GSP programs.307 Its proposal 
included exempting certain products from the MFN tariff-cutting formula, 
expanding the scope of product coverage under national GSP schemes, 
eliminating tariff peaks and tariff escalation, and making overall 
improvements in the GSP. In connection with the last point, Brazil proposed 
the margin of preference be preserved by binding it or, alternatively, by 
phasing in tariff cuts first on a preferential basis in favor of GSP beneficiary 
countries and then thereafter on an MFN basis.308  These proposals also are 
somewhat delusional given that today most developed countries’ tariff lines 
are MFN duty free. In other words, for most products, the margin of 
  
Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, TN/MA/W/27, ¶ 8 (Feb. 18, 2003) 
(proposing that maximum attention be given in the negotiations to reducing and eliminating 
tariff peaks and tariff escalation on products of export interest to developing countries).  
 306. See, e.g., WTO, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market Access for Non-
Agricultural Products, Communication from Mauritius, TN/MA/W/21/Add.1, ¶ 9 (July 15, 
2003) (proposing that the international financial institutions establish a competitiveness fund 
in order to assist the industrial restructuring and adjustment of countries most affected by the 
reduction or phasing out of tariffs); WTO, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Market 
Access for Non-Agricultural Products, Communication from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, TN/MA/W/27, ¶ 11 (Feb. 18, 2003) (proposing 
that the modalities include a procedure for establishing measures to deal with erosion of 
preferences, with the aim of avoiding or offsetting this problem or compensating the affected 
members). Such compensation could, for example, come in the form of direct payments or 
freezing existing export market shares. See Low, Piermartini & Richtering, supra note 287, 
at 221 & n. 8; Hoekman & Prowse, infra note 309, at 437 (the authors suggest the creation of 
a compensation fund to compensate developing countries for their trade losses resulting from 
trade liberalization and the resulting erosion in tariff preferences). This proposal has been 
criticized because if compensation in the form of trade adjustment assistance is to be paid for 
the erosion of potential future preferences, the prospects of arriving at a mutually agreed 
estimate of the present value of future preferences seems extremely dim.  Brenton & Özden, 
supra note 42, at 422. More importantly, the countries that would benefit most from 
compensation would probably not be the ones in greatest need of such compensation but 
rather the ones that have benefitted the most from trade preferences. Id. 
 307. See GATT, Trade Negotiations Committee, Special Procedures for Developing 
Countries, Working Paper Presented by the Brazilian Delegation, MTN/W/2, at 2 (Oct. 26, 
1973), www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91910095.pdf. See also Low, Piermartini 
& Richtering, supra note 286, at 220. 
 308. The first and second proposals are also reminiscent of a call by some developing 
countries in 2004 to postpone the implementation date of the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing out of fear that the elimination of all WTO-inconsistent quotas on imports of 
textiles and clothing would put them at a competitive disadvantage relative to China, India, 
and Pakistan. See Daniel Pruzin, Divide Grows Among Developing Countries over 2005 
Phase-Out of ATC Textile Quotas, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), March 18, 2004; Daniel 
Pruzin, Worried Textile Producers to Meet Sept. 24 on  Strategy to Cope With Quota 
Elimination, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Sept. 23, 2004; Daniel Pruzin, Worried Textile 
Producers Seen Refraining from Proposing Quota Extension at Meeting, INT’L TRADE DAILY 
(BNA), Sept. 27, 2004. 
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preference is zero as a result of the progressive reduction of tariffs over the 
course the MTN Rounds.309  
Some economists point out if multilateral rounds of tariff reductions 
continue, the margin of preference may disappear completely unless the list 
of GSP-eligible products is expanded to include more “import-sensitive” 
products.310 The duty rates on such “import-sensitive” products reflect tariff 
escalation, i.e., duty rates increase as more value is added to a product in the 
manufacturing process, with lower overall duty rates on raw products, 
higher duties on semi-manufactured goods, and still higher duties on 
finished goods.311 This phenomenon is typically observed with duties on 
textiles, clothing, footwear, and processed agricultural products, all of 
which are of keen export interest to developing countries.312  The UN 
Development Program characterizes tariff escalation as a form of regressive 
tax that hits the poorest countries the hardest; i.e., those countries least able 
to pay are forced to pay the highest rates of duty on the products of greatest 
export interest to them.313 However, the scope for expanding the coverage of 
  
 309. See Bernard Hoekman & Susan Prowse, Economic Policy Responses to 
Preference Erosion: From Trade as Aid to Aid for Trade, in TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION, 
supra note 41, at 425, 428 (the authors note that two-thirds of the major items exported from 
Africa to Canada are MFN duty free and that 69 percent of African exports to the EU face a 
zero MFN duty rate). In a 1997 OECD study the OECD found that the degree of erosion of 
preferences resulting from Uruguay Round tariff concessions by the Quad countries was 
indeed significant. See WTO, Market Access for the Least-Developed Countries: Where are 
the Obstacles? Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, at 47, tbl. 12, 
WT/LDC/HL/19 (Oct. 21, 1997) [hereinafter OECD Study]. The study estimated that in 
1997, the loss in the Canadian market was approximately 71 percent, in the EU 26 percent, in 
Japan 34 percent, and in the United States 50 percent. 
 310. See SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 1, at 282. 
 311. See id. at 37-40. The phenomenon of tariff escalation within the Quad members 
“highlights the importance of the GSP for the beneficiary countries, given that the higher the 
tariff escalation in the industrialized countries, the greater the potential benefit for the 
developing countries” if the protected products are included in the GSP programs. Id. at 40. 
 312. See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 37, at 126-27. 
 313. The U.N. Development Program provides the following illustrations of tariff 
escalation in its 2005 Human Development Report: 
 
On average, low-income developing countries exporting to high-
income countries face tariffs three to four times higher than the 
barriers applied in trade between high-income countries. The average 
conceals very large differences between countries and the very high 
tariffs on labour-intensive products of great importance for 
employment in developing countries. For example, while the average 
tariff on imports from developing countries to high income countries 
is 3.4%, Japan imposes a tariff of 26% on Kenyan footwear. The 
European Union taxes Indian garment imports at 10%. Canada levies 
a 17% tariff on garments from Malaysia. 
Trading partners’ ability to pay has little bearing on developed 
country tariffs. Developing countries account for less than one-third 
of developed country imports but for two-thirds of tariff revenues 
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product eligibility to compensate for preference erosion may be limited, 
especially in the case of the EU GSP+ and U.S. AGOA programs.314 At the 
same time, other studies conclude developing countries in the aggregate 
stand to lose little from tariff preference erosion, in the case of both 
agricultural and non-agricultural exports to developed countries, because 
such preference erosion could be more than outweighed by the benefits of 
increased market access, even for developing countries, brought about by 
multilateral trade liberalization.315 Rather than continuing GSP and other 
preferential programs (either through inertia or concern that removing them 
would be seen as a callous act taken against the world’s poorest 
populations), a better approach might be to “assist them in addressing the 
constraints that really underlie their sluggish trade and growth 
performance.”316 As noted by two other economists, “[a] careful analysis 
reveals that the majority of preference-receiving countries obtain very little 
benefit from existing preference schemes and, as a result, would not appear 
to lose much from the liberalization of global trade through lower MFN 
tariffs.”317 It has been suggested if tariff preferences were set at zero, the 
  
collected. They also account for two-thirds of developed country 
imports subjected to tariffs higher than 15%. In concrete terms this 
means that Viet Nam pays $470 million in taxes on exports to the 
United States worth $4.7 billion, while the United Kingdom pays 
roughly the same amount on exports worth $50 billion. Customs 
revenue collection as a share of imports graphically illustrates 
perverse taxation in operation. The effective US import duty for 
countries like Viet Nam and Bangladesh is some 10 times higher 
than for most countries in the European Union. 
Tariff escalation is one of the more pernicious forms of perverse 
graduation. Developed countries typically apply low tariffs to raw 
commodities but rapidly rising rates to intermediate or final products. 
In Japan tariffs on processed food products are 7 times higher than 
on first-stage products; in Canada they are 12 times higher. In the 
European Union tariffs rise from 0 to 9% on cocoa paste and to 30% 
on the final product. 
This tariff structure prevents developing countries from adding 
value to their exports. Tariff escalation is designed to transfer value 
from producers in poor countries to agricultural processors and 
retailers in rich ones—and it works.  
 
Id. at 127 (footnotes omitted). 
 314. See Low, Piermartini & Richtering, supra note 286, at 230. 
 315. See id. at 277, 299; Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, The Doha Development 
Agenda and Preference Erosion: Modeling the Impacts, in TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION, 
supra note 41, at 357-59 (where the author concludes that for developing countries combined 
tariff preferences may be worth about $8 billion in added income, or 0.1 percent of their 
income). 
 316. OECD Study, supra note 309, at 27. 
 317. Brenton & Özden, supra note 42, at 401. 
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added income from increased trade would more than offset the loss in 
preferences, at least for low-income countries.318  
In a twist on preferential trade programs, a small group of developing 
countries currently grant tariff preferences to other developing countries 
within the context of the Global System of Trade Preferences for 
Developing Countries (GSTP).319 In 2010 nine developing countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Paraguay, South Korea, and Uruguay) concluded negotiations lowering 
tariffs by 20 percent on 70 percent of the goods traded between them under 
the auspices of the GSPT.320 While any agreement on cutting tariffs is to be 
lauded, this 2010 agreement can hardly be described as bold. First of all, 
while the group’s total imports in 2009 were $1 trillion, only 10 percent 
came from within the group of 11.321 Second, assuming hypothetically that 
Brazil or India has a 30-percent ad valorem tariff on widgets, a 20-percent 
reduction of that 30-percent tariff still leaves a 24-percent ad valorem tariff. 
Third, exempting 30 percent of the goods traded among the parties to the 
agreement is not an insubstantial carve-out. Undoubtedly, the most trade-
sensitive goods were exempted from the tariff cuts. Finally, the agreement 
must be approved by the national legislatures of the eleven participating 
nations.322 According to a U.S. government official, 70 percent of all 
  
 318. See van der Mensbrugghe, supra note 315, at 359. 
 319. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. The first round of negotiations within 
the context of the GSTP took place in 1988.  At the conclusion, 48 countries exchanged 
concessions and ratified the agreement.  A new round of negotiations under the GSTP 
framework was launched in June 2004 and was concluded in December 2010.  Participants in 
the GSTP included Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, 
Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guyana, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Romania, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tanzania, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe. The text of the Agreement on the Global System of 
Trade Preferences for Developing Countries is available at www.unctadxi. 
org/templates/Page____6207.aspx. See also Sub-Comm. on Least-Developed Countries, 
Negotiating Group on Market Access, Note by the Secretariat: Market Access Issues Related 
to Products of Export Interest Originating from Least-Developed Countries, 15 n.6 , 38 n.24, 
WT/COMTD/LDC/W/35 (Oct. 13, 2004). The list of preferences can be found at the GSTP’s 
website at www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____6206.aspx. The GSTP does not strictly 
meet the conditions for derogating from MFN, but was granted a waiver by the Enabling 
Clause. See SALLIE JAMES, THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: HELPING THE 
POOR, BUT AT WHAT PRICE? 3 (2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/tpa/tpa-043.pdf. 
 320. See Ed Taylor, Brazil, India and Nine Emerging Nations Sign Trade Accord 
Lowering Tariffs by 20 Percent, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Dec. 18, 2010). 
 321. See id. 
 322. Besides the GSPT, many developing nations are parties with other developing 
countries to preferential regional trading agreements. Examples include MERCOSUR among 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement among 
the member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In addition, several 
developing countries have preferential trade programs that are focused on aiding LDCs. 
Among the developing countries that provide duty-free access to all or nearly products 
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customs duties paid by developing countries are paid to other developing 
countries.323 That fact, coupled with the need for domestic economic 
reforms by developing countries, strongly suggest that developing countries 
need to push each to lower their tariffs on trade inter se and at the same time 
to examine and reform their macroeconomic policies.324  
IV. FOUR REFORM PROPOSALS 
Sentiment within Congress has been strong that U.S. trade preference 
programs need to be reformed. In 2009 Senator Max Baucus stated he 
favored an overhaul of the trade preference programs.325 Senator Charles 
Grassley stated he would like to see trade preference benefits spread more 
evenly among the beneficiary countries.326 This article suggests four reform 
proposals: (1) integrate trade preference programs and renew the integrated 
program for a minimum of ten years; (2) revisit conditionality; (3) 
harmonize preferential rules of origin at the international level; and (4) 
provide better focused and coordinated aid for trade. 
A. Integrate U.S. Trade Preference Programs and Renew the  
  Integrated  Program for a Minimum Ten-Year Period 
There are at least six alternatives open to preference-granting countries 
under their respective trade preference schemes, in particular to the United 
States: (1) renew the existing programs for all beneficiaries without major 
amendments; (2) extend the programs in a modified form; (3) allow the 
GSP program to expire permanently; (4) support reciprocal tariff and 
market access benefits through free trade agreements; (5) renew the GSP for 
LDC beneficiaries only; or (6) in the case of the four U.S. trade preference 
  
originating in LDCs are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, and Uzbekistan. See Sub-Comm. on Least-Developed Countries, Note by the 
Secretariat: Market Access for Products and Services of Export Interest to Least-Developed 
Countries, 41-44 tbl. 3, WT/COMTD/LDC/W/46/Rev.1 (Feb. 26, 2010). For a list of all 
countries, developed and developing, that provide preferential market access to some or all 
products originating in LDCs, see id. 
 323. USTR Looks to Expiration of AGOA in 2015 In Trade Preference Debate, 
Marantis Says, INT’L TRADE Daily (BNA) (Feb. 27, 2010). 
 324. Adding its voice to this cacophony of diverse opinion, the OECD has concluded 
that developing countries stand to benefit more from cutting tariffs on each other’s trade than 
from additional tariff reductions by developed countries. The OECD estimates that the gains 
from liberalizing South-South trade would be double those from liberalizing North-South 
trade. OECD, PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 2010: SHIFTING WEALTH 161-62 
(2010). To that end, a group of 22 developing countries are engaged in negotiating tariff 
reductions of at least 20 percent on their trade inter se as part of the Global System of Trade 
Preferences. PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 162. 
 325. See Baucus Does Not Want GSP To Lapse During Reform Effort, Aide Says, 
INT’L TRADE Daily (BNA) (Oct. 29, 2009). 
 326. See id. 
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programs, merge them into a single, comprehensive program.327 All of these 
options can be viewed through the lens of leverage, both in the Doha Round 
negotiations and with individual countries and their compliance with donor-
country conditions for continued trade preference program eligibility. 
The first alternative—renew the existing program for all beneficiaries 
without major amendments—have the benefits of continuity and familiarity. 
However, as the previous discussion illustrated, the shrinking margin of 
preference is close to rendering trade preference programs irrelevant—at 
least for some countries and for those products whose MFN duty rate is 3 
percent or less. Renewing trade preference programs that are not already 
permanent (which in the case of the United States is all of them with the 
exception of CBERA) raises the ancillary question of whether all trade 
preference programs should be made permanent. A favorable aspect of such 
a proposal is that it introduces stability and predictability, which are 
essential to long-range business planning and investment. 328 The 
  
 327. Although the GSP is a unilateral and non-reciprocal tariff preference, any 
changes to such programs would need to be considered in light of the Enabling Clause, as 
interpreted by the Appellate Body. At a minimum, the United States would need to notify 
and possibly consult with other WTO Members regarding any withdrawal or modification of 
GSP benefits, as required by paragraph 4 of the Clause. The United States could also seek a 
WTO waiver were any modifications of the GSP program considered not to comport fully 
with U.S. WTO obligations. WTO waivers have been secured for the three U.S. regional 
trade preference programs. 
 328. See, e.g., Open Markets for the Poorest Countries, infra note 344, at 12-13, 
which makes the following point: 
 
Stability and predictability of access are key features of effective 
programs because they encourage international buyers to establish 
supply relationships in preference countries and firms to invest in 
potential export sectors. A critical goal of reform should thus be to 
redesign program elements that may not directly block access, as 
rules of origin can, but that increase risk and uncertainty. Two 
sources of increased risk for investors and buyers arise when 
programs must be renewed frequently, and when eligibility 
conditions are numerous, nontransparent, or arbitrary in application. 
Both of these elements are, unfortunately, problems in U.S. 
programs. . . .   
The EU’s [EBA] program has no expiration date, while Canada 
and Japan routinely extend their preference programs for LDCs for 
10-year periods. It would be helpful in promoting development goals 
if all preference programs, but especially those for LDCs, had strong 
legal foundations that authorize them permanently or for long 
periods to maximize effectiveness in promoting investment, trade, 
and job creation. U.S. legislation recently introduced to phase in 
[duty-free, quota-free] market access for LDCs recognizes the 
importance of stability for effective preference programs, and it 
authorizes that part of the program for a decade, then renews it 
automatically every five years for countries that are still LDCs.  
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counterargument is that periodic renewal provides essential leverage in 
other international fora, such as at the WTO and the stalled Doha Round 
negotiations. Threatening termination of GSP and other trade preference 
programs is seen as a tactic for moving intransigent developing countries to 
more acceptable negotiating positions in multilateral trade talks.329 One 
proposal is to introduce presidential certification into the statutory schema 
under which the President would periodically certify that beneficiary 
countries are making a positive contribution to the Doha Round 
negotiations. Absent such certification, the beneficiary country would lose 
eligibility.330 An obvious flaw with such a recommendation is it would 
impermissibly discriminate in violation of the Enabling Clause as 
interpreted by the Appellate Body in EC—Tariff Preferences. 
The second alternative—allowing GSP to expire permanently—has been 
suggested as a way of moving the stalled Doha Round forward. In a 
perverse spin on the running complaint developing countries have had with 
GSP schemes in general, the view has been expressed that Brazil and India 
are blocking progress in the Doha Round negotiations by their refusal to 
  
Id. at 12-13. The U.S. legislation to which the report refers is H.R. 4101, New Partnership for 
Trade Development Act of 2009. After being introduced the bill was never reported out of 
Committee. A similar bill, H.R. 3905, was introduced in the 110th Congress by 
Representative Jim McDermott, the same sponsor of H.R. 4101, but that bill met the same 
fate as H.R. 4101. Besides extending the GSP program for 10 years and providing duty-free, 
quota-free treatment of all imports from LDCs, H.R. 4101 would remove the GSP’s statutory 
product exclusions and create a Trade Development Review Panel to review these goods for 
preferential treatment within three years. Under the bill, AGOA preferences would be 
extended to non-AGOA LDCs. To protect AGOA countries, significant apparel suppliers 
from the group of non-AGOA LDCs would have a 10-year quota of 50 percent on those 
categories of apparel where their production overlaps with AGOA countries. The immediate 
beneficiaries of DFQF treatment of LDC textile and clothing imports would be Bangladesh 
and Cambodia. The McDermott bill would also extend the AGOA third-country fabric rule 
from September 30, 2012, when it is set to expire, to September 30, 2015, with the goal of 
strengthening and stabilizing the AGOA textiles program. U.S. textile industry trade groups, 
as well as sub-Saharan Africa LDCs and Haiti, have opposed such an extension, arguing that 
clothing exports from Bangladesh and Cambodia had grown by 63 percent from 2005-2009, 
while clothing exports from the U.S. trade preference and free trade agreement partners had 
fallen by 38 percent. Rossella Brevetti, Rangel Sees Short Term Extensions This Year for 
GSP, ATPA, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Nov. 19, 2009). See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Textile 
Industry Group Slams WTO Push for LDC Duty-Free/Quota-Free Deal, INT’L TRADE DAILY 
(BNA), (June 14, 2011) (for the 12-month period ending April 2011, U.S. clothing imports 
from Bangladesh increased almost 27 percent and U.S. clothing imports from Cambodia 
increased 26 percent).  
 329. See, e.g., COALITION FOR GSP, CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE 
PREFERENCE PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS 5 (2009), www.tradepartnership.com/pdf_files/ 
USPreferenceReformWorkingGroup-JointSubmission.pdf. Of course, no Congress can 
permanently tie the hands of a subsequent Congress to prevent amendments to or repeal of 
legislation enacted by the prior Congress. However, once legislation is enacted with no 
sunset provision, legislative inertia and third-party reliance interests make subsequent repeal 
politically difficult.  
 330. Id. at 6.  
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lower tariffs on items of export interest to developed countries.331 
Threatening them with GSP expiration would supposedly bring them to 
their senses and to the negotiating table.332 Such a strategy could backfire, of 
course, by hardening rather than softening the negotiation positions of India, 
Brazil, and other large users of GSP. 
A third alternative—extending the program in a modified form—could 
move in one of two opposite directions. In the direction of making the 
program more stringent, the GSP program could be restricted by: (1) 
making all discretionary conditions for designation as a GSP beneficiary 
mandatory with noncompliance resulting in automatic ineligibility; (2) 
removing certain products from GSP eligibility; and (3) tightening the rules 
of origin to require that a greater percentage of value-added come from the 
beneficiary country and eliminating cumulation provisions.333 Alternatively, 
moving in the diametrically opposite direction, the GSP program could be 
expanded by: (1) amending the eligibility criteria so that as many 
developing countries as possible are designated GSP beneficiaries;334 (2) 
making certain import-sensitive products that are currently ineligible GSP 
eligible with no a priori product exclusions; and (3) relaxing the rules of 
origin to require that a lower percentage of value-added come from the 
beneficiary country, expanding the cumulation provisions,335 and 
  
 331. See GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL 
DEBATE, supra note 38, at 28. 
 332. A similar position was also advocated in early 2002 when then-USTR Robert B. 
Zoellick, while testifying on intellectual property issues, mentioned that “the threat of loss of 
GSP . . . benefits has proven to be an effective point of leverage with some of our trading 
partners.” See id. 
 333. See, e.g., GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL 
DEBATE, supra note 38, at 30-31. 
 334. One recommendation is to establish two sets of criteria, one economic and the 
other socio-political. The economic criteria would borrow from the EU’s GSP+ model and 
UNCTAD’s LDC criteria by focusing on economic vulnerability and international trade 
competitiveness. The socio-political criteria would in effect be a blend of the current 
mandatory/discretionary criteria that currently are found in the four U.S. trade preference 
programs.  See, e.g., Consensus Recommendations for U.S. Trade Preference Program 
Improvements, supra note 329, at 2-3, 7; Broad Coalition Offers Recommendations For 
Reform of Trade Preference Programs, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Dec. 3, 2009). See also 
UNILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE PROGRAMS OFFERED BY THE UNITED STATES, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, AND CANADA, supra note 77, at 17-18 (“Canada and the EU extend 
preferences to more than 170 most developing countries, compared to just 130 in the United 
States. Minimal upfront eligibility criteria in Canada and the EU ensure that more developing 
countries benefit from the program, including China and Vietnam. However, in no way has 
the limited criteria in Canada and the EU prevented the removal of benefits from ‘bad actors’ 
(e.g., Belarus), when necessary.”). 
 335. The current GSP cumulation rules treat certain associations of countries as a 
single country for purposes of origin, so that if inputs from Countries A and B are used in 
making a finished product that is exported from Country C, and A, B, and C are all members 
of a designated association, then the product will be deemed to originate in Country C.  The 
list of eligible associations can be found in HTSUS General Note 4, at 172, www.usitc.gov.   
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eliminating the uncertain “substantial transformation” test and adopting a 
more predictable change-in-tariff heading methodology.336 
The fourth alternative—in lieu of GSP, pursuing reciprocal tariff and 
market access through free trade agreements—is a strategy that the EU has 
been pursuing in its trade relations with the ACP countries via its Economic 
Partnership Agreement program. In a less ambitious fashion, the United 
States has concluded FTAs with a handful of developing countries in the 
Middle East and Persian Gulf region (Israel, Jordan, Oman, and Bahrain) 
and in Latin America (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru, with FTAs with 
Panama and Colombia pending congressional approval). Given the current 
state of congressional antipathy toward FTAs—even with countries whose 
trade flows with the United States are de minimis, clearly demonstrated 
when DR-CAFTA was approved by the House of Representatives by a mere 
two-vote margin,337 by the reluctance of some members of Congress to 
approve the pending FTAs with Panama and Colombia that were concluded 
by the Bush Administration in 2007, and by the apparent reluctance on the 
part of the Obama Administration to submit them to Congress for its 
approval338—a policy of reciprocal trade agreements with developing 
countries, in lieu of GSP, would seem to be politically dead on arrival. Even 
when the benefits to the United States of DR-CAFTA were so clear, i.e., the 
DR-CAFTA countries had non-reciprocal, duty-free access to the U.S. 
market on a wide-range of products under GSP and CBERA, DR-CAFTA 
was still a hard sell in Congress.339 Even if a more pliable Congress existed, 
  
 336. A change-in-tariff heading methodology can also be restrictive, depending upon 
how significant the tariff shift has to be. For example, a requirement that the shift be from 
one chapter of the HTSUS to another chapter is onerous and restrictive. In contrast, a 
requirement that there be a shift from one four-digit heading to another four-digit heading 
within the same chapter is far less restrictive. 
 337. Edmund L. Andrews, Pleas and Promises by G.O.P. as Trade Pact Wins by 2 
Votes, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9 
D01E2DE113FF93AA15754C0A9639C8B63. 
 338. See Rossella Brevetti & Nancy Ognanovich, 44 GOP Senators Will Block 
Nomination of Commerce Secretary over Stalled FTAs, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (March 
15, 2011);  Rossella Brevetti & Amy Tsui, Outlook for Moving Stalled, Colombia, Panama, 
Korea FTAs in 2011 Improves, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Jan. 10, 2011). 
 339. Domestic concerns might also make this option undesirable. As observed by the 
Congressional Research Service: 
 
[S]uch reciprocal agreements could actually harm import-competing 
U.S. manufacturers more than unilateral preferences under the GSP, 
because automatic safeguards written into the statute, such as 
competitive need limitations, might no longer apply. Any such 
agreement could also involve a greater number of U.S. tariff 
concessions, thus certain import-sensitive items ineligible for GSP 
status could also be on the table. On the other hand, other U.S. 
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it is improbable that bilateral or even regional FTAs would be negotiated 
with all current 130+ GSP beneficiaries. Query whether the USTR’s office 
has the time, energy, or capacity to engage in such a herculean endeavor.  A 
wholesale alternative to country-by-country FTAs or EPAs is to negotiate 
ambitious tariff cuts and market access openings on a multilateral basis in 
the Doha Round. A multilateral approach would also eliminate—or at least 
mitigate—the problem of trade diversion that can result from FTAs, i.e., a 
comparatively less competitive FTA partner that is a developing country 
might gain duty-free access to the U.S. market on a product that is not GSP-
eligible at the expense of another more competitive developing or 
developed country which has to pay the MFN duty on that product.340 
A fifth alternative is to have a trade preference program for LDCs only. 
Such a scheme could take one of two forms: (1) renew the GSP program for 
least-developed beneficiaries only, but otherwise keep the program’s 
existing product exclusions in place or (2) renew the GSP program for least-
developed beneficiaries only and expand the list of eligible products to meet 
the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference commitment of duty-
free/quota-free access for all LDC imports.341.342  Some in Congress have 
  
manufacturers might benefit from the increased market access that an 
FTA or RTA would provide. 
 
GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE, supra note 
38, at 29. This argument is equally true in the context of multilateral trade negotiations where 
improved market access is on the table. While safeguards relief is nominally available in the 
case of injurious imports, such safeguards relief has seen limited use in the United States (73 
safeguards actions have been filed in the United States over the span of 35 years and fewer 
than half have been successful). Safeguards relief has seen limited action in other WTO 
members as well. See KEVIN C. KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: READINGS, 
CASES, NOTES, AND PROBLEMS 547, 699-740 (2009). See generally GREGORY BOWMAN, NICK 
COVELLI, DAVID A. GANTZ & IHN H. UHM, TRADE REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 351-401 
(2010). 
 340. One study conducted in 2006 concludes that with every enlargement of the EU, 
the countries joining the EU decrease their imports from developing countries, i.e., there is 
evidence of significant trade diversion. See Maria Persson & Fredrik Wilhelmsson, Assessing 
the Effects of EU Trade Preferences for Developing Countries 20 (Working Paper No. 
2006:4, Lund Univ. Dep’t of Economics 2006), http://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/lunewp/ 
2006_004.html. 
 341. Annex F of the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference Declaration provides as 
follows: 
 
We agree that developed-country Members shall, and developing-
country Members declaring themselves in a position to do so should:  
 
(a)(i) Provide duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting 
basis, for all products originating from all LDCs by 2008 or no 
later than the start of the implementation period in a manner that 
ensures stability, security and predictability. 
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(ii) Members facing difficulties at this time to provide market 
access as set out above shall provide duty-free and quota-free 
market access for at least 97 per cent of products originating from 
LDCs, defined at the tariff line level, by 2008 or no later than the 
start of the implementation period.  In addition, these Members 
shall take steps to progressively achieve compliance with the 
obligations set out above, taking into account the impact on other 
developing countries at similar levels of development, and, as 
appropriate, by incrementally building on the initial list of 
covered products. 
 
(iii) Developing-country Members shall be permitted to phase in 
their commitments and shall enjoy appropriate flexibility in 
coverage. 
 
(b) Ensure that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports 
from LDCs are transparent and simple, and contribute to 
facilitating market access. 
 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra note 82, annex F.  
 342. Annex F of the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference Declaration provides as 
follows: 
 
We agree that developed-country Members shall, and developing-
country Members declaring themselves in a position to do so should:  
 
(a)(i) Provide duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting 
basis, for all products originating from all LDCs by 2008 or no 
later than the start of the implementation period in a manner that 
ensures stability, security and predictability. 
 
(ii) Members facing difficulties at this time to provide market 
access as set out above shall provide duty-free and quota-free 
market access for at least 97 per cent of products originating from 
LDCs, defined at the tariff line level, by 2008 or no later than the 
start of the implementation period.  In addition, these Members 
shall take steps to progressively achieve compliance with the 
obligations set out above, taking into account the impact on other 
developing countries at similar levels of development, and, as 
appropriate, by incrementally building on the initial list of 
covered products. 
 
(iii) Developing-country Members shall be permitted to phase in 
their commitments and shall enjoy appropriate flexibility in 
coverage. 
 
(b) Ensure that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports 
from LDCs are transparent and simple, and contribute to 
facilitating market access. 
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advocated the first option.343 If enacted, it would preserve the bifurcated 
treatment that LDCs currently receive under U.S. trade preference 
programs, with one cohort of LDCs receiving the most preferential tariff 
treatment under the HOPE Act (Haiti) and AGOA (for eligible AGOA 
beneficiaries) relative to all other LDCs and the second cohort receiving 
more preferential tariff treatment under the least-developed beneficiary 
provisions of the GSP program relative to all other developed countries. The 
second option would be in effect to create an AGOA “plus” program, but 
reserved solely for LDCs.  With its exclusive LDC focus to the exclusion of 
other developing countries, it has been estimated this option would 
simultaneously create an economically significant margin of preference in 
favor of LDCs, provided the list of eligible products is expanded to 100 
percent of all LDC imports.344 However, all donor countries need to move to 
  
 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra note 82, annex F. 
 343. See GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL 
DEBATE, supra note 38, at 30.  
 344. Since 2000, there has been significant progress toward the goal of duty-free, 
quota-free (DFQF) market access for LDCs. Between 2000 and 2005, Australia, New 
Zealand and Norway announced that they were opening their markets to 100 percent of 
products from LDCs. See WTO, Briefing Notes, Towards free market access for least-
developed countries, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/brief_e/brief03_e.htm. The EU 
implemented the Everything But Arms (EBA) program in 2001. See infra notes ___ and 
accompanying text. After the restrictions on sugar and rice were phased out in 2009, the EU 
now provides full market access for LDCs (except for weapons). Following the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference in 2005, Switzerland implemented an EBA-like program that as of 
2010 also provides 100 percent market access for LDCs. Norway and Switzerland also went 
beyond these initiatives by opening their programs to other small, low-income, or heavily 
indebted countries.  Other developed countries also improved market access for LDCs in the 
2000s, but none achieved full product coverage, usually because of exclusions for sensitive 
agricultural products. Canada’s preference program reform, enacted in 2003, extends product 
coverage for LDCs to 99 percent of products, excluding only quota-controlled products 
(dairy, poultry, and eggs). Japan’s trade preference program for LDCs has approximately 98-
percent product coverage, with exclusions for fish, footwear, sugar, and rice. See Daniel 
Pruzin, Key WTO Members Discuss Elements For LDCs in Doha ‘Deliverables’ Package, 
INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (July 1, 2011). In 2010 India and Brazil announced that they 
were implementing duty-free access for goods from LDCs. See WTO, Brazil, India to push 
ahead on duty-free schemes for the poorest countries, March 18, 2010, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/devel_18mar10_e.htm; Madhur Singh, India 
Pushing Ahead With Duty-Free  Market Access  for Goods From LDCs, INT’L TRADE DAILY 
(BNA), (March 25, 2010).  
  In the United States the trade preference picture for LDCs is more complex than 
in other developed countries. The United States maintains the most exceptions, with some 
1,800 tariff lines covering goods such as sugar, cotton, leather, dairy, and textiles and 
clothing excluded. See Daniel Pruzin, Key WTO Members Discuss Elements For LDCs in 
Doha ‘Deliverables’ Package, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (July 1, 2011). Altogether, the 
United States provides DFQF access on 82.4 percent of tariff lines for all LDCs and 90 
percent of all tariff lines for AGOA-eligible LDCs.  The United States also has AGOA and 
the HOPE Act that offer greater access for sub-Saharan Africa and Haiti. In 2001, the same 
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year that the EBA initiative was launched, the United States enacted AGOA which, as noted, 
expanded duty-free, but not quota-free, access for approximately 98 percent of products 
originating in sub-Sahara Africa LDCs and other “lesser developed beneficiary countries” in 
the region. Agricultural products, most notably sugar, peanuts, dairy products, and tobacco, 
are the major exclusions. In 2006, Congress approved the HOPE Act, which expanded 
preferences under the Caribbean Basin Initiative for Haiti. It provides duty-free access for 
about 90 percent of products. Both programs go well beyond the 82.4 percent of products 
that is available to other LDCs under the U.S. GSP provisions for LDBDCs. However, even 
under AGOA — the most liberal U.S. trade preference program — not only do the product 
exclusions for agricultural products bar full market access to potential African agricultural 
exports, but the 14 LDCs located in Asia are completely excluded and thus discriminated 
against vis-à-vis sub-Saharan African LDCs with regard to clothing that is not eligible for 
duty-free treatment. As a result of GSP ineligibility of clothing, it is estimated that the United 
States collected nearly $1 billion in duties on imports of Bangladeshi and Cambodian 
clothing in 2008, more than the total amount collected on imports from the United Kingdom 
and France. See CGD Working Group on Global Trade Preference Reform, Open Markets 
for the Poorest Countries: Trade Preferences That Work 7-8 (April 2010), 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1423918/.  
  In 2011 Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced a bill that would provide AGOA-
like trade benefits to the Maldives and 12 LDCs located in the Asia-South Pacific region. 
Senator Feinstein’s bill excludes from the list of eligible beneficiaries Myanmar (listed by 
the UN as an LDC) but includes the Maldives (the Maldives graduated from the UN’s LDC 
list in 2011). In order to be designated as a beneficiary, under the Feinstein bill a country has 
to meet the AGOA eligibility criteria. See supra nn. 204-05 and accompanying text; Asia-
South Pacific Trade Preferences Act, S. 1443, 112th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4 (2011). Although 
her bill is designed to close most of the gap in trade preference coverage between sub-
Saharan Africa LDCs and LDCs located outside of sub-Saharan Africa, the bill does not 
extend AGOA’s third-country fabric provision for textiles and clothing. See supra n. 210 and 
accompanying text. Instead, the Feinstein bill provides a less generous yarn-forward rule, 
i.e., eligible textile and apparel items must be formed from yarn and material originating in 
the United States or in the other beneficiary countries. Asia-South Pacific Trade Preferences 
Act, S. 1443, 112th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5(c)(2) (2011).  
  Arguably, one of the most disturbing lobbying battles to see played out recently 
in congressional hearings is that between, on the one hand, groups supporting DFQF 
treatment of textiles and clothing from Bangladesh and Cambodia and, on the other hand, 
groups supporting sub-Saharan African countries that have benefited from AGOA’s 
preferential textile and clothing rules and are fighting to hold on to their preferred U.S. 
market access to the exclusion of Cambodia and Bangladesh. See Rossella Brevetti, Trade 
Associations Urge Duty Free Benefits for Apparel From Cambodia, INT’L TRADE DAILY 
(BNA), (Dec. 3, 2009) (the American Apparel & Footwear Association, the National Retail 
Federation, the Outdoor Industry Association, the Retailer Industry Leaders Association, and 
the United States Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel urge expeditious 
congressional action to grant Cambodia DFQF access to the U.S. market for all clothing 
products; 40 trade associations representing 29 trade preference and free trade area countries 
urge Congress to reject a proposal granting Bangladesh and Cambodia DFQF market access 
for their clothing exports to the United States). As Voltaire observed in La Bégueule, “Le 
mieux est l’ennemi du bien,” which translates as “the best is the enemy of the good.” In the 
context of international affairs Voltaire’s aphorism has sometimes been expressed as “don’t 
let the best be the enemy of the good.” Also known as the Nirvana fallacy or the perfect 
solution fallacy, Voltaire’s aphorism in essence captures the error in logic of comparing 
actual things with unrealistic, idealized alternatives. AGOA might not be the best trade 
preference program when compared to a perfect solution — assuming that one exists, and 
therein lies the fallacy because there is never a perfect solution to any human problem — but 
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100 percent product coverage, and the list of donor countries needs to 
expand to include Brazil, China, India, and high-income developing 
countries.345  
  
it still has many good features to commend it. Nevertheless, an alternative to AGOA that is 
feasible without being perfect is to have DFQF market access for all LDCs, not only for Haiti 
under the HOPE Act and for those LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa under AGOA. This 
alternative is neither unrealistic nor idealized, although it could admittedly erode SSA’s and 
Haiti’s respective U.S. market shares for textiles and clothing if demand in the U.S. market 
remains static. Moreover, there is something arguably morally perverse about a trade 
preference program that by design pits a group of LDCs against LDCs outside the group. 
Something seems inherently defective with a trade preference regime when beneficiary 
countries devote scarce resources to preserving their preferential market access rather than to 
becoming globally competitive. See James, supra note 158, at 2 (“To the extent that 
preference recipients jealously guard their special access and resist global efforts to liberalize 
trade on a nondiscriminatory basis, unilateral preference programs can be counterproductive 
to achieving a more liberal global trade regime and a more stable and permanent path to 
economic growth.”). James relates how the drive to protect the “wasting asset” of trade 
preferences has pitted developing country against developing country:  
 
Preference erosion pits developing countries against each other in 
multilateral negotiations, because the same reductions in MFN tariffs 
that erode beneficiaries’ preference margins may help their perhaps 
equally poor brethren in an “outside” country. Developing country 
groups have provided an unfortunate but instructive example in the 
Doha round: there was significant overlap between the list of tropical 
products for which eight Latin American countries sought especially 
rapid and significant liberalization during the Doha round talks, and 
the list of items the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
(ACP) wanted shielded from multilateral tariff liberalization because 
of concerns about preference erosion. 
 
Id. at 12. Such behavior gives a new twist to the term “trade protectionism.”  
 345. See Open Markets for the Poorest Countries, supra note 344, at 15, which 
estimates the following gains for LDCs if product coverage is expanded to 100 percent, 
provided all OECD countries participate and provided further that they are joined by Brazil, 
China, and India: 
 
Moving to 100 percent coverage, moreover, substantially improves 
the outcomes relative to 100 percent market access by OECD 
countries alone, especially for African LDCs. The estimates . . . 
suggest the range of potential benefits, with export gains increasing 
by as much as two-thirds for Ethiopia, three-fold for Mozambique, 
and even more than that for Senegal. Overall, for LDCs as a group, 
the gains could be as much as US$7 billion, compared to US$2 
billion when only OECD countries participate. When the large 
emerging markets also participate, the small loss for Madagascar 
becomes positive and the less conservative approach suggests that 
exports could increase 21 percent. 
 
Id. at 15. The authors gently chide Brazil, China, and India for not expanding DFQF product 
coverage for LDCs: “While the responsibility to move farthest and fastest rests with the high 
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In a proposed regulation issued by the European Commission in 2011, 
the EU plans a comprehensive revision of its current GSP scheme with a 
combination of the fourth and fifth alternatives mentioned above.346 To be 
initiated in 2014, product coverage and preference margins would remain 
unchanged. However, more than half of the current 176 GSP beneficiary 
countries would no longer be beneficiaries—although they would remain 
GSP eligible if their economic situation changes—including countries that 
fall under the World Bank high-income or upper-middle-income categories 
(such as Brazil, Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar), and countries 
that have preferential access to the EU that is at least as good as under GSP 
(e.g., under an FTA).347 The number of total GSP beneficiaries under the 
revised scheme would be reduced from the current 176 to 85 countries.348 
GSP+ and EBA would remain in place although GSP+ eligibility criteria 
would be relaxed.349 Conditionality, in its current form, would continue 
under the revised GSP scheme.350 By making standard GSP available to 
fewer beneficiaries, it is anticipated that competitive pressures among GSP 
beneficiaries will be reduced thereby making the preferences for LDCs and 
GSP+ beneficiaries more meaningful.351 
A sixth option is to combine all U.S. trade preference programs into a 
two-tiered, comprehensive program with uniform and minimal country-
eligibility criteria for all beneficiaries but expanded product eligibility for 
LDCs.352 
  
income countries, the steps by these countries [Brazil, China, and India], taken voluntarily, 
have the potential to make the DFQF initiative far more powerful. To realize the enhanced 
opportunities, however, the principles that apply to high-income countries—full product 
coverage, flexible rules of origin, and stability and predictability— are also important for 
these programs.” Id. at 14. 
 346. See European Comm’n, Focusing on Needs: The EU Reshapes its Import Scheme 
for Developing Countries, Press Release, (May 10, 2011), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147894.pdf; European Commission, 
More benefits from preferential trade tariffs for countries most in need: Reform of the EU 
Generalised System of Preferences, Press Release, (May 10, 2011), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147892.pdf. 
 347. European Comm’n, A Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, COM(2011) 241/5 
(May 10, 2011), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147893.pdf 
 348. A Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, supra note 347, art. 10-18. 
 349. See id. annex II. 
 350. See id. art. 19. Under the proposed scheme, the GSP+ import-share criterion 
would be relaxed from 1% to 2%, while the export diversification criterion would remain the 
same at 75% of a country’s exports to the EU, but for seven, rather than five, of its largest 
sectors. 
 351. European Commission, More benefits from preferential trade tariffs for countries 
most in need: Reform of the EU Generalised System of Preferences, Press Release, (May 10, 
2011), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147892.pdf. 
 352. See, e.g., Coalition for GSP, Consensus Recommendations for U.S. Trade 
Preference Program Improvements 2 (2009) (recommending that the United States maintain 
 
2012] The Generalized System of Preferences after Four Decades 627 
 
As part of the program integration process, the integrated program needs 
to be renewed for a minimum period of ten years. As noted above, while the 
Enabling Clause makes nonreciprocal tariff preferences a permanent part of 
the WTO acquis, national GSP programs are not required to be permanent. 
The Enabling Clause contains no international legal obligation making 
national GSP tariff preferences permanent and legally binding. Moreover, as 
previously noted, even if a national GSP scheme is of relatively long 
duration, there is no assurance that preferential treatment for particular 
goods will continue. These lacunae stand in contrast to the legal obligation 
created under GATT Article II on tariff bindings that bar an importing 
country from raising its bound tariffs above its tariff binding, thus making a 
country’s MFN tariff reduction commitments legally enforceable by all 
other WTO members.353 Because the Enabling Clause does not obligate 
donor countries to make their GSP programs permanent, potential investors 
and traders might be discouraged.354  
National policymakers, thus, face a trade-off in setting the duration of 
preferential benefits in authorizing legislation. On the one hand, beneficiary 
countries and U.S. businesses that import from them agree that longer and 
more predictable renewal periods for program benefits are desirable. On the 
other hand, some U.S. officials believe that periodic program expirations 
can be useful as leverage to encourage countries to act in accordance with 
U.S. interests. Table 5 provides a chronology of U.S. GSP program 
extensions since it was first enacted in 1975.355 
  
a single preference program that extends duty-free treatment for imports of eligible articles 
from BDCs, and that provides permanent, 100 percent duty-free and quota-free benefits to 
imports from eligible lesser-developed countries), www.tradepartnership.com/ 
pdf_files/USPreferenceReformWorkingGroup-JointSubmission.pdf. 
 353. For the Quad members nearly 100% of their tariff lines are bound (100% for the 
EU and the United States, 99.7% for Canada, and 99.6% for Japan). See KENNEDY, supra 
note 340, at 119. Granted, a GATT Article II tariff binding is not immutable. If a WTO 
member that has entered into a tariff binding on a particular product wishes to avoid its 
obligation, it may withdraw the commitment pursuant to GATT Article XXVIII. However, 
adversely affected WTO members must be consulted and are entitled to compensatory tariff 
adjustments on other items of export interest to them. See GATT Article XXVIII:2. 
Similarly, GATT Article XIX on emergency safeguard measures, together with the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards, permits an importing country to temporarily increase duties on 
imported goods when such goods are a cause of serious injury to a domestic industry. 
Likewise, GATT Article XII permits a WTO member to increase a bound tariff in order to 
address a shortfall in its balance-of-payments position. 
 354. See SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 1, at 32-33. 
 355. The U.S. GSP program was not enacted until 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, codified 
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65, and was not implemented until a year later, on January 1, 1976, 
pursuant to Executive Order 11,888. Executive Order No. 11,888, 40 Fed. Reg. 55,276 
(1975). The legislative authorization was for an initial ten-year period that expired on 
January 3, 1985.  Congress renewed the GSP program, and substantially amended it as well, 
in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 for an additional 8 1/2 years, until July 4, 1993. Pub. L. 
No. 98-573, tit. V, 98 Stat. 3019 (1984).  For an analysis of the 1984 amendments to the GSP 
program, see D. Robert Webster & Christopher P. Bussert, The Revised Generalized System 
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Table 5. U.S. GSP Extensions, 1975-2011 
 
Public Law Effective 
Date 
Date 
Expired 
Comments 
Pub. L. No. 93-618, 
Title V, Trade Act of 
1974 
January 2, 
1985 
January 2, 
1985 
Statute originally enacted. 
 
Pub. L. No. 98-573, 
Title V, Trade and 
Tariff Act of 1984 
October 
30, 1984 
July 4, 
1993 
Substantially amended and restated 
Pub. L. No. 103-66, 
Section 13802 (in 
Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act, 
1993) 
August 10, 
1993 
September 
30, 1994 
Extended retroactively from July 5, 
1993 to August 10, 1993.  Also 
struck out reference to “Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics” 
 
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 
Section 601 
Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act 
December 
8, 1994 
July 31, 
1995 
Extended retroactively from 
September 30, 1994 to December 8, 
1994.  No other amendments to 
provision. 
  
of Preferences: “Instant Replay” or a Real Change?, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1035 (1984-
85); Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., Renewal of the GSP: An Explanation of the Program and Changes 
Made by the 1984 Legislation, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 625 (1985). The GSP program 
was again renewed with minor amendments for only 15 months, until September 30, 1994, 
under section 13802 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 
tit. XIII, § 13802(a), 107 Stat. 667 (1993).  The GSP was thereafter renewed without 
amendment for 10 months, until July 31, 1995, by section 601 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act. Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 4961 (1994). On July 31, 1995, GSP 
expired and was not again reinstated until August 20, 1996, as part of the Small Business Job 
Protection Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1951, 110 Stat. 1755, 1917 (1996).  The 1996 
reinstatement extended GSP until May 1997, with retroactive effect from July 31, 1995.  Id. § 
1953, 110 Stat. 1926.The 1996 amendments also changed the criteria for GSP graduation and 
for the designation of eligible articles, as explained below. The U.S. GSP program was 
thereafter renewed for one year, until June 30, 1998, under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 
with retroactive effect from May 31, 1996. Pub. L. No. 105-34, tit. IX, § 981, 111. Stat. 788, 
902 (1997).  The Administration’s proposal for a ten-year extension of the GSP program, and 
for a permanent extension of the program for least-developed countries, was not enacted.  
See Administration Submits GSP, CBI and Shipbuilding Subsidies Bill, 14 INT’L TRADE REP. 
(BNA) 1080 (1997).  Even the more modest proposal for a two-year GSP extension failed to 
receive congressional approval.  See GOP Budget Reconciliation Tax Plan Includes 
Provisions for CBI, GSP, 14 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1043 (1997). Most recently, the U.S. 
GSP program expired four times in four years (2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010). By contrast, 
Canada, Japan, and the EU last extended their programs for 10 years, with periodic reviews 
to make small changes. As a result, developing-country producers and domestic importers 
know preferences will remain in effect into the foreseeable future, allowing for long-term 
investment and sourcing decisions. The pattern that has emerged in Congress since the initial 
ten-year GSP authorization expired has been to renew the GSP with short extensions—one 
year to 18 months—sometimes with retroactive effect.  The explanation for this pattern lies 
in part in federal budget politics -- operation of the GSP program means a loss of tariff 
revenues, forcing Congress and the Administration to find either a substitute revenue source 
or offsetting budget reductions—as well as the relatively low priority that GSP has an the 
national legislative agenda.  
 
 
2012] The Generalized System of Preferences after Four Decades 629 
 
 
Pub. L. No. 104-188, 
Subtitle J, section 
1952 GSP Renewal 
Act of 1996 (in 
Small Business Job 
Protection Act of 
1996) 
October 1, 
1996 (for 
GSP 
renewal 
only) 
May 31, 
1997 
Substantially amended and restated.  
Extended retroactively from August 
1, 1995 to October 1, 1996. 
 
Pub. L. No. 105-34, 
Subtitle H, section 
981 (Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997) 
August 5, 
1997 
June 30, 
1998 
Extended retroactively from May 
31, 1997 to August 5, 1997.  No 
other amendments to provision. 
 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 
Subtitle B, section 
101 (in Omnibus 
Consolidated and 
Emergency 
Supplemental 
Appropriations, 
1999) 
October 
21, 1998 
June 30, 
1999 
Extended retroactively from July 1, 
1998 to October 21, 1998.  No other 
amendments to provision. 
Pub. L. No. 106-170, 
section 508, (in 
Ticket to Work and 
Work Incentives Act 
of 1999) 
December 
17, 1999 
September 
30, 2001 
Extended retroactively from July 1, 
1999 to December 17, 1999.  No 
other amendments to provision. 
 
Pub. L. No. 107-210, 
Division D, Title 
XLI Trade Act of 
2002 
August 6, 
2002 
December 
31, 2006 
Extended retroactively from 
September 30, 2001 to August 6, 
2002.  Amended to (1) include 
requirement that BDC’s take steps 
to support efforts of United States 
to combat terrorism and (2) further 
define the term “internationally 
recognized worker rights.” 
Pub. L. No. 109-432, 
Title VIII 
December 
31, 2006 
December 
31, 2008 
Extended before program lapse. 
 
Pub. L. No.  110-
436, Section 4 
October 
16, 2008 
December 
31, 2009 
Extended before program lapse. 
 
Pub. L. No. 111-124, 
Section 1 
December 
28, 2009 
December 
31, 2010 
Extended before program lapse. 
 
Pub. L. No. 112-40, 
Section 1 
October 
21, 2011 
July 31, 
2013 
Extended retroactively from 
January 1, 2011 to October 21, 
2011.   
 
Sources:  Congressional Research Service, Author 
 
 
At the end of 2010, Congress failed to renew the U.S. GSP program 
because Senator Jeff Sessions from Alabama blocked proposed Senate 
consideration of a House-passed trade bill (H.R. 6517) that would have 
extended the GSP program and the ATPA, as well as the trade adjustment 
assistance program for workers displaced by imports, for 18 months.356 
  
 356. Brevetti, Sessions Blocks Consideration of Trade Bill In Senate Over Bangladesh 
Sleeping Bag GSP, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Dec. 18, 2010). Trade adjustment assistance 
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According to Senator Sessions, Exxel Outdoors, Inc., which is located in 
Alabama, manufactures 85 percent of the sleeping bags made in the United 
States.357 In July 2010, the USTR rejected Exxel Outdoors’ petition that 
sleeping bags are a textile product and thus should be removed from GSP 
eligibility on that basis.  The USTR determined instead that sleeping bags 
are not textiles and are thus eligible for duty-free entry under the U.S. GSP 
program.358 In response to the USTR’s denial of Exxel Outdoors’ petition, in 
August 2010 Senator Sessions introduced a bill that would have removed 
sleeping bags from the list of GSP-eligible products.359 Arguably, there is 
something deeply flawed with a trade preference program when a single 
U.S. Senator can hold up renewal of the entire GSP program over an 
administrative decision affecting one company and a single product. 
Reliance interests of foreign exporters and U.S. importers are clearly 
undermined. In addition, in a textbook example of the law of unintended 
consequences at work, the windfall beneficiary of a lapse in GSP may be 
China.360 In recognition of the importance of continuity to business 
  
and the ATPA were extended for seven weeks. See Amy Tsui, House, Senate Pass Pared 
Down Version of Omnibus Trade Measure, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Dec. 23, 2010). 
 357. See Brevetti, supra note 356. The detrimental impact of the lapse of the GSP 
program was felt almost immediately after its expiration at the end of 2010. See Rossella 
Brevetti, Coalition of Nine GSP Countries Urge Renewal of Expired Preferences, INT’L 
TRADE DAILY (BNA), (May 4, 2011).  
 358. Notice of the USTR’s decision denying Exxel Outdoor’s petition is available at 
www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2016. Textiles and textile articles are classified under Chapters 
50-63 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Sleeping bags are 
classified under Chapter 94 of the HTSUS whose title provides in part, “bedding, mattresses, 
mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings.” There are two eo nomine (i.e., 
by name) provisions for sleeping bags contained in Chapter 94: HTSUS 9404.30.40 (sleeping 
bags containing 20 percent or more by weight of feathers and/or down, with an MFN duty 
rate of 4.7-percent ad valorem) and HTSUS 9404.30.80 (sleeping bags other than those 
containing 20 percent or more by weight of feathers and/or down, with an MFN duty rate of 
9-percent ad valorem). The HTSUS is available at the U.S. International Trade 
Commission’s website, www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/1002C94.pdf. 
 359. See Rossella Brevetti, supra note 356; Len Bracken, Group Blasts Denial of GSP 
Petition On Sleeping Bags; Bangladesh Backs U.S., INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (July 8, 
2010). Undaunted by its set back, Exxel Outdoors refiled its petition to remove sleeping bags 
from GSP eligibility as part of the USTR’s 2010 GSP annual review.  See Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, List of Product Petitions Accepted for the 2010 GSP Annual Review 
(2010), www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2356. Congress eventually renewed the GSP program in 
October 2011 without the amendment removing sleeping bags from GSP product eligibility. 
See Pub. L. No 112-40, § 1 (Oct. 21, 2011). However, at the end of 2011 the U.S. Trade 
Representative removed sleeping bags from GSP eligibility on the ground that they are an 
import-sensitive product. They were the only product to lose GSP eligibility in 2011. 
Speculation is that the action came after an agreement was reached between the Obama 
Administration and Senator Sessions. See Len Bracken, Sleeping Bags No Longer GSP 
Eligible; No Change to AGOA in Preference Reviews, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Dec. 30, 
2011). 
 360. See Rossella Brevetti, China Gains Advantage by Expiration Of GSP in Terms of 
Prices, Gresser Says, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (March 14, 2011). 
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planning, within the EU the European Commission has recommended that a 
revised GSP scheme that is expected to enter into effect in 2014 will have 
no sunset provision.361 
Private sector and foreign government representatives have complained 
that short program renewal periods discourage longer-term productive 
investments that might be made to take advantage of preferences, such as 
factories or agribusiness ventures. They would like to see preference 
programs become permanent or have a longer duration. The private sector 
Coalition for GSP cites the frequent lapses in GSP between 1993 and 2001, 
with authorization periods ranging from 10 to 27 months (and gaps between 
expiration and legislative renewal of 1 to 15 months), as hindering long-
term investment in beneficiary countries.362 Both the USTR and the 
Coalition have attributed the relatively greater growth in GSP use after 2002 
to the stability provided by a 5-year program reauthorization at that time.363 
Business people say that predictable program rules and a longer program 
renewal period are important to them in making business plans and 
investment decisions in developing countries with confidence when they are 
based on preference benefits.364 Members of Congress have recognized this 
argument with respect to Africa. In December 2006, Congress renewed 
AGOA’s third-country fabric provisions for six years until 2012. AGOA’s 
general provisions had previously been renewed until 2015. On the other 
hand, it has been suggested that short-term program renewals give Congress 
more opportunities to respond to changing events and political priorities.365   
  
 361. See European Comm’n, Focusing on Needs: The EU Reshapes its Import Scheme 
for Developing Countries, Press Release, (May 10, 2011), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147894.pdf. 
 362. See, e.g., Coalition for GSP, Written Statement of the Coalition for GSP on Ways 
to Improve Preferences, Submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee 6 (Dec. 1, 
2009) (recommending that U.S. trade preference programs be made permanent), 
http://www.tradepartnership.com/pdf_files/GSPCoalitionCmntsW%26M2009.pdf. 
 363. GAO Report on Integrating U.S. Trade Preference Programs, supra note 125, at 
42. 
 364. See id. at 42 (“For example, officials in the Colombian flower industry told us 
that ATPA’s short time frame and frequent renewals made it difficult to attract investment 
needed to enable them to compete with other international cut-flower producers. They said 
investors need certainty about preference benefits for at least 10 years to amortize and project 
return on investment.”). 
 365. See id. at 42 (“Threatening to let benefits lapse can be used as a way to pressure 
countries to act on an issue. While acknowledging the need for U.S. vigilance in pursuit of its 
commercial interests, officials at USTR and Labor told us short-term program renewal can 
have other adverse consequences, such as creating uncertainty for investors and importers 
interested in using the program. From their perspective, the discretion the administration 
exercises over continuation of program benefits offers sufficient leverage to achieve policy 
goals, based on the country’s desire to maintain benefits and the possibility of removing 
benefits administratively through reviews of country conformity with eligibility 
requirements.”). In the context of AGOA, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa 
Florizelle Liser opposes making AGOA permanent. In her view, it would send a message 
that sub-Saharan Africa is a hopeless case that will never be able to compete globally without 
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U.S. trade preference programs have proliferated since 1976, but the 
United States makes no pretense to taking an integrated approach toward its 
unilateral trade preference programs for developing countries. Should there 
be one? Within the private sector, some advocacy groups—in particular, 
groups with a pro-Africa agenda—summarily reject the suggestion that U.S. 
trade preference program be integrated.366 Although the purported rationale 
for preserving the status quo, especially with regard to Africa, is to maintain 
the policy leverage that AGOA offers vis-à-vis sub-Saharan Africa,367 it is 
equally plausible that this knee-jerk rejection of a call for program 
integration is rooted in the fear that the special trade preferences that are 
available only to AGOA beneficiaries would be eroded or lost if generalized 
and made available to all developing countries. In response to statutory 
requirements, agencies pursue different approaches to monitoring 
compliance with the various criteria set for programs, resulting in a lack of 
systematic review. There are other differences in key aspects of the 
preference programs, such the use of trade capacity building in conjunction 
with opportunities provided under trade preference programs, which is 
currently most prominent in AGOA.368  
Finally, distinct approaches to reporting and examining the programs 
limit the ability of the United States to determine the extent to which U.S. 
trade preferences foster development in beneficiary countries.  There is no 
periodic reporting on the effect of GSP on the economic development of 
countries covered by that program.369 When reports are prepared on the 
  
trade preferences. Rossella Brevetti, USTR Official Says Permanent AGOA Would Not Serve 
Africa’s Best Interests, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (April 18, 2011).  
 366. See, e.g., Rossella Brevetti, Consolidation of Preference Programs Not in U.S. 
Interest, CCA President Says, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (July 16, 2009).  
 367. See id. 
 368. In 2011 USTR Ron Kirk pledged additional aid for trade capacity building for 
AGOA beneficiaries. Kirk Announces Trade Capacity Initiative At Opening of AGOA 
Ministerial Sessions, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (June 10, 2011). The African 
Competitiveness and Trade Expansion Initiative announced by Kirk at the tenth annual 
AGOA forum will provide up to $120 million over four years to “intensify and focus more 
sharply” the work of four regional trade hubs. Remarks by Ambassador Ron Kirk, United 
States Trade Representative, Opening Ceremony of the 2011 U.S.-Sub-Saharan Africa Trade 
and Economic Cooperation Forum (AGOA Forum), Lusaka, Zambia, June 9, 2011, available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2011/june/remarks-united-
states-trade-representative-ron. The regional trade hubs in Ghana, Senegal, Botswana, and 
Kenya work with producers and firms that are ready to export within Africa, to the U.S. 
market, and worldwide. 
 369. Only one program (CBERA) requires agencies to directly report on the impact on 
the beneficiaries. Nevertheless, in response to statutory requirements, several government 
agencies report on certain economic aspects of the regional trade preference programs. This 
reporting, nevertheless, is done on a program-by-program basis. For example, the USTR has 
produced several reports to Congress on the operation of ATPA and CBERA. The ITC 
prepares biennial reports on ATPA’s impact on U.S. industries and consumers and on drug 
crop eradication and crop substitution. Additionally, the USTR prepares a biennial report for 
Congress on the CBERA program’s impact on beneficiaries, U.S. consumers, and the U.S. 
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economic impact of CBERA, ATPA, and AGOA on the beneficiaries, the 
ITC and the USTR use different approaches, resulting in disparate analyses 
that are not readily comparable.370 Moreover, there is no evaluation of how 
trade preferences as a whole affect economic development in beneficiary 
countries.371 
In sum, over the years, Congress has set up a number of trade preference 
programs to meet the overall goal of development, as well as specific 
regional objectives. As a result, U.S. trade preferences have evolved into an 
increasingly complex array of programs with many countries participating 
in more than one of these programs.372 While there is overlap in various 
aspects of trade preference programs, each program is currently considered 
separately by Congress based on its distinct timetable and expiration date. 
Typically, the focus has been on issues relevant to specific programs, such 
as counternarcotics cooperation efforts in the case of ATPA, or phasing out 
benefits for advanced developing countries in the case of GSP. As a result, 
  
economy. 19 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1). Finally, the USTR produces an annual report on the 
implementation of AGOA that highlights trade and investment trends in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 370. For example, the USTR’s report on the ATPA provides some examples that 
illustrate the role of the program in promoting exports and development in each of the four 
beneficiary countries and refers to analyses by the ITC and Labor on some aspects of the 
economic impact of ATPA. On the other hand, ITC reporting on the ATPA provides some 
material on exports and economic diversification for countries under the program. The 
USTR’s reporting on CBERA highlights overall and country-specific increases in U.S. 
imports from countries in the CBI program. The report includes discussions on individual 
countries, which generally do not evaluate the impact of CBERA on the exports or 
development of the beneficiaries. The ITC reports on the impact of CBI examine how that 
program affects those countries that have relatively large trade flows with the United States. 
The trade profile for the region presented in this report has shifted over time, with certain 
countries receiving more emphasis in earlier reports while later iterations focus on others. 
The USTR’s comprehensive report on trade and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
implementation of AGOA provides an overview of trade and investment trends in 
participating Sub-Saharan countries, reviews economic integration efforts at the regional and 
sub-regional level, and discusses participation by AGOA countries in the WTO. Finally, 
while there is no regular reporting on the economic impact of GSP on beneficiary countries, 
in 1980, the administration prepared a statutorily required report to Congress on the first 5 
years of operation of the GSP program. That report included an analysis of the impact of the 
GSP on developing country economies. This appears to have been a one-time report. See 
GAO Report on Integrating U.S. Trade Preference Programs, supra note 126, at 58. Thus, 
while there is an abundance of reporting on various aspects of the economic effects of trade 
preference programs on beneficiary countries, the analyses and data presented in these 
reports is typically quite dissimilar and does not lend itself for use in evaluating the overall 
effects of trade preferences. 
 371. See GAO Report on Integrating U.S. Trade Preference Programs, supra note 
126, at 56. 
 372. Of the countries and territories eligible for U.S. trade preference programs, in 
2007 78 benefited from more than one program and 39 were eligible for more than two 
programs. For a list of beneficiary countries and the overlapping programs for which they are 
eligible, see id. at 48.  
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until 2007373 congressional deliberations have not provided for cross-
programmatic consideration or oversight. The oversight difficulties 
associated with this array of preference programs and distinct timetables is 
compounded by different statutory review and reporting requirements for 
agencies. U.S. trade preferences are neither administered nor evaluated on a 
cross-programmatic basis. A lack of systematic evaluation limits any 
judgment about the extent to which the collection of U.S. trade preference 
programs has increased trade and fostered development in beneficiary 
countries. While evaluations may occur to determine whether countries 
should retain eligibility for preferences, such inquiries have not been made 
regularly or in a consistent manner across the programs or beneficiary 
countries. Integrating the disparate programs into a comprehensive, single 
program would bring coherence to what is an otherwise crazy-quilt legal 
scheme. 
B. Eliminate Conditionality 
Some commentators have singled out U.S. GSP conditionality for special 
condemnation on the ground that as a policy instrument it exceeds the 
bounds of rational policy making by including conditions that have no 
relationship to promoting international human rights (for example, IPR 
protection and U.S. investor protection).374 As noted above in connection 
  
 373. On May 16, 2007, the Senate Committee on Finance held a hearing to assess 
U.S. trade preference programs. U.S. Preference Programs: How Well Do They Work? 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance, 110th Congress (2007). 
 374. See, e.g., Open Markets for the Poorest Countries, supra note 344, at 13, where 
the author notes: 
 
Other arbitrary and nontransparent eligibility conditions can also 
discourage investment and inhibit exports. Most programs in high-
income countries have graduation rules for both countries as their 
incomes rise and products as exports become more competitive. In 
terms of other conditions for eligibility, only the United States goes 
beyond egregious violations of human rights (several countries 
exclude Myanmar from trade preference programs, for example) to 
include conditions relating to protection of intellectual property, 
corruption, and a range of other issues, depending on the program. 
The application of both types of conditions is often arbitrary and 
unpredictable. In order to avoid undermining the value of 
preferences, eligibility conditions should be limited and as objective 
as possible. Graduation conditions should be phased in gradually and 
should ensure that higher incomes or product competitiveness are not 
transitory before preferences are revoked. Political conditions should 
be based on international definitions of standards where they exist 
and applied sparingly. 
 
Id. at 13.  Whether this patently conclusory critique of U.S. conditionality has any basis in 
fact is open to question. 
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with the EU’s GSP+ program,375 the United States is not alone among 
preference-granting countries with regard to having a comparatively 
expansive list of conditions that it imposes for trade preference eligibility. 
Two different approaches that are reflected in the U.S. programs’ respective 
statutory authorizations — a petition process and periodic reviews — have 
evolved to monitor compliance with the conditions for eligibility under the 
various U.S. trade preference programs. The petition-driven GSP reviews of 
country practices and product coverage have the advantage of adapting the 
programs to changing market conditions and the concerns of businesses, 
foreign governments, and civil society.376 However, the petition process 
results in gaps in reviews of country compliance with the GSP conditions 
for eligibility. The GSP program’s petition review process, versus the 
annual or biennial administrative government agency review that takes 
place under the regional trade preference programs, is at best scattershot.377 
From 2001 to 2006, three-quarters of the countries eligible only for GSP did 
not get examined at all for their conformity with eligibility criteria. From 
2001 to 2006, when the number of GSP beneficiaries ranged from 146 to 
131, USTR considered petitions against 32 countries.378 In addition, long 
periods passed between overall reviews of the GSP program. The USTR 
completed an overall review of the GSP program in 2006. USTR completed 
the last general review of the program approximately 20 years earlier in 
1987.379  The petition-driven review process also fails to systematically 
incorporate other ongoing monitoring efforts. For example, the lack of 
review under GSP provisions of any of the 26 preference beneficiary 
countries cited by USTR in 2006 for having problems related to the 
adequate and effective protection of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR) 
makes it appear no linkage exists between GSP and ongoing monitoring of 
IPR protection abroad.   
  
 375. See supra text accompanying notes 225-27 and accompanying text. 
 376. For example, in 2009 the USTR accepted petitions to review the country 
practices of Bangladesh, Iraq, Niger, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan with regard 
to labor rights, the country practices of Argentina related to enforcement of arbitral awards, 
and the country practices of Lebanon, Russia, and Uzbekistan regarding intellectual property 
rights protection. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Results of the 2009 GSP 
Review: Petitions for Review of Country Practices 24 (2010), 
www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2016. The worker rights petitioners were the AFL-CIO and the 
International Labor Rights Fund. The petitioner for the IP rights practices was the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance. See id. For its 2010 GSP review the USTR 
accepted country-eligibility petitions for Sri Lanka (worker rights) and Argentina 
(enforcement of arbitral awards). See Len Bracken, USTR Takes Three 2009 GSP Petitions, 
Initiates Review of 2010 Country Eligibility, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Aug. 12, 2010).  
 377. Most petitions originate from persons outside of government. See GAO REPORT 
ON INTEGRATING U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 126, at 50 (“NGO and 
private sector representatives cited the value of the petition process in bringing forward 
concerns related to intellectual property rights and workers’ rights.”). 
 378. See id. at 51. 
 379. See id.  
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The periodic reviews under the regional programs offer more timely and 
consistent evaluations of country performance against the conditions for 
participation but may still miss important concerns. For example, 11 
countries that are in regional programs were later subject of GSP complaints 
in the 2001 to 2006 period.380 Equatorial Guinea has been reviewed for 
AGOA eligibility and found to be ineligible. Yet, Equatorial Guinea has not 
been subject to a GSP country practice petition or reviewed under GSP. As 
a result, Equatorial Guinea remained eligible for GSP and exported more 
than 90 percent of its $1.7 billion in exports duty free to the United States 
under the GSP program in 2006381 (it was subsequently graduated from GSP 
as a high-income country in 2009.) AGOA requires countries to be eligible 
for GSP, but the reverse is not true. In addition to the conditions for GSP 
eligibility, AGOA requires countries to have or be making progress toward 
political pluralism and the rule of law, and prohibits participation of 
countries that undermine U.S. national security and foreign policy, commit 
gross violations of human rights, or support international terrorism.  
 
 
Table 6.  Administrative Oversight of U.S. Trade Preference Programs 
 
 
 
aThe USTR submitted the statutorily mandated eighth and final annual AGOA report in 2008. 
 
Source: U.S.  Government Accountability Office 
 
 
To its credit, the process does bring to bear the knowledge of NGOs and 
others about problems in these areas and helps the government pursue 
credible cases.382 However, some of the countries reviewed frequently are 
  
 380. See id. at 54. 
 381. See id. at 46-47.  
 382. For example, from 2001 through 2006, USTR conducted an investigation on 
copyright piracy and enforcement in Brazil in response to a petition filed under GSP by a 
coalition of seven trade associations concerned about IPR violations in that country. The 
investigation resulted in an agreement between the U.S. and Brazilian governments, hailed 
 
2012] The Generalized System of Preferences after Four Decades 637 
 
not necessarily those that perform the worst relative to the criteria for 
participation but rather those countries of most concern to particular groups, 
such as businesses or NGOs.383 In this sense, U.S. government resources 
may be unduly invested in performing repeated reviews of a country that is 
of particular concern to a given interest group, while other countries with 
potential problems receive substantially less scrutiny.  
In contrast to the episodic petition review process of the GSP program, 
the periodic reviews under the regional programs offer more timely and 
consistent evaluations of country performance against the criteria for 
participation. Among the regional programs, AGOA has the most intensive 
evaluation of country performance against the criteria for participation. 
AGOA requires the President to determine annually whether Sub-Saharan 
African countries are, or remain, eligible for the program.384 The key 
difference between the AGOA review and the CBERA and ATPA reviews 
is that only AGOA requires a determination periodically as to whether a 
country should remain a beneficiary.385 
  
by the petitioner, to increase antipiracy raids in well-known marketplaces, establish 
antipiracy task forces at the state and local level in Brazil, and enhance deterrence through 
criminal prosecutions, among other actions. See id. at 51. 
 383. GAO REPORT ON INTEGRATING U.S. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 
126, at 51. 
 384. See id. at 53. Between 2001 and 2007, the President terminated eligibility four 
times and conferred eligibility eight times. In contrast, between 2001 and 2006, one country 
was removed and reinstated for GSP, and another country was reinstated after being removed 
in 1990. No country lost eligibility under the ATPA or CBI programs.  
 385. Regarding the efficacy and labor-intensive nature of AGOA annual reviews, the 
GAO has reported the following: 
 
A USTR official testified that AGOA’s annual review process has 
resulted in improved country performance under the eligibility 
criteria. In July 2007, a senior USTR official testified before the 
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee that the President had removed, or threatened to 
remove, AGOA beneficiaries that did not meet the criteria for 
participation. This official noted that some of these countries had 
taken action to meet the criteria, and countries such as Liberia and 
Mauritania, which had been ineligible, were now eligible. However, 
U.S. officials also commented that the AGOA review is extremely 
time-consuming and demands a considerable investment of staff 
resources, since each beneficiary country must be reviewed on its 
performance on a range of criteria, such as respect for the rule of law 
and poverty reduction efforts. Moreover, these reviews must be 
updated on an annual basis.   
Despite more regular and comprehensive reviews, 11 countries 
that are in regional programs were later subject of GSP complaints in 
the 2001 to 2006 period. In several cases, the petition-based 
examination associated with the GSP process validated and resulted 
in further progress in resolving concerns with regional partners such 
as Guatemala, Swaziland, and Uganda on labor issues. For example, 
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Realistically, considering the low number of petitions that are filed 
annually with the USTR seeking revocation of a country’s GSP beneficiary 
status based upon a violation of the GSP conditions, coupled with the 
extremely high denial rate by the USTR, it has to be seriously questioned 
whether the filing of such petitions isn’t anything more than a sop to 
petitioners and an irritant to the beneficiaries and their U.S. importers. 
Although a handful of petitions are filed annually to have a beneficiary 
country’s GSP status suspended or revoked, few result in actual GSP 
suspension or revocation. (Country suspension or removal from GSP and 
the ATPA only occurs through a petition process and not through an annual 
or biennial administrative review as is the case under AGOA and CBERA, 
respectively).386 For the six-year period 2001-06, 52 petitions were filed 
against 32 countries under the GSP program (in some instances multiple 
petitions were filed against the same country), alleging violations of 
workers’ right (24 petitions), intellectual property rights (15 petitions), 
market access (6 petitions), reverse preferential treatment (4 petitions), 
contract nullification (2 petitions), and expropriation (1 petition).387 In that 
six-year period, only Ukraine had its benefits suspended, which were 
eventually restored, and Liberia had its GSP status restored following a 
1990 suspension.388 As Tables 7-11 below illustrate, this situation has not 
changed in subsequent years. Few country-practice petitions challenging a 
  
in 2005, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations filed a petition regarding Uganda’s 
performance against workers’ rights criteria under GSP and AGOA. 
The petition led to an interagency investigation that was closed after 
Uganda enacted new legislation facilitating organization of unions, 
among other things. A Labor official told us that these issues had not 
been remedied under the AGOA review. 
 
See id. at 53-54.  
 386. See GAO Overview of U.S. Trade Preference Programs, supra note 129, at 4. 
Although there was no formal process for removal or suspension under the ATPA for its first 
ten years, with the amendments to the program made under the ATPDEA in 2002 a formal 
petition process was instituted in 2003. Since 2003, the USTR conducts annual reviews and 
provides the opportunity for the submission of petitions for the withdrawal or suspension of 
certain benefits of the program to ATPDEA recipient countries. Petitions must indicate the 
eligibility criterion that the petitioner believes warrants review. In 2003 17 petitions were 
filed (8 against Peru, 8 against Ecuador, and 1 against Colombia) alleging violations of 
workers’ rights and investors’ rights. See id. at 46. 
 387. See id. 44. For a list of the countries that were the subject of these petitions, see 
id. at 72. For a list of the countries that have had their GSP status changed as a result of a 
petition since the start of the GSP program, see id. at 68-71. Any person may file a petition in 
the annual GSP review requesting that the status of any eligible beneficiary be reviewed with 
respect to any of the designation criteria listed in the statute governing the GSP program, 
including workers’ rights and intellectual property rights.  
 388. See id.  
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beneficiary’s compliance with GSP conditions are filed each year, and the 
USTR’s disposition of those petitions are generally against the petitioner. 
 
Table 7. Results of GSP Country-Practice Petitions, 2005 
 
Petitioner(s) Country Subject* Decision 
AFL-CIO Bangladesh, Oman WR Not accepted for review 
International Labor Rights Fund 
(ILRF) and Asociacíon Servicios de 
Promocíon Laboral (ASEPROL) 
Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, 
Guatemala, 
Honduras, Panamá,  
WR Not accepted for review 
AFL-CIO and Teamsters El Salvador WR Not accepted for review 
Washington Office on Latin 
America  (WOLA) and U.S. Labor 
Education in the Americas Project 
(US/LEAP) 
Guatemala WR Not accepted for review 
AFL-CIO endorsing WOLA and 
US/LEAP petition 
Guatemala WR Not accepted for review 
ILRF and UNITE HERE Uganda WR Review Continued 
AFL-CIO Swaziland WR Review closed; no 
changes to beneficiary 
status 
International Intellectual Property 
Alliance (IIPA) 
Brazil, Kazakhstan, 
Pakistan 
IPR Review closed; no 
changes to beneficiary 
status 
Motion Picture Association of 
America 
Dominican 
Republic 
IPR Not accepted for review 
IIPA Lebanon, Russia, 
Uzbekistan 
IPR Review continued 
Distilled Spirits Council of the 
United States 
Bulgaria, Romania RPT Review continued 
Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America 
Romania RPT Review continued 
* WR=Worker’s Rights;   IPR=Intellectual Property Rights;   RPT=Reverse Preferential Treatment 
 
Source:  Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, www.ustr.gov 
 
 
 
Table 8. Results of GSP Country-Practice Petitions, 2006 
 
Petitioner(s) Country Subject* Decision 
AFL-CIO Iraq WR Not accepted for 
review 
International Labor Rights 
Fund (ILRF) 
Niger WR Review 
continued 
AFL-CIO Uganda WR Review closed; 
no changes to 
beneficiary 
status 
International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (IIPA) 
Lebanon, 
Russia, 
Uzbekistan 
IPR Review 
continued 
Distilled Spirits Council 
of the United States 
Bulgaria, 
Romania 
RPT Review closed 
Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of 
America 
Romania RPT Withdrawn 
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R&J Trading International 
Co. 
Ukraine Expropriation Not accepted for 
review 
* WR=Worker’s Rights;   IPR=Intellectual Property Rights;  RPT=Reverse 
Preferential Treatment  
    
Source:  Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, www.ustr.gov 
 
 
Table 9. Results of GSP Country-Practice Petitions, 2007 
 
Petitioner(s) Country Subject* Decision 
AFL-CIO Bangladesh WR Review continued 
International Labor Rights 
Fund (ILRF) 
Niger, 
Uzbekistan 
WR Review continued 
International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (IIPA) 
Lebanon, 
Russia, 
Uzbekistan, 
Philippines 
IPR Review continued 
* WR=Worker’s Rights;   IPR=Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Source:  Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, www.ustr.gov 
 
 
Table 10. Results of GSP Country-Practice Petitions, 2008 
 
Petitioner(s) Country Subject* Decision 
AFL-CIO Bangladesh WR Review continued 
AFL-CIO Iraq WR Decision deferred 
on whether to 
accept 
International Labor Rights 
Fund (ILRF) 
Niger, 
Philippines, 
Uzbekistan 
WR Review continued 
AFL-CIO Sri Lanka WR Decision deferred 
on whether to 
accept 
International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (IIPA) 
Lebanon, 
Russia, 
Uzbekistan 
IPR Review continued 
* WR=Worker’s Rights;   IPR=Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Source:  Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, www.ustr.gov 
 
 
Table 11. Results of GSP Country-Practice Petitions, 2009 
 
Petitioner(s) Country Subject* Decision 
AFL-CIO Bangladesh WR Review continued 
AFL-CIO Iraq WR Decision deferred 
on whether to 
accept 
International Labor Rights 
Fund (ILRF) 
Niger, 
Philippines, 
Uzbekistan 
WR Review continued 
AFL-CIO Sri Lanka WR Petition accepted 
International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (IIPA) 
Lebanon, 
Russia, 
IPR Review continued 
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Uzbekistan 
Azurix Corp. Argentina Arbitral 
awards 
Petition accepted 
* WR=Worker’s Rights;   IPR=Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Source:  Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, www.ustr.gov 
 
In short, conditionality is a stage for bad political theater, and its impact 
on the beneficiary level is arguably negligible. The elimination of 
conditionality in all donor-country GSP programs should be given serious 
consideration. 
C. Harmonize Preferential Rules of Origin at the International Level 
Any type of preferential trade arrangement requires rules of origin in 
order to prevent goods produced in non-beneficiary countries from being 
transshipped through beneficiary countries receiving preferential market 
access.389 Eligibility for preferential treatment usually requires that imported 
inputs must be “substantially transformed” in the beneficiary country. 
“Substantial transformation” can be expressed in a number of ways.  In 
determining whether the country of origin of an otherwise eligible article is 
a BDC, the U.S. GSP statute390 provides that an eligible article that is the 
  
 389. In addition to preventing transshipment, some argue that rules of origin should be 
used as a form of industrial policy to promote backward linkages, for example encouraging 
local textile production as inputs for clothing exports. See Open Markets for the Poorest 
Countries, supra note 344, at 10. As the author of this report observes: 
 
[T]he EU’s Everything But Arms program is a model program with 
respect to product coverage, but it failed to deliver on its potential 
because of rules of origin that still block access for key products. The 
EBA rule for apparel, for example, restricts imports of woven 
garments by requiring that the fabric be manufactured locally and 
then cut and assembled in the beneficiary country to be eligible for 
access. But textile production is more capital-intensive and requires 
more skills than the cutting and sewing of apparel, and this rule is 
impossible to meet in smaller, poorer countries. By contrast, the U.S. 
rule for “lesser developed” beneficiaries under AGOA allows them 
to source fabric and other inputs globally and still claim AGOA 
benefits, as long as the apparel is cut and sewn in the beneficiary 
country. 
 
Id. 
 
 390. 19 U.S.C. § 2463. In interpreting the pre-1990 amendments to the Act, a 1989 
Federal Circuit opinion, Madison Galleries, Ltd. v. United States, 870 F.2d 627 (Fed. Cir. 
1989), held that an article did not have to be the growth, product, or manufacture of a BDC 
in order to be eligible for duty-free treatment.  Congress restructured this section to provide 
for GSP eligibility for articles, which are the growth, product, or manufacture of a BDC. Pub. 
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growth, product, or manufacture of a BDC shall receive duty-free treatment 
if: (1) the article is imported directly from a BDC into the customs territory 
of the United States; and (2) the sum of (a) the cost or value of the materials 
produced in the BDC or any two or more BDCs that are members of a trade 
association (such as a free trade area or customs union), which are treated as 
one country pursuant to Executive Order or presidential proclamation,391 
plus (b) the direct costs of processing operations performed in such BDC or 
such member countries,392 is not less than (c) 35 percent of the appraised 
value of such article at the time it is entered.393 In addition, materials 
imported into a BDC may be counted toward the 35-percent value-added 
requirement only if they are substantially transformed into a new and 
different article of commerce in the BDC before they are incorporated into 
the GSP-eligible article.394 As a general proposition, a good is substantially 
transformed if it is changed into a new and different article having a 
distinctive name, character, or use.395 Although it has a low value-added rule 
of origin (35 percent), the U.S. requirement that one country or small groups 
of BDCs396 meet that threshold ignores the globally integrated supply chains 
used to manufacture finished goods today.397 
  
L. No. 101-382, § 226, 104 Stat. 660 (1990). For a Customs Service definition of “imported 
directly,” see 19 C.F.R. § 10.175. Customs Service regulations identify the following items 
that may be included in the cost or value of materials: (1) the manufacturer’s actual cost for 
the materials; (2) when not included in the actual cost, freight, insurance, packing, and costs 
incurred in transporting the goods to the manufacturer’s plant; (3) the actual cost of waste 
and spoilage; and (4) taxes and duties imposed on the materials by the BDC, provided they 
are not remitted upon exportation.  See 19 C.F.R. § 10.177(c). 
 391. Such country associations include CARICOM, the Andean Pact, and ASEAN, 
and are listed in HTUSU General Note 4.   
 392. Customs Service regulations identify the following costs that may be included as 
“direct costs of processing operations:” (1) actual direct labor costs, (2) tools, equipment, and 
their depreciation allocable to the specific article, (3) research and development allocable to 
the specific article, and (4) inspection and testing costs.  Costs that are not “direct” costs 
include profit and general expenses not allocable to the specific product, such as advertising 
and administrative salaries.  See 19 C.F.R. § 10.178. 
 393. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(a)(2). U.S. Customs and Border Protection regulations 
governing the GSP program require that a GSP Declaration be filed with an entry in a case 
involving an article that is not wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of a single BDC.  
The Declaration must set forth in detail the processing operations in the countries that are 
members of a trade association, such as a free trade area or customs union. 19 C.F.R. § 
10.173. 
 394. 19 C.F.R. § 10.177(a)(2).  For an analysis of GSP rule-of-origin issues, see 
Kenneth G. Weigel, Preferential Rules of Origin, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CUSTOMS RULES 
OF ORIGIN (Am. Bar Ass’n 1993); Thomas P. Cutler, The United States Generalized System 
of Preferences: The Problem of Substantial Transformation, 5 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
393 (1980). 
 395. Anheuser-Busch Ass’n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908). 
 396. Such country associations include CARICOM, the Andean Pact, and ASEAN, 
and are listed in HTSUS General Note 4. 
 397. CBERA’s rules of origin are similar to those of the GSP program. See 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(a).  Like the GSP, CBERA requires that a product (1) be imported directly from a 
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beneficiary country to the United States, (2) satisfy the substantial transformation test for any 
foreign parts or components, and (3) contain a minimum of 35-percent local value-added. 
CBERA provides generally that in order for designated products to be eligible for 
preferential tariff treatment they must either be (1) wholly grown, produced, or manufactured 
in a CBERA country, or (2) a new or different article of commerce produced from 
substantially transformed non-CBERA inputs. As is the case under the parallel GSP origin 
rule, in meeting the 35-percent CBERA content requirement, the value-added may come 
from two or more CBERA countries. The documentation requirements necessary to claim 
either CBERA or GSP duty-free entry are identical. 
  The ATPA rule of origin is slightly more preferential than the CBERA 
counterpart.  Duty-free treatment of any eligible article is granted under the ATPA to an 
article that is the growth, product, or manufacture of a beneficiary country, provided (1) the 
article is imported directly from a beneficiary country into the customs territory of the United 
States, and (2) the sum of (a) the cost or value of materials produced in one or more Andean 
or CBERA beneficiary countries, plus (b) the direct costs of processing operations performed 
in one or more Andean or CBERA beneficiary countries is not less than 35 percent of the 
appraised value of the article. 19 U.S.C. § 3203(a); HTSUS General Note 3(c)(ix)(B)(1)(II).  
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are included as beneficiary countries, and up to 15 percent 
of the value of U.S. content may count toward the 35-percent value added. Thus, the ATPA 
rule is slightly more preferential than the CBERA rule because it allows for the inclusion of 
costs associated with CBERA-country operations, whereas the CBERA rule does not contain 
a reciprocal rule permitting the inclusion of ATPA-country costs. 
The AGOA rules of origin are essentially bifurcated: there is one rule of origin for products 
other than textile and clothing and special rules of origin for textiles and clothing. The rule of 
origin for non-textile and clothing imports is 35-percent SSA value.  In addition, 15 percent 
of the value of the imported product can be attributed to inputs originating in the United 
States.  The AGOA rule of origin provides: 
 
The duty-free treatment provided under paragraph (1) shall apply to 
any article described in that paragraph that meets the requirements of 
section 2463(a)(2) of this title [19 U.S.C.], except that-- 
 
(A) if the cost or value of materials produced in the customs 
territory of the United States is included with respect to that 
article, an amount not to exceed 15 percent of the appraised value 
of the article at the time it is entered that is attributed to such 
United States cost or value may be applied toward determining 
the percentage referred to in subparagraph (A) of  section 
2463(a)(2) of this title [19 U.S.C.];  and 
 
(B) the cost or value of the materials included with respect to that 
article that are produced in one or more beneficiary sub-Saharan 
African countries or former beneficiary sub-Saharan African 
countries shall be applied in determining such percentage. 
 
19 U.S.C. § 2466a(b)(2). As is true for non-textile and clothing articles, AGOA provides 
duty-free and quota-free treatment for eligible clothing articles made in qualifying sub-
Saharan African countries. However, not only are the rules of origin for textiles and clothing 
more stringent, but the rules on eligibility for the textile and clothing benefits are also more 
onerous. Under AGOA I, clothing imports made from sub-Saharan African fabric and yarn 
were subject to an initial cap of 1.5 percent of overall U.S. clothing imports, increasing to 3.5 
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percent of overall imports over an 8-year period. The 2002 AGOA amendments doubled the 
applicable percentages of the cap to 7 percent. The regional fabric quantities are recalculated 
for each subsequent year and the percentage figure increases incrementally in equal annual 
increases to a level of 7 percent beginning October 1, 2007. Clothing articles entered in 
excess of these quantities are subject to otherwise applicable tariffs. The duty-free cap is not 
allocated among countries, but is filled on a “first-come, first-served” basis. See Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative, 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment 
Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act 5-6 (2004). AGOA limits imports of clothing made with regional or third-
country fabric to a fixed percentage of the aggregate square meter equivalents (SME) of all 
clothing articles imported into the United States during the preceding year. The Trade Act of 
2002 increased the quantitative limitation for clothing made with regional fabric. AGOA III 
extended the regional fabric provision until September 2015, but provided that the increase 
would not apply to clothing imported under the special provision for lesser-developed 
countries that allows textile and clothing imports to be made of third-country fabrics, i.e., 
fabrics other than of U.S. or SSA origin, through September 2007. Thus, for the year 
beginning October 1, 2003, the aggregate quantity of imports eligible for preferential 
treatment under these provisions was an amount not to exceed 4.7931 percent of all clothing 
articles imported into the United States in the preceding 12-month period for which data was 
available, which equaled 956,568,715 square meters equivalent (SME). See id. at 5. The 
percentage increases annually until it reaches 7 percent of total U.S. imports, at which point 
it is capped. The AGOA III limitations of benefits provision provides:  
 
(i) In general 
 
Preferential treatment under this paragraph shall be extended in the 
1-year period beginning October 1, 2003, and in each of the 11 
succeeding 1-year periods, to imports of clothing articles in an 
amount not to exceed the applicable percentage of the aggregate 
square meter equivalents of all clothing articles imported into the 
United States in the preceding 12-month period for which data are 
available. 
 
(ii) Applicable percentage 
 
For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “applicable percentage” 
means-- 
 
(I) 4.747 percent for the 1-year period beginning October 1, 2003, 
increased in each of the 5 succeeding 1-year periods by equal 
increments, so that for the 1-year period beginning October 1, 
2007, the applicable percentage does not exceed 7 percent; and 
 
(II) for each succeeding 1-year period until September 30, 2015, 
not to exceed 7 percent. 
 
19 U.S.C. § 3721(b)(3)(A).  
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In 2010, the European Commission promulgated regulations revising the 
rules of origin for the EU’s GSP scheme.398 The revised regulation 
reintroduced the four origin methodologies, i.e., goods wholly obtained,399 
change of tariff heading or sub-heading, specific working and processing 
operations, and value-added requirement, thus abandoning the application 
of the unitary, value-added methodology initially proposed.400 
Annex 1 of the 2010 regulation, Introductory Notes and List of Working 
or Processing Operations which Confer Originating Status, identifies which 
products are subject to which ROO methodology. An effort was made to 
make the new rules of origin applicable on a sector-by-sector basis rather 
than a product-by-product basis, thereby simplifying the origin rules and, in 
some instances, liberalizing them for LDCs. The revised ROO sets the 
threshold of value-added at 50 percent for many products originating in 
non-LDC beneficiary countries.401 For other products, the revised ROO 
lowers the thresholds by 10 to 20 percent.  For LDCs, a 30-percent value-
added test is established, reflecting the EU’s stated objective of targeted 
relaxation of origin rules for these countries.402  For clothing products from 
LDCs, the revised ROO adopts a “single transformation” test.403 As a 
consequence, clothing that is assembled from imported fabric will confer 
origin. This single transformation test is sufficiently liberal so as to allow 
LDCs to effectively meet the requirement. For non-LDC developing 
countries, the prior requirement based on “dual transformation” rule is 
maintained.404 For some products, the revised ROO establishes alternative 
tests at the exporter’s option: (1) a value-added test, or (2) a change-in-
tariff-heading test.405 What are styled “tolerance” rules—in effect, de 
minimis rules—permit the use of non-originating materials in the 
production of a given product to a certain pre-determined threshold value, 
even if that would not normally satisfy the origin requirement.406  
  
 398. Comm’n Regulation 1063/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 307) 1 [hereinafter EU Reg. on 
GSP Rules of Origin].  
 399. Id. arts. 72, 75. 
 400. Id. annex I. 
 401. See, e.g., id. annex I, at 41. 
 402. See id. annex I. 
 403. See, e.g., id. annex I at 50-51. There are four steps involved in processing natural 
fibers and making them into a finished item.  First, the fiber is harvested. Second, the fiber is 
spun into yarn.  Third, the yarn is woven or knit into fabric.  Fourth, the fabric is cut and 
sewn into clothing (e.g., shirts and blouses) and other made-up textile articles (e.g., bed 
sheets and towels).  See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, TEXTILES AND APPAREL: ASSESSMENT OF 
THE COMPETITIVENESS OF CERTAIN FOREIGN SUPPLIERS TO THE U.S. MARKET, at 1-2 (Pub. 
3671 Jan. 2004). 
 404. See EU Reg. on GSP Rules of Origin, supra note 398, annex I at 50-51. Non-
LDC developing countries that do not manufacture fabric will have difficulty in meeting this 
origin requirement. 
 405. See id. annex I, at 41. 
 406. Id. art. 79. For example, the EU current origin rule provides that a doll (HS 9502) 
imported from a beneficiary country can qualify for the EU GSP if the doll is manufactured 
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The EU’s amended rules of origin have a variety of cumulation 
provisions. First, regarding bilateral cumulation, under the former rule 
beneficiary countries could cumulate bilaterally with EU member countries, 
Norway, and Switzerland. Turkey was added to the countries for which 
bilateral cumulation is allowed.407 However, cumulation is not permitted for 
agricultural products (HS 1 to 24).408  Second, regarding regional 
cumulation, the current regional cumulation rule is maintained.409 Third, 
cumulation is permitted between a beneficiary country and a country with 
which the EU has a free trade agreement (excluding agricultural 
products).410 Notwithstanding this apparent attempt to simplify the EU’s 
GSP rules of origin, the revised regulation’s entry requirements remain 
complex.411  
Canada’s GPT scheme allows all work completed in any beneficiary 
country to count towards its value threshold (i.e., cumulation). This subtle 
difference provides exporters in small countries, which might be 
competitive at producing components but not whole goods, a greater chance 
to integrate into the global production chain.412 
A value-added rule, such as the 35-percent rule of U.S. GSP, the ATPA, 
and CBERA, can require extensive documentation of costs, thus deterring 
some producers in a beneficiary country from tackling the necessary 
  
from any imported materials which are classified under a different heading, e.g., plastics or 
fabrics. However, the use of imported doll’s parts, e.g., doll’s eyes, would not normally be 
allowed as these are classified in the same tariff heading (HS 9502) as the doll itself. In this 
respect, the tolerance rule allows the use of these imported materials in the production of 
final products if they do not exceed certain threshold value levels. The “tolerance” level was 
raised from the current rule of 10 percent to 15 percent. 
 407. Id. art. 85. 
 408. Id. art. 85(3). 
 409. Id. art. 86. The following are the regional cumulation groups: Group I (the 
members of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, comprising Brunei, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, excluding 
Myanmar), Group II (the members of the Andean Community, Central American Common 
market, comprising Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela, and including Panama), Group III (the 
members of South Asian Association on Regional Cooperation — SAARC — comprising 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), and Group IV 
(MERCOSUR — the Common Market of the South — comprising Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay). The revised ROO also allows cross-cumulation between Group I 
(ASEAN) and Group III (SAARC). Id. art. 86(5). 
 410. Id. art. 86(7). 
 411. See id. arts. 90-97m. 
 412. UNILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE PROGRAMS OFFERED BY THE UNITED STATES, 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND CANADA, supra note 77, at 18. Japan’s GSP program adopts the 
goods wholly obtained and goods substantially transformed criteria. With the former there is 
little guesswork or controversy. However, Japan’s substantial transformation criterion in 
reality represents four alternative rules of origin: (1) change in tariff classification, (2) dual 
substantial transformation, (3) a 55-60% value-added test when the imported goods are 
assembled from non-originating parts, and (4) a hybrid test that combines value added with 
certain processing operations. See Komuro, supra note 41, at 108-09. 
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paperwork with the result that MFN duties are imposed. At the same time, 
the preference-granting countries have not adopted harmonized rules of 
origin, further complicating the life of producers in beneficiary countries 
who are eager to export but who could be deterred by conflicting rules of 
origin. In addition, the lack of harmonization among donor countries could 
further frustrate a producer’s ability to achieve scale economies if it has to 
comply with variant rules of origin among different export markets.   
For all these reasons, in lieu of a percentage-based value-added test, 
some experts recommend using a change-in-tariff-heading approach with 
the headings defined at a relatively disaggregated level to promote 
flexibility.413 It has been further suggested that allowing cumulation would 
address many of the problems associated with existing rules of origin and 
could be adopted unilaterally. Cumulation, which the United States permits 
under CBERA, the ATPA, and AGOA, allows inputs to be sourced from a 
designated set of countries without losing eligibility for the final product as 
long as the inputs still undergo some substantial transformation in the 
beneficiary, such as a cutting-and-sewing operation for clothing. Under an 
expansive form of cumulation, if any country’s goods would be eligible for 
duty-free treatment if shipped directly to the preference-giving country, then 
that country’s goods could be inputs in the final product shipped by the 
ultimate beneficiary country. That would allow cumulation from countries 
that are eligible for unilateral preference programs such as GSP as well as 
countries that are parties to a free trade agreement.414 The problem with such 
a proposal, however, is that preference-granting countries’ lists of eligible 
beneficiary countries under their unilateral trade preference programs and 
under their free trade partners are not identical. For example, both China 
and Vietnam are GSP beneficiaries under the EU’s GSP scheme, but neither 
is under the U.S. GSP program.415 Moreover, whereas the United States and 
Canada are free trade partners under NAFTA, neither country is a free trade 
partner with either the EU or Japan. Nevertheless, at the single donor 
  
 413. See UNILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE PROGRAMS OFFERED BY THE UNITED 
STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND CANADA, supra note 77, at 11 (footnote omitted).  
 414. See id. at 11, where the report notes that “Haiti, for example, has continued to 
have problems fully using preferences in the Canadian market because its apparel exports 
often contain U.S. fabric or other inputs (because of U.S. rules under its preference 
programs). Even though the U.S. fabric would be granted duty-free treatment if exported 
directly to Canada under the North American Free Trade Agreement, it is not eligible for 
cumulation under Canada’s rule for LDC Preferences.” 
 415. In 2008 Vietnam formally requested to be designated a U.S. GSP beneficiary. 
Letter from the Embassy of Vietnam to the United States Trade Representative (May 9, 
2008), www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/gsp/asset_upload_file29_15061.pdf. See 
Alexander H. Tuzin, Vietnam’s Eligibility to Receive Trade Benefits under the U.S. 
Generalized System of Preferences, 7 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 193, 194 (2010) 
(“Vietnam’s compliance with the GSP eligibility criteria is problematic. Ultimately, 
Vietnam’s protections for both intellectual property rights and internationally recognized 
worker rights are inadequate.”). 
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country level, a low value-added threshold coupled with a liberal 
cumulation rule can yield significant gains in trade for beneficiaries.416 In 
connection with clothing, would the third-country fabric provision of 
AGOA and the HOPE Act be carried over? Ultimately, harmonization and 
rationalization of preferential rules of origin should also be pursued, if not 
for all preferential trade arrangements at least for the ones with LDCs as the 
beneficiaries. While it is true that negotiations at the WTO to harmonize 
non-preferential rules of origin have dragged on for years,417 that project has 
proven to be extremely (if not overly) ambitious. A more modest agenda of 
negotiating harmonized rules of origin for programs that give tariff 
preferences to LDCs might stand an outside chance of success. 
D. Provide Better Focused and Coordinated Aid for Trade  
Many developing countries have expressed concern about their inability 
to take advantage of trade preferences because they lack the capacity to 
participate in international trade. In response to this criticism, the “Aid-for-
Trade” program was launched in 2005 at the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial 
meeting. 418  In brief, the Aid-for-Trade Initiative aims to help developing 
  
 416. See UNILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE PROGRAMS OFFERED BY THE UNITED 
STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND CANADA, supra note 77, at 12. The experience in 
Canada is illustrative: 
 
The most compelling evidence of the importance of reforming rules 
of origin comes from the 2003 changes in Canada’s trade preference 
program. In addition to removing duties on almost all products in its 
tariff schedule, Canada lowered the threshold for locally added value 
in LDCs [to 25 percent] and also allowed LDCs to cumulate inputs 
from all developing-country beneficiaries, not just other LDCs. The 
result was more countries benefiting from preferential access, 
increased imports to Canada from existing beneficiaries, and an 
expanded range of imports into Canada from beneficiaries. Over a 
few years, the LDC share of non-oil Canadian imports nearly tripled. 
Less dramatically, the market share of beneficiaries under the U.S. 
AGOA program, which has relatively flexible rules, increased by 
roughly a third. By contrast, the market share for LDCs not already 
eligible for the EU’s African, Caribbean, and Pacific program stayed 
flat after introduction of the EBA program with its more restrictive 
rules. 
 
Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). 
 417. See WTO. Note by the Secretariat, Tenth Annual Review of the Implementation 
and Operation of the Agreement on Rules of Origin, G/RO/59 (Dec. 10, 2004); WTO, Report 
(2010) of the Committee on Rules of Origin to the Council for Trade in Goods, G/L/939 
(Nov. 8, 2010).  
 418. The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration provides the following regarding “Aid 
for Trade:” 
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countries, particularly LDCs, to build the supply-side capacity and trade-
related infrastructure required to implement and benefit from WTO 
Agreements and, more broadly, to expand their trade. It was set into motion 
in 2006 with the establishment of a WTO Aid-for-Trade Task Force.419 The 
WTO Task Force recommended the following objectives for the initiative: 
 
• Enable developing countries, particularly LDCs, to use trade more 
effectively to promote growth, development, and poverty reduction 
• Help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build supply-side  
capacity and trade-related infrastructure in order to facilitate their 
access to markets  
• Help facilitate, implement, and adjust to trade reform and  
liberalization 
• Assist regional integration 
• Assist smooth integration into the world trading system, and 
• Assist in the implementation of trade agreements.420 
 
In addition, the Task Force recommended strengthening the partner 
country demand-side and the donor response-side as well as bridging the 
  
We welcome the discussions of Finance and Development Ministers 
in various fora, including the Development Committee of the World 
Bank and IMF, that have taken place this year on expanding Aid for 
Trade.  Aid for Trade should aim to help developing countries, 
particularly LDCs, to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related 
infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and benefit 
from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade.  Aid 
for Trade cannot be a substitute for the development benefits that 
will result from a successful conclusion to the DDA, particularly on 
market access.  However, it can be a valuable complement to the 
DDA.  We invite the Director-General to create a task force that shall 
provide recommendations on how to operationalize Aid for Trade.  
The Task Force will provide recommendations to the General 
Council by July 2006 on how Aid for Trade might contribute most 
effectively to the development dimension of the DDA.  We also 
invite the Director-General to consult with Members as well as with 
the IMF and World Bank, relevant international organisations and 
the regional development banks with a view to reporting to the 
General Council on appropriate mechanisms to secure additional 
financial resources for Aid for Trade, where appropriate through 
grants and concessional loans. 
 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra note 82, at ¶ 57. 
 419. The Task Force called for in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration reported in 
July 2006. Aid for Trade Task Force, Recommendations of the Task Force on Aid for Trade, 
WT/AFT/1 (July 27, 2006). Additional information on aid for trade is available at the WTO’s 
website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm (last visited 
May 11, 2011).  
 420. Id. at 3. 
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gap between demand and response at the national, regional, and global 
levels. To track progress on the implementation of this agenda and enhance 
the credibility of the initiative, the Task Force recommended establishing 
two accountability mechanisms: (1) at the local level, to foster genuine local 
ownership and ensure that trade needs are integrated into national 
development strategies and adequately addressed; and (2) at the global 
level, to increase transparency about what is happening, what is not, and 
where improvements are required.421  
How is aid-for-trade measured? The WTO Task Force concluded that 
aid-for-trade comprises the following categories: (a) technical assistance for 
trade policy and regulations (e.g., helping countries to develop trade 
strategies, negotiate trade agreements, and implement their outcomes); (b) 
trade-related infrastructure (e.g., building roads, ports, and 
telecommunications networks to connect domestic markets to the global 
economy); (c) productive capacity building, including trade 
development (e.g., supporting the private sector to exploit their comparative 
advantages and diversify their exports); (d) trade-related adjustment (e.g., 
helping developing countries with the costs associated with trade 
liberalization, such as tariff reductions, the shrinking margin of preference, 
or declining terms of trade); and (e) other trade-related needs, if identified 
as trade-related development priorities in partner countries’ national 
development strategies.422 
Following these recommendations, the OECD and the WTO established 
an aid-for-trade monitoring and evaluation framework.423 The objective of 
the framework is to promote dialogue and encourage all key actors to honor 
commitments, meet local needs, improve effectiveness, and reinforce 
mutual accountability. Qualitative information concerning partner-country 
demand is obtained through partner country self-assessments, which are 
based on an OECD-WTO partner questionnaire. These assessments also 
provide information about mainstreaming trade in development strategies, 
trade-related priorities, the delivery of aid-for-trade, and the co-operation 
between partner countries and donors. Information concerning donor 
response consists of quantitative information (i.e., aid-for-trade flows) 
relating to trade-related programs and projects that is extracted from the 
OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database,424 for the categories 
  
 421. See id. at 5-7.  
 422. See id. at 24. 
 423. OECD & WTO, AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2007: 1ST GLOBAL REVIEW 15-18 
(2007) [hereinafter AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2007]. 
 424. The Creditor Reporting System (CRS) is a database compiled and maintained by 
the OECD covering approximately 90 percent of all Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). It is the internationally-recognized source of data on aid activities. For the OECD, 
the CRS serves as a tool for monitoring specific policy issues, including aid for trade. The 
CRS enables the tracking of aid commitments and disbursements, and provides comparable 
data over time and across countries. The CRS does not provide data that match exactly all of 
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that are most closely related to the Task Force definition,425 and qualitative 
information concerning the donor response of aid-for-trade that is derived 
from donor self-assessment based on an OECD-WTO donor 
questionnaire.426 These self-assessments highlight the progress made by 
donors in developing operational aid-for-trade strategies, the extent to 
which these are implemented in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness,427 and the different steps taken to improve the quality of aid-
for-trade programs. 
  
the WTO Task Force-defined, aid-for-trade categories. See supra note 422 and 
accompanying text. The CRS provides proxies under the following five headings: 
 
(1) Technical assistance for trade policy and regulations covering (a) trade policy and 
administrative management, (b) trade facilitation, (c) regional trade agreements, (d) 
multilateral trade negotiations, and (e) trade education/training. 
  
(2) Economic infrastructure. This heading covers data on aid for communications, energy, 
transport, and storage. 
  
(3) Productive capacity building, including trade development. 
  
(4) Trade-related adjustment. This category identifies contributions to developing country 
budgets to assist the implementation of trade reforms and adjustments to trade policy 
measures by other countries, and to alleviate shortfalls in balance-of-payments due to 
changes in the world trading environment. 
  
(5) Other trade-related needs. The CRS covers all ODA, but only those activities reported 
under the above four categories are identified as aid for trade. A health program, for 
example, might permit increased trade from areas where the disease burden was previously a 
constraint on trade. Consequently, accurately monitoring aid for trade would require 
comparison of the CRS data with donor and partner countries’ self-assessments of their aid 
for trade.  
 
The CRS database is available at Creditor Reporting System Full, OECD STATISTICS, 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW (last visited July 25 2011).  
 425. The OECD’s Aid for Trade Statistical Queries webpage, 
http://stats.oecd.org/qwids, offers access to aid-for-trade statistics (through an interface 
called QWIDS) to measure aid-for-trade flows. Users can extract and download the latest 
aid-for-trade statistics from 2002 onwards, covering volume, origin, and aid categories for 
over 150 developing countries and territories, including project-level information reported to 
the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS). 
 426. See AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2007, supra note 423, at 49-59. 
 427. High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
OECD (March 2, 2005), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/63/43911948.pdf.  The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness resolves to reform aid in order to make it more effective at 
combating global poverty. The High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005 was 
attended by development officials and ministers from 91 countries, 26 donor organizations 
and partner countries, and civil society and private sector representatives. The Paris 
Declaration is a roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development.  At the 
heart of the Paris Declaration is the belief that aid is more effective when partner countries 
exercise strong and effective leadership over their development policies and strategies. 
Ownership is therefore the fundamental tenet underpinning the Paris Declaration. 
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Governments of developing countries are accountable to their own parliaments and citizens, 
not to donor organizations, for their development policies. In many countries, this means 
strengthening parliamentary oversight of development policies and budgets and reinforcing 
the role of civil society (¶ 48). It also requires donors to scale down their sometimes 
excessive demands for accountability from developing countries by (1) relying as much as 
possible on country systems and procedures (¶ 21), (2) avoiding intrusive conditionality (¶ 
16), (3) decreasing the number of project implementation units that undermine national 
administrations (¶ 21), and (4) providing timely and transparent information on aid flows so 
as to enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislature 
and citizens (¶ 49). The Paris Declaration is organized around five key principles: 
 
   Ownership. Developing countries are to exercise effective leadership over their  
 development policies and to coordinate development efforts. Donors are 
responsible for supporting and enabling developing-country ownership by 
respecting their policies and helping strengthen their capacity to implement them 
(¶¶ 14-15). 
   Alignment. Donors are to base their overall support on partner countries’  
 national development strategies, institutions, and procedures. This means that 
donors will impose conditions, whenever possible, from a developing country 
government’s development strategy, instead of imposing multiple conditions 
based on other agendas (¶ 16). 
   Harmonization. Donors aim to be more harmonized in their aid schemes,  
 thereby imposing fewer burdens on those countries that have weak 
administrative capacities. This means establishing common arrangements at the 
country level for planning, funding, and implementing development programs (¶ 
32). 
   Managing for results. Both donors and partner countries are to manage  
 resources and improve decision-making for results. Donors should fully support 
developing countries’ efforts in implementing performance assessment 
frameworks that measure progress against key elements of national development 
strategies (¶¶ 43-46). 
   Mutual accountability. Donors and developing countries pledge that they will  
  hold each mutually accountable for development results. 
 
  Accountability requirements are often harder on developing countries than 
donors. The Paris Declaration recognizes that for aid to become truly effective, stronger and 
more balanced accountability mechanisms are required at different levels. At the 
international level, the Paris Declaration creates a mechanism by which donors and recipients 
of aid are held mutually accountable to each other, and compliance in meeting the 
commitments will be publicly monitored. To this end, the Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness has been charged with the responsibility of establishing a medium-term 
monitoring plan (¶ 9). At the country level, the Paris Declaration encourages donors and 
partners to jointly assess mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid 
effectiveness by making use of local mechanisms such as consultative groups (¶ 50). 
The Accra Agenda for Action was drawn up in 2008 and builds on the commitments agreed 
in the Paris Declaration. The Accra Agenda contains four major points: (1) predictability 
(donors will provide 3-5 year forward information on their planned aid to partner countries), 
(2) country systems (partner country systems will be used to deliver aid as the first option, 
rather than donor systems), (3) conditionality (donors will switch from reliance on 
prescriptive conditions about how and when aid money is spent to conditions based on the 
developing country’s own development objectives), and (4) untying (donors will relax 
restrictions that prevent developing countries from buying the goods and services they need 
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The WTO plays an important role overall in monitoring and providing 
aid-for-trade.428 By its own admission, the WTO is neither a financing 
agency nor does it have any ambition to become one.429 In addition to its 
monitoring and advocacy role for aid-for-trade, the WTO provides limited 
assistance in the area of trade policy and regulation through its Institute for 
Training and Technical Co-operation,430 Trade Facilitation Technical 
Assistance for National Self-Assessments of Needs and Priorities,431 and the 
Standards and Trade Development Facility.432 Although the WTO is neither 
a development nor financing agency, it has a mandate from its members to 
work with other international organizations, including the IMF and the 
World Bank, to bring coherence to trade and development discussions. One 
by-product of this coordinated effort has been the Enhanced Integrated 
  
from whomever and wherever they can get the best quality at the lowest price). See Accra 
Agenda for Action, OECD, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/63/43911948.pdf.  
A list of the countries, territories, and organizations adhering to the Paris Declaration and 
Accra Agenda for Action, which includes the major donors of the EU, Japan, the United 
States, and the World Bank Group, is available at Countries, Territories and Organisations 
Adhering to the Paris Declaration and AAA, OECD, 
www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_36074966_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited July 25, 2011). 
 428. Additional information on the work of the WTO on aid for trade is available at 
Aid for Trade, WTO, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm (last 
visited July 25, 2011). Additional information on the work of the OECD on aid for trade is 
available at Aid for Trade, OECD, www.oecd.org/dac/aft (last visited July 25, 2011). 
 429. See WTO, Comm. on Trade & Dev., Joint WTO/OECD Background Paper on 
Aid for Trade: COMESA-EAC-SADC High Level North-South Corridor Aid-for-Trade 
Meeting, ¶ 26, WT/COMTD/AFT/W/12 (June 4, 2009). 
 430. Additional information on the work of the ITTC is available from its webpage at 
Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation, WTO, www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/ittc_e.htm (last visited July 25, 2011). For a summary of 
training activities provided by the WTO Secretariat in 2007 to a number of African countries, 
see Joint WTO/OECD Background Paper on Aid for Trade, supra note 429, at 13-14. 
 431. The raison d’être for the Trade Facilitation Technical Assistance for National 
Self Assessments of Needs and Priorities is to provide assistance and support for capacity 
building in the negotiations on trade facilitation, which in turn are part of the broader Doha 
Round multilateral trade negotiations. In order to assist countries to participate more 
effectively in the negotiations, assistance is provided by the WTO Secretariat, WTO 
members, and other intergovernmental organizations, including the World Bank, the World 
Customs Organization, and UNCTAD. Additional information is available from its webpage, 
Trade Facilitation Technical Assistance and Capacity Building, WTO, 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/ta_capac_build_negoti_e.htm (last visited July 25, 
2011). 
 432. The Standards and Trade Development Facility is a global program of the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, the 
World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the WTO. Its mandate is to assist 
developing countries, and in particular LDCs, in enhancing their expertise and capacity to 
analyze and implement international sanitary and phytosanitary standards.  Additional 
information is available at STANDARDS AND TRADE DEVELOPMENT FACILITY, 
http://www.standardsfacility.org/en/index.htm (last visited July 25, 2011). 
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Framework for Least-Developed Countries, a part of the broader Aid-for-
Trade initiative.433   
A major challenge facing the development community is improving the 
effectiveness of aid for trade.  To enhance the credibility of aid-for-trade 
and to ensure that locally identified needs—whether financial or 
performance related—are properly addressed, the Aid-for-Trade Task Force 
recommended the establishment of two accountability mechanisms.434 The 
first mechanism, at the local level, would be designed to foster local 
ownership and ensure that trade needs are adequately addressed and 
integrated into national development strategies. The second mechanism, at 
the global level, would be intended to increase transparency about what is 
and is not happening and where improvements are required.435 The OECD 
and the WTO established an aid-for-trade monitoring framework.436  The 
objective of the monitoring framework is to promote dialogue and 
encourage all key actors to honor commitments, meet local needs, improve 
effectiveness, and reinforce mutual accountability.  According to the OECD 
and WTO: 
The value of the monitoring system lies in creating incentives, through 
enhanced transparency, scrutiny, and dialogue (i.e. putting a “spotlight” on 
progress), to foster synergies between trade and other economic policy areas 
in developing countries.  This in turn should improve the coherence of aid 
for trade with overall aid strategies and donor agencies—essential 
components of an effective aid-for-trade partnership between donors and 
partner countries as embodied in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness.437 
In short, the focus on local accountability is to provide incentives to 
strengthen local ownership and management for results.  The global 
periodic review of aid-for-trade, on the other hand, is to ensure that donor 
and partner countries’ efforts are focused on the needs identified through the 
local accountability mechanism.438 A number of national and regional aid-
  
 433. The Integrated Framework (IF) for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to LDCs 
is a process that supports LDC governments in trade capacity building and integrating trade 
issues into overall national development strategies.  The WTO was one of six multilateral 
organizations which established the IF in 1997. It is the main mechanism through which 
LDCs access Aid for Trade and a concrete example of Aid for Trade in action.  Part of the 
Enhanced IF included the creation of an Executive Secretariat. Its projects and work product 
are available at Enhanced Integrated Framework Establishes an Executive Secretariat, 
Welcomes Executive Director, WTO, www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres08_e/pr541_e.htm. 
 434. See Joint WTO/OECD Background Paper on Aid for Trade, supra note 429, at 5.  
For a summary and analysis of the Aid for Trade Initiative shortly after it was launched, see 
AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2007, supra note 423. 
 435. See Joint WTO/OECD Background Paper on Aid for Trade, supra note 429, at 5. 
 436. See id.  
 437. Id. at 5.   
 438. See id. at 3. Themes emerging from the first Global Aid-for-Trade Review in 
2007 were the need to encourage greater developing-country ownership of the initiative, to 
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for-trade reviews were held in 2009,439 culminating in the Second Global 
Review of Aid for Trade, which was held at the WTO headquarters in 
Geneva, Switzerland.440 In their 2009 joint report, Aid for Trade at a Glance 
2009: Maintaining Momentum,441 the OECD and the WTO reported 
progress in partner country engagement, noting that “[a]lmost all partner 
countries indicate that they have a national development strategy and the 
majority are also mainstreaming trade based on well-developed trade-
related priorities.”442 
How effective are aid-for-trade programs? As reported by the OECD and 
WTO in 2009, in their self-assessments partner countries generally agree 
that the following four aid-for-trade programs have been most effective 
(rank-ordered): (1) trade policy analysis, negotiation, and implementation,443 
(2) trade facilitation (e.g., simplification of customs procedures and 
improvements to port authorities), (3) competitiveness,444 and (4) export 
diversification.445 Perceptions about the effectiveness of aid-for-trade 
  
strengthen monitoring and evaluation, and to shift the focus on the initiative from awareness-
raising to implementation. The report and recommendations of the African Regional review 
of Aid-for-Trade, Mobilizing Aid for Trade: Focus Africa, was prepared by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the African Development Bank, and the WTO in 
2007, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/africa_e.pdf. For the report and 
recommendations for southeast Asia, see WTO Comm. on Trade & Dev., Joint WTO/OECD 
Background Paper on Aid for Trade: ASEAN High Level Meeting, at 11, 
WT/COMTD/AFT/W/14 (June 4, 2009). 
 439. See Joint WTO/OECD Background Paper on Aid for Trade, supra note 429, at 3. 
 440. The second review evaluated progress made since the first review in 2007 and 
scrutinized how Aid for Trade was being put into operation. See WTO Committee on Trade 
and Development, Second Global Review of Aid for Trade: Summary Report, 
WT/COMTD/AFT/W/15 (Oct. 28, 2009). Additional information on the Second Global 
Review is available at Aid for Trade Global Review 2009, WTO, 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/global_review09_e.htm (last visited July 25, 
2011). 
 441. WTO & OECD, AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2009: MAINTAINING MOMENTUM 
(2009) [hereinafter AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2009], available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2649_34665_42835064_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited July 5, 2011). 
 442. Id. at 31. 
 443. According to the OECD and WTO, “The Philippines suggests that training and 
workshops have been particularly useful in helping its officials to understand better the 
function, structure and rules of the multilateral trading system. Sri Lanka reports that WTO 
technical assistance has been useful in helping to train trade negotiators, but it also worries 
that by focusing too narrowly on rules, rather than development policy, WTO programmes 
risk turning officials into ‘rule takers’ rather than ‘rule makers’.” Id. at 45. 
 444. Competitiveness is the third most frequently identified area where aid for trade 
has been effective. As noted in the OECD/WTO report, “Belize, for example, reports that the 
EU-funded Banana Special Framework of Assistance, which provided technical assistance, 
supplies, infrastructure, schools and teacher training, played a significant part in improving 
the competitiveness of its banana industry.” Id. at 45. 
 445. See id. at 45. As noted in the OECD/WTO report in connection with export 
diversification, “Zambia, for instance, reports that European-Development-Fund supported 
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programs also differ according to partner countries’ income levels, with 
upper middle income countries viewing competitiveness as the area where 
aid-for-trade had been most effective, while lower middle income countries 
and LDCs consider trade policy analysis, negotiation and implementation, 
and trade facilitation as the three areas where aid-for-trade has worked 
best.446 The OECD/WTO report issued the following cautionary note:  
While network infrastructure is identified as a priority by many partner 
countries, they do not see it as an area where aid for trade has been most 
effective. Given the likelihood of increased resources being channeled to 
network infrastructure in the future, this should be a cause for concern. 
These less positive assessments of the effectiveness of network 
infrastructure projects also contrast sharply with the generally positive 
view of regional infrastructure projects. The disconnect between priorities 
and aid effectiveness merits further study and shows the need to go to the 
country level.447  
From the perspective of donors, the OECD/WTO reported in 2009 that 
(1) most donors had developed aid-for-trade strategies, (2) “a healthy 
momentum to keep this initiative in the forefront of donors’ development 
strategies” was solidly in place,448 and (3) that aid-for-trade holds growing 
importance in donor countries’ programs and is likely to be maintained, or 
even expanded, over the medium term.449 As summarized by the 
OECD/WTO in 2009:   
[T]he Aid-for-Trade Initiative has so far been successful in galvanising 
political support and additional financial resources in the donor 
community. Progress, too, has been achieved in the delivery of aid for 
trade. More importantly, despite the current financial and economic crisis, 
donors have reaffirmed their commitment to sustaining aid flows and 
maintaining this momentum.450  
  
projects were instrumental in helping to increase the export capacity of its horticulture and 
floriculture sectors.” Id. at 46. 
 446. See AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2009, supra note 441. 
 447. Id. at 45. 
 448. AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2009, supra note 441, at 65. “The largest donors of 
aid for trade (i.e. the United States, Japan, the EC and the World Bank) all have operational 
guidance in place to step up their efforts.” Id. at 66. 
 449. Id. (“Today most donors either have operational strategies that are specifically 
focused on aid for trade or have made trade a core component of their overarching 
development policy or strategy documents.”). 
 450. Id. at 65. 
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Regional aid-for-trade flows for the period 2002-2008 (as reported by the 
OECD in a 2010 report to the WTO) went primarily to Asia.451 In 2008 Asia 
remained the largest recipient of aid-for-trade with India, Iraq, Vietnam, and 
Afghanistan being among the major individual recipients. Asia obtained an 
additional $5.3 billion compared to 2007 and reached $18.5 billion. Most of 
the growth took place in support to economic infrastructure projects, which 
received an additional $4.5 billion. In addition, donors supported productive 
capacity building with an additional $465 million and trade policy and 
regulation with $221 million.452 Flows to Africa remained stable between 
the 2002-05 baseline and 2006. In 2007, there was a large increase that has 
continued through 2008 when aid-for-trade reached $13 billion up from just 
over $10 billion in 2007. The majority of the increase went to productive 
capacity building (up $1.3 billion or 52 percent) followed by economic 
infrastructure (up $1 billion or 44 percent). The large increase in Europe of 
$2.5 billion went mostly to economic infrastructure (up 67 percent). There 
was a 20 percent increase in aid-for-trade to Oceania (now at $377 million), 
while support to the Americas declined in 2008 by 16 percent to just under 
$2 billion.453 
At the country level, in 2008 the top 20 recipients obtained over 70 
percent of the allocated flows.454 That percentage declined to roughly 50 
percent in 2009.455 Countries from all income groups were represented, with 
ten from Asia, nine from Africa, and one from Europe. In 2008, there were 
six LDCs (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mali, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
Bangladesh), six Other Low Income Countries (Ghana, India, Mongolia, 
Nigeria, Vietnam, Pakistan), seven Low Middle Income Countries (China, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Thailand, Tunisia, Iraq), and one Upper Middle 
Income Country (Turkey).456 In 2009, the top 20 aid-for-trade recipients 
remained basically the same, although there was some shuffling of the deck, 
with Burkina Faso, Georgia, Tanzania, and the Philippines joining the ranks 
of the top 20 recipients and Egypt, Mozambique, Tunisia, and Iraq dropping 
out.457 
  
 451. WTO Comm. on Trade & Dev., Communication from the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development: Aid for Trade Flows in 2008, at 3, 
WT/COMTD/AFT/W/21 (July 13, 2010) [hereinafter Aid for Trade Flows in 2008]. 
 452. See id. at 8. 
 453. See id. at 9. 
 454. See id. at 10. 
 455. OECD & WTO, AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2011: SHOWING RESULTS 51 
(2011), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/a4t11_2_chap_e.pdf.   
 456. See Aid for Trade Flows in 2008, supra note 451, at 10. For a list of the 
recipients of aid for trade during the period 2002-2008, see id. annex 4. 
 457. See AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE  2011, supra note 455, at 52, 60, table 2.1. The 
relative ranking of aid-for-trade recipients in 2009 also changed from 2008. Vietnam was the 
largest recipient in 2009 with $2.6 billion, up 27 percent from 2008 with increases to energy 
(up $560 million), and industry (up $230 million). India was the second largest recipient, but 
its flows declined substantially from 2008 mostly because of over $1 billion less to transport 
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Who are the main aid-for-trade donors? According to the OECD, in 2008 
the top 5 donors, accounting for 70 percent of total flows, were Japan, the 
United States, the EU, the World Bank Group, and Germany. Japan was the 
largest aid-for-trade donor in 2008 ($8.7 billion), followed by the United 
States ($6.4 billion), the European Union ($5.9 billion), the World Bank 
Group ($5.2 billion), and Germany ($2.9 billion).458 Japan provided an 
increase of $3.8 billion to $8.7 billion in 2008 and gave 20 percent of total 
aid-for-trade. This represents a 79 percent increase of Japanese aid-for-trade 
flows. Most of the additional flows (almost $3 billion) went to transport and 
storage, while there were also large rises for industry (up $454 million) and 
mineral resources/mining (up $479 million).459  
The United States channeled almost 80 percent of its aid-for-trade to 
three sectors: energy (25.8 percent), transport and storage (28.4 percent), 
and agriculture (23.3 percent). This distribution was almost the same as 
2007 but with US flows increasing by $1.5 billion to $6.4 billion (15 
percent of total aid-for-trade).460 The EU increased its aid-for-trade by $2.7 
billion to $5.9 billion, $2.3 billion of this for transport and storage.461 The 
World Bank Group doubled its support to trade policy and regulation, but 
flows to energy and transport and storage declined by 40 percent and 18 
percent respectively. Germany increased its aid-for-trade by $1.2 billion or 
65 percent to reach $2.9 billion. Germany allocated a growing share of its 
aid-for-trade to energy (43.4 percent in 2008 compared to 31 percent in 
2007). It rose by $727 million to $1.3 billion in 2008. In addition, Germany 
channeled a large share of its aid-for-trade through multilateral agencies.462 
Encouragingly, donors have increased their disbursements. In 2008, Japan 
had the largest disbursements ($5.3 billion), an increase of 21 percent on 
2007, followed by the World Bank Group ($4.3 billion), the EU ($3.6 
billion), and the United States ($3.6 billion).463 In their 2011 joint report, 
Aid for Trade at a Glance 2011: Showing Results,464 the OECD and WTO 
reported that in 2009 aid-for-trade commitments reached approximately $40 
billion, a 60 percent increase from the 2002-05 baseline period.465 In 2009, 
the top 10 donors provided 74 percent of the aid-for-trade, reflecting that 
aid-for-trade continues to be concentrated among a small number of 
donors—but the rank order of donors changed.466 The EU was the largest 
  
and storage. Afghanistan was the third largest recipient and saw its flows decrease slightly 
from 2008. Nigeria was the largest recipient in Africa with $1.3 billion in commitments. Id. 
at 51. 
 458. See Aid for Trade Flows in 2008, supra note 451, at 12. 
 459. See id.  
 460. See id. 
 461. See id. at 13. 
 462. See id. 
 463. See id. at 14. 
 464. AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE  2011, supra note 455.  
 465. See id. at 15. 
 466. See id. at 53. 
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donor with $14 billion annually, an increase of 70 percent in real terms 
compared to the 2002-05 baseline.467 Whereas the World Bank Group 
increased its aid-for-trade by almost 50 percent to $8 billion, other major 
donors such as Japan and the United States reported significant declines of 
37 percent and 31 percent respectively (down by $5.5 billion 
collectively).468 In fact, of the five largest bilateral donors, four declined by 
an average of 28 percent.469 
In 2010, the OECD offered the rather predictable conclusion that the 
Aid-for-Trade Initiative has succeeded in part, but that more needs to be 
done in terms of stabilizing aid flows, designing more effective aid-for-trade 
programs, and building a consensus as to what counts as aid-for-trade.470 Is 
  
 467. See id. 
 468. See id. 
 469. See id.  
 470. Aid for Trade Flows in 2008, supra note 451, at 18. As reported by the OECD 
and WTO in AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2009: 
 
The relationship between trade, growth and poverty reduction is 
complex. But it is clear that openness and integration can contribute 
to economic development and poverty reduction. 
The Aid-for-Trade Initiative has succeeded in raising awareness 
about these important links, but also about the binding trade-related 
constraints developing countries face that prevent them from 
benefiting from trade expansion. The initiative has also succeeded in 
mobilising resources to build trade capacities related to policies, 
institutions and infrastructure. 
In order to maintain the momentum of the initiative, particularly 
in light of the current economic crisis, four practical steps can be 
envisaged: 
•   First, there is still a compelling need to demonstrate—and 
broadcast the fact—that there are large potential gains to 
be made from broad-based multilateral trade liberalisation 
and the integration of developing countries into the global 
economy. It needs to be shown that aid for trade is worth 
doing. 
•   Second, stakeholders need to recognise that aid for trade is 
part of a larger picture encompassing international co-
operation, improved policy coherence and a whole-of- 
government approach to economic development and 
poverty reduction. It needs to be shown that aid for trade 
contributes to these wider goals of partner countries. 
•  Third, there needs to be case-by-case, country-by-country 
identification of the nature and extent of the impediments 
that are presently preventing the benefits of trade from 
being fully realised. Aid for trade needs to have 
identifiable targets. 
•   Fourth, there needs to be, again case-by-case and country-
by-country, a clear identification of how aid for trade will 
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aid-for-trade working? In 2010, the OECD and WTO were evasive in 
answering this overarching question, in effect responding with a call for 
more studies.471 In 2011, the two organizations were somewhat less 
diffident,472 painting an encouraging picture of a wide variety of trade-
related activities that focus on competitiveness, economic growth, and 
poverty reduction in a large number of developing countries that are being 
supported by a range of donors.473  
In recognition of the difficulty of accurately assessing the effectiveness 
of aid-for-trade programs, but at the same time being fully aware of the 
importance of the task, the WTO Task Force recommended that increased 
evaluation of aid-for-trade should be promoted and funded. In particular, the 
Task Force suggested that  
[i]n-depth country impact evaluations of Aid-for-Trade programmes 
should be undertaken to build knowledge and facilitate a results-based 
approach to delivery. Evaluation of in-country processes should focus, 
inter alia, on progress in mainstreaming trade in national development 
plans. Evaluations should adopt a results-based approach in order to ensure 
effectiveness of Aid-for-Trade programmes in relation to the objectives.474  
  
address the impediments identified, how it will work with, 
and add value to, initiatives being taken by private firms, 
and how it will fit into the evolving framework of regional 
and multilateral co-operation. It needs to be shown that aid 
for trade can hit the target. 
In short, the Aid-for-Trade Initiative needs to be strengthened at the 
country and regional levels.  
 
AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2009, supra note 441, at 105.  
 471. OECD & WTO, AID FOR TRADE: IS IT WORKING? 3 (2010).  
 472. As reported in AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2011, supra note 455, at 17. “The 
great majority of the programmes and projects in the case stories reported successes. Several 
critical factors were commonly cited: ownership at the highest political level supported 
through the active engagement of all stakeholders; adequate and reliable funding; leveraging 
partnerships (including with providers of South–South co-operation); and combining public 
and private investment with technical assistance. Conversely, delays and changes caused by 
exogenous factors such as natural disasters, political crises and global recessions threaten 
successful outcomes.” Id. at 17. 
 473. Id. at 16-17.  
 474. Aid for Trade Task Force, Recommendations of the Task Force on Aid for Trade, 
WT/AFT/1 (July 27, 2006). 
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The OECD and the WTO seconded this proposal.475 Both organizations 
have stressed the importance of partner-country ownership of aid-for-trade 
programs and increased dialogue between partner countries and donors.476 
In addition, both have underscored the following four points in the effective 
design and implementation of any aid-for-trade action plan. First, trade 
encompasses all sectors of the economy. The complexity of trade and its 
interdependence with a country’s overall development makes 
mainstreaming essential. Second, aid-for-trade must be structured so that it 
focuses on addressing the bottlenecks that seem most likely to lift trade and 
boost productivity. Third, in developing their aid-for-trade strategies, 
reformers should include the objective of strengthening the constituency for 
reform. Engaging the private sector is critical in this regard.  
Fourth, the principles set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, such as local ownership, harmonization and alignment, 
management for results, and mutual accountability, should underpin the 
design and implementation of effective aid-for-trade projects and 
programs.477  
  
 475. See AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE 2009, supra note 441, at 108. In a 2011 report 
on the effectiveness of U.S. aid for trade, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
examined the period 2005-2010 during which 24 U.S. agencies provided more than $9 
billion in TCB assistance to more than 100 countries. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES WIDE-RANGING TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING ASSISTANCE, BUT 
BETTER REPORTING AND EVALUATION ARE NEEDED (GAO-11-727 July 2011) [hereinafter 
GAO REPORT ON U.S. TCB]. GAO focused its review on the four entities that reported the 
most funding for TCB activities during the period, plus the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (those four entities are the Army, State Department, the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID)). Together, these four funded more than 90 percent of total U.S. TCB assistance 
between 2005 and 2010. Id. at 2. The definition of TCB assistance is broad in scope, making 
some activities more directly related to trade than others, GAO said. Id. at 35. MCC and 
Army TCB assistance are indirectly related to trade, but account for 54 percent of total TCB 
funding. Id. at 16. Therefore, the GAO concludes, it is increasingly important that the 
government database housing the information on TCB assistance be able to distinguish the 
trade-related components of activities from non-trade related components (the database 
currently does not make such distinctions, according to GAO). Id. at 35. Because the 
database is the primary source of information on TCB funding for Congress and the public, 
in the GAO’s view, “Clear reporting and transparent methodology and data collection are 
essential to understanding levels of funding and changes in the nature of TCB over time.” Id. 
at 36.  To gain a clear understanding on the trends and shifts in TCB funding GAO 
recommended that USAID, as database administrator, publicly report identified limitations 
and key distinctions in the categories of TCB assistance. Id. 
 476. See id. at 109. (“Aid and, by implication, aid-for-trade is effective only when it 
enables partner countries to achieve their own development goals. Consequently, the onus is 
on partner-country governments to enhance the ownership of their development efforts in 
consultation with their parliaments, citizens, civil society and the private sector. Local 
ownership of development efforts is fundamentally about political leadership, effective 
societal participation and domestic oversight and accountability.”). 
 477. See AID FOR TRADE: IS IT WORKING?, supra note 471, at 3-4. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: RETHINKING NONRECIPROCAL TRADE 
PREFERENCE PROGRAMS, INTEGRATING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INTO THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 
To quote an African proverb, “The best time to plant a tree is twenty 
years ago. The next best time is now.” It is time to move beyond 
conditionality in GSP programs and to come to terms with the looming 
shrinking margin of preference. At UNCTAD’s inaugural conference in 
1964, developing countries asserted that one of the major impediments to 
their accelerated economic growth and development was their inability to 
compete with developed countries in the international trading system; the 
developing countries argued that preferential tariffs would allow them to 
increase exports and foreign exchange earnings necessary to diversify their 
economies and reduce dependence on foreign aid. The rationale for trade 
preferences was that poorer countries need to develop industrial capacity for 
manufacturing in order to move away from dependence on imports and 
production of traditional commodities that could be subject to declining 
prices in the long term. It was argued that poorer countries also needed time 
to retain some protection to develop their “infant industries,” but that 
increases in exports would be necessary to help countries develop 
economies of scale in production and earn foreign exchange. In addition, it 
was evident that some provision for the elimination of preferences once the 
industries were firmly established was necessary. The argument was that 
trade preferences should be temporary, introduced for a period of no less 
than 10 years with respect to any given industry in any developing country. 
At the end of the 10-year period, preferences would be withdrawn unless it 
could be shown that special circumstances warranted their continuation.  
At the second UNCTAD conference in 1968, the United States joined 
other participants in supporting a resolution to establish a mutually 
acceptable system of preferences. In order to permit the implementation of a 
generalized system of preferences, in June 1971 developed countries were 
granted a 10-year waiver from their international legal obligations under 
GATT. Following the grant of this waiver, developed countries created their 
national GSP programs, and Congress enacted the U.S. GSP program in 
January 1975. The United States maintained that GSP was a temporary 
program to advance trade liberalization in the developing world, but it 
recognized the need to address the legal basis for granting these preferences 
in anticipation of the expiration of the waiver in 1981. An agreement was 
reached at the 1979 conclusion of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, known as the “Enabling Clause,” which has no expiration date 
and replaced the waiver. 
At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the Committee on Trade and 
Development held a session in November 1994 to debate the issue of the 
participation of developing countries in the international trade system.  Its 
focus was on whether developing countries had increased their share in 
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world trade, and whether international trade had made a contribution to their 
economic growth.  Ten conclusions emerged from this debate:478 
 
 Developing countries’ share in world trade has been growing. 
 The growth has been uneven, with the least-developed countries of  
Africa experiencing a decrease in their share of world trade, on the 
one hand, with many Asian countries experiencing a significant 
increase in their share, on the other hand. 
 This growth is as much a result of domestic economic policies as  
from the general international environment. 
 The Uruguay Round represents a significant opportunity for  
developing countries to increase their share of world trade for at 
least two reasons: first, because sectors previously outside GATT 
disciplines, most notably agriculture and textiles, are now integrated 
into WTO rules; and, second, because the Uruguay Round deals with 
internal policies that restricted trade. 
 Developing countries’ future participation in world trade will be  
determined by the effectiveness with which the Uruguay Round 
agreements are implemented. 
 The composition of developing countries’ trade has increased in  
manufacturing, which has created an incentive for them to 
participate more fully in the world trading system.  In this 
connection, regional trade also has become increasingly important 
for developing countries. 
 It is not clear, but it is worth examining more closely, whether trade  
barriers and the elimination of trade barriers explain developing 
countries’ share in world trade. 
 Given that developing countries account for 25 percent of world  
trade, they can be expected to make greater future commitments in   
the WTO. 
 The unilateral economic liberalization measures taken by many  
developing countries need to be integrated into the multilateral 
trading system.479 
 
As the foregoing discussion has shown, developing countries receive 
special and differential treatment not only under WTO rules but also in 
trade preference programs established for them by the United States and 
other developed countries.  In the long run, however, such special tariff 
treatment is of limited value to developing countries in achieving the goal of 
  
 478. See ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 46, at 
1041. 
 
 479. Fiftieth Session of the Contracting Parties, SR.50/1, at 5 (1994), reprinted in 
GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 46, at 1041. 
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a stable, healthy economy.  Tariff reductions associated with preferential 
treatment regimes are inherently uncertain because they depend entirely on 
the trade policies of the donor countries.  In addition, as MFN tariff rates are 
progressively lowered in developed countries following successive MTN 
rounds, the benefit to beneficiary developing countries of preferential tariff 
treatment is marginalized.   
Tariff preferences can have beneficial and negative effects. Among the 
beneficial effects the most obvious one is that they stimulate trade compared 
to what would exist under the MFN duty rate (assuming an MFN duty rate 
greater than zero), and that improved market access might enhance export-
led economic development. The potential downsides of tariff preferences 
are that they are not cost-free (it is estimated that substantiating compliance 
with rules of origin, for example, impose costs of 3 to 5 percent of the value 
of the imported goods).480 With average MFN duty rates in the United States 
and the EU currently at less than 4 percent, tariff preferences are only 
meaningful where tariff peaks exist (which is the case on textiles, clothing, 
and footwear).481 Restrictive rules of origin in the clothing sector are 
defended on the ground that they are necessary to encourage significant 
value-added activities within developing countries and to promote 
integrated production processes within individual countries.482 However, 
there is no evidence that these strict rules of origin have stimulated 
integrated production processes within small developing countries.483 
Not only does the small size of many developing countries, especially 
SSA LDCs, thwart achieving economies of scale, but the absence of 
harmonized rules of origin for preference-granting countries’ trade 
preference programs further frustrates achieving scale economies. For 
example, under the U.S. AGOA program, clothing made in eligible LDCs 
from regional or third-country fabric may enter the U.S. duty free, but not 
so in the EU under its EBA initiative. (The EBA does not allow for 
cumulation among SSA countries. Even if it did, finding adequate regional 
fabric is an additional hurdle, which explains at least in part the AGOA 
third-country fabric provision.) Even under AGOA, cumulation is not 
permitted with regard to inputs from non-AGOA trade preference 
beneficiaries. The GAO reports the following case where overly rigid rules 
of origin and a lack of trade preference program integration seemingly 
worked at cross-purposes with the development goal of these programs: 
In Ghana, for example, we met with a firm that decorates T-shirts with 
original designs, using traditional African decorative techniques. This firm 
had been importing plain white T-shirts from Honduras to decorate in 
  
 480. See Hoekman & Prowse, supra note 309, at 429. 
 481. See id.  
 482. See Brenton &  Özden, supra note 42, at 420-21. 
 483. See id. at 421. 
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Ghana and then exporting them to the United States. We were surprised to 
learn that the firm had to pay duty on the finished product exported to the 
United States, since the inputs were exempt from tariffs under U.S. 
preferences programs. For example, the plain white T-shirts manufactured 
in Honduras would have entered the United States duty-free under CBI. 
The value-added through the decorative process in Ghana would also be 
exempt from duties under AGOA. However, because the T-shirt 
manufactured in Honduras did not meet the rules of origin requirements 
for the AGOA program this company was obliged to pay duty on the 
finished decorated shirts. The company is now seeking to shift its T-shirt 
purchases to South Africa, or another AGOA beneficiary, since this 
sourcing would enable them to qualify for duty-free treatment under 
AGOA.484 
Rules of origin might also require that inputs be sourced from higher-
cost suppliers in cases where cumulation rules apply. In addition, 
compliance with certain conditions laid down in the U.S. and EU GSP 
programs can entail costs, such as labor rights and intellectual property 
rights protection. Finally, in the drive to preserve the margin of preference, 
multilateral trade liberalization may be sacrificed, possibly leading to trade 
diversion, i.e., a comparatively more efficient producer in an exporting 
country subject to an MFN duty rate is unable to successfully compete 
against a less efficient producer in a GSP beneficiary country. On the other 
hand, if the MFN duty rate is prohibitively high, then a GSP program will 
be trade creating instead of trade diverting, provided of course that the 
exported product is GSP eligible, that producers in the beneficiary country 
have supply capacity for the product in question, and that they use the GSP 
tariff preference.485  For LDCs the first proviso will generally be true, but 
not necessarily the second or third. GSP programs were built upon the 
assumption that beneficiary countries already have the capacity to engage in 
trade in GSP-eligible products. Building supply capacity is not one of the 
platforms of current GSP schemes. Better-focused and more generous aid-
for-trade is needed to correct this programmatic imbalance. 
Even where the margin of preference is economically meaningful, i.e. 
that the costs of complying with rules of origin and other administrative 
costs are less than the margin of preference, the full benefit of the 
preference margin is often not passed on to the producer in the exporting 
country because it lacks market power. Instead, buyers in the importing 
country capture a significant share of the margin of preference.486 Even 
where the margin of preference is economically meaningful and market 
  
 484. GAO Report on Integrating U.S. Trade Preference Programs, supra note 125, at 
77. 
 485. See Low, Piermartini & Richtering, supra note 286, at 222-24; Jagdish Bhagwati, 
The Poor’s Best Hope, THE ECONOMIST, June 22, 2002, at 24-26. 
 486. See Hoekman & Prowse, supra note 309, at 429. 
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access exists, that is only one element of the total trade equation and not the 
most important one: the beneficiary country has to have the capacity to 
engage in the manufacture of and trade in the product of export interest.487 
To address these problems, I propose the following four reforms.   
First, integrate U.S. trade preference programs and renew the integrated 
program for a minimum period of ten years. U.S. trade preference programs 
are neither administered nor evaluated on a cross-programmatic basis, 
which limits any judgment about the extent to which the programs have 
increased trade and fostered development in beneficiary countries. The U.S. 
GSP program has been allowed to expire eight times, most recently at the 
end of 2010. There is something deeply flawed with a trade preference 
program when a single U.S. Senator can hold up renewal of the GSP 
program over an administrative decision affecting one company and a single 
product. Reliance interests of foreign exporters and U.S. importers are 
clearly undermined by such lapses. 
Second, revisit conditionality. Conditionality is superficially high-
minded, but practically pointless. It should be eliminated because GSP 
conditions that protect U.S. commercial interests are WTO-illegal and 
should be removed. The U.S. GSP petition process is, at best, scattershot. 
Some of the countries reviewed are not necessarily those that perform the 
worst relative to the conditions for participation but instead are countries of 
most concern to particular businesses or NGOs. Considering the small 
number of annual petitions, coupled with the high denial rate by the USTR, 
it has to be seriously questioned whether the petition mechanism isn’t 
anything more than a sop to petitioners and an irritant to the beneficiaries 
and to U.S. importers who rely upon imports from the target beneficiary. A 
comprehensive annual or biennial review is a better alternative than the 
petition process. 
Third, harmonize preferential rules of origin at the international level. 
At the international level, donor countries should adopt a harmonized 
rule of origin that permits cumulation of inputs from any beneficiary 
country, including cumulation of inputs from any developing country that is 
a party to an FTA with a donor country. Not only does the small size of 
many developing countries  especially SSA LDCs  thwart achieving 
economies of scale, but the absence of harmonized rules of origin in trade 
preference programs further frustrates achieving scale economies. A thorny 
issue is what to do about China and Vietnam, neither of which are U.S. GSP 
eligible but both of which are GSP eligible in Canada, the EU, and Japan. 
Fourth, provide better-focused and coordinated aid-for-trade. Many 
developing countries have expressed concern about their inability to take 
advantage of trade preferences because they lack trade capacity, i.e., the 
ability to produce and trade competitively in world markets. In response the 
“Aid-for-Trade” Initiative was launched at the WTO’s 2005 Hong Kong 
  
 487. See id. at 445. 
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Ministerial meeting. The Aid-for-Trade Initiative has so far been successful 
in galvanizing political support and additional financial resources in the 
donor community. Progress has been achieved in the delivery of aid for 
trade, but more and better-focused aid is needed. 
Developing countries have allowed themselves to be distracted by the 
idea of tariff preferences as the means for offsetting trade restrictions 
imposed by importing countries.  Nevertheless, tariff and nontariff barriers 
to trade in products in which developing countries enjoy a comparative 
advantage have blocked their full integration into the world trading system. 
Developed countries have introduced market distortions in areas where 
developing countries have historically enjoyed an advantage, such as trade 
in agricultural products.  Part of the fallout of these distortions have been 
trade skirmishes between the United States and the EU over export markets 
for their agricultural surpluses in which developing countries have been 
caught in the cross-fire.  Unable to compete with heavily subsidized 
agricultural exports from the United States or the EU, developing countries 
have been forced to abandon certain export markets.  These EU-US 
agricultural trade battles not only have squeezed developing countries out of 
some traditional export markets, but they have also wrecked developing 
countries’ domestic agricultural programs. 
Fully integrating developing countries into the world trading system 
must proceed on several simultaneous tracks.  The first track that 
developing countries should pursue is cultivating a hospitable environment 
for foreign direct investment (FDI).  Today, developing countries treat FDI 
more liberally than they formerly did, but many developing countries 
restrict FDI by, for example, permitting only minority foreign ownership in 
local companies.  While many developing countries complain about the 
restrictive businesses practices of large multinational firms that harm local 
firms, as this author has noted elsewhere, “another perspective is that 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) bring with them not only fresh capital, but 
they also introduce modern managerial and organizational practices that 
local firms in developing countries can emulate.  They often bring with 
them the latest technologies and train indigenous populations in their use.  
Because of their high visibility, some evidence exists that MNEs are often 
better corporate citizens that pay better, do less environmental damage, and 
adhere closer to industrial codes of good conduct.”488  
  
 488. Bhala & Kennedy, supra note 48, at 1569-70 (footnote omitted). See OECD, 
ENVIRONMENT AND THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: CORPORATE 
TOOLS AND APPROACHES (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/36/ 
0,3343,en_2649_34287_34992996_1_1_1_1,00.html; OECD, The Social Impact of Foreign 
Direct Investment (Policy Brief July 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/53/8/40940418.pdf; OECD, Foreign Direct Investment for Development: 
Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
47/51/1959815.pdf. See generally OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
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The second track should be to secure broader and assured access to 
export markets for all product groups, not just primary and unprocessed 
goods.  Market access for all value-added products is of most help to 
developing countries in the long term than tariff preferences on 
commodities and semi-manufactured goods. The third tack is linked to the 
second track: integrating developing countries into the global trading system 
through the vehicle of regional trade arrangements as a step toward full 
integration into the WTO multilateral trading system.  Several of the 
existing regional trade arrangements, such as MERCOSUR and ASEAN, 
have a membership comprised exclusively of developing countries. By 
integrating their economies on a regional basis, developing countries can 
pool their economic strength and better achieve scale economies. 
Integrating their economies on a regional basis at the least will serve as a 
hedge against an uncertain future in turbulent world trade markets.  
 
 
  
Enterprises (Policy Brief June 2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
12/21/1903291.pdf.     
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INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE 
Several of the Member States of the European Union (EU) include 
overseas regions and territories lying thousands of kilometres away from 
Brussels. These territories enjoy a wide array of diverse legal statuses 
governing their position vis-à-vis EU law and seem to have one thing in 
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common: the functioning of national and European law in these areas is 
highly atypical compared with Europe. Just as it is unusual, the legal 
situation of such territories is highly acute, as millions of Britons, 
Dutchmen, Frenchmen, Danes, Spaniards and Portuguese permanently 
reside in the overseas parts of their Member States, providing a vivid 
reminder of the immediate colonial past.1 These people, like the 
innumerable companies registered in such territories, often find themselves 
in a difficult position, as it is sometimes virtually impossible to answer the 
simplest of possible questions: which law should apply? While the 
implications of the specific legal position of the overseas regions and 
territories under the sovereignty or control of the EU Member States for the 
interaction between the legal orders of municipal, European, and 
international law are extremely far-reaching, they remain dangerously 
under-researched. In fact, some of the more obscure overseas regions seem 
to exist in a kind of legal limbo. 
This contribution aims at outlining the foundations of the “EU law of the 
Overseas,” following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and 
presenting a selection of the key legal issues arising in the application of EU 
law to the Member State territories lying far away from the European 
continent, as well as placing such territories in the general context of the 
development of European integration, giving them the attention they 
deserve.  
However controversial the term “territory”2 might sound when applied to 
the EU, to deny the fact that such a thing exists would be unwise.3 Clearly, 
  
 1. For the land area and population of such overseas territories and regions, see 
Tables 1–3. Some such territories, enormous in size, cannot boast any population at all, 
however, which does not prevent them from having a Prefet/Administrateur supérieur and a 
philatelic commission. See, e.g., A. Oraison, Le statut des Terres australes et antarctiques 
françaises à la lumière de l’article additionnel 72-3 de la Constitution, 22 REVUE FRANÇAISE 
DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 681 (2006). 
 2. On the meaning of “territory” in public international law, see, for example, 
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-62 (2003); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 105-67 (6th ed. 2003). 
 3. The literature on the territorial scope of EU law usually starts with the 
assumption of the inapplicability of the notion of “territory” to the Union, only to proceed to 
the scope ratione loci later, which is a very narrow approach to the issue. See, e.g., Jacques 
Ziller, The European Union and the Territorial Scope of European Territories, 38 VICTORIA 
U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 51 (2007); V. Coussirat-Coustère, Article 227, in V. Constantinesco 
et al. (eds.), TRAITÉ INSTUTUANT LA CEE: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 1419, 1420 
(1995). See also L. Burgorgue-Larsen, L’identité de l’Union européenne au cœur d’une 
controverse territoriale tricentenaire: Quand le statut de Gibraltar réapparaît sur la scène 
judiciaire européenne, 43 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 25, 39-42 (2007); J. 
Groux, “Territorialité” et droit communautaire, 23 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
EUROPÉEN 1, 5-33 (1987). In earlier publications, I shared this perspective, arguing that 
“instead of speaking of a territory of the EU . . . it is necessary to speak separately about the 
territorial scope of application of the most important component parts of EU law.” Dimitry 
Kochenov, Substantive and Procedural Issues of Application of European Law in the 
Overseas Possessions of the Member States of the European Union, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 
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EU law applies across a certain number of square kilometres.4 Moreover, 
although one can speak about a number of different “territories” within the 
Union, depending on what one has in mind,5 the main principle here is 
  
195, 203 (2008). In light of the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon, this approach 
does not seem sustainable any more. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 
306) 1, the word “territory” should enter EU terminology without innumerable far-reaching 
derogations. 
 4. 4,324,782 km sq. (the European part). 
 5. The customs territory of the Union does not overlap with the Schengen territory. 
The Schengen provisions, although forming part of the acquis for all Member States except 
the UK and Ireland and enjoying a special status in Denmark, apply to EEA States and 
Switzerland, although not in full in some new Union Member States such as Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Cyprus. Moreover, the overseas parts of the Member States are also excluded 
from the application of the Schengen system by the Schengen Convention. See Council 
Regulation 2913/92, Establishing the Community Customs Code, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1 (as 
amended); Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common 
Borders, of the Schengen Acquis, of 14 June 1985, art. 138, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 19. For a 
meticulous analysis of the customs territory, see, for example, LAURENCE W. GORMLEY, EU 
LAW OF FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND CUSTOMS UNION (2009). France appended a special 
declaration to the Treaty of Amsterdam when the rules of the Convention were moved to 
what used to be the First Pillar of the Union. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty 
on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain 
Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1; Declaration by France Concerning the 
Situation of the Overseas Departments in the Light of the Protocol Integrating the Schengen 
Acquis into the Framework of the European Union, appended to Treaty of Amsterdam 
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 144. For a general 
analysis see, for example, RUBEN ZAIOTTI, CULTURES OF BORDER CONTROL: SCHENGEN AND 
THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN FRONTIERS (2011). The territorial scope of application of both 
aforementioned “territories” does not overlap with the scope ratione loci of the secondary 
law on turn-over taxation, whose territorial scope of application is similar to that of the 
Community Customs Code and differs from the text of Article 355 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
See Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the Harmonization of the Laws 
of the Member States Relating to Turnover Taxes-Common System of Value Added Tax: 
Uniform Basis of Assessment., 1977 O.J. (L 145) 1 (as amended). See also Case C-283/84, 
Trans Tirreno Express SpA v. Ufficio provinciale IVA, 1986 E.C.R. 231 ¶ 20. On the issue 
of the territorial scope of the EMU and the Euro, see Fabian Amtenbrink, EMU and the 
Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS: OUTERMOST REGIONS, ASSOCIATED OVERSEAS 
COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, TERRIORIES SUI GENERIS 271 (Dimitry Kochenov ed., 2011) 
[hereinafter EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS]. For a discussion of the statistical territory of the 
Community, see Council Regulation 1172/95, On the Statistics Relating to the Trading of 
Goods by the Community and Its Member States with Non-member Countries of 22 May 
1995, art. 3, O.J. (L 118) 10 (EC). To illustrate the differences, see Council Regulation 
476/97 of 13 March 1997, art. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 075) 1 (EC), amending with respect to 
statistical territory Council Regulation 1172/95. Council Regulation 476/97 included the 
Island of Helgoland, which is outside the Customs territory, into the statistical territory of the 
Community. More importantly, Eurostat strangely does not include the French Overseas 
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absolutely clear. As restated in Article 52(1) of the Treaty on the European 
Union (EU Treaty),6 EU law applies in the territory of all the Member 
States.7 Most recent case law of the Court of Justice the European Union 
(ECJ) supports the importance of territory.8 This concept came to play a 
fundamental role in the framing of the Court’s jurisdiction in EU citizenship 
cases. 
Although the EU Treaty and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)9 are independent instruments having “the same 
legal value,”10 the fact that Article 52 TEU makes a reference to “[t]he 
Treaties” and entrusts Article 355 TFEU with the task of supplying lex 
  
Departments (DOM) in the territory of France as a Member State of the European Union. 
Fabien Brial, La place des régions ultrapériphériques au sein de l’Union européenne, 1998 
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 639, 641 n.9. With regard to a number of other fields of law, 
numerous variations abound. Particularly unclear is the understanding of EU territory for the 
purposes of EU criminal law and EU external action. See, for an analysis, Maria Fletcher, EU 
Crime and Policing and the OCTs, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra, at 291; Steven 
Blockmans, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea? Conflicts in External Action Pursued 
by OCTs and the EU, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra, at 307; Kochenov, supra note 3, 
at 217–21. 
 6. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 52(1), Mar. 30, 2010, 
2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter TEU]. 
 7. Article 52(1) of the TEU reads as follows:  
The Treaties shall apply to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic 
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian 
Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the 
Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak 
Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
Problems might arise, however, when it is not absolutely clear what the meaning of a 
“Member State” is. That the issue is not purely hypothetical follows, for instance, from the 
legal questions Professor Monica Claes was asked by the Netherlands Ministry of the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations which included, “welke entiteit moet als lidstaat van de Europese 
Unie worden beschouwd: Nederland of het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden?”, i.e., the Dutch 
government did not know what a “Member State” is, even in the context of its own country. 
For Professor Claes’s answers, see Monica Claes, Europees-rechtelijke aspecten van 
kiesrecht van Nederlandse onderdanen die in de Antillen en Aruba woonachtig zijn (2010) 
(Ticom Paper, Tilburg University). 
 8. Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex 
LEXIS 609J0034 (Mar. 8, 2011); Case C-434/09, Shirley McCarthy v. Sec’y of State for the 
Home Dep’t, 2011 E.C.R. I-00000. For analysis, see Dimitry Kochenov, A Real European 
Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in 
Europe, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 55 (2011). 
 9. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 10. TEU, supra note 6, Art. 1(2). 
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specialis to accompany the lex generalis provision contained in the EU 
Treaty, unequivocally indicates that both Article 52 TEU and the relevant 
TFEU instruments are equally applicable to both Treaties, which had not 
been the case before Lisbon, when each of the Treaties in force had its own 
scope ratione loci,11 not identical to other Treaties, albeit applicable to the 
same Member States. 
  
 11. The founding Treaties formed a united system of law, since it was impossible to 
join one of the three Communities without joining the two others, just as joining the Union 
was impossible without joining the constituent Communities. This unity had started to take 
shape at least since the entry into force of the Merger Treaty. Treaty Establishing a Single 
Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, 1967 J.O. 
(152) 1 [hereinafter Merger Treaty]. See also JIM CLOOS, LE TRAITÉ DE MAASTRICHT: 
GENÈSE, ANALYSE, COMMENTAIRES 131 (2d. ed. 1994). Moreover, the single provision to 
regulate the enlargements of the Communities and the Union has been in place since 
Maastricht. Treaty on European Union art. 49, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 5. 
  Nevertheless, the founding Treaties recognised a sophisticated regime for 
differentiation in their ratione loci. Therefore, while the European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty (ECSC) only applied to the European territory of the Member States, the 
situation with European Atomic Energy Community Treaty (Euratom) and the European 
Economic Community (EEC) was drastically different, as both of them approached the 
territorial scope of application of the law differently from the ECSC. See Treaty Establishing 
the European Coal and Steel Community art. 79, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; Treaty 
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 
[hereinafter Eurotom Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. 
  The Euratom Treaty is much more inclusive due to the common European 
interests in the uranium deposits of the former colonies that existed at the time of its 
negotiation. See Dominique Custos, Implications of the European Integration for the 
Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 91. Consequently, according to 
Article 198 of Euratom, the Treaty applies to the European territory of the Member States 
and “to the non-European territories within their jurisdiction.” Eurotom Treaty, art. 198. 
Exceptions are only made for the Færœ Islands, Greenland and the UK Sovereign Bases on 
Cyprus. A special regime applies to the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. All in all, it is 
clear that the inclusive approach to territory demonstrated by Euratom lost much of its force 
upon the gaining of independence of the African colonies rich in the relevant resources. 
Coupled with the “principle of speciality,” which necessarily limits the scope of issues that 
can be addressed via the Euratom framework, the relevance of this Community, which has 
survived the Lisbon reshuffle, to the overseas regions of the Member States remains very 
limited indeed. 
 
  As for the European Economic Community Treaty, it introduced several classes 
of territories in its law, with varied application of the Treaty provisions in each. This system 
of ratione loci variation, entirely different from the ECSC, which embraced the general 
principle of exclusion, and the Euratom Treaty, which embraced the general principle of 
inclusion, can be placed between the two. It laid the foundations of the current system of 
ratione loci of the law of the EU analysed below. 
  As for the pre-Lisbon version of the EU Treaty, there was no consensus in the 
literature or among the practitioners as to how the law is to apply. Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. Most notably, the EC Treaty did not contain any provisions at all 
that would specify the extent of its territorial scope. Thus it provided an example of an 
approach to the definition of such scope that is different from the three other treaties then in 
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In other words, EU territory seems at first glance to represent a 
mathematical sum of the territories of the Member States with EU law 
equally applying to the entirety of the territory of the Member States, 
including their territorial waters12 and “ships and aircraft under the rules of 
the flag.”13 To adhere blindly to this simple statement, although generally 
correct, would be to oversimplify the issue of territorial application of EU 
law to an almost dangerous degree. Indeed, EU law applies very differently 
to Campione d’Italia, the Holy Mount Athos, the municipality of Budapest, 
the double kingdom of Wallis-et-Futuna within the French Republic, 
Martinique, or the Island of Bonaire. Interestingly, although all the 
territories mentioned are clearly parts of Member States, the application of 
EU law in each is far from identical.14 
It is possible, in this regard, to distinguish between a classical model of 
application of EU law, consisting of the full application of the acquis15 to 
the whole territory of the Member States as understood in the national 
Constitution16 and where the principle of the “unitary concept of territory”17 
  
force. This sparked academic debate, notwithstanding the basic rule of the Vienna 
Convention in the Law of Treaties art. 29, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. This treaty 
stated in Article 29 that treaty law applies to the entire territory of each party, and thus binds 
the whole territories of the member states. Id. For an outline of this debate see Kochenov, 
supra note 3, at 216, 217-23. For contemporary implications and analyses, see the views 
expressed by Jacques Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and 
Others after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra 
note 5, at 69; Morten Broberg, Access to the European Court of Justice by Courts in 
Overseas Countries and Territories, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, at 137; Fletcher, supra 
note 5, at 291; Steven Blockmans, supra note 5. On the territorial scope of the founding 
Treaties see, for example, Jacques Ziller, Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: 
Diversity and Differentiation in the Application of Substantive Law on Member States’ 
Territories, in CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU: FROM UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY? 113, 
115 (Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2000); Kochenov, supra note 3, at 204-17. It is 
unavoidable that the contributors to this book will be constantly returning to the issue of the 
historical evolution of the scopes ratione loci of the founding Treaties, which is fundamental 
to this study.  
 12. Case 61/77, Commission v. Ireland, 1978 E.C.R. 417; Case 63/83, Regina v. 
Kent Kirk, 1984 E.C.R. 2689. 
 13. See DAVID VAUGHAN, VAUGHAN LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES SERVICE 
¶ 643 (David Vaughan ed., Issue 34, 1990). 
 14. The variation in the application of EU law in the overseas regions and territories 
of the Member States should be viewed in the right context, providing yet another example 
of differentiation in the application of EU law, of which numerous examples are known. For 
an analysis of this general contest see, for example, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU: 
FROM UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY?, supra note 11. 
 15. For a general analysis of the term, see Christine Delcourt, The Acquis 
Communautaire: Has the Concept Had Its Day?, 38 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 829 (2001). 
 16. The ECJ respects the Member States’ own approaches to territory. For a concrete 
reference see, for example, Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. 
Hauptzollamt de Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787, ¶ 10. In some cases Member States tried to 
challenge the inclusive vision of territory and national institutional structure embraced by the 
ECJ vis-à-vis other Member States, but to no avail. See e.g., the British position in Joined 
cases C-100/89 and 101/89 Kaefer v. French state 1990 E.C.R. 4647 ¶¶ 6, 7. The British 
 
2012] The Application of EU Law 675 
 
applies (i.e. the main rule);18 as opposed to the model where EU law does 
not fully apply to certain parts of Member State territory, i.e. where the 
unitary idea of territory is not applicable and differentiation is the key word. 
In the territories covered by the second model, EU law “s’applique fort 
imparfaitement,”19 and to a varying degree—thus introducing concentric 
circles of EU involvement with different parts of Member States’ 
territories,20 especially in the so-called “borderland Europe”21 at times lying 
many time-zones away from the European part of the EU (i.e. the exception 
to the main rule). It is abundantly clear at this point that for some Member 
States “il n’y a pas coïncidence complète entre territoire national et territoire 
d’application du droit communautaire.”22 
While the main principle that EU law applies in full is true for virtually 
all the European territory of the EU,23 minor exceptions notwithstanding,24 
  
government submitted that a Polynesian court could not be regarded as a “court or tribunal of 
a Member State” in the sense of Art. 267 TFEU (then Art. 234 EC), an argument which 
failed to convince the Court. See also Broberg, supra note 11, at 137. Interestingly, AG 
Mischo, writing privately, was surprised that only one government made such an argument. 
J. Mischo, The Competence of the Judiciary of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba to 
Request Preliminary Rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1991 
TIJDSCHTIFT VOOR ANTILLIAANS RECHT—JUSTICIA, 140, 142. 
 17. Case 34/79, Regina v. Henn, 1979 E.C.R. 379. Speaking about prohibitions on 
imports of goods justified on the grounds of public morality, the Court underlined that “the 
fact that certain differences exist between the laws enforced in the different constituent parts 
of a Member State does not thereby prevent that state from applying a unitary concept [of 
territory].” Id. ¶ 16. 
 18. TEU art. 52. 
 19. Syméon Karagiannis, A propos du règlement des conflits d’intérêts entre les 
territoires dépendant d’Etats membres et les Communautés européennes, 75 REVUE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPARE 330, 337 (1998). 
 20. Karis Muller, “Concentric Circles” of the Periphery of the European Union, 48 
AUSTRALIAN J. POL. & HIST. 322 (2002); Morten Broberg, The EU’s Legal Ties with Its 
Former Colonies: When Old Love Never Dies? DIIS Working Paper, 2010.  
 21. See Teresa Pullano, Restructuring Europe from its Margins, in EU LAW OF THE 
OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 363, 364. 
 22. Karagiannis, supra note 19, at 333. 
 23. The meaning of the reference to the Member States in Article 52 of the TEU is to 
be interpreted in the most inclusive manner. Therefore, unless some lex specialis provisions 
in the Treaty are applicable, the principle of the unitary approach to territory reigns. Case 
34/79, Regina v. Henn, 1979 E.C.R. 3813, ¶ 6. 
 24. For such exceptions, see Council Regulation 2913/92, Establishing the 
Community Customs Code, art. 3(2), 1992 O.J. (L 302) 3 (EEC). The regulation lists all the 
territories that are outside the territory of the Member States, but are still considered part of 
the Community customs territory. Id. The consequences of such inclusion are far-reaching 
because the Customs Union is at the core of the Internal Market, and the preamble of Council 
Regulation states that the Community is “based upon a customs union.” Id. at pmbl. Such 
territories include Melilla, Ceuta, the Island of Heligoland, Buesingen, Livigno, Campione 
d’Italia. Council Regulation 2913/92, art. 3, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1 (EEC). The reverse is also 
possible: a third country can be part of the customs territory of the EU while not being a 
Member State, as the examples from the past relations between the EEC and Monaco and 
between the EEC and San Marino have demonstrated. Council Regulation 2913/92, arts. 
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the largest share of the Member State territories lying outside of Europe—
some of them not formally forming part of the particular Member State 
while clearly under its sovereignty25—provides examples of legal 
arrangements deviating from the main rule of Article 52(1) TEU. 
Unsurprisingly, such deviations are unequivocally authorised by the 
Treaties—Article 52(2) TEU contains a reference to Article 355 TFEU, 
where such rules are spelled out—and which form a complex system of 
rules.  
The fact is that millions of EU citizens residing in what is considered 
Member State territory, find themselves in areas which either do not fall 
within the scope ratione loci of EU law entirely, or where EU law applies 
with serious derogations. This situation is prone to generate confusion and 
occlude clarity, unless addressed by experts in sufficient detail. In the 
English-speaking world the latter has not been done at any serious level 
until the publication of the volume on EU Law of the Overseas26 edited by 
the author,27 on an extract from which this contribution is based. Stunningly, 
  
3(2)(b) & 3(2)(c), 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1 (now obsolete). Some other examples of European 
Member State territories where EU law does not apply in full or applies with serious 
derogations include the Holy Mount Athos, the Åland Islands, the Nordic territories 
inhabited by Sami people, and the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, which are mentioned 
above in the category of territories sui generis. See Documents Concerning the Accession of 
the Hellenic Republic to the European Communities, Joint Declaration Concerning Mount 
Athos, 1979 O.J. (L 291) 186 [hereinafter Declaration on Mount Athos]; TFEU, arts. 355(4) 
& 355(5)(c); Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the 
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the 
Adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is Founded, 1994 O.J. (C 241) 9; 
Accession of Norway, Austria, Finland, and Sweden: Protocol No. 3 On the Sami People, 
1994 O.J. (C 241) 352. 
 25. Which is the case with the numerous overseas territories connected with the U.K. 
IAN HENDRY & SUSAN DICKINSON, BRITISH OVERSEAS TERRITORIES LAW 2 (2011). 
 26. See generally EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS: OUTERMOST REGIONS, ASSOCIATED 
OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, TERRITORIES SUI GENERIS (Dimitry Kochenov ed., 
2011). 
 27. For rare exceptions in English, see, for example, Ziller, supra note 3, and 
Kochenov, supra note 3. See, e.g., Dimitry Kochenov et al., De caribische 
koninkrijksgebieden en de Europese Unie: Over de status van UPG en LGO naar Europees 
recht, 26 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR ANTILLIAANS RECHT-JUSTICIA 10 (2010); Danielle Perrot, Les 
régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, 4 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE 
DROIT EUROPÉEN 717 (2009) [hereinafter Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises 
selon le traité de Lisbonne]; Isabelle Vestris, Le statut communautaire des régions 
ultrapériphériques, la construction d’un modèle attractif et perfectible d’intégration 
différenciée (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of the French Antilles and 
Guiana) (on file with author) (French West Indies); H.E. Bröring ET AL., SCHURENDE 
RECHTSORDES: OVER DE EUROPESE UNIE, HET KONINKRIJK EN ZIJN CARIBISCHE GEBIEDEN 
(2008); UNION EUROPÉENNE ET OUTRE-MERS, UNIS DANS LEUR DIVERSITÉ (L. Tesoka & J. 
Ziller eds., 2008); H. Béringer, Outre-mer, JURISCLASSEUR FASCICULE 456 (2006); Jacques 
Ziller, L’Union Européenne et l’outre-Mer, 113 POUVOIRS 145 (2005); Jacques Ziller, The 
European Union and Overseas Territories, 113 POUVOIRS145 (2005); Jacques Ziller, Les 
outre-mers face à l’intégration européenne et à la mondialisation—L’association des pays et 
territoires d’outre-mer à la Communauté européenne, 101 REVUE FRANÇAISE 
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in numerous cases it was even impossible to state with any degree of 
certainty whether and what kind of EU law applies in a certain territory, to 
which numerous academic debates28 as well as the obvious errors made by 
the Commission in its policy documents29 overwhelmingly testify. 
Some elements of the acquis apply to the overseas parts of the territory 
of one Member State while being deemed inapplicable to the parts with 
identical EU law status connected with other Member States.30 In other 
words, the general confusion is not the only problem once the scope of 
application ratione loci of EU law is analyzed. The current state of affairs 
has led to the loss of the general uniformity in the application of EU law in 
the overseas parts of the Member States predominantly lying outside 
Europe. Consequently, although rules abound and every opportunity to 
introduce clarity into the picture seems to be present, the situation—where 
EU law supposedly applies in the Member States’ non-European 
territories—is far from clear. This article makes an attempt to remedy this 
gap. 
  
D’ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 127 (2002); Arjen van Rijn, Brussel, Den Haag en de landen 
en gebieden overzee: Problemen en perspectieven [Brussels, the Hague and the Overseas 
Countries and Territories: Problems and Prospectives], in ONZE KEUS: PIROUETTES IN HET 
GEMEERSCHAPSRECHT 126 (Rolf de Groot et al. eds., 2001) (Neth.); LA SOUVERAINETÉ 
PARTAGÉE EN NOUVELLE CALÉDONIE ET EN DROIT COMPARÉ (Jean-Yves Faberon & Guy 
Agniel eds., 2000); Danielle Perrot, Le nouvel article 299 paragraphe 2 du traité instituant 
la Communauté Européenne: Vers un approfondissement de la différenciation juridique en 
faveur des régions ultra-périphériques, 12 POUVOIRS DANS LA CARAÏBE 111 (2000) ; Jean-
Pierre Puissochet, Aux confins de la Communauté européenne: les régions 
ultrapériphériques, in MELANGES EN HOMMAGE À FERNAND SCHOCKWEILER 491 (Gil Carlos 
Rodríguez Iglesias et al. eds., 1999); Brial, supra note 5, at 639; Ismaël I. Omarjee, Le traité 
d’Amsterdam et l’avenir de la politique de différenciation en faveur des départements 
français d’outre-mer, 34 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 515 (1998); 
Karagiannis, supra note 19; JACQUES ZILLER, LES DOM-TOM (2d ed. 1996); Elisha Paulin & 
Marie Josèphe Rigobert, Les régions ultrapériphériques et la CEE, REVUE DU MARCHÉ 
COMMUN ET DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE, 436 (1993); Groux, supra note 3. See also Fiona 
Murray, The European Union and the Member State Territories: A New Legal Framework 
under the EU Treaties (2012) (Ph.D. thesis, Erasmus University of Rotterdam).  
 28. For a short summary see, for example, Kochenov, supra note 3, at 217–20. 
 29. See Commission Green Paper on the Future Relations Between the EU and the 
Overseas Countries and Territories, at 6, COM (2008) 383 final (June 25, 2008) [hereinafter 
Commission Green Paper](wrongly denying EU free movement rights to the residents of one 
group of the overseas regions holding EU citizenship). For critical discussion, see Dimitry 
Kochenov, EU Citizenship in the Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 
199, 212. 
 30. Consider, for instance, the European Arrest Warrant which functions differently 
in the French OCTs, compared with the OCTs of any other Member State, where it is not 
applicable. Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, of 13 June 2002 on the European 
Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States, 2002 O.J. (L 190) 1. 
On the French position, see Council of the European Union, Note from French Delegation on 
the Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the French Overseas Departments and 
Territories, Doc. 11356/04, Brussels (9 July 2004). For more examples, see Fletcher, supra 
note 5; Blockmans, supra note 5. 
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At issue are continental territories,31 as well as thousands of islands, 
islets and archipelagos in all the Oceans,32 belonging to Denmark, Finland,33 
France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom,34 which 
jointly (when counted with territorial waters) span a territory far greater 
than that of the European part of the Union.35 Although the process of 
decolonisation has diminished the extent of the Member States’ territorial 
reach, necessarily toning down the ambitions of the Internal Market, which 
was initially conceived as “Eurafrica,”36 the scale of the EU’s direct 
involvement with the non-European territories of the Member States, as 
well as with European territories where the main principle of full 
application of EU law as stated in Article 52 TEU applies with deviations, 
remains very considerable indeed. 
The reasons behind such deviations from the main rule vary and are 
rooted in numerous considerations, ranging from the upholding of a 
particular territory’s status under international law37 to the protection of 
minority cultures,38 the reflection of the attained level of autonomy in 
  
 31. The only continental territory outside of Europe belonging to a Member State is 
French Guiana. However, Gibraltar provides another example of a continental territory 
where the application of EU law is profoundly atypical, even though, sensu stricto, it is 
located in Europe. 
 32. See the map in Figure 1. 
 33. Although the Åland Islands are in the European waters, of course. 
 34. See HENDRY & DICKSON, supra note 25. 
 35. See Tables 1, 2, and 3 listing all such territories. 
 36. Jean-Marie Palayret, Les mouvements proeuropéens et la question de 
l’Eurafrique du Congrès de La Haye à la Convention de Yaoundé (1948–1963), in L’EUROPE 
UNIE ET L’AFRIQUE: DE L’IDÉE D’EURAFRIQUE À LA CONVENTION DE LOMÉ I 185 (Marie-
Thérèse Bitsch & Gérard Bossuat eds., 2006). See also Custos, supra note 11, at 94-101. The 
absolute majority of the founding Member States had overseas territories under their control 
at the moment of the entry of the first Treaties marking European integration into force. 
Ziller, L’Union Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27. 
 37. Which is the case of the Åland Islands, for instance. The special regime 
governing the Islands in EU law, which is reflected in TFEU art. 335(4), was put into place 
to respect arrangements existing in international law. See Report Submitted to the Council of 
the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. 
B.7.21/68/106 (1921); the guarantee to be given to the population of the Åaland Islands 
(adopted June 27, 1921) in The Åaland Islands Question, 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 691 
(1921). The special regime for the Islands dates back to the Declaration of Paris of 1856, 
aimed at guaranteeing the demilitarisation of the Islands (then a territory within the Russian 
Empire). See Martin Ekman, The Right to Be Small and Different, 10 JERSEY L. REV. 2006, 
available at http://www.jerseylaw.je/Publications/jerseylawreview/oct06/JLR0610_Ekman. 
aspx; AUTONOMY AND DEMILITARISATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ÅLAND ISLANDS IN A 
CHANGING EUROPE (Lauri Hannikainen & Frank Horn eds., 1997). See also Dimitry 
Kochenov, Regional Citizenships and EU Law: The Case of the Åland Islands and New 
Caledonia, 35 EUR. L. REV. 307 (2010). 
 38. Which is the case of the Sami lands and, at least in part, the Channel Islands. See 
Documents Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Sweden, 
the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Norway to the European Union: Protocol No. 3 
on the Sami People, Aug. 29 1994, 1994 O.J. (C 241) 352 [hereinafter Protocol No. 3 on the 
Sami People] and Protocol No. 2 on the Faroe Islands & Protocol No. 3 on the Channel 
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national law,39 as well as decolonisation.40 Although a number of different 
relevant factors can be cumulatively applied, the most common reasons for 
special treatment are related to the need to adapt the application of EU law 
in particular territories to the discrepancies in the level of wealth, 
socioeconomic development, climate, and a number of other similar 
factors.41 These factors distinguish the territory in question from the main 
territory of the EU where the acquis applies in full and reflects the special 
status of such territories in national law42 or the willingness of a particular 
self-governing territory not to be covered by EU law. 
Legally speaking, the EU’s involvement with such territories is mostly 
channelled through three main statuses in EU law granted to each particular 
territory in question, including Outermost Region (OR) status,43 Overseas 
Country or Territory Associated with the Union (OCT) status,44 and a 
  
Islands and the Isle of Man, of the Documents Concerning the Accession to the European 
Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and Kingdom of Norway and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island, Mar. 27, 1972, 1972 O.J. (L 73) 164 
[hereinafter 1972 Treaty of Accession]. See also Danielle Perrot & Franck Miatti, Les 
Lapons et les îles Åland dans le quatrième élargissement: Contribution à l’étude de la 
différenciation juridique au sein de la Communauté européenne, 413 REVUE DU MARCHÉ 
COMMUN 670, 671-76. For the general analysis of the role of minority protection in EU law, 
see, for example, Dimitry Kochenov, The Summary of Contradictions: Outline of the EU’s 
Numerous Approaches to Minority Protection, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 39. See Treaty Amending with Regard to Greenland the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities, Jan. 2, 1985, 1985 O.J. (L 29) 1. 
 40. Which was the case of numerous former colonies that have managed to gain 
independence. In the current situation, New Caledonia, along with Bermuda, is one of the 
rare Member State territories included on the UN list of territories whose people have not yet 
attained a full measure of self-government. It was struck from this list in 1947, but got 
reintroduced on the list in 1986. See G.A. Res. 41/41A, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 
53, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/41A (Dec. 2, 1986). 
 41. For a sample of factors useful to explain ratione loci differentiation, see TFEU 
art. 349. 
 42. See Alain Moyrand, Théorie de la souveraineté partagée, in LA SOUVERAINETÉ 
PARTAGÉE EN NOUVELLE CALÉDONIE ET EN DROIT COMPARÉ, supra note 27, at 29. 
 43. E.g. Saint-Martin, La Réunion, Madeira. See TFEU arts. 349, 355(1). See, e.g., 
Ismaël Omarjee, Specific Measures of the Outermost Regions After the Entry into Force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 121; Perrot, Les régions 
ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, supra note 27, at 717; Kochenov, 
supra note 3, at 227–44; Christian Vitalien, Les régions ultra-périphériques entre 
assimilation et différenciation [The Outermost Regions between Assimilation and 
Differentiation], 101 REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE [FRENCH REV. OF PUB. 
ADMIN.] 115 (2002); Perrot, Le nouvel article 299 paragraphe 2, supra note 27, at 111; 
Puissochet, supra note 27, at 491; Fabien Brial, La place des régions ultrapériphériques, 5-6 
CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 639 (1998); Omarjee, supra note 27, at 515; JACQUES ZILLER, 
LES DOM-TOM 60-78 (1996); Elisa Paulin & Marie-Josèphe Rigobert, Les Régions 
Ultrapériphériques et la CEE, 368 REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN ET DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 
[RMCUE] 436 (1993). 
 44. E.g., Bermuda, Greenland, Wallis-et-Futuna. See TFEU art. 355(2) & Annex II. 
See also TFEU Part IV. For an analysis, see Dimitry Kochenov, The Impact of European 
Citizenship on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European 
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plethora of ad hoc arrangements applicable to the Member State territories 
which do not fall squarely within the two statuses mentioned, but can be 
classed as a group of territories sui generis.45 Theoretically, yet another 
status could be added to the list: that of the European territory for whose 
external relations a Member State is responsible.46 However, since this 
category currently covers only Gibraltar,47 the latter is herewith included 
among the sui generis territories, insofar as it represents a deviation from 
the other two main statuses applicable to the territories of the Member 
States where the application of the acquis is atypical, i.e. the OR and OCT 
statuses.  
Roughly speaking, the starting assumption applicable to the ORs is that 
the EU acquis applies in full unless the contrary is stated,48 which is 
reversed in the case of the OCTs.49 The latter are, according to the ECJ, 
neither parts of the Union,50 nor third countries.51 According to established 
case law, “failing express provisions, the general provisions of the Treaty do 
not apply to [such] countries and territories.”52 
In practice, however, this division is much less obvious than what one 
might expect: both main legal statuses seem to converge in a number of 
important respects,53 while territories sui generis offer an example of 
flexible arrangements which can largely be turned either way. Key reasons 
for such convergence include the inherently limited nature of the ratione 
loci derogations contained in the Treaties, which are, as follows from the 
term itself, focused on the territoriality of the application of the law, paying 
little—if any—attention to other important factors, such as the personal 
scope of the law.54 Other examples could be the willingness of the overseas 
regions and territories to apply EU law, even when it is not required, simply 
  
Community, 36 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 239 (2009); Kochenov, supra note 3, at 
245-55; Jacques Ziller, Les outre-mers face à l’intégration européenne et à la 
mondialisation—L’association des pays et territoires d’outre-mer à la Communauté 
européenne, 101 REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 127 (2002); ZILLER, LES 
DOM-TOM, supra note 43, at 110–117; See van Rijn, supra note 27, at 126–36. 
 45. E.g., Færœ Islands, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Jersey. See TFEU arts. 355(4) (5). See 
also Kochenov, supra note 3, at 212, 256. 
 46. TFEU art. 355(3). 
 47. On the status of Gibraltar, see the Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession 
and the Adjustments to the Treaties of the 1972 Treaty of Accession, supra note 38, art. 28. 
 48. TFEU art. 355(1). 
 49. TFEU art. 355(2). 
 50. Case C-390/95 P, Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. I-769, ¶ 
36. 
 51. Since they are under the sovereignty of one of the Member States and since EU 
law applies there, at least in part. 
 52. Case C-260/90, Leplat v. French Polynesia, 1992 E.C.R. I-643, ¶ 10; Case C-
110/97, Netherlands v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-8763, ¶ 49; Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger 
v. College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 46. 
 53. See, e.g., Kochenov, supra note 44. 
 54. See id.; Kochenov, supra note 29. 
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because of its more advanced nature compared with regulation available 
locally.55 The same applies to the vital importance of the Union to the 
remote territories of the Member States in terms of gaining a privileged 
status in their respective regions of the world, and in being a way to deal 
with the inherent deficiencies of their small size,56 among other factors.57 
The need to be connected, however loosely, with the EU, ensures the very 
survival of some of the territories in question as independent economic and 
political actors,58 enabling them to guarantee the high standard of living for 
their inhabitants. The realisation of the need to remain strongly associated 
with the former colonial centre, once realised, could certainly pose 
problems, as exemplified by Prime Minister Eman in his contribution, 
which mentions the Aruban fight against full independence from the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands.59 An example of the vision contrary to the 
Aruban one would be New Caledonia, an OCT connected with France, 
which stands firmly on the way towards Kanak independence.60 
Natural convergence in the essential contenue of the three legal statuses 
available in EU law only adds to the difficulties related to outlining the 
scope of the applicable EU law. In fact, the differences between different 
territories formerly belonging to the same category in EU law (be it OR or 
  
 55. See, e.g., Eman & Sevinger, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 159 (Advocate General 
Tizzano’s Opinion). The consequences of such voluntary adoption in the context of EU law 
are not always clear and can be potentially very far-reaching, as in light of Case C-28/95, 
Leur-Bloem v. Inspecteur der Belastingen/Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2, 1997 E.C.R. I-
4161, ¶ 34. See also MORTEN BROBERG & NEILS FENGER, PRELIMINARY REFERENCES TO THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 143-52 (2010); Broberg, supra note 11, at 150. 
 56. See generally Mike Eman, Defending the Democratic Rights of EU Citizens 
Overseas: A Personal Story, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 433. 
 57. Some other handicaps are listed in TFEU art. 349, para. 1, outlining the context 
of the application of EU law in the ORs. By analogy, they should clearly be considered as 
relevant factors in analysing the OCTs too, as well as the reasons behind the special status 
enjoyed by the OCTs. 
 58. If not preventing their simple disappearance from the political map, as 
exemplified by the Falkland war and the recent tension between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and Venezuela over the Caribbean countries of the Kingdom. 
 59. The Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands regarded the status of Aruba as a 
separate country (land) within the Kingdom of the Netherlands upon Aruba’s splitting away 
from the now defunct Federation of the Netherlands Antilles merely as a step to full 
independence Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Stb. 1954, p. 503; See also 
Wijziging van 11 januari 1985, Stb. 1985, p. . It took Aruba plenty of effort to remain a part 
of the Kingdom and thus avoid getting full independence. Dimitry Kochenov, The EU and 
the Overseas: Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories Associated with the 
Union, and Territories Sui Generis, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 3, 14 n.56. 
 60. Dominique Custos, New Caledonia, a Case of Shared Sovereignty within the 
French Republic: Appearance or Reality? 13 EUR. PUB. L. 97 (2007). See also Alan Berman, 
1998 and Beyond in New Caledonia: At Freedom’s Gate?, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1 
(1998); Alan Berman, Future Kanak Independence in New Caledonia: Reality or Illusion?, 
34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 287 (1998). See also DESTINS DES COLLECTIVITÉS POLITIQUES D’OCÉANIE: 
PEUPLES, POPULATIONS, NATIONS, ÉTATS, TERRITOIRES, PAYS, PATRIES, COMMUNAUTÉS, 
FRONTIÈRES (Jean-Yves Faberon, Viviane Fayaud & Jean-Marc Regnault eds., 2011). 
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OCT) can sometimes be so considerable that the very appropriateness of the 
existing categories can in some cases be legitimately put in doubt. This is 
particularly true in the case of the OCTs. As Dominique Custos has 
abundantly demonstrated, the single legal status of the OCT has never 
actually materialised in EU law,61 as it seems to unite territories where the 
application of EU law is often profoundly dissimilar.62 In this respect, the 
difference between the OCTs and the ORs is somewhat clearer, even though 
it was virtually non-existent before the landmark Hansen decision of the 
ECJ,63 which sharpened the understanding of the OR status and laid the 
essential foundations for the distinctions existing between the OCTs and the 
ORs in the first place, textual differences to be found in the relevant 
provisions of the Treaties notwithstanding. Moreover, albeit via different 
legal means, i.e. by not applying EU law by default in the case of the OCTs, 
as opposed to applying it with profound derogations in the case of the ORs, 
a strikingly similar landscape of legal regulation can arise in practice in the 
context of the regulation of certain fields, de facto virtually removing the 
practical difference between the two statuses entirely. The story of the 
octroi de mer levies (i.e. dock dues)64 in the ORs65 and the OCTs66 provides 
a telling illustration of this convergence. 
  
 61. See Custos, supra note 11. 
 62. Bermuda is probably the most extreme example of this, as, although its status as 
an OCT cannot be put in doubt as it is included in Annex II of the TFEU, which lists all the 
territories with such a status, the provisions on the association with the Union actually do not 
apply to it in practice. The Association Decision of the Council govrning the practical 
technicalities of the status of the OCT states that “[t]he arrangements for association laid 
down in this Decision should not be applied to Bermuda in accordance with the wishes of the 
Government of Bermuda.” Council Decision 2001/822/EC, of 27 November 2001 on the 
Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Community 
(‘Overseas Association Decision’), pmbl., 2001 O.J. (L 314) 1. In this respect, the practical 
difference between OCT status and that of a territory sui generis, just to give one example, is 
not clear. It has been persuasively argued that the exclusion of Bermuda from the scope of 
application of the Association Decision cannot take precedence over the text of Annex IV, 
which includes Bermuda among other associated countries and territories. For this argument 
as well as the discussion of other scholarly opinions, see Karagiannis, supra note 19, at 338-
39, n.27. 
 63. Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt de 
Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787, ¶ 10. 
 64. For a detailed legal analysis of the legality of octroi de mer under Community 
law, see Marco Slotboom, L’application du traité CE au commerce intraétatique: Le cas de 
l’octroi de mer, 32 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 9, 9 (1996). See also Puissochet, supra note 
27, at 504-06. For a good summary of the development of the octroi de mer case-law of the 
ECJ, see Case C-126/94, Société Cadi Surgelés v. Ministre des Finances, 1996 E.C.R. I-
5647. 
 65. See Council Decision 2004/162/EC, Concerning the Dock Dues in the French 
Overseas Departments and Extending the Period of Validity of Decision 89/688/EEC, 2004 
O.J. (L 52) 64. 
 66. See, e.g., Case C-260/90, Leplat v. French Polynesia, 1992 E.C.R. I-643. For an 
analysis, see Ziller, L’Union Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27, at 149.  
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When approaching the legal situation of the overseas countries, 
territories, regions, and departments, a dynamic analysis of the law is 
absolutely indispensable as the legal statuses at issue have been in a 
constant process of mutation, shaped and remoulded by the Member States’ 
concerns, regular treaty amendments and ECJ case law. Mostly regarded as 
a burden throughout the Union’s history,67 the essential approach to the 
overseas regions and territories of the Member States in the Union seems to 
be changing at the moment,68 enabling Dominique Custos to speak about a 
positive “shift in the perception of the Overseas from the EU’s 
perspective.”69 However, this change in approach notwithstanding, the fact 
that a huge number of overwhelmingly important and apparently not 
envisaged changes in the application of EU law in such territories were 
introduced into the Treaties with the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon70 makes it clear that the amount of attention that such territories 
attract is insufficient by far to solve the outstanding problems they are 
facing.71 Most importantly, the recent changes seem to imply that the 
amount of applicable EU law could actually be reduced in some overseas 
countries and territories, which is not necessarily the case and is discussed 
infra in detail.  
The scale of the legal issues arising from the interplay between the 
“normal” way to apply the acquis and the three statuses reserved for the 
territories of the Member States lying outside of the classical scope ratione 
  
 67. The wording of the relevant Treaty provisions routed in the founding Treaties 
and dating back to the fifties still reflects this approach, making an emphasis, to provide an 
OR-related example, on the handicaps of the regions in question, rather than stressing the 
positive side of their contribution to the EU integration project. See TFEU art. 349(1). For an 
analysis, see Custos, supra note 11, at 105. 
 68. As As exemplified in the recent Commission’s documents marking the new 
approach. See Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Strategy for the Outermost Regions: Achievements and Future Prospects, COM (2007) 507 
final (Sept. 12, 2007); Communication from the Commission, The Outermost Regions: An 
Asset for Europe, COM (2008) 642 final (Oct. 17, 2008); Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Elements for a New Partnership between the 
EU and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), COM (2009) 623 final (Nov. 6, 
2009). 
 69. See Custos, supra note 11, at 110. 
 70. For detailed analysis, see Jacques Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries 
and Territories and Others after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF 
THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 81-88. 
 71. Faced with this obvious problem, the ORs and the OCTs started to group 
together to promote their interests. For an analysis of the OCTs, see, for example, Freya 
Baetens, The Overseas Countries and Territories Association: The Added Value of a 
Concerted Approach, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 383. See, e.g., Marc 
Janus, Un lobby originale des régions ultrapériphériques de la Communauté européenne, 
388 REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN ET DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE 326 (1995), for more 
information about the ORs. 
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loci of EU law, as restated in Article 52 TEU, coupled with the high 
complexity of the legal design of derogations and specific features marking 
their nature, beg for a specific term to unite all these matters in one sub-
discipline to tackle them in their legal evolution with the seriousness and 
precision they deserve. To address this challenge, the notion of EU Law of 
the Overseas has been introduced,72 which, although new to English-
speaking lawyers, is an accepted name for this branch of EU law in France, 
where it goes under the name of droit européen d’outre mer.73 The term 
“Overseas” itself, although seemingly strange, has been chosen for its 
general character. A word was needed that would encompass a reference to 
any of the overseas regions, territories, departments, dependencies, etc., of 
the Member States, no matter what status in EU or national law they 
possess. 
To provide a concise and complete overview of the EU Law of the 
Overseas, the article splits into sections dealing with the essential points 
governing the territorial scope of the Treaties and looking at the historical 
evolution of the present applicability of the EU and TFEU Treaties, as well 
as the Euratom in the Overseas (II), proceeding to the dynamic legal-
historical analysis of the key elements of the three legal statuses awarded to 
the Overseas in EU law, focusing on the ORs (III), on the OCTs (IV), as 
well as providing examples of several territories sui generis (V). The article 
then moves to the reassessment of the legal statuses presented from the 
point of view of derogations from the acquis (VI) and to the procedural 
issues of EU’s engagement with its Overseas, discussing the legal issues 
related to the changing of the legal statuses of overseas regions and 
territories in EU law (VII). The conclusion outlines the main challenges for 
the future and summarises the most important findings related to the essence 
of the core areas of the nascent EU Law of the Overseas (8).  
I. TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE TREATIES: LEGAL-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
At the moment of the negotiation and the signing of the founding 
Treaties, the territorial configuration of what later became the Member 
States was quite different from the present-day picture. The six founding 
Member States (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands) exercised sovereignty over a huge territory in the form of 
colonial possessions, protectorates, overseas departments, etc., situated all 
over the world, but mostly on the African continent. The majority of these 
territories were not fully incorporated into the Member States, different law 
applying to them, compared with the metropolitan centres and including, 
  
 72. See generally EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 26. 
 73. See Dominique Custos, La révélation d’un droit communautaire d’outre-mer, in 
UNION EUROPÉENNE ET OUTRE-MERS: UNIS DANS LEUR DIVERSITÉ 429 (Laurent Tesoka & 
Jacques Ziller eds., 2008).  
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inter alia, such territories as the (Belgian) Congo, Rwanda-Burundi, the 
(Italian) protectorate of Somalia, the Netherlands New Guinea, The 
Netherlands Antilles, Suriname, Algeria, French Equatorial Africa—
including Côte-d’Ivoire, Dahomey, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, 
Sudan and Upper-Volta—French East Africa—comprising Moyen-Congo, 
Gabon, Oubangui-Chari and Chad—the protectorates of Togo, Cameroon 
and Wallis-et-Futuna, Comoros Islands, Madagascar, Côte Française des 
Somalis, and the Etablissements français de l’Océanie (now French 
Polynesia). 
Given the huge economic potential of these territories, it is not surprising 
that the idea of a Eurafrican Common Market was considered very 
seriously at the time. The European powers saw the success of their future 
integration as directly related to the success of the gradual incorporation of 
the African dependent territories into the Single Market they planned to 
build. Eurafrica was supposed to incorporate the bigger parts of European 
and African continents, as archival research demonstrates.74 In fact, while 
the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC 
Treaty) was only to cover the European territories of the Member States, the 
two Treaties of Rome adopted a totally different perspective. France, in 
charge of the largest share of the overseas possessions among the six, 
simply refused to enter the Common Market with the other Member States-
to-be without a special accommodation of (in particular) its African 
territories. In the words of Professor Custos, “the spotlight was wholly put 
on the promises of Eurafrica”75—only to end abruptly with decolonisation.76 
While the Euratom Treaty was construed to apply to the entirety of the 
Member States’ territories, and thus still includes the Overseas,77 the EEC 
Treaty adopted a somewhat more nuanced approach. 
The level of economic development of all the territories in question, as 
well as their level of incorporation into the legal-political systems of the 
Herren der Verträge, varied to a great degree. It is thus not surprising that 
not all the parts of the Member States’ territories could be awarded identical 
status under the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty when the 
EEC was founded. The most important step made by the founding Member 
States in this regard was to agree to the French idea of the potential 
extension of what was then the Common Market to cover their overseas 
possessions, thus departing from the ECSC Treaty model, which assumed 
the non-application of the ECSC law in the Overseas.78 The first step to be 
made in this direction was to design a regime of association to tie the 
  
 74. Custos, supra note 11, at 99. 
 75. Id. at 101. 
 76. Id. at 102. 
 77. Euratom Treaty, supra note 11, art. 198. 
 78. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 97, Apr. 18, 
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. 
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African, and other territories of the Member States with the European 
integration project. With this, the status of an OCT was born. Although this 
legal status did not imply full inclusion into the Common Market, it was 
clearly designed with a view to the eventual incorporation of the territories 
benefiting from such status into the scope ratione loci of EU law, where the 
acquis would apply in full.79 
Given that some non-European territories were legally entirely 
incorporated into the signatory states, they required a different legal status 
compared with that of the colonies and other possessions, to enjoy the 
association regime of the OCTs. At that time, France, having particular ties 
with its four Overseas Departments (DOM)80 and Algeria, demanded the 
inclusion into the Treaty, in addition to the association provisions for other 
possessions (which enjoyed an infinitely higher level of importance 
economically) of a special clause granting limited differentiated treatment to 
the incorporated territories overseas—which, albeit under a specific regime 
and with some derogations, were to fall within the scope of Community law 
under the former Article 227(2) EEC [which has now mutated into Article 
349 TFEU]—giving birth to what is now an OR legal regime.81 
Accordingly, the special status for the French DOM and Algeria in 
Community law was designed to differentiate between those overseas 
territories of the Member States which are incorporated into the state and 
those overseas territories which enjoy more autonomy under the national 
law of the Member State and do not generally fall within the territorial 
scope of full application of the EEC Treaty, as a special association regime 
applies. 
At the moment of the signing of the EEC Treaty, OCT status was granted 
to a huge number of Belgian, Dutch,82 French, and Italian territories not 
  
 79. See the analysis provided by Dominique Custos, Implications of the European 
Integration for the Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5. 
 80. The French DOM included Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana and Réunion 
at the time. Due to the recent slight reshuffling of the French ORs, the list of the territories 
enjoying such status that are connected with France has become longer by two, incorporating 
Saint Barthélemy and Saint Martin with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, 
the Azores and Madeira joined the DOM in benefiting from the OR status arrangements upon 
the accession of Portugal to what used to be the Communities. See Documents Concerning 
the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European 
Communities, Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the 
Portuguese Republic and the Adjustments to the Treaties, June 12, 1985, 1985 O.J. (L 302) 9 
[hereinafter Spain and Portugal Accession Treaty]. The Canary Islands came to be within the 
scope of the OR status in 1991. Council Regulation 1911/91, Application of the Provisions of 
Community Law to the Canary Islands, 1991 O.J. (L 171) 1 (ECC). 
 81. The DOM and Algeria were legally inseparable from France and were included 
into the customs territory of the Republic. Puissochet, supra note 27, at 491. 
 82. In derogation from the general rule that the provisions of the EEC Treaty were to 
apply to the entirety of the territory of the Member States, the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
only signed this Treaty for the Kingdom in Europe and the New Guinea. A special protocol 
to this end has been appended to the EC Treaty. Vincent Coussirat-Coustère, Article 227, in 
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fully incorporated into the constitutional structure of these Member States,83 
marking a huge success of the French policy, only to be extended further 
upon the accession of the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark to the 
Communities.84 
  
TRAITE INSTITUANT LA CEE 1419, 1422 (1992). Therefore, while the Treaty was later 
extended to cover the Dutch Islands in the Caribbean, it never has applied to Suriname. De 
Overeenkomst tot wijziging van het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Economische 
Gemeenschap ten einde de bijzondere associeatieregeling van het vierde deel van het 
Verdrag op de Nederlandse Antillen te doen zijn, Nov. 13 1962, 1964 J.O. (2413) 64. 
 83. The status of countries or territories associated with the Community was first 
granted to the Belgian territories of the Congo and Rwanda-Burundi, the Italian protectorate 
of Somalia, Netherlands New Guinea, and French equatorial Africa (Côte-d’Ivoire, 
Dahomey, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sudan and Upper-Volta), French East Africa 
(Moyen-Congo, Gabon, Oubangui-Chari and Chad), the protectorates of Togo and 
Cameroon, the Comoros Islands (Mayotte, separated from them is still associated with the 
EU under Art. 355(2) TFEU and included into Annex II TFEU), Madagascar and Côte 
Française des Somalis. To be added to this list are: the present French OCT, including the 
French Polynesia, which used to be called Etablissements français de l’Océanie; Wallis-and-
Futuna, which is still a French protectorate; New Caledonia and Dependencies, French 
Southern and Antarctic Territories and St. Pierre-et-Miquelon. See generally Ziller, L’Union 
Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27, at 145-147. See De Overeenkomst tot wijziging 
van het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Economische Gemeenschap ten einde de 
bijzondere associeatieregeling van het vierde deel van het Verdrag op de Nederlandse 
Antillen te doen zijn, Nov. 13 1962, 1964 J.O. (2413) 64. See, on this issue, Dimitry 
Kochenov, Le droit européen et le fédéralisme néerlandais: Une dynamique en évolution 
progressive, in DESTINS DES COLLECTIVITÉS POLITIQUES D’OCÉANIE, supra note 60, at 345; 
M.M. Bense & E.B. Pronk, Constitutionele aspecten bij de staatkundige hervorming van het 
Koninkrijk, 2010 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR CONSTITUTIONEEL RECHT [TVCR] 61; L.J.J. Rogier, Het 
Koninkrijk der nederlanden na de opheffing van de Nederlandse Antillen op oktober 2010, 
2010 ARS AEQUI 563; H.G. Hoogers, De herstructurering van het Koninkrijk als 
lakmoesproef, 2010 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR CONSTITUTIONEEL RECHT 256; SCHURENDE 
RECHTSORDES: OVER JURIDISCHE IMPLICATIES VAN DE UPG-STATUS VOOR DE EILANDGEBIEDEN 
VAN DE NEDERLANDSE ANTILLEN EN ARUBA (Herman Bröring et al. eds., 2008). 
 84. See 1972 Treaty of Accession, supra note 38. Following the UK accession, the 
list of the associated countries and territories became much longer, including (in addition to 
the countries and territories still included in Annex II TFEU, such as Anguilla, Cayman 
Islands, Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich islands, Montserrat, 
Pitcairn, Saint Helena and Dependencies, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean 
Territory, Turks and Caicos Islands, British Virgin Islands, and Bermuda) the Bahamas, 
Brunei, the Caribbean Colonies and Associated States (including Antigua, Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Anguilla, and British Honduras), the 
Gilbert and Ellis Islands and the Line Islands, the Anglo-French Condominium of the New 
Hebrides, Solomon Islands, and Seychelles. Ziller, L’Union Européenne et l’outre-Mer, 
supra note 27, at 145-147; HENDRY & DICKSON, supra note 25. 
  Greenland acquired OCT status as a result of leaving the EEC. See Treaty 
Amending, With Regard to Greenland, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities, 
1985 O.J. (L 29) 1 (the OCT status of Greenland is also reflected in Annex II TFEU). For an 
analysis, see Fiedl Weiss, Greenland’s Withdrawal from the European Communities, 10 
EUR. L. REV. 173 (1985). The possibility of Greenland’s Association status was discussed in 
the academic literature even before the actual accession of Denmark to the EEC. See, e.g., 
Christen Boye Jacobsen, The Færœ Islands and Greenland and the European Communities, 
in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 170 (M.E. Bathurst et al. eds., 
 
688 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol.20:3  
 
In other words, although two different regimes applied, the ultimate goal 
of incorporation into the Common Market marked the development of both 
of them. The main difference between the two concerned more than 
anything the precise timing of such incorporation, as while Article 227 EEC 
contained clear deadlines for possible adjustments of some parts of the 
acquis to the objective realities of the DOM different from Europe,85 the 
Association regime of the OCT status did not provide for any clear 
timetables. Nonetheless, the drive towards decolonisation clearly destroyed 
the initial plans that informed the French ultimatum on the inclusion of its 
African possessions, making the participation of the Republic in the EEC 
dependent on the agreement of other partners to the eventual incorporation 
of the Overseas into the European project. 
Following the abandonment of the Eurafrican dream and the dramatic 
shrinking in the number of the territories falling within the OCT category, 
OR status—which could never boast particular importance at the 
preparation stages of the EEC compared with the defining role played by 
the OCTs—naturally rose to prominence due to its relative economic power 
(which used to be negligent compared to that of the OCT before 
decolonisation) not to mention its relative population size (compared with 
the remaining OCTs). This, notwithstanding the gaining of independence by 
Algeria86 and its subsequent withdrawal from the list of the territories where 
OR status applies.87 The integration project was subsequently retuned 
inwards,88 with the newly independent colonies successfully forgotten and 
safely ignored.89 
  
1972). For a meticulous analysis of the contemporary law on leaving the Union, see Adam 
Łazowski, Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership, 37 EUR. 
L. REV. 2012 (forthcoming). 
 85. See EEC Treaty art. 227(2) (as in effect 1958) (now obsolete). 
 86. On the role played by Algeria in the EEC, see Paul Tavernier, Aspects juridiques 
des relations économiques entre la C.E.E. et l’Algérie, 8 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
EUROPÉEN [R.T.D.E.] 1 (1972). 
 87. It has to be noted that “OR” status as such did not exist at that time, as the 
relevant provision of the EEC Treaty merely established a special legal regime for the French 
DOM and Algeria, without giving it a particular name. Curiously, Algeria was only struck 
from the list of territories where Article 227(2) of the EEC was to apply with the Maastricht 
revision of the Treaties, i.e. roughly thirty years after the gaining of independence by this 
country. 
 88. Notwithstanding the special association regime which was created for the former 
colonies. See, most recently, Agreement amending the Partnership Agreement between the 
members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 
2000, 2005 O.J. (L 209) 27. See Justin Daniel, Le cadre institutionnel et le dialogue sur les 
politiques: L’Accord de Cotonou à l’épreuve d’une réhabilitation du politique, in LES 
RELATIONS ACP/UE APRÉS LE MODÈLE DE LOMÉ—QUEL PARTENARIAT? 261 (Danielle Perrot 
ed., 2007).  
 89. Virtually all the available literature on the issue is silent on the roots of the OCT 
status, taking the existing OCTs and ORs as its starting point, which naturally alters the 
assessment of the first steps of integration with respect to the governance of the Overseas. 
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The Treaties currently in force are profoundly rooted in the reality of 
decolonisation dating back fifty years and basically employ the same 
division of the Overseas into classes as the one established at the moment 
when the other five partners accepted the French demands and embarked 
towards the Eurafrican dream, notwithstanding the fact that the very idea of 
Eurafrica is largely forgotten. The change in the balance of the Overseas 
that was necessarily brought about by the independence of all the most 
economically promising overseas possessions of the Member States resulted 
in a situation where the role of the Overseas, so important in accordance 
with the initial projects, deteriorated virtually entirely, marking a fading 
away in the interest or concerns about the Overseas, of which the prior lack 
of the academic attention to these territories is a sound illustration. 
Consequently, the three fundamental statuses granted to the Member States’ 
territories where the main rule of Article 52(1) TEU only applies with 
derogations have a very long history and are rooted in the negotiations 
preceding the drafting of the EEC Treaty more than half a century ago. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the main legal regimes governing the 
status of each group of the Overseas in EU law individually, the controversy 
sparked by the Treaty of Maastricht has to be mentioned, as it has 
introduced an element of unpredictability into the scope ratione loci of 
several important branches of EU law, the consequences of which are still 
felt today. At the centre of the controversy was the fact that the pre-Lisbon 
version of the EU Treaty first introduced at Maastricht90 did not contain any 
provisions specifying its territorial scope of application. Consequently, 
while it was clear how EC and Euratom law were to apply in the Overseas, 
EU law sensu stricto could not boast this clarity. It has been claimed in the 
literature that the relevant provisions of EU law at the time—concentrated 
in what used to be the Second91 and the Third Pillars92 of the Union (a 
division which is now obsolete) dealing with police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters and the EU’s external action (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP))—were not territorial in nature per se,93 which 
would make the very issue of ratione loci not applicable for them. However, 
this view of the law appears somewhat too simplistic, which became an 
especially acute issue after a number of legal instruments of binding nature, 
  
Professor Custos’s recent research is particularly important in this regard, since her archival 
research directly challenges the presumptions that OR status was more important in the eyes 
of the six founding Member States than that of the OCTs. Custos, supra note 11. 
 90. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter 
Maastricht TEU]. 
 91. Maastricht TEU arts. 11–28 (as in effect 1992). 
 92. Id. arts. 29–42 (as in effect 1992). 
 93. P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: FROM MAASTRICHT TO AMSTERDAM 93 (Laurence W. Gormley 
ed., 3d ed. 1998). See also Kochenov, supra note 3, at 217–223; JO SHAW, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ELECTORAL RIGHTS AND THE 
RESTRUCTURING OF POLITICAL SPACE 177 (2007). 
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such as the European Arrest Warrant94 for instance, entered the context of 
this “non-territorial” law upon the introduction by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
of the possibility to adopt Framework Decisions in the context of what used 
to be the Third Pillar of the EU.95 
The main rule of international law to govern ratione loci questions of 
this order is well known and has been summarised by P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. 
VerLoren van Themaat in the context of their assessment of the scope of 
application of EC law in following way: “Under general rules of 
international law it is clear that the Treaty is binding in relation to all the 
territory, including non-European parts falling under the sovereignty of the 
Parties, at least in so far as the Treaty does not provide for exceptions or 
otherwise make special provision.”96 
Applied to EC law, the same principle should have clearly also governed 
the application of the pre-Lisbon EU law. This has not happened, however. 
Notwithstanding the clarity of the international law on the issue, the practice 
of application of pre-Lisbon EU law in the Overseas pointed to the lack of 
clarity and the fragmentation of the law. The Member States adopted 
diametrically opposed approaches in this regard, either applying EU law in 
full to the entirety of their territory—thus including the Overseas, no matter 
which of the statuses available in EU law they enjoy (like France)97—or 
presuming that the provisions of the pre-Lisbon EU Treaty had to follow the 
territorial scope of the EC Treaty,98 thus recognising only a limited 
application in certain Member State overseas territories.99 Once again, the 
EU Treaty itself was silent on the matter. Moreover, due to the limited role 
entrusted to the ECJ in these areas (especially in the CFSP), no clarification 
could be expected from the Court. Consequently, a situation arose where the 
uniformity of application of EU Law in the Overseas was profoundly 
undermined and depended solely on the interpretation of the law by the 
Member State with which each particular territory was connected. 
The Treaty of Lisbon has seemingly resolved this controversy, since it 
removed the old Pillar structure of the Union and united the scopes ratione 
loci of the two Treaties by providing a cross-reference from Article 52(2) 
  
 94. For an analysis of the functioning of this instrument in the EU’s Overseas, see 
Fletcher, supra note 5. 
 95. Maastricht TEU art. 34(2)(b) (as in effect 1992). 
 96. KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 93, at 89 (footnotes omitted). 
See also KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 351 (Robert Bray ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
 97. In the literature, this position is reflected very clearly by Karagiannis: “a priori, 
les dispositions non communautaires du Traité sur l’Union européenne ont comme champ 
d’application l’intégralité du territoire des parties contractantes.” Karagiannis, supra note 19, 
at 340.  
 98. See generally KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 93. 
 99. For the criticism of this position see, e.g., Kochenov, supra note 3, at 217–20. 
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TEU to Article 355 TFEU.100 It is thus currently clear that the territorial 
scopes of application of the law of both Treaties in question are clearly 
defined and overlap entirely. As far as Euratom is concerned, there was no 
change there, and its law applies to the entirety of the territories of the 
Member States, including the Overseas. The silence of the pre-Lisbon EU 
Treaty was thus replaced by an embrace of the three special statuses known 
in European law since the entry into force of the EEC Treaty. The three now 
cover the EU Treaty, too. 
However, this arrangement does not actually touch upon the essence of 
the problem surrounding the territorial application of the EU Treaty. This is 
because although it is clear that the Treaties have identical territorial scopes, 
the question of the application or non-application of EU law in the different 
classes of the Overseas territories remains. The Member States continue to 
use diverging practices in this regard. Indeed, should the argument that the 
law of the former Second and the Third Pillars is not really territorial in 
nature since, in the words of Jo Shaw, “[it] merely binds the governments of 
the Member States,”101be accepted, all the old questions become only more 
pressing, rather than being resolved. The biggest controversy arises, as 
could be expected, with respect to the OCT status. Some authors still seem 
to subscribe to the established position of the ECJ that “the OCTs are 
subject to the special association arrangements set out in Part Four of the 
Treaty (Articles 182 to 188 EC [now Articles 198–204 TFEU]) with the 
result that, failing express reference, the general provisions of the Treaty do 
not apply to them.”102 
To agree with Jacques Ziller, in the near future the Court is likely to 
depart from this approach, reflecting the change in the Primary Law.103 In 
fact, the position of the Court, which seemed somewhat light-hearted even 
before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,104 now seems, with all 
respect, entirely inadequate. This is not only due to the fact that a huge 
number of the provisions of the Treaties contained outwith Part IV TFEU 
obviously apply, at least de facto, to the OCTs, but also due to the expansion 
of the role played by EU citizenship in the Overseas, which introduced 
important corrections into the accepted approaches to the interpretation of 
  
 100. For a general analysis of this change in the context of the CFSP, see, e.g., Peter 
Van Elsuwege, EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a 
New Balance between Delimitation and Consistency, 47 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 987 
(2010). 
 101. SHAW, supra note 93, at 177. 
 102. See Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. College van burdemeester en 
wethouders van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 46. The Commission faithfully supports 
this view. See, e.g., Commission Green Paper, supra note 29, at 3. 
 103. See Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others 
after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, 
at 73. 
 104. For criticism, see, e.g., Kochenov, supra note 3, at 217 et seq.; Ziller, The 
European Union and the Territorial Scope of European Territories, supra note 3. 
692 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol.20:3  
 
the limits territorial derogations.105 The same applies to the fundamental 
principles.106 Given that some law applies via the scope ratione loci of EU 
law and also that some other provisions must apply by default to make Part 
IV TFEU operational, as such it becomes abundantly clear that, contrary to 
what the ECJ keeps repeating, Part IV TFEU is not all the law applicable to 
the OCT. Far from it. 
There is a pressing need to attune the case law with reality at this point. 
Sooner or later the Court is bound to agree with the position that Part IV 
TFEU is merely a derogation from Part III TFEU, the former rather than the 
latter applying to the OCTs. In the words of Jacques Ziller,  
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the territorial scope of 
application is unified for all EU policies, be they under the TEU or the 
TFEU, be they in Part III TFEU on Union policies and internal actions, or 
in Part V TFEU on the Union’s external action. This is a confirmation, in 
my view, of the thesis which ventures that Part IV TFEU on OCTs cannot 
be considered as a comprehensive lex specialis covering the same ground 
as the Treaties. Part IV TFEU establishes a special legal basis for 
association for Union policies and internal actions, as an exception to Part 
III TFEU. It cannot impede the application to OCTs of the TEU and of 
Parts I TFEU on Principles, II TFEU on Non-discrimination and 
Citizenship or the Union, and VI TFEU on Institutional and Financial 
Provisions.107 
Reasoning in the same vein, Steven Blockmans asserts, quite simply, that 
“[t]he argument that EU law (in pre-Lisbon sense) [. . .] do[es] not apply to 
Greenland, New Caledonia and the other OCTs should be discarded.”108 
Importantly, this view can be substantiated not only by the very wording of 
Article 355(2) TFEU, which states that “[t]he special arrangements for 
association set out in Part Four shall apply to the overseas countries and 
territories listed in Annex II”109—thus being remarkably silent with regard 
to any principle of “non-application” of the law, which is found constantly 
restated in the ECJ’s case law on the matter—but also by the historical roots 
of the status of the OCT, as groundbreaking research by Dominique Custos 
  
 105. See Kochenov, supra note 29; Kochenov, supra note 44. 
 106. See, e.g., Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. College van burdemeester en 
wethouders van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055 (fundamental unwritten principle of equality 
was at stake). 
 107. Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after 
the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 73. 
For a similar position, see also Blockmans, supra note 5, at 307; Custos, supra note 11. See 
also H.G. Hoogers, De BES-eilanden, de Grondwet en het Europese recht: Over 
constitutionele en Europeesrechtelijke consequenties van de handhaving van de LGO-status 
van de BES-eilanden, 24 REGELMAAT 5, 9 (2009). But see Broberg, supra note 11, at 142-48 
(embracing the limited approach of the ECJ). 
 108. Blockmans, supra note 5, at 319-20. 
 109. TFEU art. 355(2). 
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has clearly demonstrated.110 Knowing that the historical roots of the status 
lie in the idea of incorporation of the OCT into the European integration 
project and that the very signing of the EEC Treaty was made conditional 
on such incorporation certainly presents the arguments in favour of the 
exclusive reading of Part IV TFEU as the only EU law applicable to the 
OCTs in a somewhat dubious light. 
All in all, although the Treaty of Lisbon has simplified the rules on the 
scope ratione loci of the Treaties to some extent, it did not entirely resolve 
the controversy arising from the failure of the drafters of the Treaty of 
Maastricht to include into the pre-Lisbon EU Treaty any provision that 
would either directly govern this issue, or provide a cross-reference to the 
other Treaties. However, as the structural and historical analysis of the 
Treaty texts currently abundantly demonstrates, there is a clash between the 
popular reading of the scope of the law reflected in the case law of the 
Court, and what the wording of the Treaties seems to imply. The academic 
disagreement which arose from this somewhat unfortunate discrepancy will 
fade away in the near future as the understanding of the implications of the 
new reality, especially in its historical context, gradually takes hold. 
Already today, sound consensus is being formed to regard the ECJ’s 
position in the most critical terms: “an overstated exclusionary status”111 is 
not legally substantiated. 
II. OUTERMOST REGIONS IN THE EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS 
The main rule governing OR status in EU law is the goal of the full 
incorporation of these territories within the scope ratione materiae of EU 
law, while taking into account the natural specificity of these regions.112 
This clearly follows from Article 355(1) TFEU, establishing that “[t]he 
provisions of the Treaties shall apply to Guadeloupe, French Guiana, 
Martinique, Réunion, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira 
and the Canary Islands in accordance with Article 349 [TFEU],”113 the latter 
requiring the Council to “adopt specific measures aimed, in particular, at 
  
 110. Custos, supra note 11. 
 111. See id. at 108. 
 112. Some elements of this and the following sections draw on Kochenov, supra note 
3. When this is the case, the text has been substantially updated to reflect the changes 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as the changing context of the EU’s perception of 
the Overseas. Custos, supra note 11. 
 113. See TFEU art. 355(1). Note that the text of the Treaties does not employ the term 
“Outermost Regions,” which is, nevertheless, widely used in the scholarly literature and 
Commission’s communications when referring to the status of the territories mentioned in 
TFEU art. 355(1). See, e.g., Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 
299(2):The Outermost Regions of the European Union, COM (2000) 147 final/2 (May 19, 
2000) [hereinafter Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2)]. 
694 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol.20:3  
 
laying down the conditions of application of the Treaties to those 
regions.”114 
Historically, the development of the OR status has been marked by a 
constant shift in the balance between the ideal of full incorporation of these 
regions into the scope of the acquis and the need to pay adequate attention 
to the objective differentiating factors able to influence the application of 
the law in those regions, putting them in a position different from that of the 
European territories of the Member States. This constant balancing, in the 
words of Christian Vitalien “entre assimilation et différenciation,”115 thus 
lies at the core of this legal status. 
Consequently, a legal analysis of the essence of this status is impossible 
without paying due attention to its evolution, which has generally resulted 
in two important developments. Firstly, the evolution of the status is a 
gradual move away from the rigid understanding of the acquis towards 
more flexible solutions better suited to the regions in question. Secondly, it 
is also a move away from the negative perception of the ORs as problematic 
regions, resulting in a positive vision of their contribution to the European 
integration project, as well as their importance and potential.116 Both lines of 
development have been evolving hand-in-hand. In order to see them with all 
clarity, all the previous versions of Article 349 TFEU,117 including Article 
299(2) EC118 and Article 227(2) EEC,119 need to be considered in the light of 
the relevant ECJ case law, which shaped the interpretation and application 
of these provisions. 
Although the starting assumption has always been that the acquis applies 
in the ORs in full, all the provisions historically governing the territories 
enjoying such status allowed for substantial derogations from this principle. 
Importantly, the Treaty of Lisbon has cast away the rigid core of the status: 
i.e. the clear statement that the Treaties apply to the ORs, which was 
contained in all the pre-Lisbon instruments governing the legal position of 
such regions. Therefore, while the now obsolete Article 299(2) EC, 
similarly to Article 227(2) EEC, used to state unequivocally that “[t]he 
provisions of [the EC] Treaty shall apply to the [ORs],”120 the text of the 
current Article 355(1) TFEU seems very different, as the restatement of the 
fact that the acquis applied tout court to the ORs gave way to a more 
  
 114. TFEU art. 349(1). 
 115. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 115. 
 116. See Custos, supra note 11, at 108-19. 
 117. For an analysis of this provision, see Omarjee, supra note 43, at 121. See also 
Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, supra note 27, 
at 717. 
 118. Omarjee, supra note 27, at 515, 516. 
 119. For a detailed analysis of this article, see Coussirat-Coustère, supra note 82, at 
1419-30; Vitalien, supra note 43, at 115-17. 
 120. EC Treaty art. 299(2). 
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nuanced formulation, “in accordance with Article 349 [TFEU].”121 
Presumably, this change can be read as a sign of the widening of the room 
for manœuvre available to the Council and the Court in shaping the essence 
of the OR status in order to meet the needs of the regions in question in the 
best possible way, which is a development to be welcomed.122 
The toned-down text of the new provision notwithstanding, the 
presumption of application of the acquis in the ORs, unless the contrary is 
clearly stated in the secondary law adopted in accordance with the 
procedure outlined in Article 349 TFEU itself holds. In this respect, all the 
case law of the ECJ informing the interpretation of the old versions of the 
Article can clearly be of assistance in clarifying the nature of the legal 
status, as well as the extent of the possible derogations allowed under 
Article 349 TFEU.123 Established ECJ case law refuses to view the ORs as 
essentially different from the European territories of the Member States as 
far as the application of EU law is concerned. In one example, in 
Coopérative agricole d’approvisionnement des Avirons, the Court found 
that “[t]he situation of Réunion is not objectively different from that of the 
rest of the Community,”124 disagreeing with the argument presented by the 
claimant that Réunion (which is an OR now included on the list of such 
regions in contained in Article 355(1) TFEU) was in a situation essentially 
different from that of the Member State territories in Europe.  
ORs thus automatically fall within the scope of application of EU law: 
full application of the acquis there is the default position. Nevertheless, the 
practice of application of the earlier version of the relevant Treaty provision 
demonstrates quite clearly that this obvious reading of the Article has not 
always been accepted by the Member States and the Institutions of the 
Community. Having analysed the text of the Treaty provisions currently in 
force, the legal evolution of the OR status will be presented.  
  
 121. TFEU art. 355(1). 
 122. But see Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de 
Lisbonne, supra note 27, at 721-24. 
 123. See generally Omarjee, supra note 43. 
 124. Case 58/86, Coopérative agricole d’approvisionnement des Avirons v. Receveur 
des douanes de Saint-Denis, 1987 E.C.R. 1525, ¶ 17. The case concerned the import levies 
on maize established by Council Regulation 2727/75, of 29 October 1975 on the Common 
Organization of the Market in Cereals, 1975 O.J. (L 281) 1 (EEC). This conclusion of the 
Court reached with regard to the free-movement of goods applies to other areas as well: the 
same flat rates of travel costs reimbursement apply to Community officials from the 
European part of France and the Island of Réunion. This, notwithstanding substantial 
differences in the costs of transportation, giving rise to proceedings before of the Civil 
Service Tribunal. See generally Case F-43/05, Chassagne v. Comm’n of the European 
Comtys, 2007 E.C.R. I-0027.  
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A. Main principles of Article 349 TFEU 
Article 349 TFEU, which is responsible for the OR status in the present 
version of the Treaties reads as follows:125 
Taking account of the structural social and economic situation of 
Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, Réunion, Saint-Barthélemy, 
Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, which is 
compounded by their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult 
topography and climate, economic dependence on a few products, the 
permanence and combination of which severely restrain their 
development, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, shall adopt specific measures aimed, 
in particular, at laying down the conditions of application of the Treaties to 
those regions, including common policies. Where the specific measures in 
question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, it shall also act on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Parliament.  
  
 125. This provision is very similar to the text of its predecessor EC Treaty art. 299(2), 
which had the following wording:  
 
2. The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the French overseas 
departments, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands.  
 
However, taking account of the structural social and economic 
situation of the French overseas departments, the Azores, Madeira 
and the Canary Islands, which is compounded by their remoteness, 
insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, economic 
dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of 
which severely restrain their development, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, shall adopt specific measures 
aimed, in particular, at laying down the conditions of application of 
the present Treaty to those regions, including common policies. 
 
The Council shall, when adopting the relevant measures referred to 
in the second subparagraph, take into account areas such as customs 
and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture and fisheries 
policies, conditions for supply of raw materials and essential 
consumer goods, State aids and conditions of access to structural 
funds and to horizontal Community programmes.  
 
The Council shall adopt the measures referred to in the second 
subparagraph taking into account the special characteristics and 
constraints of the outermost regions without undermining the 
integrity and the coherence of the Community legal order, including 
the internal market and common policies. 
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The measures referred to in the first paragraph concern in particular areas 
such as customs and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture 
and fisheries policies, conditions for supply of raw materials and essential 
consumer goods, State aids and conditions of access to structural funds 
and to horizontal Union programmes.  
The Council shall adopt the measures referred to in the first paragraph 
taking into account the special characteristics and constraints of the 
outermost regions without undermining the integrity and the coherence of 
the Union legal order, including the internal market and common policies. 
The provision makes it clear to which territories the special status 
described by the Article applies. Just as with Annex II TFEU, containing the 
list of all the OCTs, this is a closed list.126 This means that the Member 
States cannot add territories to it as they please and the procedural 
requirements contained in the Treaties have to be satisfied in order to alter 
the list and extend the application of the Article to any new territory, or 
strike a territory from the list.127 
The previous versions of the provision could not boast such clarity. Since 
OR status was first designed to clarify the status of the French DOM and 
Algeria in European law, all the pre-Lisbon versions of the relevant 
provisions contained a reference to the French DOM, without naming each 
of such territories separately. Consequently, the illusion could be created 
that the status of an OR could be attained by a territory following a change 
in the Constitutional status of this territory within the French Republic, 
which caused some problems, particularly with regard to the legal status of 
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon in European law.128 The enlargement of the OR 
status to cover non-French regions has only happened following the Iberian 
enlargement of the Communities.129 As a result, OR status came to be 
  
 126. The special regime described in TFEU art. 349 cannot apply to any territories 
that are not entered on the list. TFEU art. 349. See Answer Given by Mr. Prodi on Behalf of 
the Commission to Written Question E-2225/00 by Sebastiano Musumeci to the Commission 
on the Application of Article 299 of the EC Treaty, 2001 O.J. (C 81) 176. The question 
concerned whether the special regime of EC Treaty art. 299(2)  applied to the Islands of 
Sicily and Sardinia. EC Treaty art. 299(2) (as in effect 2002) (now TFEU art. 349). At the 
same time, the Council has used EC Treaty art. 299(2) as one of the legal bases to change the 
application of structural funds to “outlying Greek Islands which are under a handicap due to 
their distant location.” See Council Regulation 1447/2001, Amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1260/1999 Laying Down General Provisions on the Structural Funds, art. 1(1), 2001 
O.J. (L 198) 1 (EC). In other words, although EC Treaty art. 299(2) contains a closed list of 
regions where OR status applies, a specific regime which would be in some way de facto 
similar to this arrangement can also be granted to other territories. EC Treaty art. 299(2). 
 127. On the procedural aspects of territories’ status change in the EU Law of the 
Overseas, see Part VII infra; Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories 
and Others after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, 
supra note 5, at 78; Omarjee, supra note 43, at 126. 
 128. For analysis, see infra Part VII. 
 129. See Spain and Portugal Accession Treaty, supra note 80. 
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applicable to Portuguese and Spanish regions as well. Initially, the statuses 
enjoyed by the Spanish and Portuguese ORs-to-be were entirely different 
from those of the DOM and were thus not covered by what was then Article 
227(2) EEC. Two quite different approaches were adopted: with regards to 
Madeira and the Azores, full integration into the EEC legal system was 
initially foreseen. Notwithstanding minor derogations enumerated in the Act 
of Accession, these territories were aiming at accepting the acquis in full 
after the expiry of the transitional periods. With regard to the Canary 
Islands, a status largely outside the scope of Community law was designed, 
the Islands not even being integrated into the customs territory of the 
Community. The situation changed in 1991, when the Canary Islands 
decided to embrace the acquis and denounce the special status outside of the 
law of the EEC granted to them,130 and when the Azores and Madeira, aware 
of their special handicaps comparable with other territories where 
Community law applied, opted for a special status under the EEC Treaty 
before the transitional periods under the relevant Act of Accession elapsed. 
As a result of this convergence, having started at two opposing sides of the 
legal spectrum, the Portuguese and the Spanish islands in question ended up 
being grouped together with the DOM and, as a result, ended up in the OR 
group. Consequently, the territories of only three Member States benefit 
from the status regulated by Article 349 TFEU. This Article only concerns 
France, Portugal, and Spain. 
All the territories entitled to OR status are very similar in their 
particularities: all of them are influenced by the factors negatively affecting 
their development mentioned in Article 349(1) TFEU and include 
“remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, 
economic dependence on few products, the permanence and combination of 
which severely restrain development.”131 Important in this regard is that the 
Article does not presuppose that all the negative factors which it mentions 
should come together to affect negatively the same territory in order for it to 
benefit from OR status. However, it is absolutely clear from the text that the 
effect of these factors should be severe enough to justify the application of a 
special regime to the territory concerned. Moreover, “seuls les critères 
retenus dans l’énumération du traité peuvent fonder une démarche de 
différenciation.”132 In other words, this Article cannot be applied to 
relatively well-off regions not suffering from at least some of the particular 
drawbacks it lists. At the same time, being an island is not necessary, as the 
example of French Guiana demonstrates. 
The list of the negative points contained in Article 349(1) TFEU is the 
key to understanding the rationale for this provision. Only the particularities 
  
 130. Council Regulation 1911/91, of 26 June 1991 on the Application of the 
Provisions of Community Law to the Canary Islands, 1991 O.J. (L 171) 1 (EEC). 
 131. TFEU art. 349(1). 
 132. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 122. 
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of their climate, geographical position, etc. permit the justification of the 
possible deviations from the acquis. That is why the procedure that allows 
the Council to “adopt specific measures aimed, in particular, at laying down 
the conditions of application of the Treaties to [the ORs]”133 is found in the 
same subparagraph of the provision that lists the hardships which these 
regions face. The structure of the Article in question makes it clear that the 
Council is only allowed to legislate in order to remedy the specific 
difficulties described in the provision itself, not in order to defy the main 
principle of integrity of the Internal Market.134 This conclusion clearly 
follows from Article 349(3) TFEU, which expressly prohibits the abuse of 
the Article, resulting in “undermining the integrity and coherence of the 
Union legal order.”135 Specific mention of “the internal market and common 
policies”136 is extremely important in this regard, containing a clear 
indication of the inherent limitations governing the derogations from the 
acquis under this provision.137 In practice this means that Article 349 TFEU 
does not really have many teeth.138 
The guiding principle being the application of the acquis to the regions 
included in the list of Article 355(1) TFEU in full, Article 349(3) TFEU 
narrows the possible extent of deviation from this principle enormously. 
What kind of measures can the Council come up with that would not 
undermine the Internal Market or the common policies? The Council and 
the Commission, the proposing institution, are clearly invited to legislate 
very delicately, balancing two principles: full application of the acquis and 
possible limited deviations. 
  
 133. TFEU art. 349, para. 1. 
 134. For an analysis, see e.g., Danielle Perrot, Intégrité et cohérence de l’ordre 
juridique communautaire, in LE DROIT DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE EN PRINCIPES: LIBER 
AMICORUM EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN RAUX 615 (Jean Raux ed., 2006). 
 135. TFEU art. 349, para. 3. 
 136. Id. 
 137. In this sense, Article 349 TFEU, just like all its predecessors, directly borrows 
from the French Constitutional law, where the legal position of the DOM, although 
assimilated into the law of the métropole (France being “une République indivisible,”), can 
be marked by derogations when the latter are needed in order to remedy the specific negative 
factors affecting the development of the DOM. 1958 CONST. 1. So, according to Elisa Paulin 
and Marie-Josèphe Rigobert, “leurs situation outre-mer ne les différencie pas des autres 
collectivités territoriales si ce n’est par l’adaptation de certaine règles à leur situation 
spécifique.” Paulin & Rigobert, supra note 43, at 438. It is thus possible to agree with 
Christian Vitalien that with regard to the legal position of the Ors, “[l]e droit [Français] 
constitutionnel interne et le droit communautaire poursuivent . . . leur coexistence fondée sur 
des logiques interpénétrables.” Vitalien, supra note 43, at 117. See also 1958 CONST. 72 (Fr.) 
(“Le régime legislative et l’organisation administrative des Départements d’outre-mer 
peuvent faire l’objet de mesures d’adaptation nécessaires par leurs situation spécifique.”). 
See also 1946 CONST. 73 (Fr.) (“Le régime legislatif des départements d’outre-mer est le 
même que celui des départements métropolitains, sauf exceptions déterminées par la loi.”). 
 138. For the analysis of the corresponding sub-paragraph of EC art. 299, see Brial, 
supra note 5, at 655; Omarjee, supra note 27, at 525–30. 
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B. Article 349 TFEU from a legal-historical perspective 
The ECJ is the guarantor of the right balance to be struck between the 
principle of the maximal possible application of the acquis in the ORs and 
providing sufficient room for derogations in order to deal with the problems 
naturally affecting OR development, as outlined in Article 349(1) TFEU. 
Charged with ensuring that “in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties the law is observed,”139 the Court has demonstrated quite clearly 
that severe derogations from the acquis will not be tolerated, even if bound 
to the handicaps suffered by the ORs. This is the point that is crucial for the 
understanding of the potential of Article 349 TFEU to generate derogations 
from the letter of the acquis. 
The career of this provision—or, rather, of its predecessors i.e. Articles 
299(2) EC and 227(2) EEC—started with an embarrassment. Having 
provided for the application of the acquis communautaire to the territories 
listed therein, Article 227(2) EEC also set a clear deadline for the adoption 
of specific measures that would lay down the essence of OR status by 
providing specific “conditions of application” of the acquis to such 
regions.140 Simultaneously, the Article also contained a list of core EC law 
provisions to apply to those regions immediately after the entry of the EEC 
Treaty into force.141 This deadline, set on 1 January 1960, was simply 
ignored by the Institutions.  
  
 139. See TEU art. 19(1). 
 140. Note that the text of the article did not allow for non-application of some parts of 
the acquis to the territories with such status and merely allowed for derogations in how the 
acquis was to apply. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 117. 
 141. EEC Treaty art. 227(2) (as in effect 1958) (now obsolete). Article 227(2) EEC 
reads as follows: 
2. En ce qui concerne l’Algérie et les départements français d’outre-
mer, les dispositions particulières et générales du présent traité 
relatives : 
- à la libre circulation des marchandises, 
- à l’agriculture, à l’exception de l’article 40, paragraphe 4, 
- à la libération des services, 
- aux règles de concurrence, 
- aux mesures de sauvegarde prévues aux articles 108, 109 et  
226, 
- aux institutions, 
sont applicables dès l’entrée en vigueur du présent traité. 
Les conditions d’application des autres dispositions du présent traité 
seront déterminées au plus tard deux ans après son entrée en vigueur, 
par des décisions du Conseil statuant à l’unanimité sur proposition de 
la Commission. 
Les institutions de la Communauté veilleront, dans le cadre des 
procédures prévues par le présent traité et notamment de l’article 
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Such “volontarisme des institutions”142 can be explained, according to 
Jacques Ziller, by the historical circumstances of the time: there was war in 
Algeria.143 Given the prominent status played by Algeria144 and the 
importance in the eyes of the French to incorporate this region into the EEC 
Treaty system in full, it has even been argued that the DOM themselves 
were entirely forgotten at that time due to their relative lack of importance 
compared with Algeria.145 However, missing the deadline would not have 
been as embarrassing if only the Member States and the Institutions had 
been faithful to the main principle established by the Article, and this was 
not the case. Instead of accepting the obvious desire of the drafters 
gradually to incorporate the DOM into the scope of the acquis in full, minor 
derogations notwithstanding, Article 227(2) EEC was interpreted contrary 
to its very purpose as meaning that only the parts of the acquis expressly 
mentioned in the implementing legislation adopted on the basis of this 
article were binding on the DOM, thus going against this provision’s letter 
and spirit.146 It has even been suggested in the literature that “the Institutions 
did not feel bound by Article 227(2) EEC.”147 Consequently, only the core 
of the Common Market applied to the DOM for many years after the 
deadline, rather than the acquis communautaire in full, as a careful reading 
of the text of the Article would demand. 
The situation persisted until 1978, when the ECJ was able to review the 
legality of this regime by answering a preliminary question in the Hansen 
case.148 The case concerned the import of rum from Guadeloupe into 
Germany, where the alcohol of such origin was classified as a product 
  
226, à permettre le développement économique et social de ces 
régions. 
 142. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 117. Puissochet was also critical of the approach taken 
by the institutions vis-à-vis the ORs. Puissochet, supra note 27, at 491-92. 
 143. Ziller, The European Union and the Territorial Scope of European Territories, 
supra note 3, at 51. Algeria gained independence from France only in 1962. 
 144. For a discussion on the role played by Algeria in the EEC, see Tavernier, supra 
note 86. 
 145. Moreover, the French approach to Algeria played the leading role in the drafting 
of EEC art. 227(2) in the first place. Puissochet, supra note 27, at 499 n.8. 
 146. Note, however, that this is not how the French government reasoned when 
presenting the EEC Treaty for ratification to the Assemblée Nationale. The French 
government stated back then that “L’unanimité étant requise pour déterminer les conditions 
d’application des dispositions du Traité non encore applicables à l’Algérie et aux DOM, tout 
État membre de la Communauté peut refuser l’extension à l’Algérie et aux DOM des 
dispositions autres que celles énumérées à l’article 227(2)” Id. at 499 n.24. This surprising 
position does not seem to be consistent with EEC Treaty art. 227(2) (as in effect 1958) (now 
obsolete). 
 147. Ziller, The European Union and the Territorial Scope of European Territories, 
supra note 3, at 51. 
 148. See also Case 58/86, Coopérative agricole d’approvisionnement des Avirons v. 
Receveur des douanes de Saint-Denis, 1987 E.C.R. 1525. See Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & 
O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt de Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787. For the 
discussion of the Hansen case, see Puissochet, supra note 27, at 494. 
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coming from outside of the Community and taxed accordingly, rather than 
being exempt from German taxes as alcohol produced in the European part 
of France would have been. The Court stated, unequivocally, that upon the 
expiration of the transitional period, Community law applied to the DOM in 
full: 
In order to make due allowance for the special geographic, economic and 
social situation of those departments, Article 227(2) made provision for 
the Treaty to be applied by stages, and in addition it made available the 
widest powers for the adoption of special provisions commensurate to the 
specific requirements of those parts of the French territories. 
11. For that purpose, Article 227 precisely stated certain chapters and 
articles which were to apply as soon as the Treaty entered into force, while 
at the same time reserving a period of two years within which the Council 
could determine special conditions under which other groups of provisions 
were to apply. 
Therefore after the expiry of that period, the provisions of the Treaty and 
of secondary law must apply automatically to the French overseas 
departments inasmuch as they are an integral part of the French Republic, 
it being understood, however, that it always remains possible subsequently 
to adopt specific measures in order to meet the needs of those territories.149 
The ECJ thus made it absolutely clear that the DOM, by default, fall 
within the geographical scope of application of EU (then Community) law. 
While this clarification amounted to an important step forward compared 
with the pre-Hansen practice of application of Community law to the ORs, 
it did not resolve all the pending issues. Most importantly, while allowing 
for possible derogations from the acquis “to meet the needs of those 
territories,”150 Hansen did not make the limits on the possible extent of such 
derogations entirely clear.151 How far could the Council go in deviating 
from the acquis in legislating on the basis of Article 227(2) EEC? Needless 
to say, this question is also absolutely crucial in the context of the 
application of the current Article 349 TFEU.152 
As the practice of application of the Hansen rule demonstrates,153 the 
Institutions did not feel any constraints on the content of the measures to be 
adopted under Article 227(2) EEC in derogation from the acquis 
  
 149. Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt de 
Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787, ¶ 10-11. 
 150. Id. ¶ 11. 
 151. Puissochet, supra note 27, at 499. 
 152. The lack of clarity going back to Hansen still affects OR status. See Omarjee, 
supra note 43. 
 153. The core of Hansen has also been restated at the Maastricht IGC with the 
drafting of a Declaration in Annex C. 
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communautaire as long as the measures adopted aimed at remedying “the 
special geographic, economic and social situation of [the ORs].”154 
Adhering to this logic, the Council adopted the POSEI Decisions,155 dealing 
with all the three groups of the ORs, finishing off the framework of the OR 
acquis and introducing derogations from some core principles of the acquis 
communautaire. Illustrative of the importance of these Decisions, they have 
been characterised by the Commission as “the backbone of the policy for 
supporting the outermost regions.”156 
All in all, three POSEI Framework Programmes in the form of Decisions 
have been adopted: POSEIDOM,157 POSEIMA158 and POSEICAN.159 
Moreover, the status of the DOM gained in specificity due to the Dock Dues 
(octroi de mer) Decision160 to allow for a special taxation regime in the 
DOM. A number of secondary law measures have been adopted based on 
the POSEI Programmes, increasing the complexity of the OR acquis.161 
The adoption of the essentially similar POSEIDOM, POSEIMA and 
POSEICAN—albeit adopted using different legal bases, since the Spanish 
and Portuguese territories concerned were not included in the text of Article 
227(2) EEC at the moment of their adoption162—gives rise to claims of 
  
 154. Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt de 
Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787, ¶ 10. 
 155. POSEI stands for “Programme d’Options Spécifiques à l’Éloignement et à 
l’Insularité.” Le Programme POSEI France, POSEI FRANCE.FR, http://www.posei-
france.fr/index.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2012). 
 156. Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 
113, at 6. 
 157. Council Decision 89/687/EEC, of 22 December 1989 Establishing a Programme 
of Options Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of the French Overseas Departments 
(POSEIDOM), 1989 O.J. (L 399) 39 (EC) (on the DOM). 
 158. Council Decision 91/315/EEC, of 26 June 1991 Setting up a Programme of 
Options Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of Madeira and the Azores (POSEIMA), 
1991 O.J. (L 171) 10 (EC). 
 159. Council Decision 91/314/EEC, of 26 June 1991 Setting up a Programme of 
Options Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of the Canary Islands (POSEICAN), 1991 
O.J. (L 171) 5 (EC). 
 160. Council Decision 89/688/EEC, of 22 December 1989 Concerning the Dock Dues 
in the French Overseas Departments, 1989 O.J. (L 399) 46 (EC). For the second extension of 
this Decision (now in force), see Council Decision 2004/162/EC, of 10 February 2004 
Concerning the Dock Dues in the French Overseas Departments and Extending the Period of 
Validity of Decision 89/688/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 52) 64. For a detailed legal analysis of the 
legality of octroi de mer in the context of EU law, see Slotboom, supra note 64, at 9. See 
also Puissochet, supra note 27, at 504-06. 
 161. More than 700 acts have been adopted under the POSEI Decisions. Commission 
Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 113, at 13, Annex I (listing 
the most important adopted measures). 
 162. Council Decision 89/687/EEC, of 22 December 1989 Establishing a Programme 
of Options Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of the French Overseas Departments 
(POSEIDOM), 1989 O.J. (L 399) 39 (EC), was adopted on the basis of EEC arts. 227(2) & 
235; Council Decision 91/315/EEC, of 26 June 1991 Setting up a Programme of Options 
Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of Madeira and the Azores (POSEIMA), 1991 O.J. 
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applicability to the ORs of the principle of parallelism. The principle 
presupposes that the situations of all the ORs are essentially similar, making 
elaborate differentiation measures within this group impractical, if not 
illegal. Indeed, the similarity of their permanent handicaps summarised in 
the text of Article 349(1) TFEU, is behind the special status granted to these 
regions in the first place. As formulated by the former conseiller au cabinet 
du secrétaire d’État à l’outre-mer, the principle “a conduit à traiter de 
manière identique les situations comparables des régions 
ultrapériphériques.”163 
The text of Article 227(2) EEC was structurally very differently from 
that of Article 299(2) EC on which the current tandem Articles governing 
OR status, Article 355(1) and 349 TFEU, are based. One of the key 
differences between Articles 227(2) EEC and 299(2) EC was that the text of 
Article 227(2) EEC contained a clear list of provisions that were supposed 
to apply to the ORs (then only DOM) immediately upon the entry into force 
of the EEC Treaty. The Article thus contained a clear list of rules to which 
the two year deadline set in that article did not apply.164 The current legal 
provisions on OR status in the TFEU do not contain any such lists, which 
alters considerably the legal framing of OR status. 
It was when interpreting the secondary legislation adopted under the OR 
Article in force in the light of this list that the ECJ received a chance to 
review the possible extent of derogations from the acquis to be permitted 
when legislating under Article 227(2) EEC. As long as the relevant ECJ 
case law is not overruled, the Treaty provisions currently in force are thus 
indirectly affected by the list of such untouchable elements of the acquis, 
even though it is no longer included in the text of Article 349 TFEU. 
In two leading cases on explaining the extent of possible derogations to 
be granted to the ORs in the context of the list of the areas of the acquis 
which had to apply in the ORs—Legros165 and Lancry166—the Court 
nuanced Hansen, by introducing into its case law an idea of the hierarchy of 
norms within the acquis as applied to the ORs. Having first appeared in the 
  
(L 171) 10 (EC), was adopted on the basis of EEC arts. 43, 113 & 235 and the Spain and 
Portugal Accession Treaty, supra note 80. Council Decision 91/314/EEC, of 26 June 1991 
Setting up a Programme of Options Specific to the Remote and Insular Nature of the Canary 
Islands (POSEICAN), 1991 O.J. (L 171) 5 (EC), was adopted on the basis of Council 
Regulation 1911/91, of 26 June 1991 on the Application of the Provisions of Community 
Law to the Canary Islands, 1991 O.J. (L 171) 1 (EC). 
 163. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 125. 
 164. EEC Treaty art. 227(2) (as in effect 1958) (now obsolete). 
 165. Case C 163/90, Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v. Legros, 1992 
E.C.R. I-4625, ¶ 18. See Danielle Perrot, A propos de l’arrêt Legros, réflexions sur le statut 
communautaire des départements français d’outre-mer, 368 REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN ET 
DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 427 (1993). 
 166. Joined Cases C-363 & 407/93, 408/93, 409/93, 410/93 & 411/93, ené Lancry v. 
Direction Générale des Douanes, 1994 E.C.R I-3978, ¶ 37. 
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Opinion of AG Jacobs in Legros,167 a very simple argument was accepted by 
the ECJ in Lancry. The ECJ used the list of areas of Community law that 
had to be applicable in the ORs immediately upon the entry into force of the 
EEC Treaty as a clear indication of the overwhelming importance of the 
areas of law mentioned on the list compared with the rest of the acquis.  
The Court found in Lancry that when derogating from the acquis and 
using Article 227(2) EEC as a legal basis the Council could not touch the 
core of the acquis, which is listed in the provision itself: 
37. By expressly authorizing the Council to determine the conditions of 
application only of those Treaty provisions not listed in its first 
subparagraph, Article 227(2) excludes the possibility of derogating from 
the application in the French overseas departments of the provisions which 
are mentioned therein, including those relating to the free-movement of 
goods. To interpret Article 235 of the Treaty as allowing the Council to 
suspend, even temporarily, the application of Articles 9, 12 and 13 of the 
Treaty in the French overseas departments would be to disregard the 
fundamental distinction established by Article 227(2) and to deprive its 
first subparagraph of its effectiveness.168 
By using this line of argument, the ECJ thus went against the core of the 
Dock Dues Decision of the Council.169 The fact that this duty was equally 
applicable to French goods and the goods coming from other Member States 
did not change the nature of the charge, which is a “charge having an effect 
equivalent to a customs duty on imports,”170 thus going against the core 
principle of the free-movement of goods.171 A reference to the article of the 
  
 167. Case C-163/90, Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v. Legros, 1992 
E.C.R. I-4625, ¶ 14 (Opinion of AG Jacobs). The Court refused to follow the conclusion of 
the AG in that case, not ruling on the validity of the Octroi de mer decision and dealing 
solely with the octroi de mer levied preceding its entry into force. 
 168. Joined Cases C-363 & 407/93, 408/93, 409/93, 410/93 & 411/93, ené Lancry v. 
Direction Générale des Douanes, 1994 E.C.R I-3978, ¶ 37. 
 169. For an analysis, see also Alina Tryfonidou, The Overseas Application of the 
Customs Duties Provisions of the TFEU, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 221. 
 170. Case C-163/90, Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v. Legros, 1992 
E.C.R. I-4625, ¶ 13. The Court referred to Joined Cases 2/69 & 3/69, Sociaal Fonds voor de 
Diamantarbeiders v. S.A. Ch. Brachfeld & Sons, 1969 E.C.R. 211, to illustrate the meaning 
of the notion of charges having equivalent effect to customs duties. 
 171. See TFEU art. 30. The factual situation in Legros and Lancry was remarkably 
similar to that of other cases decided by the ECJ which involved regional taxes on imported 
goods decided by the ECJ. Without a special regime under EC Treaty art. 299(2) (now TFEU 
art. 349), however, such taxes were virtually impossible to justify. See Joined Cases C-485 & 
486/93, Maria Simitzi v. Dimos Kos, 1995 E.C.R. I-2655. In Simitzi the Court found that “an 
ad valorem charge levied by a Member State on goods imported from another Member State 
by reason of their entry into a region of the first Member State’s territory constitutes a charge 
having an effect equivalent to a customs duty on imports, notwithstanding the fact that it is 
also levied on goods entering that region from another part of the same State’s territory, and 
notwithstanding the fact that an ad valorem charge is also levied on goods exported from the 
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Treaty prohibiting such charges was in the list in Article 227(2)(2) EEC 
when the cases were decided, which was a clear indication, according both 
to the Court and the Advocate General, that the Council was not empowered 
to derogate from it. 
The logic of the Court is difficult to object to: the Council could not be 
given a carte blanche in its discretion to derogate from the acquis, which, 
according to the first subparagraph of Article 227(2) EEC, had to apply to 
the ORs mentioned therein in full. Moreover, as Marco Slotboom reminds, 
the Member States and the Institutions of the Union are bound to respect the 
principle of the free movement of goods.172 Using the procedures of any 
article of the Treaties in order to undermine it thus goes against the spirit of 
EU law and can be characterised as a violation of the duty of loyalty.173 It is 
clear, however that such a rigid hierarchical approach to the part of the 
acquis intended to be applicable with or without derogations in the ORs 
severely limits the freedom of the Council to legislate with a view to 
diminishing the effects of the handicaps the ORs are said to suffer from. 
Inability to deviate from a number of key areas of the acquis thus threatens 
the achievement of the very objective of the OR instrument in the Treaty—a 
situation which the renewed OR instrument in the Treaties—i.e. Article 
299(2) EC, on which the current Article 349 TFEU is based—was designed 
to remedy. This has been achieved by removing the list of the untouchable 
acquis provisions from the text of the Article. 
An obvious question arising in this regard is how far the reasoning used 
by the Court in Legros and Lancry affects the instruments currently in force, 
especially Article 349 TFEU, which largely inherited the wording of now 
obsolete Article 299(2) EC.174 In order to answer this question, it is first 
necessary to turn to the history of the drafting of this provision. It has been 
suggested in the literature that Article 299(2) EC was amended specifically 
to neutralise the ECJ’s Lancry and Legros case law with a view to returning 
to the vagueness, if not freedom, of Hansen, and thus freeing the hands of 
the Council to modify the application of any part of the acquis whatsoever 
when legislating on the basis of Article 299(2) EC and, consequently, on the 
basis of current Article 349 TFEU. 
Although the interests of the ORs and especially the DOM levying octroi 
de mer are quite clear, they have to be balanced against the goals of the 
  
region in question.” Id. ¶ 17. See also Case C-45/94, Cámara de Comercio, Industria y 
Navegación de Ceuta v. Ayuntamiento de Ceuta, 1995 E.C.R. I-4385. 
 172. Slotboom, supra note 64, at 23. See also Case 37/83, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. 
Direktor der Landwirtschafskammer Rheinland, 1984 E.C.R. 1229, ¶ 18. 
 173. TEU art. 4(3) also applies to Community Institutions. See in relation to their co-
operation with national judicial authorities, Case C-2/88, Imm., J.J. Zwartveld & Others, 
1990 E.C.R. I-4405. 
 174. For an analysis of textual changes see Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas 
Countries and Territories and Others after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU 
LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 69; see also Table 1. 
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Treaties as set out in Article 3 TEU and, especially, the idea of the Internal 
Market. In the light of these observations it is highly unlikely that a simple 
removal of the list of immediately effective provisions from a Treaty Article 
responsible for the OR regime could restrain the Court’s willingness to 
defend the coherence of the Union legal order and the Internal Market, to 
which a reference is still provided in Article 349(3) TFEU. If the OR lobby 
was trying to achieve this,175 it was clearly somewhat naïve;176 which is not, 
however, to underestimate the importance of the changes introduced into the 
text of Article 299(2) EC by the Amsterdam revision.177  
  
 175. See Ziller, The European Union and the Territorial Scope of European 
Territories, supra note 3. In their Declarations adopted during the Amsterdam IGC the 
Presidents of the ORs outlined their position regarding the particularities of the legal status 
they aspired to have under the new Treaty. The declarations make it clear that the ECJ’s 
Lancry and Legros case law was not met with enthusiasm in the ORs. The ultimate feature of 
the post-Amsterdam status had to be the possibility to derogate from any parts of the acquis 
for unlimited periods. This is something that the post-Amsterdam Art. 299(2) EC, just as Art. 
349 TFEU currently in force, clearly does not allow for. See, e.g., the so-called Funchal 
(Madeira) Declaration of 14 March 1996:  
 
Les dispositions du Traité instituant la Communauté européenne et 
du droit dérivé s’appliquent aux Régions ultrapériphériques. 
Toutefois, le Conseil, pour tenir compte des réalités et des 
spécificités de ces régions, adopte des mesures particulières en leur 
faveur et détermine les conditions spéciales de mis en œuvre des 
politiques communes [ . . . ] dans la mesure et aussi longtemps qu’il 
existe un besoin objectif de prendre de telles dispositions. 
 
Brial, supra note 5, at 653 n.54. 
 176. Two days before the Amsterdam summit was expected to approve the text of the 
Amending Treaty, the Presidents of the ORs gathered at Saint-Denis de La Réunion to issue 
a declaration demanding a change in the status of the ORs under the new Treaty. See Brial, 
supra note 5, at 651 n.50 (citing Declaration des presidents des regions ultrapéripheriques, 
Saint-Denis (La Réunion), 17 Apr. 1997). 
 177. The OR lobby was not particularly successful before the Amsterdam IGC. Its 
main achievement in Maastricht was Declaration No. 26 (Declaration on the Outermost 
Regions of the Community), appended to the Maastricht TEU, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 104). 
Numerous elements of that Declaration have been incorporated into the text of EC Treaty art. 
299(2) by the Amsterdam IGC. The Declaration read as follows: 
 
La Conférence reconnaît que les régions ultrapériphériques de la 
Communauté (départements français d’outre-mer, Açores et Madère 
et îles Canaries) subissent un retard structurel important aggravé par 
plusieurs phénomènes (grand éloignement, insularité, faible 
superficie, relief et climat difficile, dépendance économique vis-à-vis 
de quelques produits) dont la constance et le cumul portent 
lourdement préjudice à leur développement économique et 
social.Elle estime que, si les dispositions du traité instituant la 
Communauté européenne et du drpoit dérivé s’appliquent de plein 
droit aux régions ultrapériphériques, il reste possible d’adopter des 
mesures spécifiques en leur faveur dans la mesure et aussi longtemps 
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Probably receptive to this change, the Court sent a signal of 
understanding of the ORs’ special position in Chevassus-Marche178 and 
Sodiprem-SARL,179 which were decided under Article 227(2) EC when the 
new text of Article 299(2) EC has already been drafted and was available 
for consultation by the Court. Making it clear that its earlier case-law stands 
in principle, the ECJ, however, applied it in a somewhat more nuanced way, 
stating that any deviations from the acquis rooted in Article 227(2) EC 
“necessary, proportionate and precisely determined”180 are compatible with 
EU law. This reasoning allowed the Court to rule in Chevassus-Marche that 
exemptions from the octroi de mer of the locally produced goods on 
Réunion were compatible with the Treaty.181 The revolutionary nature of 
this case should not be underestimated: the Court allowed for the first time 
derogation from the principles of Article 90 EC [now Art. 110 TFEU] on 
the basis of the provision granting the ORs their special status.  
Thus, although Article 299(2) EC “pocède à une extension matérielle du 
champ ouvert aux mesures spécifiques,”182 it should be interpreted with 
caution.183 The specific list of provisions of the Treaty immediately 
applicable to the ORs having been removed from the Treaty Article 
establishing OR status, radical change in the interpretation of the essence of 
the status was highly unlikely, which has been confirmed in practice. This 
was particularly true, given the strict wording of the last paragraph of the 
relevant Treaty provision, prohibiting the Council from undermining the 
“coherence of the Union legal order, including the internal market and 
common policies.”184 To summarise, although the present version of the 
  
qu’il existe un besoin objectif de prendre de telles mesures en vue 
d’un développement économique et social de ces régions. Ces 
mesures doivent viser à la fois l’objectif de l’achèvement du marché 
intérieur et celui d’une reconnaissance de la réalité régionale en vue 
de permettre à ces régions de rattraper le niveau économique et 
social moyen de la Communauté. 
 
For an account of the ORs’ lobbying activities in Brussels see Janus, supra note 71. 
 178. Case C-212/96, Paul Chevassus-Marche v. Conseil Régional de la Réunion, 1998 
E.C.R. I-743. Before this case was decided, scholars tended to regard the regime approved by 
the Court as being contrary to Community Law, as it clearly deviated from the main 
principles of the Internal Market. Slotboom, supra note 64, at 23. 
 179. Joined Cases C-37 & 38/96, Sodiprem SARL & Others v. Direction Générale des 
Douanes, 1998 E.C.R. I-2039. For an informative summary of the development of the octroi 
de mer case-law of the ECJ, see Case C-126/94, Société Cadi Surgelés v. Ministre des Fin., 
1996 E.C.R. I-5647. 
 180. Case C-212/96, Paul Chevassus-Marche v. Conseil Régional de la Réunion, 1998 
E.C.R. I-743, ¶ 49. 
 181. Id. ¶ 53. 
 182. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 121. For a similar position see Omarjee, supra note 
27, at 518. 
 183. Omarjee, supra note 27, at 525. 
 184. TFEU art. 349, para. 3. 
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Article seemingly grants the ORs more room to accommodate their 
specificity better within the EU legal order compared to the OR instrument 
in the EEC Treaty, the far-reaching structural derogations from the acquis 
which are only nominally connected with the “handicaps” listed in Article 
349(1) TFEU are highly unlikely to be pronounced legal by the Court. In 
other words, agreeing with Fabien Brial, “de nombreuses incertitudes 
subsistent”185—a conclusion also reached by Ismaël Omarjee.186 At the same 
time, it would not be right to deny the fact that certain clarity is established 
by Chevassus-Marche and Sodiprem-SARL case law, demonstrating that 
derogations are likely not to infringe the coherence of the EU legal order as 
long as they are clearly necessary and strictly construed. 
The story presented demonstrates that there is a constant movement from 
a more to a less restrictive vision of flexibility in the way the acquis is to be 
applied in the ORs. The removal of the untouchable list from the text of the 
relevant Treaty instrument is a great illustration of this process. More 
importantly, however, the Treaty of Lisbon altered the OR Article of the 
Treaty so that the strict restatement of the main principle that the acquis 
applies in the ORs in full has disappeared from the text. To state, as Article 
355(1) TFEU does, that the Treaty is to apply to the ORs “in accordance 
with Article 349 [TFEU]”187 can only be viewed as the continuation of the 
trend leading towards the relaxation of the strict approach to the acquis 
necessarily applicable in the ORs established by the ECJ in Hansen. In the 
long run, should this trend continue, it is likely to result in an increase in the 
convergence of the main legal statuses granted to the Overseas in EU law, 
moving the ORs closer to the status enjoyed by the OCTs. This process has 
started on a number of fronts and is only likely to continue with renewed 
intensity. 
C.  Article 349 TFEU as a source of derogations 
To use Article 349(1) TFEU as a legal basis, the Council is required to 
follow the special legislative procedure described in the Article,188 which 
requires the Council to act by qualified majority voting (QMV)189 on a 
proposal of the Commission after having consulted the European 
Parliament. In fact, it is a restatement of the procedure contained in the 
  
 185. Brial, supra note 27, at 652. 
 186. Omarjee, supra note 43. 
 187. TFEU art. 355(1). 
 188. See also TFEU art. 289(2) (restating the rules of the special legislative 
procedure). See Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, 
supra note 27, at 731-36 (describing the speculation as to why TFEU art. 249 actually 
repeats TFEU art. 203 rules besides simply naming the legislative procedure in question). 
 189. TEU art. 16(3) applies since TFEU art. 349, para. 1 does not provide otherwise. 
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previous version of the Article—Article 299(2) EC.190 If we take one step 
back, it is clear that the last serious improvement brought into the OR 
derogations procedure was when Article 227(2) EC was scrapped. The latter 
required unanimity and thus was left open for any Member State to block 
the adoption of specific measures to meet the needs of the ORs. Ismaël 
Omarjee is right to point out that this possibility is not purely hypothetical, 
referring to the numerous steps taken by Germany to block special measures 
regarding the banana market.191 At the same time, if the contemporary QMV 
rules are compared to the unanimity of pre-Amsterdam times, especially 
since the number of Member States in charge of ORs has not grown at all, it 
becomes clear that QMV might not be very easy to reach either, something 
Danielle Perrot also underlined in her analysis of Article 349(1) TFEU.192 
The outcomes of the employment of the special legislative procedure of 
Article 349 TFEU only concern the application of EU law in the territories 
of a minority of the Member States. The Treaty provision does not introduce 
any qualifications to the QMV rule to reflect this reality, though it is 
possible to imagine that no measure would be adopted under the Article 
against the will of the Member State exercising sovereignty over an OR 
whose status is at stake.193 Moreover, ideally, the OR in question itself 
should be consulted as well, although no binding legal provision to this 
effect is to be found anywhere in the acquis. 
The question whether the procedure described in Article 349 TFEU will 
always be used by the Institutions remains open, however, since the choice 
of the procedure concerns the nature of Article 349(1) TFEU as a legal 
basis. Given that cumulative legal bases are not uncommon in EU law and 
that the procedures associated with different legal bases frequently vary, 
especially in derogating from the special legislative procedure, a de facto 
different procedure for the introduction of Article 349 TFEU derogations 
will often be used. 
To provide some examples, and given that Article 349 TFEU is still very 
new, the history of the employment of Article 299(2) EC as a legal basis for 
derogations in favour of the ORs needs to be considered. Parallels with 
Article 299(2) EC will obviously hold, since the procedures contained in 
  
 190. For the analysis of the contemporary wording see for example Ziller, supra note 
5; Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, supra note 
27. For an analysis of the procedure in EC art. 299(2), see, e.g., Omarjee, supra note 27, at 
520-23. 
 191. Omarjee, supra note 27, at 520. 
 192. Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, 
supra note 27, at 732. 
 193. See also Omarjee, supra note 27, at 521. There is a perception in the literature 
that the theoretical possibility of such an outcome has increased with the last rounds of 
enlargement. No evidence is provided, however, except for the simple growth in the number 
of Member States. See, e.g., Ziller, L’Union Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27, at 
154. 
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both provisions are identical and also since the rules on cumulative legal 
bases have not changed with the Treaty of Lisbon amendments. 
Although Article 299(2) EC has been used as a legal basis for the 
derogations in favour of the ORs on numerous occasions,194 equally 
numerous are the examples of the employment of the old versions of Article 
349(1) TFEU in cumulative legal bases. The analysis of the practice of 
application of Article 227(2) EC as a legal basis demonstrates, for instance, 
that before this provision became Article 299(2) EC, the Institutions were 
very eager indeed to use it in conjunction with some other legal basis from 
the EC Treaty. So the Dock Dues Decision 89/688/EEC had a double legal 
basis: both Article 227(2) EC and the former Article 235 EC195 were used.196 
Given such practice, scholars even started questioning the capacity of the 
predecessors of Article 349(1) TFEU to serve as free-standing legal bases 
for derogations from the acquis to be applied to the ORs.197 While the 
ability of the OR provision in the Treaties to provide a unique legal basis for 
derogations has already been demonstrated, it is clear that a cumulative 
legal basis is often preferred and this is unlikely to change in the future. 
Based on an analysis of the employment of Article 299(2) EC, it can be 
concluded that the Commission seems to be of the opinion that a special 
provision authorising derogations from the acquis to meet the needs of the 
ORs can only be used as a unique legal basis when no other article able to 
supply such legal basis is available in the Treaty.198 
A good example of the practical implications of this finding is 
Regulation (EC) 1447/2001 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999 
laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds,199 which was 
adopted on the basis of two articles: Article 299(2) EC and Article 161 
EC.200 The consequences of such a double legal basis are far-reaching. 
Given that the Article 299(2) EC procedure required QMV and Article 161 
EC contained a requirement for unanimity, the stricter procedure was used, 
which in practice resulted in the application of stricter voting requirements 
  
 194. See, e.g., Council Decision 2004/162, of 10 February 2004 Concerning the Dock 
Dues in the French Overseas Departments and Extending the Period of Validity of Decision 
89/688/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 52) 64 (EC); Council Decision 2002/546, of 20 June 2002 on the 
AIEM Tax Applicable in the Canary Islands, 2002 O.J. (L 179) 22 (EC). 
 195. TFEU art. 352 (formerly Art. 308 EC in post-Amsterdam numbering).  
 196. Council Decision 89/688/EEC, of 22 December 1989 Concerning the Dock Dues 
in the French Overseas Departments, pmbl., 1989 O.J. (L 399) 46 (EC). 
 197. Vitalien, supra note 43, at 123-24. 
 198. For academic support of such a position, see Perrot, Le nouvel article 299 
paragraphe 2, supra note 27, at 145, 147. 
 199. Council Regulation 1447/2001, of 28 June 2001 Amending Regulation (EC) No. 
1260/1999 Laying Down General Provisions on the Structural Funds, 2001 O.J. (L 198) 1 
(EC). See Vitalien, supra note 43, at 123-24. 
 200. Now TFEU art. 171; Council Regulation 1447/2001, of 28 June 2001 Amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999 Laying Down General Provisions on the Structural Funds, 
pmbl., 2001 O.J. (L 198) 1 (EC). 
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than would have been necessary had Article 299(2) EC been used as a free-
standing legal basis. Although Article 161 EC became Article 171 TFEU, 
which also entailed a change in the procedure required, since the most 
commonly used procedure in the Treaties is the ordinary one, it is expected 
that the European Parliament will be playing a much more important role in 
framing the derogations from the acquis to apply in the ORs than what 
Article 349(1) TFEU seems to suggest. Article 171 TFEU also now contains 
a requirement to use an ordinary legislative procedure.201 
All in all, the practice of cumulation of legal bases can thus make the 
adoption of acts under Article 349(1) TFEU more difficult.202 In this 
context, it may be reasonable to consider changing the current practice of 
applying provisions responsible for the shaping of the OR acquis. Indeed, 
neither the text of Article 349 TFEU nor the way the Article and its 
predecessors have been interpreted by the ECJ provide reasons for believing 
that the institutions are right in not using it as a free-standing legal basis, 
even if there is an apparent overlap with other treaty provisions. The 
position embraced by Jean-Pierre Puissochet is very instructive in this 
regard. He interpreted the silence of the Court in Chevassus-Marche about 
any other legal bases for the Dock Dues Decision besides Article 299(2)EC 
as a clear indication of the irrelevance of the additional legal basis.203  
Although put in place to deal with permanent handicaps, the derogations 
from the acquis under Article 349 TFEU cannot be permanent in nature. 
This provision thus cannot be viewed as being exempt from the main 
principles of EU law governing the employment of derogations: they have 
to be construed as strictly as possible, be proportionate to the stated goals 
and be temporary. Agreeing with Ismaël Omarjee on this point, it is clear 
that “la possibilité permanente d’adopter des mesures spécifiques ne signifie 
pas forcément la permanence de ces mesures.”204 However, the extension of 
previously granted derogations is obviously possible. 
In practice, the Commission has historically played a leading role in the 
implementation of the Treaty articles responsible for the introduction and 
the extension of the derogations from the acquis in favour of the ORs. Upon 
the request of the European Council,205 the Commission submits general 
  
 201. It has to be borne in mind, however, that TEU art. 48(7), para. 2 allows for a 
simplified Treaty amendment to replace special legislative procedures with ordinary ones. 
Should TFEU art. 349, para. 1 demonstrate that, in practice, the accumulation of legal basis 
mostly results in the application of the ordinary legislative procedure, it would make sense to 
make use of TEU art. 48(7), para. 2 in order to bridge the gap between the reality of OR 
regulation and the text of TFEU art. 349, para. 1. 
 202. See also Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de 
Lisbonne, supra note 27, at 734-35. 
 203. The second legal basis was EC Treaty art. 308 (as in effect 2007) (now TFEU art. 
352). See Puissochet, supra note 27, at 506. 
 204. The declaration is quoted in full in Omarjee, supra note 27, at 520. 
 205. So the 1999 Cologne European Council invited the Commission “to submit to the 
Council by the end of 1999 a report identifying a package of measures to implement the 
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reports on the measures designed to ensure the application of the OR 
provision of the Treaty, analysing the opportunities the acquis offers to deal 
with the natural handicaps of the ORs.206 The reports are “built on global, 
coherent approach to the special characteristics of the [situation of the ORs] 
and to way[s] of addressing them.”207 Such analysis is conducted in close 
cooperation and partnership with the authorities of the Member States 
concerned and of the ORs themselves,208 so that the Commission has access 
to the most up-to-date information in drafting its reports. 
Along with the general strategic reports, the Commission also releases 
progress reports that assess the effect of the special measures already 
adopted on the basis of Article 349 TFEU and its predecessors.209 Such 
reports cover all the steps taken by the Commission towards using the 
possibilities offered by the treaties to remedy the permanent handicaps 
which the ORs suffer from. Thus, the Commission is there to provide 
general policy guidelines, which are then incorporated into the proposals it 
submits to the Council legislating on the basis of Article 349 TFEU. The 
2004 Communication on the Stronger Partnership with the Outermost 
Regions210 outlined the key aspects of future development of the outermost 
regions acquis. These are competitiveness, access and offsetting of other 
constraints, and integration into the regional area211—the main fields to 
mark the use of Article 349 TFEU in the near future. 
  
provisions of Article 299(2) of the EC Treaty with regard to the outermost regions”: 
Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, E.U. BULL., no. 6, ¶ 38 (1999). See also 
Presidency Conclusions, Seville European Council, E.U. BULL., no. 6, ¶ 58 (2002) 
[hereinafter Seville European Council]. 
 206. See e.g., Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra 
note 113; Communication from the Commission: A Stronger Partnership for the Outermost 
Regions, COM (2004) 343 final (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter Commission Communication on 
Partnership for Outermost Regions]. These should not be confused with the Reports 
regularly submitted by the Commission on the progress made in implementation of POSEI 
programmes. See, e.g., Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament in Accordance with Article 23 of Regulation (EEC) No 3763/91, Report from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament in Accordance with Article 35 of 
Regulation (EEC) No 1600/92, Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament in Accordance with Article 30 of Regulation (EEC) No 1601/92, COM 
(2000) 790 final (Nov. 29, 2000). 
 207. Seville European Council, supra note 205, ¶ 58. 
 208. See, e.g., Answer of Mr. Prodi on Behalf of the Commission to the Written 
Question P-224/00 by Carlos Costa Neves to the Commission (Jan. 3,1 2000) Regarding 
Commission Report on the Application of Article 299(2) of the Treaty, 2000 O.J. (303) 163 
E. The input from the ORs is acknowledged in the Commission’s Reports. See, e.g., 
Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 113, at 5-6. 
 209. See, e.g., Report from the Commission on Implementation of Article 299(2) of the 
EC Treaty; Measures to Assist the Outermost Regions, COM (2002) 723 final (Dec. 19, 
2002) [hereinafter Report on the Implementation of Article 299(2)]. 
 210. Commission Communication on Partnership for Outermost Regions, supra note 
206. 
 211. Id. at 4. 
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D. Examples of Derogations Enjoyed by the ORs 
The POSEI programmes and further legislation focus on derogations in a 
number of fields, mostly concentrating on: agriculture; fisheries; taxation; 
customs; state aids; aid to small businesses, craft firms and tourism; energy; 
transport; research and development; the information society; environment; 
and regional cooperation.212 The broad coverage of areas by specific 
measures does not mean, however, that the derogations in question 
necessarily substantially alter the norms of the acquis applicable to the ORs 
in all the areas mentioned. The intensity of derogations varies to a great 
degree. While in some fields, such as taxation, derogations are quite far-
reaching,213 in others, such as research and development, there is virtually 
nothing available in terms of specific measures targeting the handicaps the 
ORs suffer from. In its Report on a Stronger Partnership for the Outermost 
Regions214 the Commission expressed concerns with the practical 
functioning of some of the derogations. The acquis applicable to the ORs in 
the areas of the environment, transport, and the Internal Market has been 
particularly characterised as failing to “take adequate account of the special 
features of the [outermost] regions.”215 Clearly, there is room for 
improvement in the way Article 349 TFEU is employed. 
To illustrate the depth of derogations from the acquis in favour of the 
ORs, several examples can be provided. The derogations in the field of 
agriculture216 thus concern the special measures regarding the traditional 
  
 212. For further analysis of TFEU art. 249(2) as a source of derogations see Omarjee, 
supra note 43, at 126. TFEU art. 349, para. 2 contains its own list of the main areas where 
the derogations from the acquis are most likely. It mentions that “in particular areas such as 
customs and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture and fisheries policies, 
conditions for supply of raw materials and essential consumer goods, State aids and 
conditions of access to structural funds and to horizontal Union programmes.” Id. 
 213. See Kochenov, supra note 3, at 282-85. 
 214. Commission Communication on Partnership for Outermost Regions, supra note 
206. 
 215. Id. ¶ 2.2. 
 216. See, e.g., Council Regulations (EC) 1452/2001 (POSEIDOM); 1453/2001 
(POSEIMA); See, e.g., Council Regulations 1452/2001, of 28 June 2001 Introducing 
Specific Measures for Certain Agricultural Products for the French Overseas Departments 
(POSEIDOM), 2001 O.J. (L 198) 11 (EC); Council Regulation 1453/2001, of 28 June 2001 
Introducing Specific Measures for Certain Agricultural Products for the Azores and Madeira 
(POSEIMA), 2001 O.J. (L 198) 26 (EC); Council Regulation 1454/2001, of 28 June 2001 
Introducing Specific Measures for Certain Agricultural Products for the Canary Islands 
(POSEICAN), 2001 O.J. (L 198) 45 (EC); Council Regulation 1455/2001, of 28 June 
2001Amending Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 on the Common Organisation of the Market 
in Beef and Veal, 2001 O.J. (L 198) 58 (EC); Council Regulation 1447/2001, of 28 June 
2001 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 and Laying Down General Provisions on the 
Structural Funds, 2001 O.J. (L 198) 1 (EC); Council Regulation (EC) 1455/2001 of 28 June 
2001 [2001] OJ L 198/54; Council Regulation (EC) 1447/2001 of 28 June 2001 [2001] OJ L 
198. 
2012] The Application of EU Law 715 
 
products of the ORs, especially rice, sugar, pineapples, and bananas.217 
These measures aim to guarantee production and prices. They also concern 
compensatory aid for production and the import of such products, especially 
bananas, from the third-countries.218 The second most important aspect 
related to the special measures in the field of agriculture concern the 
establishment of a system of specific supply arrangements. The 
Commission summarised the system as follows: 
Each marketing year, a forecast supply balance is adopted for agricultural 
products necessary for human consumption and local processing. . . . 
Imports originating outside the Community are exempt from customs 
duties, while supplies or products originating in the Community benefit 
from aid equivalent to the benefit arising from this exemption.  
The aim of this measure is to offset the additional costs arising as a result 
of remoteness and isolation and to bring down prices for end users by 
promoting competition between sources of supply. . . . 
Products benefiting from the arrangements may not be re-exported to third 
countries or redispatched to the rest of the Community. However, where 
they are processed in the region concerned, this ban does not apply to 
traditional exports or shipments to the rest of the Community within given 
limits.219 
In the field of fisheries, when scrutinising state aid to the fisheries sector, 
the Commission uses guidelines specifically referring to the special position 
enjoyed by the ORs given the handicaps they suffer from.220 A special 
system of compensation for the additional costs incurred as a result of the 
remoteness for the marketing of the fisheries products from the ORs permits 
special treatment of these regions. The system is extended regularly based 
  
 217. Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 
113, at 13. 
 218. See, e.g., Council Regulation 2587/2001, of 19 December 2001 Amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the Common Organisation of the Market in Bananas, 2001 
O.J. (L 345) 13 (EC) (introducing tariff system). 
 219. Id. at 14. 
 220. Guidelines for the Examination of State Aid to Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2001 
O.J. (C 19) 7. Section 2.9.5 of the Guidelines allows for a special regime of aid granted in the 
ORs:  
 
Aid designed to meet the needs of outermost regions will be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the provisions of Article 
299(2) of the EC Treaty [now TFEU art. 349] and the compatibility 
of the measures concerned with the objectives of the common 
fisheries policy and the potential effect of the measures on 
competition in these regions and in the other parts of the [Union].  
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on Commission assessments.221 The present instrument for “offsetting the 
additional costs for the marketing of certain fishery products”222 will apply 
until 2013.223 As is the case with all the measures adopted on the basis of 
Article 349 TFEU and its predecessors, extension will be possible if needed 
for dealing with the permanent handicaps described in the Article. 
Similarly to the aid to the fisheries industry, the concept of remoteness 
has been incorporated into the Guidelines on National Regional Aid, 
providing for more favourable rules on the assessment of the compatibility 
of such aid with the Internal Market,224 which is now reflected in the 
Treaties.225 
Special customs duties regimes applicable in the ORs allow for 
exemptions from customs duties of certain products able to assist the ORs in 
dealing with the permanent handicaps. The duties on the import to Canary 
Islands of goods for capital investment and raw materials for maintenance 
and processing and fisheries products are thus suspended until 31 December 
2011.226 The case of the Canary Islands is in no way exceptional among the 
ORs. In its Report the Commission specified that it is:  
[w]illing to consider any other request for customs measures to assist the 
outermost regions and designed to offset the effects of trade policy 
towards non-member countries, particularly those bordering on the 
outermost regions, as long as such measures comply with the limits set out 
in Article 299(2) of the Treaty [now Art. 349 TFEU].227 
In the area of transport, the ports of the ORs are automatically regarded 
as “of common interest and form part of the trans-European network” and 
are thus eligible for finance from the Cohesion fund.228 In addition to the 
funding for ports, the possibility to impose public service obligations on the 
  
 221. For the latest Regulation adopted in this context, see Council Regulation 
791/2007, of 21 May 2007 Introducing a Scheme to Compensate for the Additional Costs 
Incurred in the Marketing of Certain Fishery Products from the Outermost Regions the 
Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands, French Guiana and Réunion, 2007 O.J. (L 176) 1 (EC). 
 222. Id. at pmbl. 
 223. Id. art. 14. 
 224. Amendments to the Guidelines on National Regional Aid, 2000 O.J. (C 258) 5. 
 225. TFEU art. 107(3)(a). 
 226. Council Regulation 704/2002, Temporary Suspending Autonomous Common 
Customs Tariff Duties on Imports of Certain Industrial Products and Opening and Providing 
for the Administration of Autonomous Community Tariff Quotas on Imports of Certain 
Fishery Products into the Canary Islands, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 111) 1, 3 (EC). 
 227. Report on the Implementation of Article 299(2), supra note 209, at 8.  
 228. Decision 1346/2001, Amending Decision No 1692/96/EC as Regards Seaports, 
Inland Ports and Intermodal Terminals as well as Project No. 8 in Annex III, 2001 O.J. (L 
185) 1. 
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scheduled services to the airports serving outermost regions has also 
benefited the accessibility of these regions.229 
All in all, special measures rooted in Article 349 TFEU are absolutely 
necessary to make OR status work to the benefit of the territories concerned. 
Although the Article does not provide any time limits for derogations, each 
of them should be limited in time. Such limitation does not mean, however, 
that the derogations should necessarily cease to apply upon the expiry of the 
time-limit concerned. All the instruments introducing special measures 
derogating from the acquis based on Article 349 TFEU and its predecessors 
require regular reassessment of the situation in each sector, which normally 
leads to the prolongation of the derogations, giving them at least de facto 
quasi-permanence. 
The regulation of the legal position of the ORs in EU law is a very 
dynamic field, which is bound to follow the developments in the regions 
concerned. The recent negative to positive change in the approach endorsed 
by the EU with respect to the Overseas in general and the ORs in particular, 
leaves room for optimism that Article 349 TFEU will be used in the best 
possible way to attune the acquis to the specificity of these regions. 
III. OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES IN THE EU LAW OF THE 
OVERSEAS 
The OCTs in the sense of Article 355(2) TFEU (formerly Art. 299(3) 
EC) are only those countries and territories associated with the EU 
mentioned in Annex II TFEU.230 Clarifying the status of these territories in 
EU law, Article 355(2) TFEU states that “special arrangements for 
association set out in Part Four [TFEU] shall apply to the overseas countries 
and territories listed in Annex II.”231 Part IV TFEU232 contains a number of 
  
 229. Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 
113, at 22-23. 
 230. TFEU Annex II includes the following: Danish, French and the Netherlands 
territories and the territories under the sovereignty of the UK: Greenland; New Caledonia; 
French Polynesia; Wallis-and-Futuna; Mayotte; Saint-Pierre-and-Miquelon; French Austral 
and Antarctic Territory; Aruba; the Netherlands Antilles (now divided into five separate 
entities separately included in the Annex. i.e. Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, Sint Eustasius and Sint 
Maarten); Anguilla; British Virgin Islands; Cayman Islands; Montserrat; the Turks and 
Caicos Islands; the Falkland Islands; Saint Helena and its Dependencies; British Indian 
Ocean Territory (Chagos archipelago); Pitcairn; the South Sandwich Islands and Southern 
Georgia; British Antarctic Territory; and the Bermuda Islands. On the situation of the OCTs 
vis-à-vis EU law in their evolution see generally Custos, supra note 11; ZILLER, LES DOM-
TOM, supra note 27. For the initial French perspective, see J.L. Gautron, La situation des 
DOM et des TOM au regard de la CEE, 3 ANNUAIRE DU TIERS MONDE 141. A number of the 
overseas territories and regions of the UK not included in the list and not specifically referred 
to in TFEU art. 355 are, by virtue of TFEU art. 355(2), para. 2, totally excluded from the 
scope of the Treaties—thus unable to claim OCT or any other status in EU law. 
 231. TFEU art. 355(2). 
 232. TFEU arts. 198–204. 
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provisions specifying the limits of the application of the core of the Internal 
Market acquis in the OCTs, as well as providing a legal basis under Article 
203 TFEU for designing and managing further rules of association.  
It is important in this regard not to confuse the association of the OCTs 
with the EU and the association agreements concluded with the third 
countries, since the OCTs’ association merely refers to a system of 
secondary EU law which governs the specific rules of application of EU law 
in the territories listed in Annex II TFEU. Consequently, the OCTs’ 
association does not entail any negotiations or the signing of any 
agreements with the OCTs themselves. All the day-to-day rules of 
association are stated in a Decision adopted on the basis of Article 203 
TFEU, which simply requires the Council to act unanimously on the 
proposal of the Commission—no negotiations, diplomatic games, and 
ratifications are required.233 
A. The Main Rules of Association 
Part IV TFEU established the main rules of association. In the opening 
article of this part,234 the goals of association are outlined in the following 
terms: 
The purpose of association shall be to promote the economic and social 
development of the countries and territories and to establish close 
economic relations between them and the Union as a whole.235 
In accordance with the principles set out in the preamble to this Treaty, 
association shall serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of 
the inhabitants of these countries and territories in order to lead them to the 
economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire.236 
The association regime is currently governed by Council Decision 
2001/822/EC237 —adopted on the basis of Article 187 EC (now Article 203 
TFEU)—and Secondary law adopted on the basis of this decision.238 
  
 233. The OCTs are united in the Overseas Countries and Territories Association 
(OCTA), which might provide an opportunity for their voice to be heard, should such games 
be required. For an analysis, see Baetens, supra note 71, at 383. 
 234. TFEU art. 198. 
 235. TFEU art. 198, para. 2. 
 236. TFEU art. 198, para. 3. 
 237. Council Decision 2001/822, On the Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories with the European Community, 2001 O.J. (L 314) 1 (EC). For a commentary see 
Ziller, Les outre-mers face à l’intégration européenne et à la mondialisation—L’association 
des pays et territoires d’outre-mer à la Communauté européenne, supra note 44, at 133, 134. 
 238. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1424/2007, Amending Regulation (EC) No 
2304/2002 Implementing Council Decision 2001/822/EC on the Association of the Overseas 
Countries and Territories with the European Community and Allocating the Indicative 
Amounts under the 10th European Development Fund, 2007 O.J. (L 317) 38 (EC). 
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Part IV TFEU provides for a number of important principles guiding the 
association. The asymmetry in the EU–OCTs relationship emerges as the 
key element of Part IV TFEU regime. The relations between the Union and 
the OCTs associated with it are far from equal—preference always being 
given to the OCTs—which can be illustrated by a number of examples, 
ranging from free movement of goods to free movement of persons. 
Therefore, while the “Member States . . . apply to their trade with the 
countries and territories the same treatment as they accord each other 
pursuant to the Treaties,”239 the OCTs merely “apply to [their] trade with the 
Member States and with the other countries and territories the same 
treatment as that which [is] applie[d] to the European State with which it 
has its special relations.”240 Consequently, while the “[c]ustoms duties on 
imports into the Member States of goods originating in the countries and 
territories [are] prohibited,”241 the OCTs themselves are empowered to “levy 
customs duties which meet the needs of their development and 
industrialisation or produce revenue for their budgets.”242 The latter 
freedom is limited by the principle of non-discrimination,243 since such 
duties “may not exceed the level of those imposed on imports of products 
from the Member State with which each country or territory has special 
relations.”244 The ECJ explained that “although the OCTs are countries and 
territories which have special links with the [EU], they do not, however, 
form part of the [Union], and free-movement of goods between the OCTs 
and the Community does not exist unrestrictedly at this stage.”245 As a result 
of this approach, the OCTs enjoy much more freedom in economic affairs 
than the ORs. In one example, unlike the ORs, the OCTs were allowed 
more flexibility in the field of taxation and had no trouble levying octroi de 
mer-like taxes.246  
  
 239. TFEU art. 199(1). This provision does not mean, however, that unrestricted free-
movement of goods exists between the Union and the OCTs. See generally Tryfonidou, 
supra note 169. See also Cees T. Dekker, The Ambit of the Free Movement of Goods under 
the Association of Overseas Countries and Territories, 23 EUR. L. REV. 272 (1998); R.H. 
Lauwaars & M.C.E.J. Bronckers, Passen communautaire origineregels in het handelsverkeer 
met de Landen en Gebieden Overzee?, in MET HET OOG OP EUROPA: DE EUROPESE 
GEMEENSCHAP, DE NEDERLANDSE ANTILLEN EN ARUBA 34 (1991). 
 240. TFEU art. 199(2). 
 241. TFEU art. 200(1). In practice, however, this prohibition is not absolute, since 
“originating” can know restrictive interpretations. See Case C-310/95, Road Air BV v. 
Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1997 E.C.R. I-2229. 
 242. TFEU art. 200(3) (emphasis added). But see TFEU art. 200(2) (“Customs duties 
on imports into each country or territory form Member States or from the other countries or 
territories shall be prohibited in accordance with the provisions of Article 30.”). 
 243. Both direct and indirect discrimination “either in law or in fact” between imports 
from various Member States is prohibited. TFEU art. 200(5). 
 244. TFEU art. 200(3), para. 2. 
 245. Case C-390/95 P. Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-769, ¶ 36. 
 246. Case C-260/90, Leplat v. French Polynesia, 1992 E.C.R. I-643. Ziller, L’Union 
Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27, at 149. 
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As far as the free movement of persons goes, it only applies to the 
movement of EU citizens from the OCTs to the EU, not vice versa.247 This 
provides another example of asymmetry in the EU–OCT interaction 
according to the current OCT acquis. Freedom of establishment does 
apply.248 While derogations are theoretically possible under Article 203 
TFEU, as long as they are adopted by the Council unanimously and are 
grounded in the principles of the treaties,249 such derogations will only apply 
in the OCTs, not in the EU in Europe, which means that the same 
asymmetry observations valid in the context of free movement of persons 
and goods apply to establishment in the same way. 
B. ECJ out of line with the spirit of the law? 
Although the position of the Court interpreting the essence of the OCTs’ 
association with the EU is very restrictive—its oft-repeated standpoint 
consists in underlining the position that “failing express provisions, the 
general provisions of the Treaty do not apply to [such] countries and 
territories”250—this is likely to change. 
In addition to the obvious message stemming from the fact that the 
Treaties are silent on any “principle of non-application” of the general EU 
acquis in the OCTs, an academic consensus championed by Jacques Ziller251 
to treat Article 355(2) TFEU and Part IV TFEU as lex specialis vis-à-vis the 
rules found elsewhere in the Treaties—not as all the law applicable to the 
OCTs252—has been arrived at, as exemplified above.253 The reasons to be 
suspicious of the sustainability of the Court’s approach are numerous and 
  
 247. For the analysis of this issue, see Kochenov, supra note 29, at 211. 
 248. TFEU art. 199(5). The provision contains a direct reference to the provisions of 
the mainstream acquis allowing for derogations on the basis of TFEU art. 203. For an 
analysis of this freedom see Iris Goldner Lang and Tamara Perišin, Free Movement of 
Services and Establishment in the Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 
179; Daniël S. Smit, The Position of the EU Member States’ Associated and Dependent 
Territories Under the Freedom of Establishment, the Free Movement of Capital and 
Secondary EU Law in the Field of Company Taxation, 39 INTERTAX 40 (2011). 
 249. TFEU art. 203; Joined Cases T-480 & 483/93, Antillean Rice Mills NV v. 
Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. II-2305, ¶¶ 92-93. 
 250. Case C-260/90, Leplat v. French Polynesia, 1992 E.C.R. I-643, ¶ 10; Case C-
110/97, Netherlands v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-8763, ¶ 49; Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger 
v. College van Burgemeester en Wethouders van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 46. 
 251. Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after 
the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 73. 
See also Ziller, Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: Diversity and 
Differentiation in the Application of Substantive Law on Member States’ Territories, supra 
note 11, at 119 (arguing in this direction well before the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon). 
 252. Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after 
the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 73. 
 253. See supra Part II. 
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vary from the obvious conclusions to be drawn from the careful reading of 
the text of Article 355(2) TFEU to taking into account the logic of the 
integrated approach to territory, embraced by the Treaty of Lisbon through 
Article 52 TEU, as well as the need to pay due regard to the history of the 
OCT status254 and the interplay between the scopes ratione loci and ratione 
personae explored elsewhere.255 These factors point to the fact that the 
position currently embraced by the ECJ not only fails to capture the current 
state of affairs in OCT–EU relationship—as much more EU law de facto 
applies to their association than is contained in Part IV TFEU—but is also 
hardly faithful to the spirit of the law. 
Therefore, although seemingly falling outside the scope of the 
mainstream EU acquis—which is the only conclusion to be made based on 
the unequivocal language of the ECJ—the OCTs are nevertheless under 
growing EU law influence. This is the case not so much because of the 
wording of Part IV TFEU, which applies to them according to Article 
355(2) TFEU, but simply by virtue of the very composition of the EU legal 
system. In other words, agreeing with Jacques Ziller, only Part III TFEU 
will not apply to them.256 Only the general euro-acquis would be an obvious 
exception.257 
The Eurafrica-inspired rationale behind the creation of this special group 
of territories was to exclude them, for a time at least, from the effects of the 
Internal Market. Consequently, in accordance with Article 3 of the Customs 
Code258 they are not part of the Customs Territory of the Union. The 
application of the other parts of the acquis is growing on a constant basis. In 
Antillean Rice Mills, the CFI (then the Court of the First Instance, now the 
General Court) acknowledged that the regime of association is not shaped 
exclusively by the rules of Part IV TFEU (then the EC) and stated that the 
general principles of European law and the objectives of integration should 
apply equally to the OCT association regime.259 The judges stressed that 
“the reference to the ‘principles set out in this Treaty’ is not merely to the 
principles set out in Part Four of the Treaty but to all the principles set out 
in the Treaty, in particular those listed in Part One, entitled ‘Principles.’”260 
The ECJ concurred.261 Interpreting the association described in Part IV 
  
 254. See Custos, supra note 11. 
 255. See Kochenov, supra note 29. 
 256. Ziller, Flexibility in the Geographical Scope of EU Law: Diversity and 
Differentiation in the Application of Substantive Law on Member States’ Territories, supra 
note 11, at 119. See also discussion supra Part II. 
 257. See Fabian Amtenbrink, EMU and the Overseas, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, 
supra note 5, at 271. 
 258. Council Regulation 2913/92, art. 3, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 3 (EEC) (as amended). 
 259. TFEU art. 203 makes a direct reference to “the principles set out in the Treaties.” 
 260. Joined Cases T-480 & 483/93, Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. 
II-2305, ¶¶ 92-93. 
 261. Case C-390/95 P. Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-769, ¶ 37 
(explaining that when adopting Decisions shaping the association, the Council is supposed to 
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TFEU in a legal vacuum and out of the context of the general principles 
contained in the EU and TFEU Treaties and unwritten principles of law 
would be counter-productive and legally unsound, since Part IV TFEU is 
engrained in the coherent system of EU law, forming an organic part of an 
infinitely more complicated whole which cannot be dismissed as irrelevant 
without threatening to undermine the essence of association. 
Moreover, going beyond the general principles of EU law, as a 
consequence of the fact that the absolute majority of the OCTs’ inhabitants 
are European citizens,262 the scope of EU law applicable to these territories 
is much greater that what Part IV TFEU describes.263 This is because all the 
limitations of the scope of EU law imposed by Article 355 TFEU are 
uniquely territorial in nature and cannot be construed as capable of also 
restraining the personal scope of the law. In other words, not limited by 
Article 355 TFEU, the scope ratione personae of EU law plays the key role 
in the EU Law of the Overseas, including the acquis regulating the OCT 
status.264 Consequently, Part II TFEU (Non-Discrimination and Citizenship 
of the Union), which applies to persons and has only an indirect link with 
territory,265 applies also in the OCTs, as clarified by the ECJ in Eman en 
Sevinger.266 Other Parts of the Treaties also obviously apply—and it is 
absolutely necessary, sooner or later, to admit this reality. No reference 
from Part IV TFEU is needed for the provisions on Institutions (Title III 
TEU, Part VI TFEU) or for Part VII TFEU on the General and Final 
Provisions to govern, even if indirectly, the legal position of the OCTs. 
Indeed, to take the Institutions as an example, the Minister representing in 
the Council of the Member State with which a particular OCT is connected 
is—as happens in numerous cases—also their (i.e. OCT-relevant) Minister. 
Moreover, when the inhabitants of the OCTs vote in the European 
Parliament elections,267 how is it possible to state that the provisions on the 
rules of formation and the powers of the EP do not apply to them? 
Moreover, the fact that, as the ECJ agreed, the courts of the OCTs can be 
regarded as courts or tribunals of a Member State in the sense of Article 267 
  
take into account not only the principles of Part IV TFEU, but also other principles of the 
Treaties). 
 262. Kochenov, supra note 29, at 209. 
 263. The EU’s Overseas will be increasingly integrated into the scope of EU law 
given the rapid rise in the importance of EU citizenship provisions for the construction of 
such scope. Dimitry Kochenov & Sir Richard Plender, EU Citizenship: From an Incipient 
Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text, 37 Eur. L. Rev. (2012, 
forthcoming). 
 264. See Dimitry Kochenov, Regional Citizenships in the EU: An Example of the 
Åland Islands and New Caledonia, 35 Eur. L. Rev. 307 (2010). 
 265. Kochenov, supra note 29, at 211. 
 266. Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. College van Burgemeester en Wethouders 
van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055, ¶ 72. 
 267. For the analysis of the political rights of OCTs inhabitants with EU citizenship, 
see Kochenov, supra note 29, at 216. 
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TFEU (formerly Article 234 EC),268 which provides another argument for 
treating the position embraced by the ECJ with deep suspicion. Tout court, 
it is simply impossible to claim at this point that Part IV TFEU is the only 
part of the Treaties to apply to the OCTs, rhetoric notwithstanding. 
Crucially, asymmetry remains the main principle of association, which is 
entirely in line with the goals of association set out in Article 198 TFEU. 
In short, agreeing with Professor Ziller, while Part III TFEU does not 
apply in full, as the majority of derogations contained in Part IV TFEU 
actually concern the provisions of the mainstream acquis on the four 
freedoms and the Internal Market, other parts of the Treaties should be 
deemed to have at least potential legal effects with regard to the situation of 
the OCTs. Going even further along the path of the integrationalist vision of 
the OCTs, Dominique Custos is absolutely right that, notwithstanding the 
Part IV TFEU derogations, it is possible to speak of the application of the 
four freedoms to the OCTs,269 some of them virtually unrestrictedly.270  
IV. TERRITORIES SUI GENERIS IN THE EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS 
In addition to the ORs and OCTs, EU law applies in the most exceptional 
manner in a number of territories of the Member States not covered by these 
statuses. The situation of such territories, where profoundly atypical 
application of EU law is not based on Article 355(1) or (2) TFEU, is joined 
here in a category of sui generis territories. This group covers a number of 
territories where the degree of application of EU law varies from virtually 
full (territorial) non-application271 to significant inclusion into the scope of 
the acquis.272 
The legal regime of the application of the acquis to the sui generis 
territories is regulated by Article 355(3)–(5) TFEU, alongside the other 
primary law of the Union. The TFEU thus incorporates specific provisions 
limiting the application of EU law to the Channel Islands,273 the Isle of 
Man274 and the Åland Islands,275 and contains a list of the territories to 
which Community law does not apply, including the Færœ Islands276 and 
  
 268. Joined Cases C-100 & 101/89, Kaefer & Procacci v. French State, 1990 E.C.R. I-
4647, ¶¶ 7, 9-10; Broberg, supra note 11, at 138; Kochenov, supra note 3, at 253-54. 
 269. See Custos, supra note 11, at 108. 
 270. For detailed analysis of the application of specific areas of EU law in the 
Overseas, see EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 26. 
 271. E.g., the Færœ Islands. See TFEU art. 355(5)(a). 
 272. E.g., Gibraltar or the Åland Islands. See TFEU arts. 355(3) & (4). 
 273. TFEU art. 355(5)(c). 
 274. Id. 
 275. TFEU art. 355(4). 
 276. TFEU art. 355(5)(a). The Islands are willing to rethink their status. See Helena 
Spongenberg, Faroe Islands Seek Closer EU Relations, EUOBSERVER (Oct. 8, 2007), 
http://euobserver.com/24/24907. 
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the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus (SBAs).277 Some relevant sections 
of Article 355 TFEU contain references to the specific provisions of the 
Acts of Accession, which entered into force at the moment of the accession 
to the Union of the Member States in charge of particular sui generis 
territories.278 However, a direct reference to the provisions of the Treaties of 
Accession limiting the extent to which the acquis applies in certain 
territories should not necessarily be contained in the TFEU, since the 
primary law status of such treaties is undisputed. Moreover, even failing to 
mention a territory in Article 355 TFEU directly does not exclude the 
possibility of a sui generis status for it. Examples of Gibraltar—which is 
covered by Article 355(3) TFEU—or the Holy Mount Athos—covered by a 
Declaration Appended to an Act of Accession279—are cases in point. 
The de facto disapplication of either particular elements or even the 
whole body of the acquis can also stem from the particular circumstances in 
which a Member State finds itself, especially when unable to exercise 
sovereignty over the whole state territory, which is the case of the Republic 
of Cyprus, for instance.280 The example of Cyprus is used more in the legal 
comparative vein, however, as it would be somewhat unjust to add the so-
called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on the list of the 
  
 277. TFEU art. 355(5)(b). The exceptional status of the Sovereign Base Areas is 
related to the non-economic nature of the British presence on Cyprus, as clarified in the Joint 
Declaration on the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland in Cyprus, appended to the 1972 Treaty of Accession, supra note 38. For an 
analysis see, e.g., Stéphanie Lauhlé Shaelou, The Principle of Territorial Exclusion in the 
EU: SBAs in Cyprus—A Special Case of Sui Generis Territories in the EU, in EU LAW OF 
THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 153. 
 278. The Treaties of Accession and Acts of Accession (making integral parts of the 
former) regulate the special status of Gibraltar. Accession to the European Communities of 
the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Jan. 22, 1972, 1972 O.J. (L 73) 5 (First Accession Treaty); Spain and Portugal 
Accession Treaty, supra note 80, art. 25 (explaining that the Canary Islands and Ceuta and 
Melilla may be decided to be included the Community). 
  Protocols appended to the Acts of Accession also play an important role in the 
delimitation of the territorial scope of application of the Treaties. See, e.g., Protocols No. 2 & 
3 to the 1972 Treaty of Accession, supra note 38; Protocol No. 2 to the 1985 Act of 
Accession Concerning the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Melilla, Nov. 15, 1985, 1985 O.J. 
(L 302) 400; Protocol No. 3 on the Sami People, supra note 38. The same applies to the 
Declarations appended to the Acts of Accession. See, e.g., Joint Declaration on the Sovereign 
Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Cyprus, 
appended to the 1972 Treaty of Accession, supra note 38; Declaration on Mount Athos, 
supra note 24.  
 279. Declaration on Mount Athos, supra note 24. 
 280. On the special position of the Cypriot territories not controlled by the 
government of Cyprus, see, for example, NIKOS SKOUTARIS, THE CYPRUS ISSUE: THE FOUR 
FREEDOMS IN A MEMBER STATE UNDER SIEGE (2011); STÉPHANIE LAULHÉ SHAELOU, THE EU 
AND CYPRUS: PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES OF FULL INTEGRATION (2010). 
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territories sui generis in the chosen sense of the term.281 Former examples of 
Hong Kong and Macao are equally not without interest.282 
All in all, the most important conclusion to be drawn from the very 
existence, as well as particular legal configuration of the modalities of sui 
generis application of the acquis in some Member States’ territories is that 
primary law of the Union provides enough flexibility for accommodating a 
broad array of far-reaching derogations, meeting the specific needs of those 
territories which are not satisfied with OR or OCT statuses. In other words, 
for the Member States it is theoretically possible to negotiate “in-between” 
statuses for specific territories virtually from scratch, should they be able to 
convince their other partners that there is sufficient need to deviate from the 
existing legal solutions.  
V. EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS AND OPT-OUTS AND DEROGATIONS FROM 
THE ACQUIS 
The derogations and opt-outs from the acquis are essential in shaping the 
legal essence of the special statuses granted to the Overseas in EU law. In 
fact, the EU Law of the Overseas is nothing but a law of derogations: it 
covers the special system of rules governing the adaptation of the familiar 
norms of the acquis to the specificities of the Overseas context. 
Assessed from this vantage point, OCT status can be regarded as a 
derogation in itself, as Jacques Ziller rightly noted,283 given that on the basis 
of Article 355(2) TFEU such countries and territories do not normally fall 
within the scope of EU law in its classical sense, as Part IV TFEU applies, 
supplying a derogatory lex specialis for the ordinary provisions of the 
acquis contained in Part III TFEU. 
The same can be said about all the sui generis statuses granted to 
Member States’ territories in EU law. The presumption is always absolutely 
clear: unless there is an unequivocal statement to the contrary, EU law, 
including the principle of the inclusive unitary interpretation of Member 
State territory, will be applicable to the whole of the territory of each of the 
Member States in full. In other words, even the total non-application of EU 
law, which can be witnessed in the context of some sui generis statuses, 
  
 281. Nikos Skoutaris, The Status of Northern Cyrus Under EU Law: A Comparative 
Approach to the Territorial Suspension of the Acquis, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra 
note 5, at 401.  
 282. For an analysis of the dubious legal position of Macao and Hong Kong in 
Community law before these territories were transferred to China (also differentiating 
between the sui generis statuses applicable to these territories), see Karagiannis, supra note 
19, at 338 n.26. See also Brian Hook & Miguel Santos Neves, The Role of Hong Kong and 
Macau in China’s Relations with Europe, 169 CHINA Q. 108 (2002). 
 283. Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after 
the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 73. 
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such as that enjoyed by the Færœ Islands,284 for instance, is still to be 
regarded as a derogation or opt-out granted in EU law. Such opt-outs are not 
unilateral and require the consent of all the Member States to address the 
staring presumption of the application of the acquis in full. 
Similarly, the OR status, even though it is rooted in the principle of the 
application of the acquis in the ORs, only acquires its meaning once 
derogations from the main principle are thoroughly considered. In fact, OR 
status has only acquired legal substance as a result of the articulation of the 
rules on how far and to what extent the acquis can be deviated from—which 
is the sole aim and purpose of Article 349 TFEU in the first place. The 
possibility to derogate is at the core of each of the statuses in question and 
forms the essence of the EU Law of the Overseas. 
In this context, a distinction should be made between the derogations in 
primary law, including total opt-outs, and derogations in secondary law. 
While the former can be permanent and it is up to the Member States to 
establish how far such derogations will actually go, the latter are quite 
different, as the approach to them is generally much stricter. Accordingly, 
following the Court’s case law, the reading of derogations should be as 
narrow as possible285 and their strict application should apply to the Member 
State subject to the derogation, other Member States286 and to the 
Institutions equally.287 These key attributes of derogations, whatever legal 
basis they have and whatever goals they are set out to achieve, remain 
largely intact also in the context of the Overseas. All derogations must 
deviate from the acquis as little as possible, and only as far as it is 
demonstrably necessary to achieve their specific goals. Moreover, they must 
be time-bound. There is thus no possibility of derogating from the acquis 
permanently under Article 349 TFEU, since, according to the Commission, 
the Treaty “does [not] provide a generalised ‘opt-out’ [for the ORs],”288 
which is a position also reflected in the ECJ’s Chevassus-Marche case 
law.289 
The nature of derogations may vary. In general, derogations can create 
legal consequences of different nature, depending on the type of the 
derogation in force. Four main types of derogations can be distinguished in 
this regard: opt-outs granted in the primary law of the Union (e.g. those 
included into the Treaty of Accession signed with an incoming Member 
State possessing special territories); dynamic derogations, rooted in primary 
  
 284. TFEU art. 355(5)(a). 
 285. E.g., Case 58/83, Comm’n v. Hellenic Republic, 1984 E.C.R. 2027; Case 192/84, 
Comm’n v. Hellenic Republic, 1985 E.C.R. 3967. 
 286. E.g., Case 77/82, Peskegloglou v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 1983 E.C.R. 1085. 
 287. E.g., Case 11/82, Piraiki-Patraiki v. Comm’n, 1985 E.C.R. 207, ¶¶ 24-46. 
 288. Commission Report on the Measures to Implement Article 299(2), supra note 
113, at 31. 
 289. See generally Case C-212/96, Paul Chevassus-Marche v. Conseil Régional de la 
Réunion, 1998 E.C.R. I-743. 
2012] The Application of EU Law 727 
 
EU law, but essentially depending on the assessment of the situation in 
place in the regions enjoying a special status (e.g. when the Treaty of 
Accession allows for the broadening of the scope of derogations, or, on the 
contrary, narrowing their scope or shortening the time of applicability of 
derogations); derogations arising from secondary EU law and enabled by 
the use of the provisions on the special status of the Overseas as a legal 
basis (e.g. the ones contained in the Overseas Association Decisions and 
POSEI programmes); and derogations in secondary law not based on the 
special provisions in the Treaties on the Overseas, but de facto aiming to 
achieve objectives very similar or identical to those spelled out in the 
Overseas provisions. 
Opt-outs in primary law enjoy the most far-reaching effects among all 
the four types of derogations. They are capable of altering the very nature of 
the acquis applicable to a particular territory and—by virtue of being part of 
the Primary law—cannot be challenged in Court.290 The non-application of 
Part III TFEU in the OCTs, or the placement of the Færœ Islands outside 
the framework of the Treaties are good examples of such opt-outs. Unlike 
any other derogations, these are permanent: it takes a treaty revision to 
change them. 
Dynamic derogations in primary law function differently. They allow for 
the reassessment of the term of their validity upon expiry of a certain period 
contained in the derogating measure. The special legal regime applying to 
the Nordic territories inhabited by the Sami people, granted by virtue of 
Protocol No. 3 to the 1994 Act of Accession,291 illuminates how such 
derogations function. The Protocol established an ethnicity-based monopoly 
on the reindeer breeding in those regions,292 the extent of which can be 
altered in the future to exclude other traditional Sami activities from the 
scope of application of Community law, as long as it is deemed necessary 
for the preservation of their culture.293 An example of the same type of 
derogations applied in the context of the Overseas are the derogations 
contained in the Act of Accession that enlarged the Communities to 
incorporate the Iberian states, which allowed for the exclusion of the Canary 
Islands from the acquis and opened the way to reverse this position by 
Secondary law.294 Consequently, the Canary Islands were included into the 
  
 290. Joined Cases 31 & 35/86, Levantina Agricola Indus. SA (Laisa) & CPC España 
SA v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 2285,¶ 22. The Court can only interpret the provisions of the 
Treaties of Accession, Acts of Accession and Annexes to the Acts of Accession. See also, 
e.g., Case C-355/97, Landesgrundverkehrsreferent der Tiroler Landesregierung v. Beck 
Liegenschaftsverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH, 1999 E.C.R. I-4977. On the practical 
functioning of such derogation in the context of the recent enlargement of the Union, see 
Dimitry Kochenov, European Integration and the Gift of the Second Class Citizenship, 13 
MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J. L. 209 (2006). 
 291. See Perrot & Miatti, supra note 38, at 672-76. 
 292. Protocol No. 3 on the Sami People, supra note 38, art. 1. 
 293. Id. art. 2. See also Perrot & Miatti, supra note 38, at 674. 
 294. Spain and Portugal Accession Treaty, supra note 80, art. 25(4). 
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scope of EU law and the customs territory of the Union by Council 
Regulation 1911/91.295 This regulation started the process of integration of 
the Canary Islands into the EU and ultimately resulted in the grant of OR 
status to the Islands. 
Derogations in secondary law, based on the specific provisions in the 
Treaties on the Overseas, have a much more dynamic character than 
primary law opt-outs and derogations. In the context of the ORs, such 
derogations are based on the Council Decisions that have Article 349(1) 
TFEU as a legal basis, while in the context of the OCTs, such a special 
derogatory regime is established by Council Decisions adopted on the basis 
of Article 203 TFEU. The goals of such derogations would be to fully 
utilise the potential of the special statuses in question to meet the needs of 
the Overseas. Controversies can arise, with respect to the extent to which 
the Council can employ the special legal bases in the TFEU Treaty in 
derogating from the main rules of the acquis designed for each of the 
particular statuses in question. Interestingly, although neither Article 349(1) 
nor Article 203 TFEU spell out clear limits for Council action, a systemic 
reading of the Treaties along with the relevant case law makes it absolutely 
clear that those limits are there and that they should always be taken into 
account. Although the tension over the possible depth of derogations was 
somewhat relieved by Chevassus-Marche and other relevant cases in the 
context of the ORs, in the context of the OCTs such clarification is yet to 
come. Amusingly, the Overseas Association Decisions seem to derogate 
even from primary law, which is hardly acceptable. The strangest example 
is placing Bermuda, a British OCT included in Annex II TFEU, outside the 
scope of Association.296 The legality of this approach is very questionable 
indeed.297 Importantly, the derogations based on secondary law are not 
reshaping the essence of the acquis, like the primary law opt-outs, but are 
rooted in the spirit and the letter of the acquis itself, which indicates their 
different nature, compared with the first two types of derogations, and 
subordinates them vis-à-vis the primary law of the Union. 
Sometimes derogations of entirely different natures can be hardly 
distinguished from each other due to the similarities in the legal situations 
they create. The octroi de mer levied in the DOM thus used to have exactly 
the same practical consequences for the free-movement of goods as the 
arbitrio insular—tarifa especial levied by the Spanish authorities on the 
Canary Islands. However, due to their different nature, the legal status of the 
two taxes differed entirely. The French one was based on a Council 
  
 295. Council Regulation 1911/91, of 26 June 1991 on the Application of the 
Provisions of Community Law to the Canary Islands, 1991 O.J. (L 171) 1 (EEC). 
 296. See Council Decision 2001/822, On the Association of the Overseas Countries 
and Territories with the European Community, pmbl. para. 22, 2001 O.J. (L 314) 3 (EC). 
 297. E.g., Karagiannis, supra note 19, at 338-39 n. 27. 
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Decision adopted on the legal basis of the former Article 227(2) EEC298 and 
was thus an attempt to use a special legal basis provided in the EEC Treaty 
for the accommodation of the needs of the ORs. The Spanish one could be 
levied as part of a transitional regime applied to Spain following its 
accession to the EC and could remain in force until 31 December 2001.299 It 
was thus used to better prepare Spain for the eventual complete embrace of 
the acquis. Consequently, the Court could strike down300 and later adopt a 
milder position301 vis-à-vis the French tax, but the issue of the validity of a 
Spanish tax, which had identical implications for the free-movement of 
goods, could not even be raised before it. 
Not all the derogations aimed at meeting the special needs of the 
Overseas are based on the specific provisions designed for that purpose in 
the Treaties. This is particularly the case of the ORs. The use of multiple 
other legal bases both in Primary and Secondary EC law is possible. A 
virtually infinite number of examples can be provided, ranging from the 
rules on the operation of subsonic private jets,302 the definition of marine 
waters for the purposes of the marine environmental policy,303 to the 
regulation of electricity markets.304 What unites all the known examples is 
the link made between the derogation and the specificity of the region or 
territory overseas where such derogation applies. 
  
 298. Council Decision 89/688/EEC, of 22 December 1989 Concerning the Dock Dues 
in the French Overseas Departments, 1989 O.J. (L 399) 46 (EC). The dock dues system 
presently in force is based on Council Decision 2004/162, of 10 February 2004 Concerning 
the Dock Dues in the French Overseas Departments and Extending the Period of Validity of 
Decision 89/688/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 52) 64 (EC). This decision has EC Treaty art. 299(2) 
(now TFEU art. 349(1)) as a legal basis. 
 299. Protocol No. 2 of the Spain and Portugal Accession Treaty, supra note 80, art. 6. 
 300. Joined Cases C-363 & 407/93, 408/93, 409/93, 410/93 & 411/93, ené Lancry v. 
Direction Générale des Douanes, 1994 E.C.R I-3978. 
 301. See generally Case C-212/96, Paul Chevassus-Marche v. Conseil Régional de la 
Réunion, 1998 E.C.R. I-743. 
 302. Directive 2006/93/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on the Regulation of the Operation of Aeroplanes Covered by Part II, 
Chapter 3, Volume 1 of Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Second 
Edition (1988), art. 2, 2006 O.J. (L 374) 1, 2 (codified version) (not applicable to DOM). 
 303. Directive 2008/56, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Marine 
Environmental Policy, art. 3(1), 2008 O.J. (L 164) 19, 24 (EC) (putting the DOM on equal 
footing with the OCTs). 
 304. See, e.g., Commission Decision 2004/920, On a Derogation from Certain 
Provisions of Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Concerning the Archipelago of the Azores, 2004 O.J. (L 389) 31 (EC). The Derogation in 
question is based on Directive 2003/54/EC, Concerning Common Rules for the Internal 
Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 96/92/EC, art. 26(1), 2003 O.J. (L 176) 51. 
Commission Decision 2004/920/EC, pmbl. para. 4, 2004 O.J. (L 389) 31 (referencing the 
handicaps mentioned in EC Treaty art. 299(2) (as in effect 2002) (now TFEU art. 349). 
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All in all, the EU Law of the Overseas is clearly the law of derogations 
and should be regarded as such, the Overseas being firmly rooted in the 
letter and the spirit of the acquis unless the contrary is provided for. 
VI. CHANGING THE STATUS OF AN OVERSEAS REGION OR TERRITORY  
Having provided for two main legal statuses for the Overseas in addition 
to special accommodations for the sui generis territories, the Treaties 
obviously had to be able to accommodate the desire of particular overseas 
regions and territories to change status in EU law. That such change can be 
required is not an overstatement. Moreover, the order of importance of the 
status change will vary. Three different situations can be distinguished in 
this regard. 
The simplest among them concerns the reflection in the Treaties of the 
change in the constitutional structure of the Member State, which does not 
actually entail a status change for the particular territory in EU law. 
Therefore, when Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-Martin became separate 
entities in French law,305 independent of the DOM Guadeloupe, it became 
necessary to have them included in the list of what is now Article 355(1) 
TFEU, even though their OR status was not at issue: after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, those territories simply became ORs in their 
own right. 
More interesting examples concern the change of the status of an 
overseas territory from OR to OCT or vice versa, driven by a belief that the 
new status will be better suited to guaranteeing the well-being of the 
population of the territory in question. Mayotte, a French OCT located 
between Madagascar and the African continent is currently on the way to 
OR status, to which end a special Declaration has been appended to the 
Treaty of Lisbon.306 Saint-Barthélemy, endowed with OR status upon 
splitting from Guadeloupe, demonstrated an intention to move in the 
opposite direction, towards the acquisition of OCT status.307 To provide 
another example, following the splitting of the Federation of the 
Netherlands Antilles, the so-called BES-eilanden (i.e. Bonaire, Sint-
Eustasius, and Saba) ended up incorporated within the constitutional 
structure of the European part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which 
could eventually result in pressure to change status from the current OCT to 
OR too.308 Currently, it has been decided to wait five years before reopening 
  
 305. See, e.g., André Oraison, Le statut nouveau de collectivité d’outre-mer des îles de 
Saint-Barthélemy et de Saint-Martin, in REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC, 154 (2008). 
 306. Declaration No. 43 on Article 355(6) of the TFEU, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 351. See 
also its predecessor, Declaration on Article IV-440(7), appended to the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 463 (never ratified) [hereinafter TCE]. 
 307. Oraison, supra 305, at 164. 
 308. Discussions to this end are ongoing. See, e.g., Hoogers, supra note 107; F.H. van 
den Brug, De BES-eilanden van buiten de Europese Unie naar binnen de Europese Unie 
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the issue.309 Such status change requires a lot of preparation, since the legal 
position of an OR, where the acquis applies by default, is quite different 
from that of an OCT, where derogations constitute the main rule. 
Consequently, the territories willing to undergo the change need to be 
adequately prepared for what lies ahead.310 The same can be said about 
changing from OR to OCT status, however. The challenges here are 
different, since the territory in question will need to be capable of handling 
a greater measure of autonomy in EU law and thus needs to be adequately 
prepared for the responsibilities and the challenges accompanying a greater 
degree of self-government. 
It can also be foreseen that a third, more complicated type of status 
change might also become an issue in the near future—moving the Overseas 
not currently subject to EU law within the realm of the acquis, or moving 
ORs or OCTs into the group of the territories sui generis. This could even 
result in the creation of new legal statuses for the Overseas in EU law. The 
possibilities for the creation of new, mixed-bag legal regimes are clearly 
foreseeable and virtually infinite. With the entry of Iceland into the EU, it 
can be expected that the Færœ Islands (a sui generis territory where EU law 
does not apply)311 and possibly Greenland (an OCT included in Annex II 
TFEU), would decide to amend their status in EU law, which might be 
required to meet the challenge of the changes in the fisheries regime 
applicable to Iceland after its accession. 
The Treaties regard such situations differently. The difference in 
approach does not only depend on the type of the status change in question, 
but also on the Member State with which a particular overseas region or 
territory is connected. Two Articles are applicable in this respect. Lex 
generalis is provided by Article 48 TEU, which contains a description of the 
procedures for Treaty amendment. Given that the subject matter of the 
status change of the Overseas is not covered by Article 48(6) TEU, 
simplified revision procedures outlined by Article 48 TEU are not 
applicable in this case, and the ordinary revision procedure applies.312 Lex 
  
[The BES Islands from Outside the European Union Within the European Union], 24 
REGELMAAT 230 (2009). See, e.g., H.G. Hoogers et al., Staatsrechtelijke consequenties van 
de toekenning van een UPG-status aan Aruba en de Eilandgebieden van de huidige 
Nederlandse Antillen, 26 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR ANTILLIAANS RECHT—JUSTICIA (2010) (Neth.) 
for an analysis of the constitutional consequences of a more global shift from the OCT to the 
OR status among the Netherlands Overseas. 
 309. Hoogers, supra note 107, at 6. 
 310. A good example of the depth of the preparation required is the gradual change of 
the law of Mayotte, done in preparation to making it an OR in EU law. See, e.g., MINOM 
DAESC AE DEU, Evolution du Statut Européen de Mayotte en RUP (June 16, 2004) 
(unpublished document) (on file with the author). See also Hugues Béringer, 
Departementalisation de Mayotte: Un changement de regime statutaire aix enjeux 
internationaux, 2 in REVUE JURIDIQUE ET POLITIQUE 176 (2010). 
 311. TFEU art. 355(5)(a). 
 312. TEU art. 48(2)–(5).  
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specialis, concerning a possibility of simplified status change via a Decision 
of the European Council is contained in Article 355(6) TFEU and only 
applies to “amending the status, with regard to the Union, of a Danish, 
French, or Netherlands country or territory referred to in paragraphs 1 and 
2.”313 Given that Article 355(1) and (2) refers to the ORs and the OCTs, the 
ordinary Treaty amendment procedure will not apply to the Danish, French, 
and Netherlands Overseas wishing to amend status in line with the first two 
categories of status change outlined above—which includes the conferral of 
a particular status in its own right on a territory already enjoying such a 
status via affiliation with a larger entity, such as the grant of OR status to 
Saint-Martin on its split from Guadeloupe, which is also an OR—or moving 
a territory from one status to another. 
Whether the third type of status change outlined above would be covered 
by Article 355(6) TFEU is not entirely clear. Given that the provision 
allows for “amending the status, with regard to the Union,”314 it can be 
concluded that such a possibility exists. In other words, a simplified 
procedure for Article 355(6) TFEU can even be used to create new, sui 
generis statuses in EU law—and no formal Treaty amendment in line with 
Article 48 TEU would be required.315 
The reach of such lex specialis is limited in two respects, however. 
Firstly, geographically, the Spanish, Portuguese and British Overseas cannot 
benefit from Article 355(6) TFEU and are bound to rely on lex generalis—
i.e. an ordinary treaty amendment procedure—in all the situations involving 
a change of a status of such territories with regard to EU law, including 
even the simplest ones. Secondly, since the simplified status change 
procedure only applies to the current OCT and ORs, it is impossible to 
employ this procedure to change the status of a Member State region or 
territory even if they are referred to in Article 355(6) TFEU, if such a region 
or territory does not fall within the two statuses. Consequently, while the 
simplified procedure might enable Greenland to amend its status in EU law, 
it is not applicable to the Færœ Islands, which, although Danish, enjoy a sui 
generis status under Article 355(5)(a) and are thus not covered. 
Needless to say, the differences between the two procedures are truly 
fundamental to say the least. While it is abundantly clear after a number of 
negative referenda and in a situation where the number of the Member 
  
 313. TFEU art. 355(6). For analysis Ziller, Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries 
and Territories and Others after the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF 
THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 78; Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le 
traité de Lisbonne, supra note 27, at 736-39. This provision is rooted in TCE art. IV-440, 
which never entered into force.  
 314. TFEU art. 355(6). 
 315. Danielle Perrot shares this position: “[TFEU art. 355(6)] n’exclut nullement que 
puisse être donné une suite juridique à une volonté politique de forger un statut encore 
inédit.” Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de Lisbonne, supra 
note 27, at 736. 
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States is only growing, that amending the Treaties will not become any 
easier in the years to come, recourse to an ordinary treaty amendment 
procedure can potentially be problematic. This is exactly the problem that 
Article 355(6) TFEU—inserted into the treaties by the Lisbon 
amendment—was intended to solve (for the ORs and the OCTs connected 
with some Member States at least). Puzzlingly, the Treaties do not make 
any reference to the democratic principles behind such status changes.316 
Faithful to the language of the primary law of the Union, it is only possible 
to wonder at how not a single word about the will of the people inhabiting 
the territories concerned entered the Treaty of Lisbon provision. 
Comparing the procedures, while Article 355(6) TFEU requires a 
unanimous decision of the European Council, with Commission 
consultation, on a proposal from the Member State connected with the 
territory subjected to the status change, Article 48 TEU is full of procedural 
complications and requires the involvement of a huge number of actors, the 
convening of a Convention “composed of representatives of the national 
Parliaments, of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, of 
the European Parliament and of the Commission,”317 as well as the 
Conference of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
(IGC),318 the signing of the new Treaty by all the Member States and its 
ratification in accordance with their respective national constitutional 
requirements.319 It should be quite clear at this point that the employment of 
Article 48 TEU is not easy at all. At the same time, there is no obligation to 
draft a separate amending Treaty for every change in status of each overseas 
territory. The relevant changes can be made in the course of an IGC having 
a much broader mandate, thus becoming part of a somewhat more 
encompassing Treaty amendment procedure. 
  
 316. The Kingdom of the Netherlands appended a special Declaration to the Treaty of 
Lisbon in order to remedy this deficiency in the context of the eventual change in the EU 
legal status of one of its OCTs. See Declaration by the Kingdom of the Netherlands on 
Article 55 of the on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 
358. See also its predecessor, Kingdom of the Netherlands on Article IV-440, appended to 
the TCE, supra note 303 (never entered into force). 
 317. TEU art. 48(3). 
 318. TEU art. 48(4). 
 319. TEU art. 48(4), para. 2. 
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Before the inclusion of Article 355(6) TFEU into the Treaties by the 
Treaty of Lisbon,320 Treaty amendment was the only way to change a status 
of an overseas territory or region of a Member State vis-à-vis EU law, 
which can be illustrated by the change of the status of the Netherlands 
Antilles, 321 Greenland,322 or, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the update of the 
ORs list to include Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-Martin. Consequently, 
unilateral action by a Member State cannot possibly lead to a change in the 
legal status of an overseas region or territory in EU law.323 
  
 320. Such provision was actually first included in the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe which, however, never entered into force. See TCE art. IV-440(7). 
For an analysis see, for example, Jacques Ziller, Les collectivités des outre-mer de l’Union 
européenne, in L’OUTRE-MER FRANÇAIS: LA NOUVELLE DONNE INSTITUTIONNELLE 105–114 
(Jean Yves Faberon ed., 2004). For the general analysis of the likely influence of the TCE in 
the context of the Overseas, see Nadége Damoiseau, La portée du projet de Traité européen 
pour les DOM/ROM, 42 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPÉEN [RTDE] 649 (2006). 
 321. See de Overeenkomst tot wijziging van het Verdrag tot oprichting van de 
Europese Economische Gemeenschap ten einde de bijzondere associeatieregeling van het 
vierde deel van het Verdrag op de Nederlandse Antillen te doen zijn, of 13 November 1962, 
1964 J.O. (2413) 64.  
 322. See Greenland Treaty, Mar. 13, 1984, 1985 O.J. (L 29) 1. See also Weiss, supra 
note 84, at 173-75; Hylke Dijkstra et al., The European Union as an Actor in Arctic 
Governance, 16 EUR. F. AFF. REV. 227 (2011). 
 323. See also Perrot, Les régions ultrapériphériques françaises selon le traité de 
Lisbonne, supra note 27, at 719; The “seemingly illegal” example of Saint-Pierre-et-
Miquelon is the only precedent known today of an attempt at a unilateral change of a status 
of a territory by a Member State. Ziller, supra note 11, at 120. This territory, lying off the 
North-Eastern coast of Canada, was unilaterally proclaimed by France to have changed its 
status from an OCT to an OR (a status entirely reserved for the French DOM at the time, 
following the independence of Algeria) since it became a DOM in French law in 1976. 
France assumed that being a DOM in national law was enough to qualify as a DOM in the 
sense of EEC art. 227(2) (then in force), which made a general reference to the constitutional 
status of such territories in French law, instead of naming them all, which the Treaty of 
Lisbon has introduced. Consequently, according to the French, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon held 
the DOM status in the sense of national law and, also, in the sense of Community law until 
1985 when a reverse switch occurred, making it an OCT again. A number of French legal 
scholars assumed that such a change had legal effects in Community law. Coussirat-
Coustère, supra note 82, at 1425 n.28. The study of the Community documents demonstrates, 
however, that Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon was, in fact, treated as an OCT, not as an OR during 
its short-lived “éphémère période départementale” between 1976 and 1985. Ziller, L’Union 
Européenne et l’outre-Mer, supra note 27, at 151. Therefore, it was not made part of the 
customs territory of the Community, which can be regarded a necessary element of the OR 
status. Moreover, it has always been mentioned in the Annex to the EEC Treaty listing the 
associated countries and territories (now TFEU Annex II). Nevertheless, in an answer to a 
written question, the Commission stated unequivocally that it was covered by the status of 
EEC art. 227(2), i.e., that it was in fact an OR. See Written Question No. 400/76 by Mr. 
Lagorce to the Commission Concerning the Situation of the Islands Saint-Pierre-and-
Miquelon, 1976 O.J. (C 294) 16 [hereinafter Written Question by Mr. Lagorce]. The fact that 
it was not treated as one in Community law is indicative of the fact that de facto the change 
of status has never occurred. The Treaty of Lisbon made the repetition of such 
misunderstandings impossible, since from the date of its entry into force no connection is 
made between the legal status of an overseas territory or region in national law of the 
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VII. THE FUTURE OF EU OVERSEAS LAW 
Upon an overview of the essential principles and instruments affecting 
the legal regime of the Overseas, a contradictory picture emerges. On one 
hand, the Treaties unquestionably recognise the innate specificity of these 
regions compared with the Member States’ territories lying in the European 
continent—where the acquis applies in full—and provide for a clear 
demarcation of three legal statuses to be awarded to such regions in EU law. 
On the other hand, from the analysis presented above, it is clear that the 
essential content of the legal statuses in question is very fluid and can 
largely overlap from one status to another. Although the starting principles 
currently governing the operation of EU law in each of the three legal 
regimes analysed are very different, according to the Treaties and to the 
case law of the Court, the analysis of the practical consequences of the 
application of these differences shows that, in some fields at least, these 
differences can be truly negligible. The problematic nature of this state of 
affairs should not be overstated, however. Given the profound discrepancies 
between the conditions of particular Overseas, whatever category they fall 
in, flexibility, also within EU Law of the Overseas, is to be regarded as an 
essential and necessary principle. In fact, all the relevant law can be 
reinterpreted in this light—the special legal statuses for the Overseas were 
created for no other reason than for ensuring the maximum level of flexible 
application of law in these regions, to adjust the acquis optimally to make it 
suit their needs. Which starting assumption is adopted in this respect—i.e. 
whether it be the application of EU law in full with possible far-reaching 
derogations, or a general exclusion from the scope of the Internal Market 
law, again, with far-reaching derogations—ultimately changes little, if not 
nothing. These are simply two sides of the same coin and have to be 
regarded as such.  
The story of the Overseas in the EU is a story of constant readjustment of 
their legal position. In essence a circular move can be observed in this 
respect. Having started as a potentially key element of the Eurafrican 
project, the Overseas that remained connected to the Member States upon 
the finalization of decolonization largely fell into oblivion and lost any 
relevance whatsoever in the eyes of the Union, except for the constant 
refrain about their “under-development” and “handicaps.” No distinction is 
to be made between the OCTs and the ORs in this respect, since both have 
enjoyed the same treatment. The situation seems to be changing at the 
moment, however, as the Commission and other Institutions have started 
paying greater attention to the Overseas, recognizing their potential.324 The 
  
Member State with which they are connected and EU law, making the claims that one should 
follow another untenable. 
 324. E.g., Communication from the Commission on Halting the Loss of Biodiversity 
by 2010—and Beyond: Sustaining Ecosystem Services for Human Well-being, COM (2006) 
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circle is thus rounding; hopefully, the Overseas will regain their initial 
importance in the eyes of the Union, which will benefit all the three sides 
involved: the EU, the Member States and, of course, the Overseas 
themselves. In addition to this welcome circular move, the dynamics of the 
Overseas’ law development over recent decades permits the outlining of 
four profoundly interrelated trends affecting the legal situation of the 
Overseas in the Union. 
The first trend concerns the gradual rise in attention paid to the needs of 
the Overseas, as well as clearer articulation of their statuses, allowing a 
substantial increase in flexibility. Although the ECJ can clearly be criticized 
for embracing a somewhat limiting approach to the two main Overseas 
statuses—which can be exemplified by Lancry325 and Antillean Rice 
Mills326—ultimately the Court undoubtedly played a leading role in the 
articulation of the legal specificity of the Overseas, using those limited 
opportunities which arose to clarify their status. In fact, before Hansen,327 
the distinction between the ORs and the OCTs, which is stated in the 
Treaties quite clearly, was virtually ignored in practice, so it is due to the 
Court that the current statuses took shape in an atmosphere of waning 
interest on the part of the Member States and the Institutions. Now that the 
Commission has joined in with its recent Papers,328 the situation is changing 
for the better for the Overseas and promises due attention in future, as well 
as clarity of status and better opportunities for development in a situation 
where their specificity is duly recognised. 
The second trend in the evolution of the EU Law of the Overseas is the 
gradual rise in the flexibility of the reading of the essential elements of each 
of the legal statuses concerned. It is now abundantly clear to the Institutions, 
and most importantly, the Court, that the status of an OR or an OCT is 
unlikely to be productive if construed too rigidly. Moving away from 
rigidity in the framing of these statuses is to be witnessed at all the three 
relevant levels of legal-political regulation. This is happening at the policy 
level, with the Commission unequivocally recognizing the need for the 
special treatment of the Overseas in its recent policy documents; at the level 
of law-making (including primary law) where each Treaty revision has 
added more subtlety to the legal construction of the Overseas, to which the 
removal of the list of the “untouchable” areas of the acquis from the 
  
216 final (May 22, 2006) [hereinafter Communication on Halting the Loss of Biodiversity]; 
Commission Green Paper, supra note 29. 
 325. Joined Cases C-363 & 407/93, 408/93, 409/93, 410/93 & 411/93, ené Lancry v. 
Direction Générale des Douanes, 1994 E.C.R I-3978. 
 326. See Case C-390/95 P. Antillean Rice Mills NV v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-769, ¶ 
37. 
 327. Case 148/77, H. Hansen Jun & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt de 
Flensburg, 1978 E.C.R. 1787. 
 328. E.g., Communication on Halting the Loss of Biodiversity, supra note 324; 
Commission Green Paper, supra note 29. 
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relevant Article in Amsterdam329 is a great illustration; and also at the level 
of interpreting the law, where the Court embraced OR flexibility, going far 
beyond what had previously been seemingly permitted in the Chevassus-
Marche line of case law,330 as well as recognized the influence on the 
OCTs’ acquis from different sources, ranging from the general principles of 
EU law to EU citizenship.331 As a result of the recent reshuffling of the way 
the Overseas are regarded in EU law, the legal regimes in question became 
much better suited to the full reflection of the specificity of the regions 
concerned. 
It became clear, at the same time, that the special legal regimes created 
for the Overseas in the Treaties recognize many more limitations than 
initially thought, which forms the third notable trend in the development of 
the EU Overseas law. Being essentially territorial in nature, the special 
clauses in the Treaties dealing with the Overseas are powerless in the face 
of the penetration of EU law via other routes, especially the scope ratione 
personae, which has received a notable boost with the articulation of the 
importance of the concept of EU citizenship by the ECJ during the last ten 
years.332 Although the inherent limitations of the territorial logic of all the 
derogations marking the legal situation of the Overseas in the Treaties can 
be regarded favourably, given that EU citizens residing there are not always 
affected by such limitations and can, as a consequence, invoke EU law on 
some occasions even when residing largely outside the scope ratione loci of 
EU law—to of which Eman and Sevinger333 is a perfect illustration334—this 
development can also have a negative side to it, since it limits the extent of 
possible derogations from the mainstream acquis in the Overseas, thus 
undermining the very rationale for the creation of the special statuses. This 
mostly concerns the OCTs, of course, but can also become acute in the OR 
context, since the rights of EU citizenship not connected to territory can 
potentially come into conflict with the special derogatory regime of the 
application of EU law in such regions. The same largely also applies to the 
  
 329. EC Treaty art. 227(2). 
 330. Case C-212/96, Paul Chevassus-Marche v. Conseil Régional de la Réunion, 1998 
E.C.R. I-743. See also Joined Cases C-37 & 38/96, Sodiprem SARL & Others v. Direction 
Générale des Douanes, 1998 E.C.R. I-2039. 
 331. Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. College van Burgemeester en Wethouders 
van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055. 
 332. See, e.g., Case C-85/96, Martínez Sala v. Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691; Case C-
200/02, Zhu v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, 2004 E.C.R. I-9925; See generally Case C-
192/05, K. Tas-Hagen and R.A. Tas v. Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen- en 
Uitkeringsraad, 2006 E.C.R. I-10451; Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R.I-
1449. For an analysis see Kochenov & Plender, supra note 263; Dimitry Kochenov, Ius 
Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship between Status 
and Rights, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 169 (2009). 
 333. See generally Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. College van Burgemeester en 
Wethouders van Den Haag, 2006 E.C.R. I-8055. 
 334. See Kochenov, supra note 29. 
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sui generis statuses.335 All in all, the last ten years have demonstrated that 
the derogatory essence of the Overseas’ legal regime in EU law should not 
be overstated, as its territorial nature competes with other scopes of EU law, 
the latter not acknowledging any exceptional statuses for the Overseas. 
Taking all the aforementioned aspects marking the evolution of the legal 
position of the Overseas in the Union together, the fourth trend worth 
mentioning emerges. It concerns the on-going convergence in the essence of 
the majority of the legal statuses demarcated by Article 355 TFEU. In other 
words, considering the effects of the rise in the flexibility coupled with the 
effects of the rising awareness of the limitations inherent in the territorial 
logic marking the essence of Article 355 TFEU, as well as the willingness 
of the Institutions to do more in connection with meeting the needs of the 
Overseas related to their special position, all act to blur the border between 
the OCTs and the ORs. This development should not be lamented and could 
even probably be predicted, given the stunning diversity observable from 
one EU overseas region or territory to another. Consequently, it is not 
surprising in the slightest that the main legal framework designed to cater 
for the needs of the Overseas demands increasingly flexible approaches to 
achieve its stated goals, even if the result of such evolution tends to 
undermine the crisp distinction set out in the initial design of the legal 
regime of the Overseas in EU law. 
Accordingly, approaching all the special legal statuses created for the 
Overseas in the EU separately, and viewing the Overseas in isolation from 
the mainstream acquis and other, non-territorial, scopes of EU law except 
ratione loci, is currently impossible. An integrated approach to the Overseas 
in the EU is indispensable in studying the legal aspects of the EU’s 
Overseas.  
In the context of the main trends in the development of the EU Law of 
the Overseas, a number of important questions arise, signposting the likely 
evolution of this branch in the near future. The most important foundational 
question in this context is related to the need to repeatedly find the right 
balance between integration and differentiation. Undoubtedly, it equally 
concerns all the known types of the Overseas in EU law. A number of 
related issues emerge, involving the necessity to pay due attention to the 
actual needs of the Overseas when derogating from the acquis, to take into 
account the main rationale and principles of European integration and EU 
citizenship when framing the Overseas acquis, and to avoid post-colonialist 
attitudes in EU–Overseas interactions. 
  
 335. For an analysis focusing especially on the potential influence of EU citizenship 
on the law of the Åland Islands see Kochenov, supra note 37. 
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TABLE 1: OUTERMOST REGIONS OF THE EU 
 
OR Member 
State 
Location Capital Surface 
Area 
Population 
Azores Portugal Atlantic Ponta 
Delgada 
2.333 
km2
237.900 
Canary 
Islands 
Spain Atlantic Las 
Palmas 
7.447 
km2
1.755.700 
Guadeloupe France Caribbean Pointe-
à-Pitre 
1.710 
km2
425.700 
French 
Guiana 
France South 
America 
Cayenne 84.000 
km2
161.100 
Madeira Portugal Atlantic Funchal 795 
km2
244.800 
Martinique France Caribbean Fort-de-
France 
1.080 
km2
383.300 
Réunion  France Indian 
Ocean 
Saint-
Denis 
2.510 
km2
715.900 
Saint-
Martin 
France Caribbean Marigot 53 km2 35.000 
 
TABLE 2: EXAMPLES OF TERRITORIES SUI GENERIS 
 
TSG Member 
State 
Location Capital Surface 
Area 
(km2) 
Population 
Åland Islands Finland Baltic Mariehamn 13.517 27.700 
Færœ Islands Denmark North Atlantic Tórshavn 1.399 48.917 
Gibraltar United 
Kingdom 
Mediterranean Gibraltar 6,8 29.431 
Guernsey United 
Kingdom 
English 
Channel 
Saint Peter 
Port 
78 65.573 
Isle of Man United 
Kingdom 
Irish Sea Douglas 572 80.085 
Jersey United 
Kingdom 
English 
Channel 
Saint 
Helier 
116 91.626 
Sovereign 
British Bases 
on Cyprus 
(Akrotiri and 
Dhekelia) 
United 
Kingdom 
Mediterranean Episkopi 254 14.500 
 
TABLE 3: OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
EU 
 
OCT Member 
State 
Location Capital Surface 
Area 
(km2) 
Population 
Anguilla United 
Kingdom 
Caribbean The Valley 91 11.430 
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Aruba Netherlands Caribbean Oranjestad 180 90.508 
Bermuda United 
Kingdom 
Atlantic Hamilton 53 62.059 
Bonaire Netherlands Caribbean Kralendijk 288 15.414 
British Antarctic 
Territory 
United 
Kingdom 
Antarctica Rothera 1.709.4
00 
250 
British Indian 
Ocean Territory 
United 
Kingdom 
Indian 
Ocean 
Diego 
Garcia 
60 4.000 
British Virgin 
Islands 
United 
Kingdom 
Caribbean Road Town 153 27.000 
Cayman Islands United 
Kingdom 
Caribbean George 
Town 
264 60.456 
Curaçao Netherlands Caribbean Willemstad 444 142.180 
Falkland Islands United 
Kingdom 
Atlantic Stanley 12.173 3.140 
French 
Polynesia 
France Pacific 
Ocean 
Papeete 4.167 26.000 
French Southern 
and Antarctic 
Territories 
France Indian 
Ocean, 
Antarctica 
Port-aux-
Français 
439.781 140 
Greenland Denmark Arctic Nuuk 2.166.0 56.452 
Mayotte France Indian 
Ocean 
Mamoudzou 374 194.000 
Montserrat United 
Kingdom 
Caribbean Plymouth 
(Brades) 
102 4.655 
New Caledonia 
and 
Dependencies 
France Pacific Nouméa 18.575 249.000 
Pitcairn United 
Kingdom 
Pacific Adamstown 47 50 
Saba Netherlands Caribbean The Bottom 13 2.000 
Saint-
Barthélémy 
France Caribbean Gustavia 25 8.300 
Saint Helena and 
Dependencies 
United 
Kingdom 
Atlantic Jamestown 122 4.255 
Saint-Pierre- et-
Miquelon 
France Atlantic Saint-Pierre 242 7.063 
Sint Eustasius Netherlands Caribbean Oranjestad 21 3.100 
Sint Maarten Netherlands Caribbean Philipsburg 34 71.000 
South Georgia 
and South 
Sandwitch 
Islands 
United 
Kingdom 
Atlantic King 
Edward 
Point 
3.903 30 
Turks and 
Caicos Islands 
United 
Kingdom 
West 
Indies 
Cockburn 
Town 
430 36.605 
Wallis and 
Futuna Islands 
France Pacific Mata-Utu 264 15.289 
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TABLE 4: KEY PROVISIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STATUS OF THE 
OVERSEAS: PRE-LISBON AND LISBON VERSIONS COMPARED.336 
 
TFEU EC Treaty 
Article 203 (formerly Article 187 EC) 
 
The Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission, shall, on the 
basis of the experience acquired under the 
association of the countries and territories with 
the Union and of the principles set out in the 
Treaties, lay down provisions as regards the 
detailed rules and the procedure for the 
association of the countries and territories with 
the Union. Where the provisions in question 
are adopted by the Council in accordance with 
a special legislative procedure, it shall act 
unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament.  
Article 187 (formerly Article 136) 
 
The Council, acting unanimously, 
shall, on the basis of the experience 
acquired under the association of 
the countries and territories with the 
Community and of the principles 
set out in this Treaty, lay down 
provisions as regards the detailed 
rules and the procedure for the 
association of the countries and 
territories with the Community. 
 
Article 349 
(formerly Article 299(2), second, third and 
fourth subparagraphs, EC) 
 
Taking account of the structural social and 
economic situation of Guadeloupe, French 
Guiana, Martinique, Réunion, Saint-
Barthélémy, Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira 
and the Canary Islands, which is compounded 
by their remoteness, insularity, small size, 
difficult topography and climate, economic 
dependence on a few products, the permanence 
and combination of which severely restrain 
their development, the Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, shall adopt specific 
measures aimed, in particular, at laying down 
the conditions of application of the Treaties to 
those regions, including common policies. 
Where the specific measures in question are 
adopted by the Council in accordance with a 
special legislative procedure, it shall also act 
on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament. 
 
 
 
The measures referred to in the first paragraph 
concern in particular areas such as customs 
Article 299 (formerly Article 227) 
 
 
 
2. [ . . . ] However, taking account 
of the structural social and 
economic situation of the French 
overseas departments, the Azores, 
Madeira and the Canary Islands, 
which is compounded by their 
remoteness, insularity, small size, 
difficult topography and climate, 
economic dependence on a few 
products, the permanence and 
combination of which severely 
restrain their development, the 
Council, acting by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting 
the European Parliament, shall 
adopt specific measures aimed, in 
particular, at laying down the 
conditions of application of the 
present Treaty to those regions, 
including common policies. 
 
 
The Council shall, when adopting 
the relevant measures referred to in 
  
 336. Emphasis indicates changes in wording other than mere change in style. Ziller, 
Outermost Regions, Overseas Countries and Territories and Others after the Entry into 
Force of the Lisbon Treaty, in EU LAW OF THE OVERSEAS, supra note 5, at 86-88. 
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and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, 
agriculture and fisheries policies, conditions for 
supply of raw materials and essential consumer 
goods, State aids and conditions of access to 
structural funds and to horizontal Union 
programmes. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Council shall adopt the measures referred 
to in the first paragraph taking into account the 
special characteristics and constraints of the 
outermost regions without undermining the 
integrity and the coherence of the Union legal 
order, including the Internal Market and 
common policies. 
the second subparagraph, take into 
account areas such as customs and 
trade policies, fiscal policy, free 
zones, agriculture and fisheries 
policies, conditions for supply of 
raw materials and essential 
consumer goods, State aids and 
conditions of access to structural 
funds and to horizontal Community 
programmes. 
 
The Council shall adopt the 
measures referred to in the second 
subparagraph taking into account 
the special characteristics and 
constraints of the outermost regions 
without undermining the integrity 
and the coherence of the 
Community legal order, including 
the Internal Market and common 
policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On 2 September 2011, Professor Dubner received an e-mail from a 
gentleman by the name of Andrew Mwangura which was sent from 
Mombasa, Kenya. This same gentleman, and between 20 and 25 people, 
including Professor Dubner, were invited to the Harvard’s Kennedy School 
of Government under the auspices of the World Peace Foundation and the 
Cambridge Coalition to Combat Piracy (December 2009) in order to express 
views on how to resolve piracy off the coast of Somalia. Included in this 
group were scholars, diplomats, senior ranking military officers, intelligence 
representatives, shipping industry officials, and other experts on maritime 
piracy. They came from all over the world to attend this important meeting 
They met in a conference room in the Harvard Kennedy Center and 
discussed the situation for two and a half days. The results of these sessions 
became embodied in an article called “Combating Maritime Piracy: A 
Policy Brief with Recommendations for Actions.”1 Since that meeting and 
resulting policy brief, there have been numerous articles and studies by the 
United Nations’ maritime-economists. Most recently, the United Nations 
(U.N.) issued a Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities for the 
  
 a1. Barry Hart Dubner, Professor of Law, Barry University, Andreas School of 
Law, Orlando, Florida; J.D., New York Law School; LL.M., University of Miami, School of 
Law; LL.M., New York University School of Law; J.S.D., New York University School of 
Law. Ritvik Raturi, B.Sc., University of Toronto; J.D. Barry University, Andreas School of 
Law. 
 1. ROBERT I. ROTBERG, COMBATING MARITIME PIRACY: A POLICY BRIEF 
WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTIONS, WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION, POLICY 
BRIEF #11 (World Peace Found. 2010), available at http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/ 
2010/418/WPF_Piracy_PolicyBrief_11.pdf. 
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Establishment of Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy Courts (hereinafter, 
Modalities Report).2 
Perhaps the most interesting statement on the current state of piracy does 
not come from U.N. documents and other articles, but from the 
aforementioned email that was received from Mr. Mwangura.3 He posed a 
series of questions and requested assistance in obtaining certain data on 
Somali sea piracy occurrences from September 2010 to August 2011. The 
request he posed is quite telling (see Appendix A). The questions 
demonstrate how the crime of piracy has expanded from the simple stealing 
of petty fund boxes and safes on board ships to the kidnapping of human 
beings and the hijacking of ships. The questions show that, even without the 
answers, exactly how bad the situation has become with regard to sea piracy 
committed in both near and far from the 1800 mile coast off of Somalia. 
The answers to these questions can be found in many sources, including 
the United States Government Counter-Piracy Steering Group, the Contact 
Group on Piracy, and their five working groups and the International 
Maritime Bureau.4 The reason for asking these questions was never given 
but it is obvious that the simple crime of piracy has now become rather a 
  
 2. U.N. Secretary-General, The Modalities for the Establishment of Specialized 
Somali Anti-Piracy Courts: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2011/360 (June 15, 
2011), available at http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/S-
2011-360%20%2815Jun2011%29%20Piracy.pdf [hereinafter The Modalities]. 
 3. See infra App. A. 
 4. See Counter Piracy and Maritime Security (PM/CPMS), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/c32662.htm (“The U.S. Government Counter-Piracy 
Steering Group is an “executive-level body created to implement the National Action and 
Partnership Plan to Combat Piracy off the Horn of Africa, this group is co-chaired by the 
Departments of State and Defense and reports to the National Security Staff. Also 
represented on this group are the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, 
Transportation, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.”); see Background, 
CONTACT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 
http://www.thecgpcs.org/about.do?action=background (last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (“Pursuant 
to UN Security Council Resolution 1851, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia (CGPCS) was established on January 14, 2009 to facilitate the discussion and 
coordination of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of 
Somalia. This international forum has brought together more than 60 countries and 
international organizations all working towards the prevention of piracy off the Somali 
coast.”); see International Maritime Bureau, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://icc-
ccs.org/home/imb (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (“The International Maritime Bureau [(IMB)] 
is a specialized division of the International Chamber [o]f Commerce [(ICC)]” that was 
“established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight against all types of maritime crime and 
malpractice.”). Since 1992, the IMB has operated its Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC), the 
main objective of which ”is to be the first point of contact for the shipmaster to report” an 
actual or attempted attack or even suspicious movements, “thus initiating the process of 
response.” IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://icc-
ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). The PRC’s “main aim” is to 
“raise awareness within the shipping industry, which includes the shipmaster, ship-owner, 
insurance companies, traders, etc[.], of the areas of high risk associated with piratical attacks 
or specific ports and anchorages associated with armed robberies on board ships.” Id. 
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strain economically on maritime shipping companies and countries, such as 
the United States and European Union. The purpose of this article is to 
show how and why there is a “cottage” industry developing to both prevent 
and fight piracy. Mr. Mwangura ends his e-mail as follows: “Everyone is 
crying out for peace, none of them is crying for justice. We want equal 
rights and justice.” (See Appendix A).  The assumption is that this refers to 
the seamen and other civilian hostages that are being held over long periods 
of time. The waste of human life is appalling. The economics of the 
situation is one of the main causes of sea piracy. 
I. THE EXTENT OF THE SEA PIRACY PROBLEM 
One of the key questions asked in Mr. Mwangura’s email was whether or 
not the prosecution of pirates had any effect. The answer lies partly with the 
economics involved. When reading the statistics, sea piracy seems to be 
getting worse, not better. For example, as of March 2011, Contact Group on 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) Plenary Session reported that 
pirates were holding 26 ships and 573 hostages; in July 2011, CGPCS 
Plenary Session reported 17 ships and 393 hostages; and in November 2011, 
CGPCS Plenary Session reported 10 ships and 243 hostages.5 These reports 
show that there is a continuing trend of pirates capturing fewer ships (“IMB 
credits the reduction in hijackings to the intervention by international naval 
forces.”).6 However, in contrast to the trend of fewer hijackings is the fact 
that piracy is a growing threat because the number of pirate attacks 
continues to be on the rise, “albeit with a decreasing rate of success.”7 In 
July 2011, the IMB released a report stating that pirates are now targeting 
areas frequented by crude oil tankers.8 Furthermore, “Ships, including oil 
and chemical tankers, are increasingly being attacked with automatic 
weapons and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Whereas five years ago 
  
 5. See also Contact Group of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Communiqué: Ninth 
Plenary Session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, N.Y., July 14, 
2011, available at http://www.thecgpcs.org/plenary.do?action=plenarySub&seq=18 (follow 
“Communique from 9th Session” hyperlink) [hereinafter ninth Plenary Session]; Contact 
Group of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Communiqué: Tenth Plenary Session of the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, N.Y., Nov. 17, 2011, available at 
http://www.thecgpcs.org/plenary.do?action=plenarySub&seq=19 (follow “Communique 
from 10th Session” hyperlink) [hereinafter Tenth Plenary Session]. 
 6. See Ninth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 1. See also As World Piracy Hits a 
New High, More Ships are Escaping Somali Pirates, Says IMB Report, INT’L MAR. BUREAU 
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/969-as-world-piracy-hits-a-new-high-more-
ships-are-escaping-somali-pirates-says-imb-r. 
 7. Tenth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 1. 
 8. Pirate Attacks at Sea Getting Bigger and Bolder, Says IMB Report, INT’L 
MAR. BUREAU (July 14, 2011), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/450-pirate-attacks-at-sea-
getting-bigger-and-bolder-says-imb-report.International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 2011 
figures show that Somali pirates this year have initiated more attacks, 231 this year, up from 
126 for the first nine months of 2010. Id. 
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pirates were just as likely to brandish a knife as a gun, this year guns were 
used in 160 attacks and knives in 35.”9 Owners of oil and energy tankers are 
also claiming that insider information is allowing pirates to target their 
ships.10  
“The geographical area of the attacks now stretches to 2.8 million square 
miles, an area that is increasingly difficult for naval forces to patrol.”11 In 
addition, according to the Modalities Report, the expanding range of attacks 
has been achieved through the use of mother ships.12 The Modalities Report 
stated that Pirates are now 
[u]sing large vessels with supplies for smaller pirate vessels used in 
attacks, and with as  many as a hundred pirates on board to guard 
hostages and to deter rescue attempts. Pirate  attacks now often involve 
the use of overwhelming force to overcome security personnel  on board 
merchant ships. Hijacked crews have been used as “human shields” 
against  military intervention, and have been threatened as a means to 
deter military attack.13 
It is estimated that there are about “50 main pirate leaders, around 300 
leaders of pirate attack groups, and aground 2,500 ‘foot soldiers.’ It is 
believed that financing is provided by [approximately] 10 to 20 individuals. 
In addition, there is a large number of armed individuals guarding captured 
ships, and numerous ransom negotiators” working for the pirates.14 
Against this background, this essay will explore the “classical” period of 
piracy to see how much difference there is between the operations of pirates 
centuries ago, in the Caribbean, for example, and operations that are being 
used today off of Somalia. It will be observed that everything has changed 
and nothing has changed meaning that though there are numerous new 
tactics used by pirates and their backers, the laws regarding piracy are 
essentially the same now as they were centuries ago; the prosecution of 
pirates and trying to create a prosecutorial system in a lawless country has 
become problematic, just as it was centuries ago; and the approach to the 
problem of sea piracy has been one of repeating past mistakes. This article 
will demonstrate that all of the economic and prosecutorial problems that 
exist today also existed hundreds of years ago.  
The resurgence of piracy is obviously due to the fact that it has become a 
financial success for the pirates and their backers. Now most of the 
countries are waiting to see what is going to happen to the relationship 
  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Walter Menya, Kenya: Nation’s Neighbours Reluctant to Host Courts to Try 
Somali Pirates, ALL AFRICA (July 9, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201107111497.html.   
 12. The Modalities, supra note 2, at 27. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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between pirates and the various extremist groups in Somalia. Can the 
relationship of extremists and organized crime syndicates with pirates 
become so successful that nobody in the country of Somalia will be able to 
stop it? Will piracy develop in the same manner as the South American drug 
trade in the 1970s, a relatively small-time operation turning into a huge 
global crisis? These are some of the questions that this article is going to 
explore. 
This discussion will commence with a look at some of the highlights of 
piracy that existed centuries ago. 
II. THE CLASSICAL PERIOD OF PIRACY 
When Professor Dubner became interested in writing about piracy it was 
because he had thought that the crime had disappeared from the face of the 
earth. He wrote the first book on International Law of Sea Piracy over 30 
years ago.15 At that time, the main source of material was a 1932 study by 
the Harvard Research Group.16  The group proposed draft articles on the 
subject of sea piracy and concluded that they were going to prepare the draft 
articles (later adopted in the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)) in an expeditious 
manner, because the crime itself had long ago been forgotten and was 
insignificant.17  
The classical or “golden age” of piracy, when pirates were at their 
strongest and sea piracy was at its height, extended from the 1660s to the 
1730s.18 According to Defoe, “[t]his was at a Time that the Pyrates had 
obtained such an Acquisition of Strength, that they were in no concern 
about preserving themselves from the Justice of Laws.”19 Everybody has 
heard about Blackbeard (his real name being Edward Teach or possibly 
“Tech,” etc.), Bartholomew Roberts and others. One of the most interesting 
facts that could be related to piracy off of Somalia is that a sample of about 
700 active pirates in the Caribbean between 1715 and 1725 was composed 
of different and mixed descent, ranging from American, West Indian, 
Swedish, Dutch, and others.20  Not only were they of different nationalities, 
but they were also racially diverse.21 “Based on data available from 23 
  
 15. BARRY HART DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY (1980). 
 16. See Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, with 
Comment, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 739 (1932). 
 17. Id. at 787 (“It is expediency that should be the chief guide in the formulation of a 
convention.”). 
 18. See, e.g., BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE: HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION, 
1660-1730 (Joel H. Baer ed., 2007) (citing the years 1660-1730). 
 19. DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES 87 (Manuel Schonhorn ed., 
Courier Dover Pub’ns 1999) (1724).  
 20. Peter T. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, 
115 J.POL. ECON 1049, 1054 (2007) [hereinafter Leeson, An-arrgh-chy].  
 21. Id. 
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pirate crews active between 1682 and 1726, the racial composition of ships 
varied between 13 and 98 percent black.” 22 If this sample is representative, 
then 25-30 percent of the average pirates were of “African descent.”23 This 
is an important statistic because one of the arguments against attacking 
pirates ashore, which was made at the Harvard meeting that Professor 
Dubner attended in December 2009, was the fact that many of the countries 
that were trying to thwart piracy today, are composed of Caucasians and are 
usually Christian, whereas the Somalians are mostly people of color and 
Muslim. Today, the international community does not want to appear as 
though it is starting a racial or religious crusade over the crime of piracy. It 
will be demonstrated later in this essay that the economics of piracy requires 
an understanding of the religious dimension involved because Hawawal, 
which is an informal money transfer system used almost solely by Muslims, 
is also the primary system pirates use to launder ransom payments.24   
In the classical period the total number of pirates that existed according 
to pirate historians “[b]etween 1716 and 1722 . . . were between 1,000-
2,000 sea bandits.”25 In an interesting footnote, Leeson pointed out that the 
“Royal Navy averaged only 13,000 men in any one year between 1716 and 
1726, making the pirate population in a good year more than 15 percent of 
the navy population.”26 In 1680, the total population of the American 
colonies was less than 152,000 according to Leeson.27 In fact, as late as 
1790 when the first U.S. census was taken, only 24 places in the country 
had a population greater of 2,500.28 
Unlike today where Somali pirates go out on skiffs and make use of 
mother ships, the average crew size, between the period of 1716 and 1726, 
was about 80 members.29 Some pirate crews were close to 120 members and 
crews of 150 to 200 were not uncommon.” 30 Several pirate crews were 
reported to be bigger than this. For example, Leeson notes that 
“Blackbeard’s crew aboard the Queen Anne’s Revenge was 300 men.”31 
  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. (citing KENNETH J. KINKOR, BLACK MEN UNDER THE BLACK FLAG, IN BANDITS 
AT SEA: A PIRATES READER, 195, 200-01 (C.R. Pennell ed., 2001)). 
 24. See Hawala System, GLOBAL JIHAD, http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp? 
id=1171 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 25. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20, at 1054 (citation omitted). 
 26. Id. at 1054 n.14 (citing REDIKER, supra note 28, at 256).  
 27. Id. (citing JONATHAN HUGHES & LOUIS P. CAIN, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
20 (4th ed. 1994)). 
 28. Id. (citing HUGHES & CAIN, supra note 30, at 28). 
 29. Id. at 1054 (citing REDIKER, supra note 29, at 256). 
 30. Id. at 1054-55. 
 31. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20, at 1055 (quoting DAVID CORDINGLY, 
UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE REALITY OF LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES 165-
66 (2006)). “[A] sixth-rate Royal Navy ship in the early eighteenth century carried more 
crew members than the average pirate vessel (about 150). . . . Furthermore, some pirate 
crews were too large to fit in one ship. . . .[and would form] squadrons.” Id. at 1055 (citation 
omitted). Professor Leeson gives as an example Captain Bartholomew Roberts commanding 
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Apparently, many of the multiple pirate ships joined concerted plundering 
expeditions, for example: 
The most impressive fleets of sea bandits belong to the buccaneers. . . . 
Captain Morgan commanded a fleet of 37 ships and 2,000 men sufficient 
to attack coastal communities on the Spanish Main. 32  
Ships joining into fleets or becoming fleets apparently was nothing out 
of the ordinary in those days. The manner in which pirate organizations 
operate today is comparable to the way pirates operated in the classical 
period. Much like today, pirates in the classical period did not acquire their 
ships by purchase or otherwise; they stole them.33 It has not been 
uncommon for pirates off of Somalia to steal a fishing vessel, for example, 
and use it as a mother ship. Naturally, all the pirates followed the basic rule 
of “‘no prey, no pay.’”34 As will be seen later in this paper, the amount of 
pay and how it is divided is very similar to the way things are done today. 
For example, after they captured a ship “[t]he hunters’ pay will generally be 
200 pieces of eight; the carpenter, for his work . . ., would be paid 100 to 
150 pieces of eight; the surgeon would receive 200 or 250 for his medical 
supplies.”35 Pirates even had a set amount for the loss of limb or other 
injuries. For a loss of the right arm, (i.e., 600 pieces of eight or six slaves); 
for a left arm 500 pieces of eight or five slaves; “the left leg was 400 and 
four slaves; an eye 100 or one slave and the same award was made for the 
loss of a finger.”36 Also, articles of piracy (i.e., a chasse-partie) would set 
forth all of the “duty” among the officers and crews.37 In addition to the 
above amounts, which were withdrawn from the capital:  
[T]he rest of the prize would be divided into as many portions as men on 
the ship. The  captain draws four or five men’s portions for the use of the 
ship, perhaps even more, and  two portions for himself. The rest of the 
men share uniformly, and the boys get half a  man’s share.38   
  
a squadron of four ships to carry 508 men. Id. (citing CORDINGLY, supra, at 111, 165-66); 
REDIKER, supra note 28 at 107. 
 32. Id. (citing ALEXANDER O. EXQUEMELIN, THE BUCCANEERS OF AMERICA 171 
(Alexis Brown trans., Dover 2000) (1678).  
 33. Id. at 1064. “There is at least one eighteenth-century pirate, however, Stede 
Bonnet, who actually purchased the first ship he went on the account with.” Id. n.30. 
 34. Id. at 1070. (“The buccaneers called their articles a chasse-partie. These articles 
specified the division of booty among the officers and crew along with other terms of the 
buccaneers’ organization. All sea bandits followed the basic rule of ‘no prey, no pay.’ Unless 
a pirating expedition was successful, no man received any payment.”).  
 35. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20 (quoting EXQUEMELIN, supra note 35, at 
71-72).  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1069-70. 
 38. Id. at 1070. See also id. at 1076 (“The evidence also suggests that piratical 
articles were successful in preventing internal conflict and creating order aboard pirate ships. 
Pirates, it appears, strictly adhered to their articles.”).  
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Piratical organization in the classical period also received a significant 
sum from their plunder: 
At a time when Anglo-American seamen on a trading voyage to 
Madagascar were collecting less than twelve pounds sterling a year . . . the 
deep-water pirates could realize a hundred or even a thousand times more . 
. . The amount of money was rather enormous. In 1695, for example, 
Henry Every’s pirate fleet captured a prize carrying more than £600,000 in 
precious metals and jewels. The resulting share-out earned each member 
of his crew £1,000, the equivalent of nearly 80 years [sic]’ income for an 
able merchant seaman at the time. In the early eighteenth century, Captain 
John Bowen’s pirate crew plundered a prize ‘which yielded them 500 
[pounds] per Man. Several years later, Captain Thomas White’s crew 
retired to Madagascar after a marauding expedition each pirate having 
earned £1,200 from the cruise. In 1720, Captain Christopher Condent’s 
crew seized a prize that earned each pirate £3,000. In 1721, Captain John 
Taylor and Oliver La Bouche’s pirate consort earned an astonishing 
£4,000 for each crew member from a single attack.  Even the small pirate 
crew, captained by John Evens in 1722 took enough booty to split ‘nine 
thousand Pounds among thirty Persons’—or £300 a pirate. To put these 
earnings in perspective, compare them to the able merchant seaman’s 
wage over the same period. Between 1689 and 1740 this varied from 25 to 
55 shillings per month, a meager £15 to £33 per year. 39 
It will be shown that these figures are comparable to the figures that exist 
for Somali pirates today. For example, a Somali pirate today can earn 
between $168,630 and $394,200 in the course of five years, whereas their 
next best alternative yields a meager $14,500 over their entire life time.40 
One important fact that can be learned from reviewing classical pirate 
profits is that “[p]irate crew members—the piratical firm’s employees—
jointly owned and operated the piratical firm.”41 Sound familiar? This is 
because there have been numerous studies regarding the amount and 
structure of ownership and funding of pirates today. Pirates today operate 
through external funding, which comes from different sources, including the 
  
 39. Id. at 1077-78 (citation omitted) (Konstam’s original text states that £1,000 is the 
equivalent of nearly 80 years’ income for an able merchant seaman, whereas Leeson, in 
quoting Konstam, stated £1,000 is the equivalent of nearly 40 years income). In 1932 John 
Robert Moore, an American scholar of Daniel Defoe published his theory that Charles 
Johnson was really Daniel Defoe writing under his pen name. Moore’s argument was so 
persuasive that most libraries catalogued Johnson’s books under Defoe’s name for the next 
50 years. Leeson cites Charles Johnson throughout his publication, however many of  
Leeson’s references may possibly be catalogued under Daniele Defoe. See e.g., BARB KARG 
& ARJEAN , THE EVERYTHING PIRATES BOOK: A SWASHBUCKLING HISTORY OF ADVENTURE ON 
THE HIGH SEAS 223 (Adams Media, 2007).           
 40. See GEOPOLICITY, infra note 62, at iv. 
 41. Peter T. Leeson, The Invisible Hook: The Law and Economics of Pirate 
Tolerance, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 139, 151 (2009) [hereinafter Leeson, The Invisible 
Hook]. 
2012] On the Economics of International Sea Piracy 753 
underworld.42 In the classical period, however, pirates did not require 
external financiers, for “each employee of the piratical firm was nearly a 
partner: a near-equal firm-owner with an equal say in firm activities, such as 
whether the crew would continue on the account (or retire), who would lead 
the crew, and so on.”43 In the classical period the pirate pay scale was 
extremely flat, the difference between the highest and lowest paid person 
was only a single share.”44  
In contrast, modern day pirates have a large disparity within their pay 
scale. The stark difference in the pay scales of pirates and their backers 
allows the top commanding backer to receive nearly one hundred times 
more than a bottom level employee.45 Journalist Jay Bahadur, in an article 
titled “Pirates Inc.,” described one instance of this payment structure.46 Mr. 
Bahadur’s article focused on the pirates that captured crewmembers aboard 
the MV Victoria.47 The Pirates ransom payment was distributed as follows:48 
 
Position   Salary  
Officers 
  
 
Commander-in-chief, Financial Backer $900,000   
“Computer” 
 
 
Interpreter Loyanne $60,000   
Accountant Mustuku $60,000   
Supplies logistics officer $30,000  
“Commander of the Khat” 
  
 
Attackers   
  
 
First to board the MV Victoria  $150,000 
Mohamad Abdi (plus Land Cruiser bonus) 
Eight others $41,000 each 
Cooks   
  
 
Head Chef $20,000   
Sous-chef $9,000   
Holders   
  
 
20 men   $12,000 each 
TOTAL   ~$1,800,000  
                            
  
 42. See, e.g., Rob Walker, Inside Story of Somali Pirate Attack, BBC NEWS (June 4, 
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8080098.stm.  
 43. Leeson, The Invisible Hook, supra note 41, at 151. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Jay Bhadur, Pirates, Inc., FIN. TIMES (London), June 23, 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e5f60614-7d23-11df-8845-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1x3TabtjB. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. M.V. Victoria was hijacked by eight pirates in the Gulf of Aden on May 5, 
2009 while on its way to the Saudi port of Jeddah. One million, eight hundred thousand 
dollars in ransom was paid. The table shows how the ransom payment was divided. Id. 
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After discussing what each pirate received, Mr. Bahadur stated: 
As in any pyramid scheme, the clear winner was the man on the top. 
Computer was  responsible for supplying start-up capital worth roughly 
$40,000, which went toward the  attack boat, outboard motors, weapons, 
food and fuel. For this investment he received  half of the total ransom, or 
$900,000. After subtracting the operating expenses of  $230,000 that the 
group incurred during the Victoria’s captivity in Eyl, Computer’s return 
 on the investment would have been enviable 1,600 per cent.49 
The hijacking of the MV Victoria, which amounted to a ransom payment 
of $1.8 million, represents a small part of the greater pirate industry that 
causes over $12 billion of damage annually.50 Because of this, we now turn 
to the statistics provided by two recent economic studies which show in 
detail the financial impact of piracy on the international community. 
III. THE PRESENT DAY ECONOMICS OF SEA PIRACY AND THE COST TO THE 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY  
A. Background 
During the meeting at the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, 
one of the main concerns expressed was the fact that piracy had changed 
over the years from the simple theft of a ship’s money or of a ship to a 
criminal industry backed by organized crime. There, in December 2009, it 
was estimated that “[a]bout 1,500 pirates were involved, with 7 syndicates 
and fewer ‘bosses’ controlling separate but linked enterprises [that are] 
largely financed and brokered from Kenya, Dubai, Lebanon, Somalia, and 
elsewhere.”51 Although Russia was mentioned, nothing was shown at the 
time that indicated that the Russian mafia was involved.52 A chart 
concerning finances (“the money paper trail”) was introduced at this 
meeting, as follows: 
 
 
 
  
 49. Bhadur, supra note 45.  
 50. See, e.g., Anna Bowden et al., The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 25 (One 
Earth Future, Working Paper, Dec. 2010), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/ 
sites/default/files/documents_old/The_Economic_Cost_of_Piracy_Full_Report.pdf. “The 
main direct costs of piracy, [include] the cost of ransoms, piracy insurance premiums, 
deterrent equipment, re-routing vessels away from piracy risk zones, naval deployments in 
piracy hot zones, piracy prosecutions, and organization budgets dedicated to reducing 
piracy.” Id. 
 51. ROTBERG, supra note 1, at 3. 
 52. Id. 
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FINANCING  LAUNDERING 
 
              
Enablers53   
 
Thereafter, in July 2011, a report was issued by the Financial Action 
Task Force Groupe d’action Financiére (FATF*GAFI).54 The FATF “is an 
independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies 
to protect the global financial system against money laundering and terrorist 
financing.”55 The report was broken up into two parts: maritime piracy for 
ransom (MPR) and kidnapping for ransom (KFR).56 One of the more 
interesting points made by the study was as follows: 
With ransom demands and payments for the release of vessels and 
hostages escalating,  there appears to be a definite link to money flows 
related to both those who are financing  piracy and the proceeds of this 
criminal activity. Despite this, international maritime operations involving 
  
 53. Id. 
 54. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, ORGANIZED MARITIME PIRACY AND RELATED 
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM (2011), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/40/ 
13/48426561.pdf [hereinafter FATF Report]. 
 55. Id. at 2. 
 56. Id. at 3. The Report contained, for example, case studies concerning the financial 
aspects of maritime piracy for ransom. The executive summary contains a statement saying 
that this is the “first comprehensive picture” of maritime piracy for ransom (as well as 
kidnapping for ransom) and their “attempts to outline the financial implications to these 
activities” as well as the work to be done in the future. Id. at 5. 
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warships from dozens of countries remains the primary response  against 
PFR.57  
If this is so, it is because the international community believes that 
stopping the acts of piracy at these stages should take priority due to the 
number of sailors that are being held for ransom as well as being killed and 
tortured. Also, industry professionals who deal with the payment of ransoms 
have little interest in insisting on the understanding of where the monies are 
being distributed. What they are more interested in is getting the vessels 
back.58  
The FAFT report shows that within the past few years the piracy for 
ransom situation has grown rapidly: 
In 2010, hijackings off the coast of Somalia resulted in 49 vessels captured 
and 1016 hostages taken, as well as eight fatalities. Another four vessels 
with 165 crew members were hijacked elsewhere in the world. As of 3 
March 2011, 33 vessels were being held, including one that was converted 
to use as a pirate “mother ship.” A total of 711 were also being held. In the 
first two months of 2011, seven fatalities resulted from PFR-related 
attacks.59  
As this is going on, “[r]ansoms are rising exponentially, having increased 
from an average of $150,000 per vessel/crew accrued in 2005 to an 
estimated $5.2 million per vessels/crew in 2010.”60 “[A]pproximately 
USD180-238 million were reportedly paid in ransoms in 2010. The total 
  
 57. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The result of this report is that the piracy off the coast 
of Somalia, is creating major problems for the international community: inter alia, “money 
laundering/proceeds” and the “multi-dimensional threat to financial systems, including . . .[ ] 
shipping costs, inflation of insurance premiums for vessels and cargos, freedom of commerce 
on the high seas, and the rise in ransom payments themselves.” Id. 
 58. Id. “One of the most spectacular increases in the costs of piracy in recent years 
has been the increasing price of ransoms paid to release hijacked ships. Ransoms are 
generally sought by Somali pirates. Pirates in other regions have more often stolen the vessel 
or cargo, rather than ransoming the value of the seafarers’ lives and their ship. In November 
2010, the highest ransom on record, $9.5 million, was paid to Somali pirates to release the 
Samho Dream, a South Korean oil tanker. Indeed, 2010 set a remarkable record for the cost 
of ransoms, with the year kicking off to a $7 million ransom paid in January to release the 
Greek supertanker MV Maran Centaurus, which had been carrying $162 million of crude oil 
from Saudi Arabia to the United States.” FATF Report, supra note 51 at 9. FATF 
emphasized that if a pirate organization knows an individual, business, or other entity is 
willing to pay ransoms, the greater the likelihood that those who pay will be targeted again. 
Id. Also, “the more companies are willing to pay regularly, the more lucrative piracy as a 
business becomes. Today insurance costs have skyrocketed to the point that some companies 
would rather take a chance sailing through pirate-ridden waters and pay ransoms than 
repeatedly pay monumental premiums.” Mayann Lawlor, Signal Magazine, Piracy Threatens 
Global Economy (June 2010), available at http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/ 
Signal_Article_Template.asp?articleid=2304&zoneid=285. 
 59. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 7-8 (footnote omitted). 
 60. Id. at 8. 
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cost of PFR-related incidents, including vessel-related cost, depreciation 
and spoilage of goods, together with increased cost to manufacturers, 
shipping companies, maritime insurers, labor cost were estimated to be 
[USD] 7-12 billion per annum.”61 
Consistent with the economic studies presented in the FATF Report, in 
May 2011, the following table was presented by Geopolicity:62 
 
HEADLINES (Based on Available Data):63 
 
Low/High Pirate income (2010): 
Using 1,500 Pirates 
~US$33,000-US$79,000/year 
Potential Lifetime Earnings (2010: 
Using 1,500 Pirates 
~US$168,000 US $394,000 
 
Next Best Alternative:  ~US$500/year 
Pirates Incomes Compared to 
Average Income: 
~67-157 higher 
No. Pirates Could Double by: ~2016 
Total Cost of Piracy 2010: ~US$4.9-8.3 billion 
Projected Increase by 2014: ~US$13-15 billion 
Major Stakeholders:  Financiers, Sponsors, Officials, Pirates, 
Maritime Insurers, Security Companies, 
Navies, Merchant Marine 
 
 
In the economic model, Geopolicity assesses the cost and benefits of 
international piracy and creates a “value chain” where the  
[g]reatest rates of return on international counter pirate investment and 
policy are to be found. The model includes [a]: i) a cost-benefit analysis at 
the individual pirate level, based on existing socioeconomic and market 
data ii) the aggregate cost- benefit analysis at the international systems 
level[,] and iii) comprehensive data on the resurgence of piracy by 
  
 61. Id. (footnotes omitted). In calculating the total damage that piracy has caused to 
the international community it is also important to note that  
[t]he total cost of ransom is estimated to be around double the value actually paid to pirates. 
The total cost is duplicated by a number of factors, such as: the cost of negotiations, 
psychological trauma counseling, repair to ship damage caused while it is held captive, and 
the physical delivery of the ransom money, often done by helicopter or private plane. Finally, 
large costs result from ships being held and out of service. For instance, it costs around $3 
million for a cargo ship to be held for two months at a charter hire rate of $50,000 per day. 
Bowden, supra note 50, at 9-10 (footnotes omitted). 
 62. GEOPOLICITY, THE ECONOMICS OF PIRACY: PIRATE RANSOMS & LIVELIHOODS OFF 
THE COAST OF SOMALIA (2011), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ 
geopolicity_-_the_economics_of_piracy_-_pirates__livelihoods_off_the_coast_of_somalia.pdf. 
 63. Id. at cover page. 
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functional classification sovereign jurisdiction . . . [which] include[s] 
trend, comparator, and predictive analysis.64  
Geopolicity also made what they called an “executive summary outline” 
which it hoped would benefit the CGPCS.65 In the summary and subsequent 
study, Geopolicity estimates the cost of piracy to the international 
community as between $4.9-8.3 billion in 2010.66 It foresees estimates of 
$13-15 billion by the year 2015.67 The report also states that the income to 
pirates off the coast of Somalia alone in 2010 was between $75-238 million 
and could rise to $200-400 million by 2015.68 “Assuming only 1,500 active 
pirates exist off the coa[s]ts of Somalia, a pirate can expect to earn between 
$168,630 and $394,200 over a theoretical five-year career.”69 If these 
individuals were not pirates they could hope to earn, at best, approximately 
$14,500 over their entire working life.70 This “report also runs scenarios 
based on 3,000 pirates.”71 It predicts that the amount of increase in the 
number of pirates will jump from 200 to 400 in an annual rate based on 
present demand assumptions.72 By the time this study by Geopolicity was 
written, “[t]he expansion of global piracy incidents . . . increased from 276 
in 2005 to 445 in 2010 (219 of which were off the coast of Somalia).”73 
“This [number] could increase to more than 600 incidents by 2015, based on 
the application of supply/demand and opportunity cost theory.”74 The study 
suggests that the significant proportion of proceeds (between forty and fifty 
percent) are transferred out of Somalia using informant money transfer 
systems, presenting a vulnerability to the Anti-Money Laundering/ 
Countering the Finance of Terrorism (AML/CFT) system.75  
As a result of this data, Geopolicity proposes a 3-phase independent 
economic research program which includes: strengthening and overcoming 
data paucity constraints; producing quarterly updates for the international 
community; undertaking country level financial tracking and sponsorship 
research; strengthening the understanding of the entire value chain; and 
  
 64. Id. at iv. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at iv, 9. 
 67. Geopolicity, supra note 62, at iv. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. The figures are comparable to that of the classical period where a small pirate 
crew could take £300 in one expedition whereas the next best alternative was £15 to £33 per 
year. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20, at 1078. 
 71. See GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at iv. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. The International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre on June 7, 2012 
indicated, 157 worldwide incidents, of which 61 were off the Coast of Somalia. See Piracy 
News & Figures, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-
reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures (last visited Jun. 10, 2012). 
 74. See GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at iv. 
 75. Id.  
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developing a framework of corrective measures that focus on policy, 
institutional, security sector reform, law enforcement, prevention, and 
systems monitoring.76  
An interesting point that the Geopolicity study raises is that the origins of 
piracy off the coast of Somalia can be traced back to the political, economic, 
and social unrest, which characterized Somalia in the mid-1990s.77 It also 
points out that in the absence of a functioning central government, some 
Somali fishermen assumed the role of protecting Somali waters from both 
illegal dumping of waste by foreigners as well as over-fishing.78 The report 
calls these vigilante activities, which has led to selecting piracy as a way to 
supplement livelihoods.79 Additionally, it also points out that there are few 
legal alternatives for some of these impoverished Somalis.80 Some authors 
have suggested that Somalia may be better off stateless and set forth before 
and after scenarios to demonstrate their point, which to the authors, is 
simply ridiculous.81  
The main problem is that the crime of international sea piracy is 
becoming institutionalized with respect to entrenched organization 
structures and self-financing mechanisms.82 There have been suggestions of 
linkages between pirates and terrorist groups, but that connect has not been 
determined definitively.83 Piracy has been considered haram (forbidden) 
under Islam, yet there are many anecdotes of Somali pirates paying 
“docking fees” and “taxes” to Al-Shabaab and possibly to other Islamic 
terrorist groups.84 There was a report by a foreign press in February 2011, 
indicating that al-Shabaab ordered pirates in central Somalia to provide a 
cut of twenty percent of their profits to the terrorist group.85 When the 
pirates refused to do so, al-Shabaab reportedly detained four of the pirates’ 
  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 8. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PIRACY REPORT (2011), available at 
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa.piracy.c32662.htm). 
 81. Because Somalia has been able to improve its performance on a number of 
human development indicators despite the absence of government leads authors to formulate 
arguments that suggest Somali is better off stateless. The fact of the matter is Somalia has 
endured two decades of war, beset by droughts and now the only lucrative opportunity in that 
region is piracy. The cash brought in through piracy may cause some economic growth, but 
at what cost? A state run by terrorists and organized crime syndicates is by no means better 
than a state which functions through an elected government. See, e.g., Peter T. Leeson, Better 
Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 689 
(2007). 
 82. Bahadur, supra note 45. 
 83. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 9. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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investors.86 Thankfully, in December 2011, Islamist militants were ousted 
from the Somali capital, Mogadishu, and U.N. officials viewed this event as 
a brief window of opportunity to set up a working government in Somalia.87 
The worry, nevertheless, still remains that piracy will continue to be an 
“attractive option to [certain] terrorist groups in the future.”88 
B. Analyzing the ‘Money Trail’ of Present Day Sea Piracy  
In order to restrain the growth of Somali Piracy, the Geopolicity group 
points out that the key focus of future research should be in, “(i) the 
payment of money and laundering of ransom payments (ii) asset tracing (iii) 
where relevant informal money transfer systems (iv) pirate value chain 
analysis . . . “89 In addition, the important fact to be considered is that the 
ransom payment can be collected and consolidated anywhere in the world.90 
The payments made for the release of crews and vessels can also be spent 
and converted into different types of financial instruments, or used to 
purchase real property and other fixed assets in multiple jurisdictions as 
well:  
A common ratio that academic experts use in theorizing about the amount 
of PFR-related monies remaining in Somalia versus the amount leaving 
there is 60/40. However, even if indeed “only” 40% of ransom proceeds 
leave Somalia, the actual and potential exploitation of the financial sector 
by those who commit and support PFR globally still represents a money 
laundering and terrorist financing threat. For example, based on the USD 
238 million in ransoms reportedly paid to Somali pirates in 2010, 
approximately USD 95 million would comprise the 40% sent out of the 
country. This is a significant amount of illicit finance relative to the region 
that could enter the international financial system in a variety of 
jurisdictions. . . . 91 
The Report of the FATF also shows that there are three basic means of 
financing the piracy industry.92 In all three cases, the pirate leader is well-
connected and a person respected in the community, and is thus able to 
draw upon his personal network for protection and problem solving: 
  
 86. Id. The link between piracy and terrorism can also include the sale or transfer of 
hostages to terrorist groups. See, e.g., Abdalle Ahmed, Somalia: British Couple Held 
Hostage in Harardhere Transferred to Unknown Location, Pirate Says, RBC RADIO (Apr. 
29, 2010, 01:52 PM), http://www.raxanreeb.com/dev/2010/04/somalia-british-couple-held-
hostage-in-harardhere-transferred-to-unknown-location-pirate-says/. 
 87. See Somalia’s Rare Window of Hope, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16156157. 
 88. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 10. 
 89. GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at 13.  
 90. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 10. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 17. 
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1. A cottage industry structure in which the whole operation is owned 
by a single funder. He may lead the group, and, if the hijacking is 
successful, takes the largest share of the ransom payment. 
2. A shareholder or cooperative structure in which individual pirates 
invest in the operation and share the PRF proceeds. Each pirate is equipped 
with his own weapon and other gear, and supplies his own food and other 
necessities. The boat is owned by a member of each “cooperative.” 
3. A syndicate or committee structure formed by several investors. 
Syndicates are responsible for the majority of hijackings. They arm and 
equip several pirate groups and draw up contracts for PFR operations and 
the distribution of ransom payments. Successful syndicates can command as 
much as a 50 per cent share of a ransom payment.93  
Of the three forms of financing piracy, the syndicate model, according to 
the FATF, has generated the most amount of interest.94 Today, shares in a 
given syndicate can cost between five to ten thousand dollars each.95  
The committee may have direct access to the pirate leadership, or may 
choose to . . . use a facilitator to transport the funds to the pirate group. An 
agreement specifies the amount of money they are collectively providing; 
usually has the name of the individual receiving this money and how much 
the investors require as a return.96  
The pirates will issue two types of shares in the venture: “A” shares, in 
which the individual receives a percentage of the ransom, and are reserved 
for investors, pirate leaders and the successful pirate crew; and “B” shares, 
which entitle the individual to a fixed fee.97 The report indicates that “A” 
shares generally go to investors, pirate leadership and pirate crew, and “B” 
shares are paid to individuals with singular tasks such as armed guards, 
interpreters, and middlemen.98 This investor scheme setup also displays 
characteristics similar to those employed in conventional organized crime.99  
  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 17. One report indicated that at present, it costs 
investors approximately six thousand dollars to send a team of pirates out searching for ships 
to hijack. This money goes toward the purchase of food, ammunition, and fuel and the rental 
of rocket-propelled grenade launchers and speedboats.  Even though it costs investors six 
thousand dollars to send a team of pirates, each investor must be prepared to fund several 
failed attempts. When an investor’s team succeeds, the investor receives upwards of thirty 
percent of the total ransom. Walker, supra note 52. Based on this report, an investment of 
approximately 40 thousand to one hundred thousand dollars can bring in millions of dollars 
profit. Because of the potential payoff for investors piracy is turning into an extremely 
lucrative enterprise. 
 96. FATF Report, supra note 54.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
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Accompanying the distribution of shares schematic, the FAFT Report 
indicates that in 2006 the estimated total ransom money paid to Somali 
pirates was $5 million in 2006; $25 million in 2007; $70 million in 2008; 
$80 million in 2009 and $180 million in 2010. 100  
Even the type of notes that comprise the ransom payment differ from 
“USD 100 notes (90%); USD 50 notes (7%) and in USD 20 notes (3%). 
Eighty percent of the ransoms are delivered by airdrop as it entails less risk 
than any other method . . . . [M]any experts believe that a significant 
amount of the money—from 40-60%—never leaves Somalia. Proportions 
of the profits are offered to various groups, including [t]he initial investors, 
payments to local clan chiefs and militia, reinvesting in weapons and 
equipment, payments to the pirates’ leader and the other pirates, both the 
initial hijackers as well as the guards. 101  
The report goes on to indicate that the proceeds of piracy have been used 
to purchase real estate in Puntland as well as areas in Kenya such as 
Eastleigh in Mombasa.102 
In addition, the report has set forth various case studies in order to 
illustrate not only the brazen nature of Somali piracy but also the somewhat 
uncoordinated nature of the international community in detecting, 
interdicting, and deterring hijacking.103 The report claims that the 
“disjointed nature of cooperation between shipping companies, maritime 
insurance underwriters, law enforcement, financial intelligence units, and 
post-incident investigators in sharing information” ultimately leads to the 
inability to follow the financial trail pirates almost always leave behind.104 
One of the conclusions of the case study is that the “Somali pirates are 
becoming ‘[i]ncreasingly reliant on the international financial system and 
other money service provider to move cash off-shore [in order] to finance 
other activities.’”105  
The report also demonstrates the generic typology for PFR operations off 
the coast of Somalia:  
[A] vessel is seized, the owner or management company is contacted, and 
a ransom payment is negotiated, often by third party intermediaries. The 
insurance company of the hijacked vessel then arranges for a cash 
payment. The cash is obtained from a financial institution, which may be 
the insurance company itself, and packaged for delivery, often being 
  
 100. Id. at 18. “The actual figures are assumed to be higher than these, because the 
shipping industry does not always report the total ransom amounts accurately.” FATF 
Report, supra note 54, at 18. 
 101. FATF Report, supra note 54.  
 102. Id. at 19. 
 103. See generally FATF Report, supra note 54, at 11-12. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 13. 
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airdropped to a prearranged location. These payments seem to demonstrate 
two money laundering/terrorist financing vulnerabilities: that these 
payments often do not result in bulk cash disclosures/declarations and/or 
suspicious transaction reporting to the FIUs [Financial Intelligence Unit]. 
This occurs either because jurisdictions lack these requirements and/or 
those facilitating the payments of ransoms are successfully evading these 
reporting requirements. Once ransoms are paid and the cash subsequently 
enters Somalia, “following the money” becomes difficult because there are 
no mechanisms to identify the source and destination of these funds and 
because the trail goes cold if such payments were not previously reported 
to FIUs and other AML/ CFT authorities.106 
Rather than the typical classical situation where pirates buried their loot 
on some remote, usually uninhabited island, or tendered over a percentage 
of it to the government that was sponsoring them, the Somali piracy 
situation presents the need for targeting financial activity of pirates, 
especially their financiers and instigators, through the freezing and seizure 
of assets, and the confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of 
piracy.107 This method  
[c]ould help to (1) disrupt financial support to pirate organizations, (2) 
track and seize (either through post-conviction or non-conviction based 
forfeiture, depending on the jurisdiction) assets enabling pirate operations, 
(3) prevent pirates from using the international banking system and other 
formal financial systems, and (4) prevent pirates  from using cash couriers 
and other informal-value transfer mechanisms to transmit funds. . . . 108 
One of the most important findings is that  
[o]ne of the most challenging conditions is the lack of capacity in the 
regions where piracy occurs. In particular, Somalia has no formal 
authorities or structures to implement an AML, and Puntland is known for 
its complicity. The countries surrounding Somalia are characterized by 
lack of capacity: Kenya has no FIU [Financial Intelligence Unit] and has 
not begun implementation of its ALM law. The AML/CFT regimes of 
Ethiopia, Seychelles, Yemen, and Tanzania are in varying degrees of 
development and implementation while, Uganda does not have an ALM 
law at all. 109  
  
 106. Id. Note that FIU stands for Financial Intelligence Unit, AML stands for Anti-
Money Laundering, and CFT stands for Countering the Finance of Terrorism. 
 107. Id. at 20. 
 108. Id.  
 109. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 22. 
764 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:3 
This is particularly alarming because these regions account for the 
majority of piracy prosecutions today.110 “Even in countries [that have a] 
traditionally higher capacity including countries that have a cursory 
ALM/CFT regime, there is a lack of consistency regarding bulk cash 
reporting, interdiction and investigation, hawala money server business 
regulation, reporting regimes and investigation.”111  
Where does this all lead us? In terms of the “number of [s]tates 
prosecuting acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia in their courts,” the 
statistics show that the number of participating courts has risen from [ten] to 
[twenty]; and the total number of prosecutions taking place has nearly 
doubled from 528 to 1,011.”112 Kenya alone has convicted 119 pirates and 
Somalia, surprisingly has, according to U.N. data, tried 290 pirates in 
Puntland and convicted 240 of them.113 In Somaliland, there were 94 trials 
and 68 convictions, and in South Central Somalia there were eighteen trials 
held.114 Altogether, approximately 20 states have tried pirates, and over 
1,000 trials have been held since the date of this U.N. report.115 Much of the 
international resources, which are being spent today are used to arrest and 
prosecute pirates through international naval operations. By allocating the 
majority of resources to prosecuting pirates at sea, less emphasis has been 
placed on prosecution through the tracing of the ransom payments. Given 
the syndicate nature of piracy and the fact that nearly 50% of the ransom is 
  
 110. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Human Cost of Piracy Off Somalia 
Coast ‘Incalculable’, Full Range of Legal. Preventative Measures Needed To Thwart 
Attacks, Security Council Told, U.N. Doc. SC/10551 (Feb. 22, 2012).  
 111. Id. at 22. Hawala (also known as hundi) is an informal money transfer system, 
used almost solely by Muslims, based on performance and honor of a huge network of 
money brokers who are primarily located in the Muslim World — Middle East, Africa 
and Asia. Hawala has its origins in classic Islamic Law — the Sharia — and is mentioned in 
texts already as early as the 8th century. Hawala itself later influenced the development of 
the Western Common Law and Civil Law such as the French Aval (Avallo in Italian). In the 
most basic variant of the Hawala system, money is transferred via a network of Hawala 
brokers, or Hawaladars. A customer approaches a Hawala broker in one city and gives a 
sum of money to be transferred to a recipient in another, usually foreign, city. The Hawala 
broker calls another Hawala broker in the recipient’s city, gives disposition instructions of 
the funds (usually minus a small commission), and promises to settle the debt at a later date. 
The disposition is executed based solely of the mutual trust and credibility between the two 
brokers without any further documentation. As the system does not depend on the legal 
enforceability of claims, it can operate even in the absence of a legal and judicial 
environment. No records are produced of individual transactions — only a running tally of 
the amount owed by one broker to another is kept. Hawala is attractive to customers because 
it provides a fast and convenient transfer of funds, usually with a far lower commission than 
that charged by banks. Furthermore, the transfers are informal and not effectively regulated 
by governments, which is a major advantage to customers. Hawala is also an ideal system 
for laundering money for those who trust the system. See Hawala System, supra note 24.  
 112. The Modalities, supra note 2, at 27. 
 113. Id. at 27-28. 
 114. Id. at 28. 
 115. Id. 
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distributed to only a few individuals, the figures make it clear that finding 
the few individuals that invest in piracy can result in bringing down an 
entire operation. Because of this, reports such as those from Geopolicity 
explicitly state that it is vital to target piracy through the pirate value chain, 
concentrating on the payment of money, laundering of ransom payments, 
tracking of assets, and analyzing the informal (hawala) money transfer 
systems.116 
The next section explores the complexity of tracing ransom money. What 
is important to note is that there are two simultaneous streams of commerce 
in which pirate ransom money can be placed. Low level Somali pirates that 
collect ransom payments are likely to place their share of profits into their 
local economies, whereas piracy investors are more likely to divert funds 
through an intrinsic money laundering system. Interestingly, because of this 
dichotomy, financial analysts must employ two radically different strategies 
in attempting to trace the movement of ransom payments. Furthermore, 
tracing this ransom money also reveals lucid ways in which modern piracy 
is beginning to parallel piracy in the classical period. 
C. Tracing the Ransom Payments Made to Pirate Organizations 
Everybody agrees that the crime of piracy can only be stopped if the 
conditions in Somalia improve. Somalia has endured two decades of war, 
beset by drought and famine; it is now the home to both a lucrative piracy 
industry and Islamist militant groups.117 For this reason, Somalia is 
considered the ultimate failed state.118  
Today, piracy in Somalia is starting to develop into a mini-economy, 
which employs hundreds of people, all of whom share the ransom.119 
Reports indicate that piracy in “Somalia is attracting big-time criminals 
from all over the world.”120 As in the classical period, piracy today is a 
transnational crime, and the entity, i.e. Somalia, operates without rules, 
regulations or a functioning government.121 Because of this, “Somalis do not 
need to launder the money they make from piracy because their unique 
financial system operates on trust and honour, bypassing banks and other 
financial institutions.”122 The piratical financial system, hawala, does not 
  
 116. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 13. 
 117. See Somalia’s Rare Window of Hope, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16156157. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Mary Harper, Chasing the Somali Piracy Money Trail, BBC NEWS (May 24, 
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8061535.stm. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. This system of trust and honor also helps explain how pirates, in both the 
classical era and today, can steal valuables from other ships, and share their profits, without 
cheating or killing each other. In the classic era pirates operated through a democratic style 
institution and their practices were institutionalized as the “custom of the coast.” The success 
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involve documentation; most transactions are done verbally, so there is no 
paper trail.123 The hawala system also “makes it almost impossible to find 
out what happens to money made from ransom payments or any other 
transactions in Somalia.” [Furthermore,] the fact that most ransoms are paid 
in cash means they simply disappear into the Somali community, rather than 
ending up in banks or other financial bodies.”124 
Given the paucity and exceedingly opaque nature of the economic data 
involved in pirate transactions, analysts are beginning to use atypical 
methods for tracing the cash flow of ransom payments.125 For example, Anja 
Shorthand, from the Economics and Finance Department at Brunel 
University, has used province-level market data, nightlight emissions, and 
high resolution satellite imagery to show that significant amounts of ransom 
monies are spent within Somalia.126 Nightlight emissions, which are an 
excellent proxy for local and regional production and income in statistically 
challenged countries, shows that ‘pirates appear to invest their money 
principally in the [Somali] cities of Garowe and Bosasso rather than in the 
backward coastal communities.”127 Garowe and Bosasso are also known for 
providing “the material inputs and the ‘fire power’ of [many] pirate 
operations.”128 The change of light emissions is one method of detecting the 
distribution of piracy income because, in impoverished regions, these 
  
of pirates in the classical period was in many respects dependent on their organizational 
achievements and mutual fairness. Being organized and mutually fair was less problematic 
due to the fact that many of the pirates in the classical period were legitimate crewmen that 
walked away because of ill-treatment by their former officers. Today, piracy is not only 
growing but is becoming more organized than ever before. Trust, honor, organization, and 
fairness is also the backbone of the piratical financial system, Hawala. Just as many pirates 
in the classical period were legitimate crewmen, pirates today began as legitimate fisherman 
whose waters were dumped in and over-fished by different organizations. Somalia is 
stateless and unable to protect its territorial sea; therefore, it is rather easy for organizations 
to exploit and pollute the Somali coast. This exploitation has led fishermen to lose their 
livelihood and turn to piracy. As an aside, this trust and fairness among pirates is also the 
reason why Pirates, like other colorful outlaws, have fascinated many readers throughout the 
ages. See Pirates Had Democratic Ways, WORLD SCIENCE (Feb. 22, 2008), 
http://www.world-science.net/othernews/080222_pirates.htm. See also Analysis: Somalia 
Piracy Began in Response to Illegal Fishing and Toxic Dumping by Western Ships off Somali 
Coast, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://www.democracynow.org/ 
2009/4/14/analysis_somalia_piracy_began_in_response. 
 123. Harper, supra note 119.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Note that Geopolicity proposed in its independent economic research program 
that strengthening and overcoming data paucity constraints will strengthen understanding of 
the entire piracy value chain. See GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at iv. 
 126. Anja Shortland, “Robin Hook”: The Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy 2 
(German Inst. for Econ. Research, DIW Berlin, Discussion Paper No. 1155, 2011), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1940271. 
 127. Id. at 1. 
 128. Id. at 3. 
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emissions indicate a clear sign of the movement in disposable income.129 
The report also used high resolution satellite images to corroborate the 
nightlight emission results; in Garowe, the satellite images showed 
“massive investment in housing and hotels, infrastructure, and religious and 
educational facilities between 2002 and 2009, with much of the 
development taking place in the latter part of the period.”130  
Anja Shorthand’s study also shows that finding pirates is extremely 
challenging because of the deep-rooted “culture of sharing” in Somalia.131 
Those who are more in Somalia raise their social status by sharing resources 
within social, clan-based networks, where individuals have an obligation to 
assist other members.132 “A Somali proverb says: ‘The man who owns 100 
goats, but his relatives have nothing, he is poor.’”133 When “Pirate Chief 
Abshir Boyah [was] questioned on how he spent his considerable profits 
from piracy, [he stated,] ‘it’s not like three people split a million bucks. It’s 
more like three hundred.’”134  
Investors, on the other hand, who take the lion’s share, do not operate 
within a “culture of sharing,” and therefore are less likely to spend ransom 
money on items that create local economic development.135 Rather, 
investors tend to spend ransom money on imported status goods such as 
sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and divert their proceeds through intricate 
money-laundering schemes.136 For analysts, tracing piracy ransom money 
though an intricate money-laundering scheme is extremely difficult. 
Appendix B shows how an intricate money-laundering scheme works when 
illegal proceeds are mixed with legitimate used car sale profits in Africa, 
and are sent to banks through exchange houses.137 The data in Appendix B 
  
 129. Id. at 16. 
 130. Id. at 3. The province-level market data, nightlight emissions and high-resolution 
satellite imagery seems to provide a good initial step towards finding where suspected pirate 
organizations are likely located. 
 131. Id. at 3. 
 132. Shortland, supra note 126, at 7. 
 133. Id. at 4.  
 134. Id. at 8. 
 135. Id. at 6, 7. 
 136. Id. at 7. 
 137. Jo Becker, Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah’s Financing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/world/middleeast/beirut-bank-seen-as-a-
hub-of-hezbollahs-financing.html?pagewanted=all (“American Treasury officials said senior 
bank managers had assisted a handful of account holders in running a scheme to wash drug 
money by mixing it with the proceeds of used cars bought in the United States and sold in 
Africa. A cut of the profits, officials said, went to Hezbollah, a link the organization disputes. 
. . .  In all, hundreds of millions of dollars a year sloshed through the accounts, held mainly 
by Shiite Muslim businessmen in the drug-smuggling nations of West Africa, many of them 
known Hezbollah supporters, trading in everything from rough-cut diamonds to cosmetics 
and frozen chicken, according to people with knowledge of the matter in the United States 
and Europe. The companies appeared to be serving as fronts for Hezbollah to move all sorts 
of dubious funds, on its own behalf or for others.”). 
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was gathered from a drug money laundering operation, which had ties to 
organizations in Africa, Europe, China, South America and the United 
States.138 Maritime security expert Christopher Ledger has expressed that 
the drug trade and piracy are similar in many respects; drug trade, “which 
started off as a relatively small-time operation” has grown into a “huge 
global crime,” which is also the path maritime piracy seems to be taking.139 
Moreover, international piracy is starting to replicate the drug industry in 
the United States, where billions of dollars are spent each year in trying to 
attempt to keep the drug situation under control. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecution of criminals and the economics of criminal activity are 
intimately related. In terms of piracy, the CGPCS established Working 
Group 5 to focus on and coordinate efforts to disrupt the pirate enterprise 
ashore, but so far, a report has not been issued. In order to improve the 
economic conditions ashore, CPGCS has advocated the “Kampala Process, 
a Somali counter-piracy dialogue forum which discusses, inter alia, how to 
best strengthen the capacity to prosecute suspected pirates.”140One of the top 
priorities listed by the CGPCS has been “to increase the number of 
prosecutions,” as more than 1,000 pirates have been detained and 
prosecuted in 20 jurisdictions across the world as of July 2011.141 The 
authors’ conclusion is that none of the prosecutions will hold water if there 
is so much money out that the judges and lawyers can be bought off. It is 
hard to believe with the millions of dollars being spent by the UNODC and 
other groups in Somalia, that something will not be done; however, the 
authors are very pessimistic about the way things are going regarding 
funding of the pirates given the amount of cash involved.  
It does not help to see headlines indicating that the pirates have their own 
stock exchange.142 Yes, that is sadly true. Apparently, “the world’s first 
  
 138. See infra App. B.  
 139. See Harper, supra note 119.  
 140. See Ninth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 2. The “Somali Contact Group on 
Counter-Piracy[,]”[] also called the Kampala Process, was established on the basis of a 
request by Working Group 1 of the CGPCS at a technical meeting between the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), Puntland and Somaliland in January 2010 with a view to 
promote internal coordination, information-generation and sharing, and to coordinate their 
respective counter-piracy offices. Since the initial meeting, Galmudug has joined the 
Kampala Process. United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), in collaboration 
with partners, provides secretariat functions, based in Hargeisa, to advance an integrated law 
reform strategy for Somalia. Kampala Process, OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY, 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/activity/kampala-process (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 141. CGPCS, Ninth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 2. 
 142. Avi Jorisch, Opinion, Today’s Pirates Have Their Own Stock Exchange, WALL 
ST. J., June 16, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576341 
223910765818.html. 
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pira[cy] stock exchange was established in 2009 in Harardheere, [which is 
located about] 250 miles northeast of Mogadishu, Somalia.”143 It is open 24 
hours a day and it allows investors to profit from ransoms collected on the 
high seas which can approach $10 million for successful attacks against 
Western commercial vessels.144 There are over 70 entities listed on this 
exchange, which provide Somali pirates with access to capital and pay 
investors a share of the profits. 145 A former pirate stated to Reuters that 
“‘[t]he shares are open to all and everybody can take part, whether 
personally at sea or on land by providing cash, weapons or useful materials. 
. . . We’ve made piracy a community activity.’”146  
CGPCS has stressed the international community’s anger at the ongoing 
suffering of kidnapped innocent seafarers, and their Tenth Plenary Session 
noted the important deterrent role of military Vessel Protection 
Detachments (VPDs) in preventing vessels from being pirated.147 Though 
international navies have substantially increased the difficulty in hijacking 
ships, investors have been forced to place more resources into maximizing 
the return from each captured ship.148 The increasing amount of financial 
investments from both the piracy benefactor and international community 
has caused maritime piracy to evolve into an environment where both 
pirates and navies are more violent than ever before.149 Navies are 
struggling to cope with the increasing surge of pirate attacks; while piracy 
itself has become “an expanding phenomenon[,]” both in terms of the level 
of activity and range.”150 It is hoped that the international community will be 
able to get all of this under control at some point. At present, there needs to 
be coordination between the results shown regarding the economics and 
financing of sea piracy with 1) the prosecution of pirates and 2) the 
organizers and backers of the various financial institutions that are involved 
with this enterprise. U.N. has issued numerous reports, which emphasize 
that in order for any viable success to be shown piracy has to be solved 
  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. To date, there are four banks in Somalia indicated to be involved with the 
stock exchange, all of which are probably wholly owned by the government of Somalia as 
well as an independent bank known as the Universal Bank of Somalia. In order to prevent 
U.S. citizens from engaging with this stock exchange, the U.S. Treasury Department, it is 
suggested, could mandate a standard of care by issuing guidance to American financial 
institutions making certain that they are not doing business for this exchange or any other 
piracy exchange that is set up. Id.  
 147. CGPCS, Tenth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 2. 
 148. Shorthand, supra note 126, at 2. 
 149. Violence begets violence and pirates today are not only more organized but also 
more willing to kill than ever before. See, e.g., Edward H. Lundquist, Pirates are Becoming 
More Violent (May 15, 2011), http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/pirates-are-
becoming-more-violent/. 
 150. See, e.g., Nick Childs, Navies Struggle with ‘Swarming’ Pirates, BBC NEWS 
(Apr. 1, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8598726.stm.  
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within the gates of Somalia.151 The economics of piracy, however, is 
beginning to show that if piracy is not solved within Somalia’s borders soon 
then piracy may replicate the South American drugs trade in the 1970s—a 
relatively small-time operation which turned into a huge global crisis.  
  
 151. See, e.g., U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (July 
26, 2010).  
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APPENDIX A 
Andrew Mwangura’s E-mail Request: 
 
1.  ·A complete list of all ships and hostages currently being held. The 
number of ships and hostages (along with date and location taken) 
 ·Asking Price, Current location and whether the ships are being    
used as mother ships 
 
2.  ·A complete list of all successful ransoms. 
  ·Name, flag, country of ownership, number of crew 
  ·Initial asking price for each ship 
  ·Eventual ransom paid 
  ·Time held in captivity before release 
 
3. ·A complete list of all pirate groups and financiers, including the     
locations they work out of. 
·A list of all pirate groups and their names, and an estimate of the   
number of pirates. 
Comparison to the number of groups over the same period last 
year, and the number of pirates. 
 
4. ·A complete list of hostages who died in this period, and how they     
were killed. 
 
5. ·An accurate figure of the number of attacks over the period  
     mentioned above. 
Included in this should be a month-by-month breakdown of  
    Number of attacks vs. success rate. 
 
6. A detailed look at the following trends: 
 ·Increase in violence against hostages. 
 ·How much has this increased? 
 ·Why is this changing? 
 ·The use of VPDs 
·How many vessels have VPDs today compared to one year ago 
(estimate of actual number and percentage of merchant shipping in 
piracy danger zone)? 
·How does this correlate to the number of successful attacks? 
·What is the general feeling in the shipping industry? 
·Will VPDs help quell the problem or cause more violence? 
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·Are there still concerns over rogue companies setting themselves    
up and providing poor security? 
  ·Change in pirate tactics 
  ·How have pirate tactics changed? 
  ·Are they using more force? 
  ·Do they have better weapons? 
  ·Are they ranging even further out to sea? 
·Are they now targeting governments for ransoms more, and 
why? 
·Are they keeping more sailors on land, and why (numbers, 
please)? 
·Are they using the media more to push negotiations (examples 
and evidence, please)? 
 
7. Community opposition to piracy 
·How much has this grown? How has this force the pirates to 
move? 
 ·What were the old hotspots and what are the new hotspots? 
 ·Anti-piracy initiatives 
·What new initiatives are we seeing, for example land-based pro-
grams? 
 ·How has the focus changed, if at all? 
 
 Prosecutions and deaths 
·How many pirates have been captured over the last year? 
·How many have been prosecuted over how many had to be re-
leased? 
 ·How many pirates have been killed? 
 ·How does these figures compare to the previous year? 
 ·Have prosecutions had any effect? 
 
 Ransom payments 
·Was the seizure of the ransom in Mogadishu a one-off, or could 
ransom payments be targeted in the future? 
 
 Navies 
 ·How many attacks have the navies disrupted? 
 ·How does this compare to the previous year? 
 ·Has this had any effect on the number of successful attacks? 
·Have they changed their tactics (for example, when they formed a 
barrier close to the Somali coast and targeted pirate vessels)? 
 
2012] On the Economics of International Sea Piracy 773
 Costs 
 ·How much has this cost the shipping industry over the last year? 
 ·How does this compare to the previous one-year period? 
 Pirates and al-Shabaab 
·Are there any links between the pirates and al-Shabaab? We need 
evidence (names,  dates and payments made, and where they were 
paid).
APPENDIX B 152
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States of America has long been regarded as the driving 
force behind international human rights and historically “set the standard” 
for what those rights entail. Often admired and respected, the United States 
has been considered a pioneer of human rights, in large part because of its 
role in founding the United Nations. The United Nations Charter, crafted in 
part to protect human rights and maintain international stability, is one of 
many mechanisms established to achieve the ultimate ends of respecting 
human rights and the territorial sovereignty of other nations. Article 55(c) 
highlights the notion of respecting human rights in providing that:  
[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being, 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, the United Nations shall promote: . . . c. universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.2 
This general principle of Article 55 and the aforementioned U.S. 
Department of State’s mission statement generally sets the backdrop for the 
United States’ stance on international human rights and its respect for other 
nations’ sovereignty. 
However, the unprecedented and arguably tyrannical exercise of 
“executive” power in United States v. Alvarez-Machain3 not only 
undermines the rule of law and the United States’ reputation in the 
international world, it sets a dangerous precedent that unjustifiably 
sacrifices the liberty of many for the questionable justice of few. The 
position of the United States, historically, has demonstrated that this type of 
event is the exception rather than the norm. Yet, it does not detract from the 
underlying notion that it can, and may, happen again and that it 
detrimentally affects not only the populace of the United States, but the 
territorial sovereignty of other nations. 
Section II of this note provides a history of the extradition process, its 
natural effects on nations’ sovereignty, and a review of the executive 
branch’s role in the extralegal abduction of Humberto Alvarez-Machain. 
Section III describes and analyzes the purpose and essence of the 
Constitution, the inherent checks and balances therein, the enumerated text 
implicated in Alvarez-Machain, and the Supreme Court’s failure to consider 
constitutional implications, resulting in a potential constitutional violation. 
Lastly, this note illustrates the repercussions of the executive branch’s 
  
 2. U.N. Charter art. 55(c). 
 3. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
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actions on foreign affairs, international relations, and, arguably most 
important, United States citizens.4  
I. EXTRADITION, SOVEREIGNTY, AND UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN  
A. Extradition 
Extradition is defined as “the official surrender of an alleged criminal by 
one state or nation to another having jurisdiction over the crime charged.”5 
Furthermore, international extradition is defined as an “extradition in 
response to a demand made by the executive of one nation on the executive 
of another.”6 To secure alleged criminals who commit crimes within one 
nation and then later flee to another nation, or who commit the crimes from 
abroad, nations have relied on the extradition process for their 
apprehension.  
The United States’ first extradition treaty, the Jay Treaty with Great 
Britain in 1794, stated the United States or Great Britain, “on mutual 
requisition, . . . will deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged 
with murder or forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of either.”7 
Centuries later, the Supreme Court of the United States posited that 
“international law recognize[s] no right to extradition apart from treaty . . . . 
[T]he legal right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty to 
surrender him to the demanding country exist only when created by treaty.”8  
As international relationships became more interconnected and complex, 
the need for a formal process was further emphasized. Cherif Bassiouni, 
speaking of international law in the 20th century, argued that “[r]elations 
between nation-states are ceasing to be a matter of limited interest and 
exclusive concern to the parties immediately involved, but are broadening to 
encompass some aspects of the world community’s interests in the 
maintenance and preservation of minimum world order.”9 Further, 
  
 4. Generally, the United States has extradition treaties with many other countries. 
The particular instances argued herein are not meant to be representative of all treaties. 
Rather, they are used only to support the general principles subsequently argued. Moreover, 
this paper does not address the issue of extraditions, legal or otherwise, of criminals in 
relation to individual states to be tried under state law, which raises interesting questions of 
federalism. Nor does this paper discuss the certain exceptions or immunities applicable to 
extradition, such as the political exception doctrine or the Second Circuit’s “Toscanino 
exception.”    
 5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (9th ed. 2009). 
 6. Id.  
 7. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 
26 (1974). 
 8. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933). For a general discussion of 
the development of United States extradition policy, see Abraham Abramovskya, 
Extraterritorial Abductions: America’s “Catch and Snatch” Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 151, 154-56 (1991).  
 9. BASSIOUNI, supra note 7, at 571. 
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Bassiouni suggested that “[s]ince World War II, the peoples of the world 
have become, more than ever, in the history of Humankind, conscious of the 
need to insure their collective safety and survival.”10  
Today, this sentiment resonates even more strongly, given the 
interconnectivity of the international world, where actions taken with 
respect to one nation can result in social, economical, political, or other 
fallout with another nation. H. Jefferson Powell argues, referring to the 21st 
century, “the government of the [U.S.] possesses almost incalculable power 
to affect the lives of people all over the globe [and] . . . is the world’s 
mightiest military power, its largest economy, and a pervasive cultural 
influence, for good and ill.”11 As a result, “[t]he decisions which its 
government makes in the name of American foreign policy thus are of the 
greatest human significance.”12  
The United States presently has extradition treaties with 112 nations.13 
Each of these agreements outlines in detail the particular procedures that a 
respective nation must follow and meet in order to obtain the sought after 
suspect, such as the necessary level of cause. While each nation may have 
different motivations for executing such agreements, two fundamental 
incentives are constant. Each nation retains the authority to obtain fugitives 
outside of its jurisdiction,14 and the extradition treaty provides recourse 
when the necessary procedures are not satisfied, such as when a hosting 
nation objects to the taking of an individual from its border without consent. 
B. Sovereignty 
A fundamental principle of sovereignty is that every state has legal 
authority over those within its boundaries. A common rationale for nations 
to enter into extradition agreements is to retain their sovereignty and have it 
respected by other nations.15 This is achieved by requiring nations who wish 
to obtain criminals from the hosting nation to conform to the formal treaty 
  
 10. Id. at 558. 
 11. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN 
ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION xiii (2002).  
 12. Id. 
 13. For a list of countries with which the United States has extradition treaties, 
including when they were signed and entered into force, see 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2006).  
 14. BASSIOUNI, supra note 7, at 9 (“[E]xtradition has not been looked upon as an 
absolute international duty, and that if a state wishes to ensure that it secures the return of its 
own criminals it must enter into treaties with other states . . . .”).  
 15. David H. Herrold, Comment, A New, Emerging World Order: Reflections of 
Tradition and Progression Through the Eyes of Two Courts, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
143, 149 (“Article 10 of the Treaty . . . illuminates the importance of the process to both 
States. Such procedural formality can only imply a certain respect for and consideration of 
the sovereignty of each State and that of each State’s legal processes as well.”). 
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process.16 However, conforming to such procedures may in fact deprive 
them of sovereignty, rather than ensure it.  
Without a treaty, the hosting nation would have complete control over 
the individual and could do what it wished within its own laws and 
processes. An extradition treaty inextricably limits this control by creating a 
reciprocal role to be played by the hosting country, which may be against its 
ultimate wishes within the treaty’s procedures. However, under some 
treaties, even though the requesting nation has complied with all 
procedures, the hosting nation, through its executive or a designated final 
arbiter, may nonetheless retain control over the suspect.17 Alternatively, 
some treaties provide that if a hosting nation refuses to extradite, the 
requesting party can demand that the case be submitted to the hosting 
nations’ authorities for prosecution.18  These alternative mechanisms, in 
turn, counteract any questions regarding a treaty’s limitation on the 
sovereignty of the hosting nation, as they provide, through formal means, 
the final choice in the proceedings.  
Irrespective of a treaty’s effect on a nation’s sovereignty, it is generally 
held that rendition techniques such as abduction and kidnapping, taken 
outside of a formal treaty process, are not only a violation of a nation’s 
sovereignty, but ultimately much more.19 As David H. Herrold writes 
regarding forced extradition and kidnapping under color of law, abductions 
are “considered violations of State sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
These actions allegedly permit a State to exercise judiciary power over a 
fugitive offender brought before it by any means, regardless of the legality 
of those means.”20 Bassiouni states that these acts threaten “minimum world 
order” and violate other lofty principles, including: the state of refuge’s 
  
 16. Id. at 145 (“Extradition treaties confer upon the contracting States a greater 
degree of control over certain citizens of the States . . . putting into place a means by which a 
State may lawfully, and with respect for the sovereignty of the other, exercise jurisdiction 
over a particular national of the other State.”); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 
655, 668 n.14 (1992) (“[M]ost international agreements have the common purpose of 
safeguarding the sovereignty of signatory nations, in that they seek to further peaceful 
relations between nations”). 
 17. Herrold, supra note 15, at 149 (“Whether the State from which extradition is 
requested is bound to deliver an alleged offender is a question of the State’s executory power 
and discretion. Under the Article 9 of the Treaty, neither State is bound to deliver any 
national, and the ultimate decision is made by ‘executive’ authority and discretion.”).  
 18. Abramovskya, supra note 8, at 206-07 (“Under the United States-Mexico 
Extradition Treaty, neither country is required to extradite its own nationals. . . . [A]rticle 
9(2) provides for the requested party to submit the case to its own authorities for prosecution, 
provided that they have jurisdiction over the offense.”). 
 19. BASSIOUNI, supra note 7, at 123. “[E]nd result of all such processes is the 
rendition of a person against his or her will by one state to another because what is at issue is 
not the end result but the processes employed.” Id. at 121. More troublesome is that “there is 
no deterrent to them because their consequences are allowed to produce legally valid 
results.” Id. at 123.  
 20. Herrold, supra note 15, at 146.  
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sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic process; the individual’s right 
to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention and international due process 
and fairness; and the integrity of the international process.21 
C. United States v. Alvarez-Machain 
In 1984, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conducted a series 
of successful raids of marijuana operations by a drug cartel in Mexico.22 
These successes incited retaliation by the drug cartel, including the 
abduction and torture of DEA agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar and a 
Mexican pilot, both of whom were subsequently murdered.23 Humberto 
Alvarez-Machain was a doctor who “was present during Camarena-
Salazar’s interrogation and administered a drug ‘to revive the agent when he 
passed out while being interrogated by his captors.’”24 Suspecting Alvarez-
Machain conspired in Camarena-Salazar’s torture and subsequent death, the 
United States sought to bring him to justice.  
Thereafter, the United States twice unsuccessfully negotiated with the 
Mexican government for the extradition of Alvarez-Machain.25 The first 
negotiation failed due to the refusal by Mexican officials to pay for the 
expense of transportation, while the second failed because of increased 
tension between the two nations from the publicity of Camarena-Salazar’s 
murder.26 Subsequently, four men sponsored by the U.S. government 
abducted Alvarez-Machain from Mexico and placed him on a plane to El 
Paso, Texas, where he was then arrested by DEA agents.27 The Mexican 
government responded by filing three separate diplomatic protests of this 
abduction to the United States Department of State.28 
In 1992, the Supreme Court of the United States, while having 
“previously considered proceedings in claimed violation of an extradition 
treaty and proceedings against a defendant brought before a court by means 
of a forcible abduction,”29 held in United States v. Alvarez-Machain that the 
“fact of respondent’s forcible abduction does not therefore prohibit his trial 
in a court in the United States for violations of the criminal laws of the 
United States.”30 
  
 21. BASSIOUNI, supra note 7, at 182. 
 22. Stephen Fone, Note, Do DEA Field Agents Have the Power to Unilaterally 
Execute a Trans-Border Abduction?: The Ninth Circuit’s Take on Alvarez-Machain v. 
United States, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 221, 223 (2004).  
 23. Id. at 224.  
 24. Id. at 225 (quoting Physician in Camarena Case Pleads Not Guilty, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 11, 1990, at B2). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 226.  
 27. Abramovskya, supra note 8, at 156. 
 28. Id. at 168. 
 29. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659 (1992).  
 30. Id. at 670. 
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The Supreme Court, framing the issue as whether the abduction of a 
criminal defendant to the United States from a nation with which the U.S. 
maintains an extradition treaty provides him a defense to the jurisdiction of 
United States courts,31 rationalized that the treaty had no express provision 
regarding forced abduction or extradition on its face to consider the 
abduction a violation of the treaty.32 Further, through an analysis of the 
historical practice between each nation under the treaty, notably the 
Martinez incident of 1905,33 the Court held there was no implied provision 
prohibiting such conduct because the Mexican government was aware of the 
United States’ position on forcible abductions around that time.34 Lastly, the 
Court reasoned that Alvarez-Machain’s arguments regarding customary 
international law were unpersuasive, as the examples cited were of “little 
aid in construing the terms of an extradition treaty, or the authority of a 
court to later try an individual who has been so abducted” 35 and “to imply 
from the terms of this Treaty that it prohibits obtaining the presence of an 
individual by means outside of the procedures the Treaty establishes 
requires a much larger inferential leap.”36 Thus, the Court found that the Ker 
doctrine applied and jurisdiction was proper. The Ker doctrine (commonly 
referred to as Ker-Frisbie doctrine, combining Supreme Court cases Ker v. 
Illinois37 and Frisbie v. Collins38), as a general rule, held that the “power of 
a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the manner in which he 
has been brought within the court’s jurisdiction, whether by forcible 
abduction, violation of international treaty, or illegal arrest.”39 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and O’Connor, offered a 
forceful dissenting opinion. The dissent reasoned that the Ker and Frisbie 
cases did not apply, as this case “involve[d] this country’s abduction of 
another country’s citizen; it also involves a violation of the territorial 
  
 31. Id. at 657. 
 32. Id. at 663.  
 33. Id. at 665 & n.11. 
 34. Id. at 665. See also Herrold, supra note 15, at 149. 
 35. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 668 & n.15.  
 36. Id. at 669; Herrold, supra note 15, at 156-57 (“Alvarez’s main argument caused 
the majority to briefly consider international custom. The Court recognized that it had 
created a term by implication in the U.S.-England extradition treaty in Rauscher in 1886; but 
it also noted the term had been created by implication because of the similar ‘practice by 
nations with regard to extradition treaties’ during that period.”) (footnotes omitted) (citation 
omitted). 
 37. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). 
 38. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). 
 39. Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, District Court Jurisdiction Over Criminal 
Suspects who was Abducted in Foreign Country and Returned to United States for Trial or 
Sentencing, 64 A.L.R. FED. 292, § 2 (1983). Neither Ker nor Frisbie, however, touched on 
“whether the U.S. courts have jurisdiction when the U.S. government sponsors an 
extraterritorial abduction.” Michael J. Weiner, The Importance of a Clear Rule for Judicial 
Deference to Executive Interpretations of Treaties: A Defense of United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 12 WIS. INT’L L.J. 125, 140 (1993).  
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integrity of that other country, with which this country has signed an 
extradition treaty.”40  
In Ker, Ker was abducted from Peru by a private U.S. citizen in order to 
stand trial for larceny in Illinois, arguably violating the extradition treaty 
between Peru and the United States. The Court held that its power to try a 
person for a crime was not impaired because the defendant was obtained by 
forcible means against his will. Similarly, in Frisbie, the Court held that 
Collins’ kidnapping in Illinois by Michigan officers did not make 
jurisdiction improper, reasoning that “due process of law is satisfied when 
one present in court is convicted of [a] crime after having been fairly 
apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with 
constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution 
that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape 
justice because he was brought to trial against his will.”41  
The Supreme Court majority’s approach of deciding the matter narrowly 
on the jurisdictional grounds was akin to finding a needle in a haystack. In 
Alvarez-Machain, the Court inappropriately minimized the distinction 
between private actors abducting a suspect, as opposed to government or 
government-sponsored abductions attaining the same end. The Court 
acknowledges that the only difference between Ker and the case at bar was 
that Ker was decided on the premise that there was no governmental 
involvement in the abduction.42 Given the Court’s admitted distinction of 
this critical fact, highlighted by the dissenting view of Justice Stevens, the 
application of the Ker doctrine was inappropriate. 
The dissent further reasoned in Alvarez-Machain that the abduction of 
Alvarez-Machain violated the treaty between the nations as the explicit 
provisions within the treaty would be completely undermined to mere 
verbiage.43 The dissent noted that, if the Court’s argument regarding how 
abduction was not expressly prohibited by the treaty and therefore was 
allowable, then “[i]f the United States . . . thought it more expedient to 
torture or simply to execute a person rather than to attempt extradition, these 
options would be equally available because they, too, were not explicitly 
prohibited by the Treaty.”44 Furthermore, in reciting Justice Story’s opinion 
in The Apollon,45 finding support in a leading treatise (Oppenheim’s 
International Law),46 and echoing the chief reporter of the American Law 
  
 40. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 41. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522. 
 42. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 662. 
 43. Id. at 673-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 44. Id. at 674. The dissent further found it was “ironic that the United States has 
attempted to justify its unilateral action based on the kidnapping, torture, and murder of a 
federal agent by authorizing the kidnapping of respondent, for which the American law 
enforcement agents who participated have now been charged by Mexico.” Id. at 674 & n.12.  
 45. Id. at 679. 
 46. Id. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Institute’s Restatement of Foreign Relations,47 the dissent found a clear case 
of a violation against internationally accepted principles. 
 
II. THE CONSTITUTION 
The executive branch’s coordination of an international abduction of a 
fugitive from Mexico in Alvarez-Machain is distinguishable from the 
precedent relied upon by the Supreme Court in its holding, thus making its 
application inappropriate. In Ker, the Court held the international abduction 
performed by a bounty hunter was conducted “without any pretence of 
authority under the treaty or from the government of the United States.”48 
Moreover, the Peruvian government did not technically object because it 
was in disarray. The implication of this fact is that it cannot be determined 
whether Peru would have acquiesced in the abduction for there to be a 
challengeable violation in the first place, as an objection is often required 
for there to be a violation of a treaty.49 Moreover, in Frisbie, the Court held 
that an interstate abduction did not prevent jurisdiction even in cases where 
there was direct government involvement.50  However, factually and legally 
Frisbie did not address the propriety of government involvement in 
international abductions. Therefore, the appropriate question would have 
turned on whether this act of abduction and kidnapping organized by the 
executive branch is a legitimate power under the Constitution. The answer 
is likely no because the Court undervalued the importance of the 
government’s involvement in the abduction, the executive branch’s 
kidnapping constituted a violation of the separation of powers, the meaning 
of “executive” power at the time of the United States’ founding did not 
include the ability to seize individuals, and acquiescing in the executive 
branch’s action circumvents the inherent accountability created by the 
Constitution. 
Most fundamental is Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion regarding the 
“critical flaw” in the majority’s opinion that it “fails to differentiate between 
the conduct of private citizens, which does not violate any treaty 
obligations, and conduct expressly authorized by the Executive Branch of 
the Government, which unquestionably constitutes a flagrant violation of 
international law.”51 However, irrespective of deciding the case on 
international law grounds, Alvarez-Machain could have been decided as 
executive action violating the Constitution. 
  
 47. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 680-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 48. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886); See also Weiner, supra note 39, at 140.  
 49. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438-43.  
 50. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 519-23 (1952) (emphasis added); See also 
Weiner, supra note 39, at 141. 
 51. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 682 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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A. The Constitutional Text and Basis of the Executive Power in 
Foreign Affairs 
The Constitution is one of the most sophisticated documents ever 
created. Its fundamental purpose is to ensure and promote the liberty and 
freedom of its constituents. It achieves this purpose through a variety of 
means found in the document itself. These structural devices consist of 
notions of federalism, separation of powers, elections, and checks and 
balances in order to prevent any one branch of government, the executive, 
judiciary, or legislature, to acquire an excess of power in any particular 
matter. 
The Constitution, through the aptly named “Vesting Clauses,” allocates 
powers to the respective branches. Article I of the Constitution provides that 
“[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.”52 Importantly, Article II provides “[t]he executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”53 Finally, 
Article III provides “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish.”54 These specific sections 
merely set the groundwork of the separation of powers, and have been 
further delineated through particular sections and case law.  
There has been much written by the Supreme Court and commentators 
regarding the nature and amount of executive power afforded by the 
Constitution. According to Edward S. Corwin, “[t]hroughout the last half 
century the theory of presidential power has recruited strength from a 
succession of ‘strong’ presidents, from an economic crisis, from our 
participation in two world wars and a ‘cold’ war, and finally from 
organization of the labor movement.”55 Moreover, the Constitution makes 
clear that all federal executive power is afforded in the President to “ensure 
a unity in purpose and energy in action . . . [and] is particularly crucial in 
matters of . . . foreign policy, where a unitary executive can evaluate threats, 
consider policy choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and 
energy that is far superior to any other branch.”56  
  
 52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  
 53. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 55. Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 
COLUM. L. REV. 53, 54 (1953). 
 56. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to the Deputy 
Counsel to the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military 
Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm [hereinafter Memorandum]. 
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The Supreme Court has recognized “the generally accepted view that 
foreign policy [is] the province and responsibility of the Executive.”57 “The 
Founders in their wisdom made [the President] not only the Commander-in-
Chief but also the guiding organ in the conduct of our foreign affairs, 
possessing ‘vast powers in relation to the outside world.’”58 The foreign 
affairs power is “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its 
exercise an act of Congress.”59 Lastly, “[b]oth the Supreme Court and the 
political branches have often recognized that governmental practice plays a 
highly significant role in establishing the contours of the constitutional 
separation of powers: ‘a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long 
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . 
may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by §1 
of Art. II.’”60   
In light of a treaty, however, “the basic framework for the making of 
foreign policy is, or ought to be, the Constitution of the United States . . . 
[that it] is the product of independent and often antagonistic institutions—
the legislative and executive branches of the federal government.”61 
The Treaty Clause of Article II of the Constitution provides the 
“[President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur.”62 Alvarez-Machain presents an issue where the Senate has 
authorized the treaty through ratification, thus giving the treaty the force of 
law and making it the “supreme law of the land,”63 circumscribing the legal 
framework and process of extradition vis-à-vis Mexico.  
While the president is dependent on Congress for the provision of most of 
the tools of foreign policy . . . the president needs no legislative 
authorization to use such tools as may exist to create and pursue a foreign 
policy, and in most instances (though not all) is constitutionally entitled to 
adhere to presidential policy even in the teeth of the contrary wishes of the 
legislature.64  
  
 57. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 
U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981)). 
 58. Memorandum, supra note 56, at 5 (quoting Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 
173 (1948)). 
 59. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).  
 60. Memorandum, supra note 56, at (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 61. POWELL, supra note 11, at xiii.  
 62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 63. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
 64. POWELL, supra note 11, at xiv.  
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It is within this category of “though not all” that the Court overlooked. 
“[T]he idea of executive foreign affairs power contained in Article II, 
Section I grants the President material independent power, but this power is 
not an open-ended or unlimited source of authority.”65  
B. The Executive’s Ability to Internationally Abduct Suspected 
Criminals Violates Separation of Powers Principles Fundamental 
to the Constitution 
The Court’s decision in Alvarez-Machain essentially obliterates the core 
mechanisms of the Constitution for checking the power of the executive 
branch if it were merely labeled as within the foreign affairs power. 
Explicitly, the enumerated text of the Treaty Clause in Article II of the 
Constitution is undermined if the executive branch can merely go above and 
beyond the text of the treaty as ratified by the Senate. Deference to an 
executive’s power is not absolute, even if it is with an international 
objective. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Court held that 
President Truman’s order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize the 
nation’s steel mills was invalid as the President did not have the authority to 
issue such an order.66 Justice Black reasoned that there was no 
congressional statute that authorized such a seizure,67 the President’s 
military power as Commander and Chief did not encompass labor 
disputes,68 and the President’s power “to see that the laws are faithfully 
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”69    
While the seizure of the steel mills was domestic in nature, while the 
seizure of Alvarez-Machain was internationally related, they both were 
intended to achieve international objectives. In Youngstown, the objective 
was national security and “to avert a national catastrophe which would 
inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production” in light of the Korean 
War,70 whereas the objective in Alvarez-Machain was his capture from 
Mexico to be tried within the U.S. for the homicide of a DEA agent in 
Mexico.  
The most impactful opinion in Youngstown, Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence, has become a measuring stick for the Court in interpreting 
executive authority. Justice Jackson reasoned that deference, from highest to 
lowest, by the judiciary to the executive is dependent on whether he or she 
is acting pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, acting 
in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, or taking 
  
 65. Michael D. Ramsey, The Textual Basis of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 150 (2006). 
 66. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).  
 67. Id. at 586.  
 68. Id. at 587. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 582.  
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actions that are incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress.71 The executive branch’s involvement in the kidnapping, the first 
of its kind presented to the Supreme Court, is not of such routine practice as 
to rise to a “gloss” on executive power as described by Justice Frankfurter 
in his concurring opinion.72 But, Congress or, in the Alvarez-Machain case, 
the Senate has spoken and created a basis for which the executive branch 
must follow to achieve its ends. The executive branch’s connivance in the 
abduction of Alvarez-Machain is akin to an order that was not “executed in 
a manner prescribed by Congress,”73 by its ratification of the treaty. 
The Senate’s ratification of the applicable treaty between the United 
States and Mexico addressed the specific situation where our government 
wished to punish a particular person outside of United States’ boundaries 
and how the government must go about obtaining suspects via the treaty. If 
the executive could merely go above and beyond what is written within the 
treaty, it essentially guts the entire purpose of its creation and makes Senate 
ratification a mere formality, rather than an essential mandate required by 
the Constitution.74  
  
 71. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“1. When the President acts pursuant to an 
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes 
all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these 
circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the 
federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually 
means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed 
by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of 
presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion 
would rest heavily upon any who might attack it. 2. When the President acts in absence of 
either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent 
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, 
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, 
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is 
likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on 
abstract theories of law. 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely 
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over 
the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling 
the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so 
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the 
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”). 
 72. For an example where routine practice represented a “gloss” in executive power, 
see United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).  
 73. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588. 
 74.  
Tho’ several writers on the subject of government place that power 
[of making treaties] in the class of Executive authorities, yet this is 
evidently an arbitrary disposition. For if we attend carefully, to its 
operation, it will be found to partake more of the legislative than of 
the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall within 
the definition of either of them. The essence of the legislative 
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The aforementioned action arguably results in a violation of the 
separation of powers.75 “The Executive, except for recommendation and 
veto, has no legislative power. The executive action we have here originates 
in the individual will of the [executive branch] and represents an exercise of 
authority without law.”76  
  
authority, is to enact laws; or in other words, to prescribe rules for 
the regulation of the society. While the execution of the laws and the 
employment of the common strength, either for this purpose, or for 
the common defence, seem to comprize all the functions of the 
Executive magistrate. The power of making treaties is plainly neither 
the one nor the other. It relates neither to the execution of the 
subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new ones, and still less to an 
exertion of the common strength. Its objects are contracts with 
foreign nations, which have the force of law, but derive it from the 
obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by the 
sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and 
sovereign. The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct 
department, and to belong properly neither to the legislative nor to 
the executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in 
the management of foreign negotiations, point out the executive as 
the most fit agent in those transactions: whilst the vast importance of 
the trust, and the operation of treaties as Laws, plead strongly for the 
participation of the whole or a part of the legislative body in the 
office of making them.  
James Madison, Helvidius No. 1 (Aug. 24, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 66, 69 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 
(Alexander Hamilton).  
 
It will not fail to be remarked on this commentary, that whatever 
doubts may be started as to the correctness of its reasoning against 
the legislative nature of the power to make treaties: it is clear, 
consistent, and confident, in deciding that the power is plainly and 
evidently not an executive power.   
Id.  
 
 75.  
It cannot be contended that the President would have had power to 
issue this order had Congress explicitly negated such authority in 
formal legislation. Congress had expressed its will to withhold this 
power from the President as though it had said so in so many words. 
The authoritatively expressed purpose of Congress to disallow such 
power to the President and to require him, when in his mind the 
occasion arose for such a seizure, to put the matter to Congress and 
ask for specific authority from it, could not be more decisive if it had 
been written into [the Taft-Hartley Act].  
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 
 76. Id. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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It is one thing to draw an intention of Congress from general language and 
to say that Congress would have explicitly written what is inferred, where 
Congress has not addressed itself to a specific situation. It is quite 
impossible, however, when Congress did specifically address itself to a 
problem, as Congress did to that of seizure, to find secreted in the 
interstices of legislation the very grant of power which Congress 
consciously withheld. To find authority so explicitly withheld is not 
merely to disregard a particular instance the clear will of Congress. It is to 
disrespect the whole legislative process and the constitutional division 
between President and Congress.77 
In light of Jackson’s concurring opinion the executive branch’s action 
falls within either the second or third category of judicial deference. As can 
be inferred, the Mexican-American Extradition Treaty neither granted nor 
explicitly denied the authority to abduct suspects outside of the treaty 
process. Adopting this view for the moment, the executive can only rely 
upon his or her own independent powers and that “any actual test of power 
is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary 
imponderables.”78 The abduction of Alvarez-Machain was not in the midst 
of a national emergency. Nor was it a condition meant to improve national 
security. Rather, the motivation behind the abduction was potentially a 
multitude of reasons: the executive branch’s personal interest in the matter 
(death of one of its own agents),79 fear of corrupt officials within Mexico, 
the lack of faith in the efficacy of the Mexican legal system as an 
alternative, frustration with the Mexican government in negotiations, and/or 
more. None of these arise to a justifiable reason to go beyond the rule of 
law. Thus, the executive’s actions in this case would likely constitute a 
violation.  
Alternatively, a stronger argument is that the Senate, rather than stating 
explicitly that the government cannot perform abductions outside of the 
treaty, had implied it in some manner.80 The executive’s power would then 
“be at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”81 
Justice Jackson reasoned that “[c]ourts can sustain exclusive presidential 
  
 77. Id. at 609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 78. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 79. “The Executive Branch freely admits that it was at least partially motivated by a 
vengeful spirit.” Jonathan A. Lonner, Official Government Abductions in the Presence of 
Extradition Treaties, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 998, 1021 (1993). 
 80. The Court’s “literalist approach to treaty interpretation such as that employed by 
the majority may have virtue in some cases. But that, in this case, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
reading of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty yielded a result clearly inconsistent with the 
treaty’s intent.” Michael Shawn Hudson, U.S. Government Sanctioned Extraterritorial 
Abduction of Criminals: Permissible or Violations of International Law?, 31 LINCOLN L. 
REV. 25, 43 (2003). 
 81. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. 
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control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the 
subject.”82 However, to disable the Senate from acting upon this subject 
would be in complete contradiction to the plain words of the Constitution as 
provided in Article II’s Treaty Clause, a strict limitation on the President’s 
foreign affairs power. Thus, the executive branch’s connivance in the 
abduction of Alvarez-Machain was tantamount to a violation of the 
Constitution.    
“The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the 
Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise 
of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of 
the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental 
powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.”83 
Edward S. Corwin argued that the best safeguard against presidential 
autocracy is Congress, through timely action and procedures as can be 
anticipated by them.84 However, in retrospect, it may be argued that 
Congress is acquiescing in the executive branch’s activity and is, through its 
continued silence, endorsing it. In that case, it must fall to the judiciary to 
curb such an abuse of power.  
As Charles L. Black Jr. argued, a government must devise a way of 
“bringing about a feeling in the nation that the actions of government, even 
when disapproved of, are authorized rather than merely usurpative.”85 Black 
suggested that hope in determining what is authorized versus usurpative lies 
best with the Supreme Court.86 As Justice Stevens penned, an executive’s 
interest in the matter is no “justification for disregarding the Rule of Law 
that this Court has a duty to uphold.”87 Justice Stevens then went on to echo 
Justice Brandeis regarding the Court’s duty  “to render judgment evenly and 
dispassionately according to law88:  
[I]n a case of this kind sets an example that other tribunals in other 
countries are sure to emulate. Crime is contagious. If the Government 
becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the 
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare 
  
 82. Id. at 637-38.  
 83. Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 
293 (1926)). 
 84. Corwin, supra note 55, at 66. “‘Presidential autocracy,’ when it is justified, is an 
inrush of power to fill a power vacuum. Nature abhors a vacuum; so does an age of 
emergency. Let Congress see to it that no such vacuum occurs.” Id.  
 85. CHARLES L. BLACK, Jr., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A 
DEMOCRACY 47 (Greenwood Press 1977) (1960).    
 86. Id. at 51. 
 87. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 686 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
 88. Id. At 687 (quoting United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 342 (1947) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting)). 
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that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction 
of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution. Against that 
pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.89  
C. A Historical Interpretation of “Executive” Power Does Not 
Include the Power to Abduct  
While the meaning of “executive” power at the time of ratification 
included foreign affairs power, it is unlikely that the Founders envisioned 
this to include the power to abduct citizens of other nations to be tried in 
United States courts. Therefore, the executive’s action in Alvarez-Machain 
is not authorized by an interpretation of the “executive” power and 
constitutes a violation of the Constitution.  
In Philip Bobbitt’s work, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the 
Constitution, Bobbitt typifies six modalities, ways in which legal 
propositions are characterized to form a constitutional point of law, to 
express various interpretations of the constitution.90 Bobbitt’s historical 
approach, which questions what the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of 
the Constitution were to interpret what the Constitution affords, lends 
insight into what powers the Executive may have.91 In this respect, we look 
to what the framers intended the scope of the executive branch’s power with 
respect to foreign affairs is to be. Specifically, analyzing whether 
“executive” power affords the ability to circumvent a procedural process 
created through a treaty, which at its core is proposed by the Executive and 
ratified by a majority of the Senate, to abduct a citizen of another country 
for crimes committed that essentially affect the United States. 
Michael D. Ramsey provides a complement to Justice Jackson’s 
Youngstown opinion in analyzing an Executive’s foreign affairs power.92 
Adopting what he calls “Jeffersonian” executive power, Ramsey 
emphasizes that “[t]he Constitution . . . has declared that ‘the Executive 
powers shall be vested in the President.’ . . . The transaction of business 
with foreign nations is Executive altogether. It belongs then to the head of 
the department, except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to 
the Senate.”93 Ramsey’s argument is four-fold that the 18th century meaning 
of “executive” included foreign affairs power: first, that key writers, such as 
Montesquieu and Blackstone, whom the Framers relied upon, included 
  
 89. Id. at 686 n.33 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 90. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 4-5 
(1984). 
 91. Id.  
 92. Ramsey, supra note 65, at 141. 
 93. Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting 
Diplomatic Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 378, 378-79 
(Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1961).  
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foreign affairs power; second, that the era leading up to the Constitution’s 
drafting recognized that American discourse itself associated “executive” 
power with foreign affairs power; third, when George Washington was 
elected President, he swiftly took control over foreign affairs; and fourth, 
when figures of that era interpreted Washington’s foreign affairs power they 
did so under the guise of Article II, Section 1.94   
However, it is difficult to imagine that the ability of the executive, or 
with his connivance generally with subordinates within the executive 
branch, to abduct a person from another country in order to try that person. 
As a matter of practicality during the 18th century, this not only would have 
been extremely difficult to accomplish given the state of technology and 
communication at that time without going through formal means, but also, 
factually it is doubtful this scenario ever arose for the framers to have even 
considered the issue. If the potential of international abduction had been 
recognized it likely would have been treated similarly to the other acts of 
George III, which actions led to the creation of the Declaration of 
Independence.95  
Moreover, Thomas Jefferson rejected “specific substantive attributes of 
the Crown’s federative and prerogative powers: ‘We do however expressly 
deny him the prerogative powers of . . . recalling to it any citizen thereof . . . 
except so far as he may be authorized.’”96 It is not too great an inferential 
step to consider if the founding fathers wished to limit the Crown’s powers 
of “recalling” any citizen to his presence in our Executive under our system 
of government, that a non-citizen, outside the context of war, could not 
similarly be “recalled.”  
Thus, the “executive” power did not entail the ability of an executive to 
abduct citizens of another country as intended by the ratifiers of the 
Constitution. Without the checks and balances inherent in the Constitution 
being triggered by such executive action, it affords the executive branch 
practical unaccountability.   
  
 94. Id. at 141-51. “[F]or example, the President cannot make law . . . even in support 
of foreign affairs objectives, as the Supreme Court rightly held in the Youngstown case, 
because the eighteenth-century meaning of “executive” powers did not extend so far.” Id. at 
150.  
 95. “The example of such unlimited executive power that must have most impressed 
the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the description of its evils in 
the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating their new 
Executive in his image.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 
(1952). 
 96. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 16 (1993). 
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D. Presidential Action to Abduct Circumvents Notions of 
Accountability Inherent in the Constitution  
Condoning such “executive” behavior raises questions of accountability. 
If the structural devices of the Constitution, such as separation of powers 
and checks and balances, do not ultimately result in the prohibition of 
abductions, then on principles of democracy and accountability it should. 
As Rebecca Brown argues, “[e]lections provide the people with an 
opportunity to punish those who have violated their duty by invading the 
liberties of the people. The problem with unaccountable government is there 
is no one to blame if oppression ensues.”97 Impeachment is an unlikely 
option, especially given the nature and motivation of the abduction of 
Alvarez-Machain. The President is, in part, directly elected and directly 
accountable to the citizens of the United States. This kind of accountability, 
however, is likely an ineffective deterrent.98  
Moreover, the officials appointed through the Appointments Clause in 
Article II are directly accountable to the President and can be removed per 
administrative law principles.99 However, in situations such as Alvarez-
Machain, middle level officials not directly accountable to the President can 
act on behalf of the executive branch, resulting in “various law enforcement 
networks and organizations, which operate with varying degrees of 
visibility to the public . . . , operate in a way that sets the legal framework 
for their operation rather than being confined by that legal frame.”100 So, 
“far from protecting the people from a ‘tyranny of the majority’ . . . under 
this system the people are subject to the tyrannical whims of convenience of 
professionals who cannot be held to account under any mechanism, nor, 
indeed, do those professionals seem to be removable from office.”101   
E. Effect on Foreign Affairs, International Relations, and U.S. citizens 
John Locke, whose thought was highly influential to the founding 
fathers, described particular powers possessed by the executive in his 
Second Treatise of Civil Government, including the “prerogative” power.102 
  
 97. Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 531, 565 (1998).  
 98. Direct election may not necessarily be a deterrent either. George H. W. Bush was 
President during the abduction of Alvarez-Machain and subsequently lost in re-election, but 
what weight can be attributed to that fact in his losing bid? For a general discussion of 
Bush’s presidency and reasons for not being re-elected, see George H. W. Bush, THE WHITE 
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgehwbush (last visited Mar. 7, 
2012). 
 99. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 100. J. W. E. Sheptycki, Law Enforcement, Justice and Democracy in the 
Transnational Arena: Reflections on the War on Drugs, 24 INT’L J. SOC. L. 61, 72 (1996). 
 101. Id. at 70.  
 102. Monaghan, supra note 96, at 13.  
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The “prerogative” power that Locke posited was the “[p]ower to act 
according to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the 
Law, and sometimes even against it.”103 In the instant case, however, it 
would be naive to postulate that the abduction of Alvarez-Machain is in the 
public good when its ramifications are considered. Congress’arguable 
acquiescence and the Supreme Court’s holding in Alvarez-Machain sets a 
dangerous precedent. Within the context of the law of war, Peter J. Spiro, 
borrowing from Michael J. Glennon’s adoption of the international legal 
doctrine of opinio juris, argued that the legal significance of any particular 
action of a government branch hinges on three elements: 
First, it is actions that count, not words; mere assertions of executive or 
legislative authority are largely irrelevant in the long run, the chaff of 
institutional bravado. Second, in order to take on lawmaking significance, 
the conduct must be known to the other branch; secret operations will have 
no constitutional significance until they are made known to Congress and 
it has had an opportunity to respond. Third, the other branch must have 
accepted or acquiesced in the action. Any conduct that satisfies (or even 
arguably satisfies) these requirements will become part of the precedential 
mix; a single historical episode can create incremental elements of custom 
in the same way that a single judicial decision will incrementally change 
court-made doctrine.104 
Allowing this kind of precedent further destroys America’s image in the 
world and its international relationships with other countries, and places 
U.S. citizens at risk. 
There were a number of predominately negative reactions internationally 
towards the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez-Machain.105 Most notably, 
it adversely affected United States’ relationship with Mexico, a border 
neighbor and close economic partner. It also placed tension in the two 
  
 103. Id.  
 104. Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1338, 1356 (1993) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)). “Individual episodes will, of course, have 
more or less weight in the same way that decisions from some courts are more meaningful 
than from others, and in this respect such factors as frequency, consistency, and regularity 
will be important to determining the constitutional probity of a particular practice.” Id. This 
idea speaks even more so against the government’s action in this case. Recently, notorious 
“merchant of death” Russian citizen Viktor Bout was extradited by Thailand to the United 
States through its  formal treaty process. “[L]ong considered simply untouchable by law 
enforcement,” Bout was wanted because “of his ability to arm terrorists targeting the United 
States.” Viktor Bout: Capturing “The Merchant of Death,” CBS News (Nov. 21, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/18/60minutes/main7067797.shtml. It is difficult to 
imagine, outside of politics, why the United States, given the gravity of Bout’s reputation, 
would go through formal means of extradition, whereas Alvarez-Machain was abducted by 
the government.    
 105. See Aimee Lee, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The Deleterious 
Ramifications of Illegal Abductions, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 126 (1993).  
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nations’ ability to cooperate in the war against drugs.106 The most impactful 
implication and worst case scenario is that it provides a precedent for other 
nations to “legally” abduct a U.S. citizen.107 Abraham Abramovskya and 
Michael Shawn Hudson both provide chilling hypotheticals where this is the 
case.108 Justice Stevens writes in his dissenting opinion that Abraham 
Sofaer, “a Legal Adviser of the State Department,” resisted the notion that 
abductions were acceptable based on a hypothetical where the United 
Kingdom abducted a terrorist from the United States.109 However, this is 
now possible under Alvarez-Machain.     
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court, irrespective of whether there was an international 
law violation, overlooked the question whether the Executive’s authority, 
through the executive branch generally, was a legitimate exercise of power 
granted by the Constitution. The Constitution was purposely endowed with 
checks and balances to further the aims of liberty. The actions taken in 
abducting Alvarez-Machain amounted to a violation of the separation of 
powers explicitly laid out in Article II of the Constitution. Further, the 18th 
century meaning of the term “executive” and what powers it encompassed 
at that time did not amount to an executive being able to abduct persons 
located within or outside the borders of our nation. Moreover, the 
democratic ideals instilled in the Constitution are frustrated in that the 
  
 106.  
The Alvarez case raises significant issues regarding the United 
States’ foreign relations with Mexico. There are three essential 
reasons why the United States cannot condone vigilantism in the war 
against drugs. First, such activity jeopardizes three treaties currently 
in effect with Mexico which are important to combating narcotics 
trafficking: the extradition treaty, the transfer of penal sanctions 
treaty and the mutual legal assistance treaty. Second, unilateral 
extraterritorial abductions are likely to result in a breakdown of any 
sub rosa efforts previously employed to combat drug trafficking. 
Finally, this type of vigilantism endangers the broader issue of the 
future relations between Mexico and the United States, including 
legal, economic and strategic concerns.  
Abramovskya, supra note 8, at 206.  
 
 107. “[F]oreign powers may refer to precedent within U.S. case law to justify the 
nefarious capture of either alleged offenders, government officials, or totally innocent 
citizens.” Id. at 152 (footnote omitted). 
 108. For Hudson’s hypothetical regarding a law professor being abducted by Iranian 
captors for criticizing the Islamic religion, see Hudson, supra note 80, at 25-26. For 
Abramovskya’s hypothetical regarding Iraqi abductors kidnapping a U.S. citizen who is a 
CEO of an oil company, see Abramovskya, supra note 8, at 151.  
 109. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 679 n.21 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
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accountability of the actors involved is unrealistic and inefficient, a mere 
façade of legitimacy. It makes it difficult to see how the Department of 
State can meet the goals of its mission statement when such fundamental 
violations of sovereignty, respect, and human rights are condoned by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.       
Martin Luther King Jr. commonly echoed “the arc of the moral universe 
is long, but it bends towards justice.” Given the consequences of the 
executive branch’s actions and the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez-
Machain, the outcry by the international community, the loss of face in 
international relations, the disrespect of another nation’s sovereignty, and 
the jeopardy of U.S. citizens’ safety, it is difficult to see how justice has 
been served in this case. It is without a doubt that the United States 
government “won” the battle when the Supreme Court allowed for the 
abduction to be legitimate; however, it may come to be one of the gravest of 
Pyrrhic victories. Only time will tell, but it seems the arc of the moral 
universe needs some bending, and soon.  
 
THE NECESSITY FOR NATIONAL FEDERATIONS TO 
STAND UP FOR THEMSELVES  
Sean Rassel 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 797 
I. IMPORTANCE OF HOSTING INTERNATIONAL  
 ATHLETIC COMPETITIONS ................................................................... 798 
 A. Economic Importance.................................................................... 798 
 B. Diplomatic and Political Importance............................................. 800 
II. INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW ............................................................ 801 
 A. Olympic Movement....................................................................... 801 
  1. Structure of the IOC ................................................................ 802 
  2. Olympic and IF Sovereignty.................................................... 803 
 B. Structure of FIFA........................................................................... 804 
  1. Executive Committee .............................................................. 804 
  2. FIFA Code of Ethics................................................................ 804 
 C. Subjecting FIFA to the Rules of the IOC ...................................... 805 
  1. The Olympic Advantage.......................................................... 805 
  2. FIFA’s Olympic Immunity...................................................... 806 
 D. Court of Arbitration Sport ............................................................. 808 
  1. Infancy of the CAS.................................................................. 808 
  2. Reform of the CAS and the Paris Agreement.......................... 808 
  3. Current State of the CAS......................................................... 809 
  4. Overview of CAS Procedures.................................................. 810 
  5. Strength of the CAS................................................................. 811 
  6. Why a CAS? ............................................................................ 811 
III. CORRUPTION INVOLVED IN HOSTING THE OLYMPICS  
 AND THE WORLD CUP.......................................................................... 812 
 A. Salt Lake City ................................................................................ 812 
 B. Olympic Response and Current Standards .................................... 813 
 C. Is History Repeating Itself? ........................................................... 815 
IV. ELIMINATING THE PROBLEM ............................................................... 818 
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 821 
 
INTRODUCTION 
International athletic competitions are some of the most popular events 
in the world and have impacts that can be felt around the world.  
Unfortunately, many events involving international athletic competition 
require legal resolutions.  This paper will detail why nations are so 
competitive in their bids to host events like the Olympic Games and the 
International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) World Cup.  The 
paper will then go on to discuss the structure of the International Olympic 
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Committee (IOC), FIFA, and international sports law, including the 
evolution of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Finally, the paper 
will detail the corruption scandals that have plagued and continue to plague 
the selection of host cities for the Olympics and FIFA World Cup and 
discuss the power of the CAS and how it is expanding. The current system 
is not sufficient to control International Federations (IFs) and the IOC, and 
it remains to be seen if the necessary action will ever willingly be taken to 
create a system that can provide justice in the world of international 
athletics.  As a result, it is imperative for National Federations and National 
Olympic Committees to work together and take the necessary actions to 
protect the integrity and value of international athletic competitions; these 
organizations cannot blindly rely on their respective International 
Federations.   
I.  IMPORTANCE OF HOSTING INTERNATIONAL ATHLETIC COMPETITIONS 
 Hosting large international sporting events can have a significant impact 
on nations and the pride that comes with international success is difficult to 
match.  One of the most tangible ways to measure the importance of hosting 
these events is the economic impact.  Hosting these events can serve as a 
significant bargaining chip in global politics, making the competition 
amongst bidding countries and cities to host these events intense. 
A.  Economic Importance  
One of the cities that bid to host the 2012 Summer Olympic Games was 
the Washington-Baltimore Metropolitan Area.1  It was estimated that 
hosting the Olympic Games in this area would generate $3.17 billion, 
including $2.15 billion in increased transactions among local businesses 
resulting from increased personal income among local residents.2  The total 
economic impact was estimated to be $5.3 billion and would result in new 
jobs, wage increases, and new tax revenue that would not be created,-- and 
has not been created,-- without hosting the Olympic Games.3   
AECOM,4 a managing and consulting firm, was enlisted to do a similar 
study on the economic impacts that hosting a potential World Cup would 
  
 1. STEPHEN S. FULLER & RICHARD CLINCH, THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF 
HOSTING THE 2012 OLYMPIC GAMES ON THE WASHINGTON-BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA 
2 (2000). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Background information on the AECOM company can be found at About, 
AECOM, http://www.aecom.com/About (last visited Apr. 30, 2012). 
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have on the United States5 and estimated that it would have a $5 billion 
impact on the United States economy.6  The study also estimated there 
would be a creation of between 65,000 and 100,000 new jobs because of the 
preparation and operation needed to host a World Cup tournament.7  
AECOM compared the impact of hosting the World Cup to the equivalent 
of hosting 12 to 18 Super Bowls, with each city receiving an economic 
impact between $400 million and $600 million as well as the creation of 
5,000 to 8,000 jobs during the event.8 
Although it is not a sharp economic jolt that results from hosting the 
Olympic Games, the long term economic impact of hosting the event is 
evident. Park City, Utah is a perfect example of the long term effects.   Over 
the past ten years, overall skiers have increased by 42%9 and the overall 
skiable acreage has increased by 26% in Utah.10  Park City, Utah, for 
example, has seen a 200% increase in international guests, including guests 
from Brazil, Australia, and Mexico.11  It is questionable if Park City was 
even a consideration for visitors prior to the resorts’ exposure during the 
2002 Winter Olympics.12 
The economic benefits of hosting international competitions are not 
universally regarded so highly.  Estimations made while bidding or preparing 
to host an international competition are often inflated and studies rarely 
examine whether the claimed benefits actually materialized.13  Most of these 
projections also fail to take into account what is displaced within the 
economic landscape by the new projected expenditures.14  Although there is 
not an exact science to determine what impact hosting an international 
athletic event would have on an economy, it will affect the economy, even if 
the effects are long-term and not immediately noticeable .15  Furthermore, 
even if the economic benefits are minimal as some economists predict,16 the 
  
 5. AECOM Studies Economic Impact of Hosting FIFA World Cup in US, AECOM 
(Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.aecom.com/What+We+Do/Economics/_news/AECOM+Studies+ 
Economic+Impact+of+Hosting+FIFA+World+Cup+in+US.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Lynn DeBruin, Utah Resorts Still Capitalizing on Olympic Success, YAHOO.COM, 
Nov. 14, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/utah-resorts-still-capitalizing-olympic-success-
184505576.html. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. (citing Park City Chamber and Visitors Bureau President Bill Malone’s 
comments regarding the exposure the Olympic Games provided Park City’s ski resorts). 
 13. Brian Sturgess & Chris Brady, Hosting the FIFA World Cup, 7 WORLD ECON. 
145, 147 (2006). 
 14. Id. at 149. 
 15. Id. at 163.   
 16. See generally Dennis Coates, World Cup Economics: What Americans Need to 
Know About a US World Cup Bid (Univ. of Maryland Baltimore County, Working Paper No. 
10-121), available at http://www.umbc.edu/economics/wpapers/wp_10_121.pdf.  
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perceived potential gain serves as a political advantage for those responsible 
for bringing in these events.  Consequently, the bidding to host these events 
is both competitive and expensive.   
B.  Diplomatic and Political Importance 
In addition to the economic benefits, whether perceived or real, hosting 
international athletic events may increase a nation’s global political 
strength. The role of nationalism in international sports will not disappear 
anytime soon.  Nationalism and political movements were never 
characteristics that were intended to be a part of the Olympic Movement, 
but have made international competition special and have since been 
embraced by the IOC as part of the Olympic Movement.17  Sportsmanship 
and goodwill are no longer the centerpieces of international competition, at 
least as far as sovereign nations are concerned:18  national governments are 
now using these events to exert political pressure for diplomatic or political 
gains.19  
International athletic events have been used to gain both national and 
political recognition, combat human rights problems, foster international 
cooperation, and spread political ideology.20 Unfortunately, national 
governments have abused national pride to advance political agendas. For 
example, the main purpose of international athletic developmental programs 
in the Soviet Union was to ensure that Soviet athletes played a leading role 
internationally and use the success on the playing field to advance the 
communist movement.21 In addition, The Peoples’ Republic of China has 
used international athletics as a means of establishing diplomatic relations 
with other nations.22  
The tipping point of political involvement within international athletic 
events can be seen in the boycotts of the Olympic Games in 1980 and 1984. 
Hosting the 1980 Summer Olympics was extremely important to the 
Soviets, and the Soviet Union saw the selection of Moscow as the host city 
as the IOC’s acceptance of the Soviet Union’s commitment to peace and 
national stability.23 United States President Jimmy Carter was not happy 
about the selection of Moscow as the host city for the 1980 Olympic 
Games, and Carter used the Olympic Games to show his disapproval of the 
  
 17. Barbara O’Neill, International Sports: Have States Succeeded Athletes as the 
Players?, 6 DICK. J. INT’L L. 403, 413 (1988). 
 18. Id. at 405. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 417. 
 21. Id. at 416.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Scott Rosner & Deborah Low, The Efficacy of Olympic Bans and Boycotts on 
Effectuating International Political and Economic Change, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 
27, 46 (2009) 
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Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.24 Four years later, the 1984 
Olympics were held in Los Angeles.25 Consequently, the Soviet Union 
accused the United States organizers of being anti-Soviet and boycotted the 
games.26 Although the Soviet Union claimed that its boycott of the Los 
Angeles games was due to security concerns, it was clear there was a 
political motive behind the action.27  
II.  INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW  
There are many reasons why nations desire to host large international 
sporting events. Pride and intense competition are two aspects that make 
athletics both entertaining and memorable experiences. The competition, 
however, extends far beyond the playing fields. Unfortunately, even in the 
arena of international athletic competition, participants still end up in legal 
disputes. International sports law cannot be easily defined by a set of rules, 
but it can instead be defined as a set of principles, institutions, and 
procedures that are exercised while partaking in international athletic 
activities.28 The law governing these activities is consequently drawn from 
international agreements, customs, generally accepted practices, and judicial 
decisions.29 These influences have been codified in the Olympic Charter, 
which now serves as the foundation for international sports law.30 Because 
soccer is currently an Olympic sport, both FIFA and its member federations 
are bound by the provisions of the Olympic Charter.  
A.   Olympic Movement 
At the heart of the Olympic Charter is the Olympic Movement, which 
aims “to contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating 
youth through sport practised in accordance with Olympism and its 
values.”31 Although the Olympic Charter does not serve as the ultimate 
source of international sports law, it does provide a solid foundation by 
serving as a nucleus for the development of international sports law and sets 
a foundation for managing the legal process.32 There are three main 
constituents of the Olympic Movement: the IOC, IFs, and National Olympic 
Committees.33  
  
 24. Id. at 47. 
 25. Id. at 53. 
 26. Id. at 55.  
 27. Id.   
 28. JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 1 (2d ed. 2004). 
 29. Id. at 1-2. 
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. OLYMPIC CHARTER, Rule 1(2). 
 32. NAFZIGER, supra note 28, at 3.   
 33. OLYMPIC CHARTER, Rule 1(2).  
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1.    Structure of the IOC 
The IOC is the ultimate decision-maker under the Olympic Charter, and 
claims authority over any “organisation belonging in any capacity 
whatsoever to the Olympic Movement.”34 The IOC has taken proactive 
steps toward ensuring the Olympic process is one free of corruption and 
unethical influence. The IOC is officially a non-governmental not-for-profit 
organization that consists of up to 115 members.35 The IOC Executive 
Board resolves disputes relating to the IOC’s application of the Olympic 
Charter or Code of Ethics.36 The IOC’s Executive Board is made up of a 
president, four vice-presidents, and ten other members.37 Members of the 
IOC Executive Board are elected through a secret ballot election by the 
Session38 and are responsible for overseeing the Olympic Charter and 
producing legally binding codes, rulings, norms, guidelines, guides, 
manuals, instructions, requirements and other decisions including, but not 
limited to all regulations necessary to ensure proper implementation of the 
Olympic Charter and proper organization of the Olympic Games.”39   
The Ethics Commission is one of the most important entities created by 
the IOC and aims to retain the integrity of the IOC and Olympic Movement, 
but the commission only has jurisdiction over matters referred by the IOC 
President.40 Although this provision gives the IOC President a potentially 
dangerous amount of discretion over the Ethics Commissions authority, the 
circumstances leading up to its creation should not be overlooked.41 The 
IOC Ethics Commission is independent of the IOC and cannot consist of 
more than four IOC members and must have at least five members that are 
not members of the IOC.42 Members of the commission are appointed by the 
IOC President and confirmed by the Executive Committee.43 Once again, 
the IOC allows its president a substantial amount of authority, but when it 
comes to establishing the Ethics Commission, there is a check on the 
President’s authority.  
  
 34. Id. at Rule 1(4). 
 35. Id. at Rules 15(1), 16(1). 
 36. Id. at Rule 19.  
 37. Id.   
 38. The Session is the general collection of IOC members. 
 39. OLYMPIC CHARTER, Rule 19(3.1). 
 40. INT’L OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, CODE OF ETHICS AND OTHER TEXTS 83-87 (2009), 
available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/Code-Ethique-2009-WebEN.pdf 
 [hereinafter IOC CODE OF ETHICS]. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 133-35. 
 43. Id. 
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2.  Olympic and IF Sovereignty 
International sports organizations enjoy freedom to regulate themselves 
and promulgate their own rules by setting up their own bylaws and 
disciplinary procedures. These organizations are created under the arm of 
private law, and they have placed the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers on themselves.44 IFs have even been able to punish members for 
merely challenging decisions of the IF in a court of law.45 National courts, 
however, still interject their opinions, which has led to a change in 
philosophy by the IOC and IFs.46  
When dealing with these organizations, it can be nearly impossible to 
coordinate the national justice system with IFs and the IOC. This was 
depicted throughout the litigation process of Reynolds v. IAAF and 
surrounding events. Butch Reynolds47 was an American track and field star 
who attempted to resolve his issues with the International Amateur Athletic 
Federation (IAAF) through United States Federal Court, but the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that international sports 
federations must have sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state to 
have jurisdiction, and merely governing athletes located within that state 
does not constitute sufficient contacts.48  
However, the Sixth Circuit improperly interjected its opinion on 
jurisdiction in the case of Butch Reynolds. The Reynolds case had been 
previously arbitrated per the rules governing the IAAF and The Athletic 
Congress.49 The United States is a party to the United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.50 Because 
the U.S. is a party to this treaty, it is binding on the Sixth Circuit,51 and the 
fact that this case had been previously arbitrated should have been the 
deciding factor, not the Sixth Circuit’s opinion on whether there was proper 
jurisdiction. But the Sixth Circuit felt it was necessary to take a much more 
controversial route than was necessary to reach its conclusion.  
  
 44. Andrea Pinna, The Trials and Tribulations of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. 
Contribution to the Study of the Arbitration of Disputes Concerning Disciplinary Sanctions, 
in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004 386, 389 (Ian S. Blackshaw, Robert 
C.R. Siekmann & Janwillem Soek eds., 2006). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 390.   
 47. USATF Athlete Biography: Butch Reynolds, USATF.COM, 
http://www.usatf.org/athletes/bios/TrackAndFieldArchive/2000/reynolds.html (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2012). 
 48. See generally Reynolds v. IAAF, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 49. NAFZIGER, supra note 28, at 75. 
 50. Id. at 78. 
 51. Id.   
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B.  Structure of FIFA 
 FIFA is the international governing body for the sport of soccer. The 
federation is controlled by the Executive Committee which is supposed to 
abide by the standards set forth in the FIFA Code of Ethics and is bound by 
the Olympic Charter. However, it is Committee members’ alleged 
misconduct that has given rise to questions surrounding the ability of 
international sports law to prevent corruption in international sports 
organizations.  
1.  Executive Committee  
The FIFA World Cup’s location is chosen by the FIFA’s Executive 
Committee, which is made up of 24 members: one President elected by the 
congress, eight Vice Presidents, and fifteen members appointed by the 
world’s soccer Confederations and Associations.52 The design of the 
committee makes it impossible for a single geographic region to dominate 
the Executive Committee,53 and consequently, in order for a country’s bid to 
be selected to host the World Cup, requires some sort of majority amongst 
FIFA’s global representatives.  
2.  FIFA Code of Ethics 
FIFA also has a code of ethics, and FIFA’s Executive Committee 
approved the creation of an independent Ethics Committee.54 The FIFA 
Code of Ethics directly addresses the giving and accepting of gifts as well as 
bribery of its members.55 There is not a blanket ban on the acceptance of 
gifts or other benefits from hosts,56 but these gifts must be in accordance 
with cultural norms and customs.57 However, if there is any doubt as to 
whether gifts are not in compliance with the FIFA Code of Ethics, then the 
gifts must be declined.58 Further, cash is never an appropriate gift for a 
FIFA official to accept.59 FIFA officials must always err on the side of 
caution when the exchanging of gifts is involved. However, even with a gift 
  
 52. FIFA STATUTES, Rule 30(1) (2011), available at 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/01/48/60/05/fifastatuten2011_e.pdf. 
 53. Id.   
 54. FIFA CODE OF ETHICS (2009), available at 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/50/02/82/efsdcodeofethics_ 
web.pdf. 
 55. Id. at Rules 10, 11. 
 56. Id. at Rule 10. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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exchanging provision, the FIFA Code of Ethics contains a strict prohibition 
on bribery.60  
The FIFA Code of Ethics also addresses the Ethics Committee’s 
jurisdiction, means of redress, and other responsibilities. The FIFA Code of 
Ethics expressly gives the Ethics Committee the authority to judge all cases 
that fall under the jurisdiction of FIFA, which include those relating to the 
conduct of FIFA officials, confederation officials, and associations.61 FIFA 
also has jurisdiction over national cases that local governing bodies fail to 
prosecute appropriately.62 The discipline for any violations of the FIFA 
Code of Ethics is derived from the FIFA Statutes and the FIFA Disciplinary 
Code.63 Any decision that is made by the Ethics Committee may be 
appealed to the Appeal Committee unless the sanction handed down was a 
warning, reprimand, suspension of less than three matches or of up to two 
months, or a fine of less than CHF 7,500.64 Appeals Committee decisions 
are final but are subject to appeals with the CAS.65  
C.  Subjecting FIFA to the Rules of the IOC 
The Olympic Charter places the burden on IFs to ensure the values that 
are stated in the Olympic Charter are embodied within each individual 
federation.66 Consequently, the IOC has a vested interest in its investigation 
of FIFA. However, the greater question is if FIFA truly cares about the IOC 
or its own duties to the Olympic Charter. The Olympic Charter seems to 
suggest that the IOC has the authority to impose its standards on FIFA, who 
must also submit voluntarily to the IOC’s implied authority. FIFA, however, 
has a larger bargaining chip than other IFs, and appears to be using it to its 
advantage.  
1.  The Olympic Advantage  
Traditionally, IFs use the Olympics as a method to provide a tremendous 
boost for the profiles of their respective sports. This is evidenced by the 
actions taken by the Federation Internationale de Basketball and the 
International Ice Hockey Federation.67 After National Basketball 
  
 60. FIFA CODE OF ETHICS (2009), Rule 11. 
 61. Id. at Rule 15.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at Rule 17. 
 64. Id. at Rule 18. CHF 7,500 is approximately equal to $8, 266 in United States 
currency.  
 65. Id. 
 66. OLYMPIC CHARTER, Rule 27. 
 67. Federation Rule Change Opens Olympics to N.B.A. Players, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 
1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/08/sports/federation-rule-change-opens-olympics-to-
nba-players.html; Joe LaPointe, The N.H.L.’s Olympic Gamble; Stars’ Participation in 
Nagano Could Raise Sport’s Profile, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, 
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Association (NBA) players were allowed to play in the Olympics, the 
NBA’s global awareness grew substantially because of the Dream Team’s68 
performance in the 1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona.69 Prior to the 
1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, National Hockey League (NHL) players 
were not able to participate in the Olympic Games, but the NHL’s 
commissioner, Gary Bettman, was aware of the boom the NBA experienced 
by participating in the Olympic games and wanted to follow the NBA 
model for gathering more exposure.70  In prior Winter Olympics, hockey 
tournament participation was limited to any player that had not played in the 
NHL.71  
Baseball, by contrast, is a sport that has recently lost its Olympic status.72 
Baseball has a characteristic different than basketball and hockey: 
Europeans simply do not have interest in the sport and the majority of 
influence on the IOC is still European.73 Further, In addition to the inability 
of the IOC to secure the participation of Major League Baseball (MLB) 
players for the Olympic baseball tournament, the tournament is formatted in 
a manner that prevents high levels of play because the competition is 
limited by providing automatic qualification to regions or countries that 
have little or no tradition in the sport.74 For example, China started a 
baseball program solely because they were given an automatic bid in the 
2008 Summer Olympics for being the host nation.75 The exclusion of MLB 
players may have been insulting to the IOC. Olympic historian David 
Wallechinsky believes that the IOC was upset with MLB which resulted in 
the exclusion of baseball from future Olympic Games.76  
2.  FIFA’s Olympic Immunity 
The Olympic soccer tournament is limited to mostly younger players still 
trying to establish themselves. National teams may only use players under 
the age of 23, with the exception of three spots available for veterans that 
  
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/16/sports/hockey-nhl-s-olympic-gamble-stars-
participation-nagano-could-raise-sport-s.html. 
 68. The Original Dream Team, NBA ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.nba.com/history/ 
dreamT_moments.html (last visited April 22, 2012). 
 69. LaPointe, supra note 67. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Mark Zuckerman, On Baseball: No Crying Over Olympic Baseball, WASH. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/12/no-use-crying-
over-olympic-baseballs-end. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Strike 3 for Olympic Baseball, CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/09/sportsline/main1300205.shtml. 
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exceed the age limit.77 Although players that meet this qualification 
frequently have tremendous talent, the Olympic competition is more of a 
young stars competition than a true competition between the elite athletes of 
the game.78 If the Olympic soccer tournament was to start tomorrow, there 
is the potential it would have to do so without superstars such as Wayne 
Rooney,79 Landon Donovan,80 Didier Drogba,81 and Lionel Messi.82 Further, 
none of the players that were members of the United States’ 2010 World 
Cup team will be eligible for the 2012 Olympic Games in London.83 
Although three of these players could be added to the roster as one of the 
exempted players, the national teams are still left with an unproven roster. 
Consequently, fans are left to see an Olympic soccer tournament without the 
best players from each country.  
FIFA’s disregard for the Olympics is based purely on the way the 
Olympic soccer tournament is classified by FIFA. In the days leading up to 
the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, three European soccer clubs won 
the right to prevent their players from playing in the Olympic tournament.84 
The CAS took a position in favor of the European clubs because FIFA did 
not include the Olympic tournament on its official match calendar.85 
Although the decision did not affect the eligibility of the players for the 
Olympic tournament,86 it does show that FIFA did not consider the Olympic 
tournament a priority. There does appear to be some accountability being 
demonstrated as the Olympics have been included on the match calendar for 
2012.87  
  
 77. Sam Stern, Olympic Soccer Limits Age, Not Talent, N.Y. SUN (Aug. 5, 2008), 
http://www.nysun.com/sports/olympic-soccer-limits-age-not-talent/83209/ 
 78. Id. 
 79. Wayne Rooney, ESPN.COM, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/player/_/id/21046/ 
Wayne-Rooney?cc=5901 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 80. Landon Donovan, ESPN.COM, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/player/_/id/19107/ 
landon-donovan?cc=5901 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 81. Didier Drogba, ESPN.COM, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/player/_/id/18727? 
cc=5901 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 82. Lionel Messi, ESPN.COM http://soccernet.espn.go.com/player/_/id/45843/lionel-
messi?cc=5901 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 83. 2010 FIFA World Cup Roster, USSOCCER.COM, http://www.ussoccer.com/ 
Tournaments/FIFA-World-Cup/2010-FIFA-World-Cup/Training-Camp-Roster/100526-
Roster.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 84. Stephen Wade, European Soccer Clubs Win Appeal, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2008-08-06-3240442092_x.htm.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Calendar, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/calendar/events.html (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2012).  
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D.  Court of Arbitration Sport 
In addition to the IOC and IF regulation of international sports, the Court 
of Arbitration Sport (CAS) is in place to handle international sports disputes 
through arbitration. The CAS serves as the appellate court for international 
sports disputes. Every year the number of disputes seems to be growing 
exponentially, and the CAS has been continuously evolving through an 
expansion process since its creation.88  
1.  Infancy of the CAS 
The CAS was established in 1983 by the IOC and began work in June of 
1984.89 The first IF to accept the CAS as a supreme arbitrator was the 
International Equestrian Federation.90 But when the independence of the 
CAS was challenged, the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that the CAS was 
independent from IFs.91  
At the inception of the CAS, the IOC had at least the appearance of 
substantial authority over the CAS. First, the IOC was originally responsible 
for the costs of the CAS.92 Also, the combination of the IOC and its 
President had the authority to appoint 30 of the 60 members of the CAS.93 
The combination of these authorities was enough for the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal to declare that the CAS was not independent from the reach of the 
IOC.94 The lack of complete independence from the IOC showed the 
necessity for a change in the structure of the CAS.95  
2.  Reform of the CAS and the Paris Agreement 
The International Conference of Law and Sport was held in 1993 to 
present proposed changes to the CAS.96 The most notable change made 
during this conference was the creation of the International Council of 
Arbitration for Sport (ICAS).97 The ICAS then replaced the IOC as the party 
responsible for overseeing and financing the CAS.98 The CAS was 
  
 88. James A.R. Nafziger, Globalizing Sports Law, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 225, 232 
(1999). 
 89. Mattieu Reeb, The Role and Functions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS), in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004 31, 32 (Ian S. Blackshaw, 
Robert C.R. Siekmann, & Janwillem Soek eds., 2006). 
 90. Id. at 33.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 32-33. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 33-34. 
 95. Reeb, supra note 89, at 33.  
 96. Id. at 34.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
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consequently set up into an ordinary arbitration division and appeals 
arbitration division,99 which changes can be seen in the Code of Sports-
related Arbitration.100 
The proposed changes that were made at the International Conference of 
Law and Sport were agreed to in Paris on June 22, 1994.101 This agreement 
was signed by the “highest authorities” of the international sporting world: 
the IOC, Association of Summer Olympic International Federations 
(ASOIF), Association of International Winter Sports Federations (AIWF), 
and the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC).102 Although 
all arbitration is governed by the Swiss Federal Act on Private International 
Law, the CAS has increased its physical presence around the globe by 
opening offices in the United States and Australia.103 Since this agreement, 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal has not ruled in favor of any appeal that is based 
upon the principle of the CAS’s independence from a sports governing 
body.104  
3.  Current State of the CAS 
The CAS got off to a slow start after its creation, but has since picked up 
steam.105 It was not until the early part of the 2000s that FIFA and the 
International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) decided to make 
the CAS part of their organizational structure.106 Now that FIFA and the 
IAAF have accepted the CAS as their appellate court, these organizations 
make up 30-40% of the caseload for the CAS.107 The decisions by FIFA and 
the IAAF seem to have played a large part in the expansion of the CAS and 
were among major reasons the CAS has evolved into a legitimate 
international legal entity. Another factor that has drastically increased the 
caseload of the CAS is that it was chosen as the arbitrator responsible for 
resolving disputes arising out of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC).108 
The CAS has experienced an increase in responsibility as the sporting world 
looks to it for leadership, and it is apparent that the global community has 
accepted the abilities of the CAS. Today the CAS averages between 250 and 
300 cases every year.109  
  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Reeb, supra note 89, at 34. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 37-38. 
 104. Richard H. McLaren, Twenty-Five Years of the Court of Arbitration Sport: A 
Look in the Rear-View Mirror, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 305, 309 (2010).  
 105. Id. at 315.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 316. 
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It seems that the majority of cases that come before the CAS involve 
doping or drug use110 and a governing body imposing a punishment on an 
individual. This makes the comments of IOC President Jacques Rogge even 
more interesting; Rogge stated, “‘In terms of the champions, there is always 
the threat of doping. In terms of management of sport, there is the threat of 
unethical practices.’”111 This implies that, at least as far as the IOC is 
concerned, the CAS was intended to have the authority to review corruption 
charges based upon the decisions of IFs and the IOC. Because of the 
relationship of the IOC and IFs, this should include all IFs that participate in 
the Olympics. However, Rogge’s statement does not go so far as to allow 
national bodies to challenge IFs or the IOC.  
4.  Overview of CAS Procedures 
In order for a case to even reach the CAS, the appellant must have 
exhausted all possible action within the appropriate governing body.112 
However, once a case makes it before the CAS, the CAS has substantial 
freedom in handling the dispute. According to the CAS code, the CAS panel 
is required to review the facts and legal consequences while making its 
decision.113  
The appeals process consists of two stages: 1) a statement of appeal must 
be submitted to the CAS; and 2) the appellant must substantiate the appeal 
in an appellate brief to the CAS.114 The appellee, coincidentally, responds to 
the appeal in two parts. First, the respondent must appoint an arbitrator if 
one has not been previously agreed to within ten days of receipt of the 
appellant’s petition.115 If the appellee fails to appoint an arbitrator, the 
President of the appropriate CAS division shall make the appointment.116 
Second, the appellee must submit and answer any defense regarding lack of 
jurisdiction and any potential counterclaim within twenty days of the receipt 
of the appeal,117 as well as specify evidence, witnesses, and experts.118 
The arbitration panel has three options when hearing an appeal: uphold 
the decision, replace the decision with its own, or vacate the decision and 
  
 110. See McLaren, supra note 104, at 316-322 for a discussion of the development of 
the jurisprudence of the CAS. 
 111. Jacques Rogge Calls for Corruption Fight, ESPN.COM (May 11, 2011), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/news/story?id=6525565 (quoting Jacques Rogge). 
 112. Christian Krähe, The Appeals Procedure Before the CAS, in THE COURT OF 
ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, at 99 (Ian S. Blackshaw, Robert C.R. Siekmann & 
Janwillem Soek eds., 2006). 
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 115. Id. at 101. 
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 118. Krähe, supra note 112, at 101. 
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remand the case to a lower authority.119 The option to remand the case to a 
lower authority is seldom used because of the lack of efficiency and high 
costs associated with the process.120 The decision of the CASis binding on 
the participating parties.121 In appropriate cases, the CAS may take 
provisional action.122  
5.  Strength of the CAS 
The idea of an independent international tribunal like the CAS is ideal 
for parties in the international community. Unfortunately, these tribunals are 
only as enforceable as the participating parties are willing to accept. 
Consequently, CAS decisions are only enforceable in nations that have 
signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards.123  Every nation that bid for the 2018 and 2022 
World Cups, however, was a party to this agreement.124 Thus, any decision 
that may be handed down by the CAS would be binding on all of the 
participating nations in the bid process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups.  
Awards that are given pursuant to the CAS may only be challenged 
before the Swiss Federal Tribunal.125 But even those challenges are limited 
to challenges on incorrect constitution of the arbitral tribunal, lack of 
jurisdiction, violation of the principle of equal treatment, or incompatibility 
with public policy.126 
6.  Why a CAS? 
There is no flawless plan for an international tribunal. The perfection of 
our own system in the United States can be heavily debated, but there are 
certain advantages to the CAS that cannot be ignored. One of the 
advantages of CAS is the confidentiality the process provides.127 CAS 
proceedings are private, have no public record, and happen without the 
media being informed about the proceedings.128 This may be helpful to 
maintain the public perception of athletes and athletic organizations that are 
wrongfully charged. This can be extremely important for athletes because of 
the public perception that being a cheater creates and the mentality that has 
formed amongst the masses that athletes are guilty of cheating until they are 
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 121. Id. at 103.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Reeb, supra note 89, at 38. 
 124. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
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able to prove they are innocent.129 The interest and amount of litigation in 
sports worldwide has become so great that the mass publication of remote 
cases may cause the loss of interest or faith by the public. However, there 
are instances where the public interest may outweigh the CAS’s obligation 
of confidentiality.130 The CAS is also designed to be a quick process and 
allows flexibility of its procedures in order to maximize its practicality.131 
One of the main goals of the CAS is to provide low cost service to the 
parties without incurring excessive costs.132 The creation of the CAS 
appears to have the interest of fairness being exemplified in sports 
regardless of a party’s financial assets.  
III.  CORRUPTION INVOLVED IN HOSTING THE OLYMPICS AND THE WORLD 
CUP 
Becoming the host for the Olympics is an extremely elaborate process.133 
Hosting international competitions such as the Olympic Games and the 
World Cup is left up to committee elections,134 and the competition for 
selection between host candidates is a high stakes competition. Chicago 
spent an estimated $100 million on its Olympic bid and finished fourth out 
of four in the final vote for the 2016 Olympic Games, losing to Rio de 
Janeiro, Madrid, and Tokyo.135 This is not the type of money that host 
candidates are looking to spend without a belief that they are going to be 
selected to host the event. Because of this intense competition, corruption 
has been a widespread problem in both the Olympics and World Cup.136 
There have been a few memorable recent controversies involving the 
selection of hosts for these prestigious events, including the 2002 Winter 
Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah and the most recent World Cup selections 
of Russia and Qatar.  
A.  Salt Lake City 
Salt Lake City, Utah was awarded the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in 
1995, and three years later a corruption scandal broke in relation to the 
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city’s obtaining of the games.137 Allegations surfaced that members of the 
Salt Lake City Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games had given 
IOC members goods, services, contracts, educational benefits, employment 
of relatives, and as much as $1.2 million in payments to agents of IOC 
membership blocs.138 One example of kickbacks given to a voter was Jean-
Claude Ganga from the Congo Republic: Ganga benefited greatly from the 
Salt Lake City corruption by receiving $300,000 cash, medical treatment, 
travel expenses, doorknobs, and knee replacement surgery for his mother-
in-law.139 Ganga was ultimately forced to resign his from his position with 
the IOC.140 
The election of Salt Lake City to host the 2002 Winter Olympic Games 
is not the only instance of irregularities in host city elections.141 
Irregularities were evident in the selections of Atlanta, Nagano, and 
Sydney.142 Sydney paid IOC members $35,000 apiece to ensure its two vote 
victory over Beijing to host the 2000 Summer Olympic Games.143  
The success and popularity of the 2002 Winter Olympics is enough to 
demonstrate how the Salt Lake City Olympic scandal ended: The games 
stayed in Salt Lake. In fact, the investigation into the allegations revealed a 
complete disregard for the bidding process and the rules governing it for 
several previous Olympic Games.144 The organizers of the Salt Lake bid 
were frustrated by other cities cheating and decided to “play the game.”145  
B.  Olympic Response and Current Standards 
These scandals ultimately prompted amendments to the Olympic Charter 
regarding the Olympic site-selection process, as the IOC adopted a Code of 
Ethics and formed an Ethics Commission to address issues of 
impropriety.146 Rule 22 of the Olympic Charter creates the authority of the 
IOC’s Ethics Commission.147 The Ethical Standards of the IOC are outlined 
in the IOC Code of Ethics. The preamble of the IOC Code of Ethics states: 
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The International Olympic Committee and each of its members, the cities 
wishing to organise the Olympic Games, the Organising Committees of 
the Olympic Games and the National Olympic Committees (“the Olympic 
parties”) restate their commitment to the Olympic Charter and in particular 
its Fundamental Principles. The Olympic parties affirm their loyalty to the 
Olympic ideal inspired by Pierre de Coubertin.  
Consequently, at all times the Olympic parties and, in the framework of 
the Olympic Games, the participants, undertake to respect and ensure 
respect of the present Code and the following principles: Dignity . . . 
Integrity . . . Resources . . . Candidatures . . . Relations with States . . . 
Confidentiality . . . Implementation.148 
All of the IOC’s members are required to behave in a manner that is in 
accordance with the ethical standards of the IOC.149 In addition to those 
standards, the IOC Code of Ethics also outlines the steps that the IOC Ethics 
Commission must take while investigating potential or alleged 
wrongdoing.150 This structure was to lay the foundation for the Olympic 
Movement to maintain its integrity.  
The IOC’s response to the Salt Lake City Scandal may not have been 
enough to deter participants from engaging in unethical behavior. The IOC 
seems to be committed to maintaining a system of protectionism,151 which 
can be seen in the events following the tragic death of a Georgian luger at 
the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver.152 On the opening day of the 
Vancouver Games, a Georgian luger died while on a training run.153 
Following an investigation by the International Luge Federation (FIL), the 
FIL found that there were several interrelated events that had caused the 
tragedy, emphasizing driver error.154 The FIL declined to make 
recommendations to the IOC to increase safety and the IOC declined to 
admit a mistake had been made by leaving exposed metal poles next to the 
track immediately after one of the fastest and most dangerous curves in luge 
history.155 Instead, the IOC stuck to a policy of denial that protects the 
relationships of the IOC and IFs.156 
From a business aspect, the IOC enjoys the freedoms provided by Swiss 
business laws, which are ineffective at governing the IOC as a 
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corporation.157 There are proposed reforms that may ultimately hold the IOC 
and IFs responsible for their business actions.158 Until the reforms are 
passed, however, it will be nearly impossible to regulate these 
organizations.159  
C.  Is History Repeating Itself? 
The Olympic Games are by no means the only events subject to 
corruption. There are also questions surrounding the selection of the 2018 
and 2022 World Cup host nations. FIFA and the IOC are not the same 
organization; however, there is a significant relationship between 
international federations and the International Olympic Committee.160 
Fortunately for FIFA, of the International Federations they are the least 
handicapped by the IOC’s power.161 Most International Federations are 
dependent on the IOC for the promotion of their sports,162 but FIFA’s World 
Cup is just as big as, if not bigger than, the Olympics.   
The IOC announced they are going to investigate claims of corruption in 
FIFA.163 However, the authority to investigate FIFA is only created by the 
relationships between IFs and the IOC. Although the IOC does not have any 
formal authority over FIFA in particular, there is some the IOC may exert 
over individual members and participating federations.164 Because the IOC 
does maintain the ability to supervise its members, it may exert an 
investigation into their actions.165 In this instance, FIFA’s Executive 
Committee President, Joseph S. Blatter (Sepp Blatter) is a member of the 
IOC,166 as well as one of the Vice Presidents of FIFA’s Executive 
Committee, Issa Hayatou are members of both FIFA’s executive committee 
and the IOC.167 
Accusations of corruption within FIFA have since been made during a 
British parliamentary inquiry.168 David Triesman, the former leader of 
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England’s bid for the 2018 FIFA World Cup, told British lawmakers that 
four well-established FIFA officials had requested bribes to secure their 
votes for the host country selection.169 In addition to that incident, British 
lawmakers were also informed via The Sunday Times that two FIFA 
officials, Issa Hayatou and Jacques Anouma, were paid $1.5 million for 
their support of the Qatar bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup.170 These 
two members of FIFA’s Executive Committee were ultimately barred from 
the selection votes of the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups.171 FIFA’s 
secretary general, Jerome Valcke, has since requested all documented 
evidence from the accusing parties,172 and it is up to Valcke to request the 
FIFA ethics court open an official investigation into these allegations.173 It is 
still not clear whether FIFA will conduct a formal investigation.174 
Andrew Jennings is an investigative reporter that has been investigating 
FIFA for several years and gave a special report on corruption within FIFA 
on the British Broadcasting Company’s (BBC) program Panorama.175 In 
addition to outlining recent corruption scandals in FIFA, Jennings suggests 
that the leadership within FIFA does not care about corruption so long as 
the exchange of money is kept private.176 The program also suggested that 
FIFA’s Ethics Committee does not take allegations against FIFA’s senior 
members seriously.177 It is almost as if FIFA’s Ethics Committee was 
implemented to create the illusion that FIFA is concerned about the integrity 
of its organization. Further, FIFA President Sepp Blatter stated in regard to 
ethics investigations that evidence should be “knowledgeable to us, by 
official means, or by official channels, [and] then naturally we would have a 
look on that.”178 FIFA is apparently unwilling to conduct its own 
investigations of its officials: FIFA will only take action if another 
organization that FIFA deems credible exhausts its resources to uncover the 
misdeeds of FIFA’s members. It is unfortunate that national federations do 
not have the ability to stand up to FIFA and are forced to work within the 
questionable system that has been created.179 It is not difficult to see why 
Salt Lake City felt compelled to join the bribery game in order to win its bid 
to host the 2002 Winter Olympics.  
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It appears that, in order to host the FIFA World Cup, national 
governments were required to submit to FIFA’s demands. These demands, 
to FIFA’s displeasure, were published by the Dutch and consisted of the 
suspension of visa rules, the suspension of workers rights, tax exemptions, 
the creation of new laws to protect FIFA’s official sponsors, and a special 
set of rules for FIFA’s access to the host country’s legal system.180 FIFA’s 
demands are harsh. When the Dutch attempted to stand up to FIFA, FIFA 
responded with a strong letter stating they were putting their bid to host the 
FIFA World Cup at risk.181  
One of the biggest examples of FIFA’s questionable practices is 
Guarantee No. 3, which allows FIFA to operate within the host country 
without having to pay any taxes, and forbids the host country from passing 
any laws that levy taxes on FIFA or its subsidiaries.182 This is a very 
detailed scheme that FIFA uses in order to maximize profit, even though 
FIFA claims to be and operate as a not for profit organization.183 These 
demands leave us to wonder which national governments can even adhere to 
these demands, assuming, arguendo, that governments would even want to. 
FIFA is also secretive about the demands it makes. A senior member of the 
United Kingdom’s Parliament requested to see to what the nation would be 
agreeing, but he was told that the guarantees were confidential184—
apparently so confidential that the people responsible for the guarantees 
were not privileged enough to see them. Democratic nations would have a 
difficult time making these guarantees because of the secrecy FIFA 
requires. Observers of FIFA’s requirements are left to wonder what the 
bigger purpose is behind secretive demands and if these demands are 
designed to make it easier for some countries to have more attractive bids 
than others.185  
It would be easy for analysts to shrug off accusations of corruption 
during the selection processes of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups by 
countries who had losing bids. However, there have already been several 
instances where FIFA officials have been suspended because their 
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involvement in bribery and corruption was caught by the media.186 For 
example, FIFA official Amadou Diakite was suspended for two years 
because he allegedly told reporters posing as bid lobbyists that Qatar bid 
officials had offered $1 million to FIFA leaders from Africa.187 Also, 
Nigeria’s Amos Adamu was suspended for three years for soliciting 
bribes,188 and Togo’s Ahongalu Fusimalohi was suspended two years for 
advising the media how to bribe FIFA officials.189 The multiple instances of 
caught corruption should lead a reasonable person to believe there may be 
more, they just have yet to be caught. 
IV.  ELIMINATING THE PROBLEM 
The lack of authority demonstrated in Reynolds of a national court 
system to resolve disputes involving the IOC and IFs puts people subjected 
to the IOC’s and IFs’ internal rules in a precarious position because there is 
limited recourse for people to make claims against them.190 Also, depending 
on which national governments have allowed themselves to have 
jurisdiction over the IOC or IFs could create a hostile and unnecessary game 
of international politics. It is also unrealistic to expect the IOC or an IF to 
criticize itself and create remedies to correct its own wrongdoing.191 
Consequently, the IOC and IFs are left to exert minimally-checked authority 
over people within the IOC and IFs’ respective sports.  
Although the power reserved by the IOC and IFs has minimal oversight, 
these international sports governing bodies no longer consider themselves to 
be completely immune to national judicial systems and no longer expressly 
prohibit appeals to national courts, accepting, in theory, the competence of 
national court systems.192 However, the IOC and IFs that confer judicial 
power on themselves have taken the approach of using independent 
arbitration.193 By conferring this authority to independent arbitration bodies, 
international sports governing bodies have been able, for practical purposes, 
to eliminate the opinions of national courts to resolve disputes revolving 
around international athletic competition.194  
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The CAS has recently become involved in the corruption scandal that is 
surrounding FIFA. Three suspensions of FIFA officials are currently being 
appealed,195 but CAS has not yet set a date to hear any of these appeals.196 In 
addition to the action pending before the CAS, FIFA president Sepp Blatter 
has expressed his interest in making FIFA as legitimate a governing body as 
possible. Blatter has instituted the idea of zero-tolerance for corruption as a 
platform for his reelection as president of soccer’s governing body.197 
Although no action has yet been taken with respect to England’s allegations 
regarding the 2018 FIFA World Cup, it is now apparent that FIFA will at 
least talk to the whistleblower about the allegations of buying votes for 
Qatar’s bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup.198 Blatter would not specify what 
actions would be taken, but suggested that the Executive Committee-
controlled Ethics Commission could be invoked and even left open the 
chance of reopening the election of a host nation for the 2022 FIFA World 
Cup.199 However, in light of the previous leadership provided by Sepp 
Blatter, it is not clear how genuine this policy is. The policy cannot and 
should not be viewed as anything more than a campaign promise during 
Blatter’s campaign to be reelected FIFA’s president.  
Since its creation, the CAS is gradually assuming a more prominent role 
in resolving international sports disputes. National federations have even 
begun to use the CAS as their highest level of appeal in lieu of their own 
national judicial system.200 The important thing now is for the CAS to 
continue to grow. It may be necessary for the CAS to take on some 
prosecutorial duties, but the CAS, like the ethics commissions of IFs, relies 
on the IOC and IFs for its authority201 and will unlikely be given the 
authority to tackle improper actions by IOC and IF officials. However, IF 
officials may be susceptible to CAS action if action is first taken by the 
IOC.  
There is now a similar situation to what happened surrounding the 2002 
Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City. In the situation currently 
evolving between the IOC and FIFA, there is no incentive for FIFA to 
legitimately concern itself with the IOC’s investigation. FIFA has 
demonstrated that the Olympics and the IOC are not its principal concerns. 
FIFA shows complete disregard for how international law has developed or 
the structure of the IF and IOC relationship. The economic viability of FIFA 
is not dependent on the IOC like the majority of IFs are, and this allows 
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FIFA to act as an independent body equal to that of the IOC. If the CAS was 
able to assume a prosecutorial role with the backing of the international 
community (governments, national federations, and national olympic 
committees), it may be able to apply adequate pressure and backing to force 
FIFA and the IOC into cleaning up their organizations and proving they are 
run without outside and improper influences. However, this is dependent on 
the International Community joining together, and sporting disputes are 
rarely the main concerns of world leaders.  
The decisions of the CAS are only enforceable because international 
sporting organizations have submitted to its use. Even though the Federal 
Swiss Tribunal has ruled that the CAS is independent of IFs and the IOC, 
the CAS would cease to exist without the submission of these organizations 
to its authority. Therefore, although the CAS may be structurally 
independent, its existence is entirely dependent and consequently checked 
by IFs and the IOC. The CAS cannot be seen as a tribunal that does not 
have an interest in the proceedings that come before it.  
There does not seem to be an easy fix to problems facing the 
international sporting community. The global problems affected by the legal 
interactions between FIFA, the IOC, and the CAS are not a matter of life 
and death. Consequently, they will not necessarily get nor deserve the 
attention of our global leaders. We may be stuck with the system that we 
have and forced to rely on public pressure and private investigations to 
expose improper actions taken by these organizations.  
The best hope for reform is for the media to keep shining light on these 
organizations and for national federations to band together and stand up for 
themselves. The British have appeared to be the leaders in both of these 
instances. The British media is responsible for bringing many of the most 
recent facts to the public, and England has even discussed leaving FIFA, 
though it has since decided against it.202 Though leaving FIFA may be an 
extreme and unreasonable solution, organizing National Federations and 
National Olympic Committees may be the best way to create genuine 
change and purify the host site selection process. Without the support of 
national bodies, their international counterparts will lose all importance.  
It is not unprecedented for parties involved in highly publicized 
international competition to participate in such collective action. The fight 
against doping in sport has required collective action from a variety of 
interested parties.203 Although this is more of an example of the IFs from 
different sports banding to together to create a common body,204 it serves as 
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proof that federations can work together toward reaching a goal or, as in this 
case, eliminating a problem from their sport. This has been an efficient 
method of solving issues in the past and could effectively be called upon 
again.  
The latest corruption scandal in FIFA may also have served as a turning 
point for the Swiss legislature. There is currently an initiative sponsored by 
Carlo Sommaruga, a Geneva-based lawmaker and member of the Swiss 
Socialist Party, which will make bribery of individuals a criminal offense.205 
However, it remains to be seen whether both houses in the Swiss Parliament 
view this as a significant problem.206 Under Swiss law,207 prosecutors have 
no legal authority to investigate bribery in sporting organizations.208 This 
gives these organizations the freedom to operate as they wish and may even 
be a contributing factor in the selection of Switzerland as a headquarters.  
CONCLUSION  
 Selecting hosts for the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics is an important 
and competitive process. However, like the competition within the field of 
play, it is important that the spirit of international competition be 
exemplified throughout the selection process. It may not always be possible 
to count on an international sports law system to protect the interests of all 
parties. In addition to the media’s role of shining the spotlight on 
organizations such as the IOC and FIFA, it is imperative for participants and 
national organizations to stand up for themselves. These are the groups that 
make up international sports and should be able to hold their representative 
International Federations accountable for their actions. Also, it seems that 
those that host these organizations are beginning to get tired of being taken 
advantage of and may also begin to hold international sporting 
organizations accountable for their actions. Ultimately, there does not 
appear to be one single solution to the problem at hand, but maximizing 
transparency and not blindly following International Federations will create 
the fairest host site selection process.  
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